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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis explores the practices and perceptions of the courts and professionals in 
child contact proceedings where domestic violence is an issue and the implications 
of this for mothers, with particular reference to Practice Direction 12J which 
establishes the framework for best practice to be followed in such proceedings. In-
depth interviews were undertaken with 29 family lawyers and Cafcass officers 
covering a broad geographic and demographic area, and the reported cases to which 
the Practice Direction applies were reviewed. The resulting data were analysed 
utilising discourse analytic and qualitative approaches, drawing on a feminist 
poststructuralist approach and also insights from autopoietic theory. It was found 
that the ‘presumption of contact’ and an acontextual, legalistic approach to domestic 
violence reinforce each other and have a powerful normative influence on 
professional and judicial perceptions and practices. Dominant parental subjectivities 
of ‘implacably hostile mothers’ and ‘safe family men’ continue to resonate with 
many courts and professionals, who  focus on promoting contact rather than 
safeguarding mothers and children. Despite more judges and professionals gaining a 
broader understanding of the coercively controlling nature of domestic violence, 
only recent, very severe physical violence warrants the holding of fact-finding 
hearings on disputed allegations and provides sufficiently ‘cogent’ reasons for family 
lawyers to support mothers in opposing contact and for courts to refuse contact. The 
notion that domestic violence is morally reprehensible and a significant failure in 
parenting, and that women’s desires for safety, wellbeing and autonomy are morally 
legitimate, finds very little expression. This study concludes that in order to regain a 
valid and authoritative voice for women in current family law we need to expose and 
disrupt law’s construction of the ‘scientific truth’ about children’s welfare, the 
dominant parental subjectivities to which it gives rise, and the ‘safe haven’ of law’s 
ideal post-separation family. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis explores the practices and perceptions of the courts and professionals 
when applying Practice Direction 12J in relation to child contact proceedings, and 
the implications of these practices and perceptions for women involved in contact 
disputes where domestic violence is an issue. 
 
Practice Direction 12J
1
 [‘the Practice Direction’] was issued by the President of the 
Family Division in May 2008 in response to concerns expressed by the Family 
Justice Council that the safety of children and resident parents (usually mothers) was 
being put at risk in contact proceedings. Courts and professionals were downgrading 
or ignoring domestic violence in their drive to promote contact between children and 
non-resident fathers.
2
 The Family Justice Council called for a “cultural shift” in the 
approach of courts and professionals away from pursuing contact “at all costs”, 
towards promoting contact when it is “safe and positive for the child”,3 and also for 
recognition that domestic violence constitutes a “significant failure in parenting”.4 It 
was hoped that the Practice Direction would provide the vehicle for effecting that 
cultural transformation. The Practice Direction establishes the framework for best 
practice to be followed by courts and professionals in terms of scrutinising proposed 
consent orders, proving domestic violence, assessing risk, ensuring the safety of 
children and resident parents both prior to and after domestic violence has been 
proved or admitted, and determining whether contact may benefit the child.  
 
The Practice Direction was not the first judicial attempt at encouraging the family 
courts and professionals to take domestic violence seriously in private law Children 
Act proceedings. Research undertaken in the 1990s, which inquired into the 
implications for women and children of continued contact with violent fathers, found 
that the practices and perceptions of professionals were both influenced by, and 
reinforced, the ideological separation of contact and domestic violence, with serious 
                                                 
1
 Potter P, Practice Direction: Residence and Contact Orders: Domestic Violence and Harm [2008] 2 
FLR 103, reissued on 14
th
 January 2009 at [2009] 2 FLR 1400 
2
 This study explicitly refers to ‘mothers’ and ‘fathers’ as opposed to the gender-neutral term, 
‘parents’, which works to conceal the gendered operation and effect of current family law. 
3
 Jane Craig, ‘Everybody’s Business: Applications for Contact Orders by Consent’ (2007) 37 Family 
Law 26, 27 
4
 ibid 30 
2 
 
consequences for mothers and children.
5
 This research led to ‘good practice’ 
guidelines issued by the Children Act Sub-Committee of the Advisory Board on 
Family Law [the ‘CASC’]6 in 2000 as well as guidelines laid down by the Court of 
Appeal in the combined appeals in Re L, V, M, H [‘Re L’] .7 However, subsequent 
research and case law revealed that many courts and professionals disregarded these 
guidelines and continued to promote contact by minimising, trivialising or ignoring 
women’s concerns about continued contact with violent fathers. This raises questions 
about why contact between children and violent fathers is seen as not only 
permissible but positively desirable and why it is so hard for women to oppose such 
contact. These are questions that this study seeks to answer. 
 
This project is the first in-depth, national study into the operation and effect of the 
Practice Direction. It provides a unique exploration of whether the practices and 
perceptions of courts and professionals reveal any transformation in the discursive 
and ideological terrain of current family law since the implementation of the Practice 
Direction, and whether there has been any change in the ability of women involved 
in contact proceedings to obtain protection and autonomy from violent fathers. In so 
doing, this project aims to benefit the women who are so harshly disciplined and 
regulated by current family law, and to contribute to a broader tradition of feminist 
legal scholarship that seeks to deconstruct and transform the patriarchal relations of 
power that inform family law in England and Wales, and to illuminate the 
possibilities for, and limitations on, articulating a feminine subject with a valid and 
authoritative voice and knowledge.  
 
It should be noted that during the course of undertaking this PhD, other studies 
emerged on this topic. National survey research was undertaken for the Family 
Justice Council into fact-finding hearings and the implementation of the Practice 
                                                 
5
 Marianne Hester and Lorraine Radford, Domestic Violence and Child Contact Arrangements in 
England and Denmark (The Polity Press 1996); Marianne Hester, Chris Pearson and Lorraine 
Radford, Domestic Violence: A National Survey of Child Welfare and Voluntary Sector Mediation 
Practice (The Polity Press 1997); Leslie Anderson, Contact between Children and Violent Fathers 
(Rights of Women 1997) 
6
 Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Board on Family Law, Children Act Sub-Committee, Report to the 
Lord Chancellor on the Question of Parental Contact in Cases where there is Domestic Violence 
(TSO 2000) 
7
 Re L, V, M, H (Contact: Domestic Violence) [2000] 4 All ER 609, [2000] 2 FLR 334, CA 
3 
 
Direction, which gathered quantitative (and some qualitative) data.
8
 Additionally, 
London-based research was undertaken by Rights of Women, comprising interviews 
with women involved in contact proceedings and a survey of legal professionals.
9
 
The data from these studies were of assistance in enhancing the findings of this 
project. 
 
Research methods that would facilitate an in-depth investigation of the perceptions 
and practices of professionals operating in the family justice system, as well as an 
exploration of the way in which the lower and appellate courts apply the Practice 
Direction, best suited the subject of this study. Accordingly, empirical research in the 
form of in-depth interviews with legal and child welfare professionals as well as a 
review and analysis of the relevant case law was undertaken, to provide rich, original 
texts. The resulting data were analysed within a theoretical framework informed by a 
poststructuralist feminist approach as well as insights from ‘autopoietic’ or ‘systems’ 
theory. These perspectives provide a productive framework for exploring the world 
constructed in and by current family law, how meanings are represented and 
produced, and the consequences of those representations and meanings for judicial 
and professional practice and consequently for the women and children who are 
subjected to those practices. 
 
Overview of chapters 
This thesis is presented in eight chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the research 
methodology and the specific methods employed. The chapter commences with an 
explanation of the theoretical perspectives that inform this study. A poststructuralist 
feminist approach enables us to explore the extent to which professional and judicial 
perceptions and practices are informed by and reinforce dominant discourses that 
structure child contact proceedings. This approach also enables us to examine what 
the possibilities are for transforming patriarchal power relations so that suppressed or 
oppositional meanings can emerge and gain authority. Insights from autopoietic 
theory, which explains the contingent nature of societal communications, are very 
                                                 
8
  Rosemary Hunter and Adrienne Barnett, Fact-Finding Hearings and the Implementation of the 
President’s Practice Direction: Residence and Contact Orders: Domestic Violence and Harm 
(Family Justice Council 2013) www.familyjusticecouncil.org.uk, last accessed 12.11.13 
9
 Maddy Coy, Katherine Perks, Emma Scott and Ruth Tweedale, Picking up the pieces: domestic 
violence and child contact (Rights of Women 2012) 
4 
 
useful in explaining how particular assumptions about children’s best interests and 
dominant understandings of domestic violence have been constructed and sustained, 
and enable us to acknowledge and confront the complexities of modern society and 
the possibilities for, and limitations on social change.   
 
Chapter 1 then discusses the methodological approaches that best suit these 
theoretical perspectives and the research question. These are a combination of 
discourse analytic and qualitative approaches, as well as the strategic use of a 
quantitative approach. The chosen research methods that were considered most 
appropriate to the subject matter and methodology of the study were: 
 a review and analysis of all reported cases relevant to the operation of the 
Practice Direction 
 a review of selected case records held by county courts and Family 
Proceedings Courts in five HMCS regions. However despite a lengthy and 
exhaustive application process which is described in Chapter 1, it was not 
possible to undertake the review of court records or to interview judicial 
officers because the requisite permissions were not obtained 
 in-depth interviews with judicial officers, barristers, solicitors and Cafcass 
officers.  
 a national survey of judicial officers and professionals. It was not necessary 
to undertake survey research because the findings of the FJC research 
undertaken by Hunter and Barnett became available during the course of this 
study.
10
 
 
The review of reported cases and the interviews with professionals comprised the 
empirical component of this study. Chapter 1 explains how the interviews were 
piloted, the sampling strategy and method for selecting participants, and the 
interview process. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with a total of 29 
participants covering a diverse geographical and demographic area. Finally, Chapter 
1 describes how the data obtained from the interviews and the review of reported 
cases were analysed thematically, utilising discourse analytic and qualitative 
approaches. 
                                                 
10
 Hunter and Barnett (n 8) 
5 
 
Chapter 2 explores legal constructions of children and parents, and in particular how 
law has selectively constructed a dominant model of children’s welfare that 
constitutes contact between children and non-resident fathers as essential for 
children’s emotional, psychological and developmental welfare. A review of the case 
law and academic research and literature reveals the increasing importance ascribed 
to post-separation contact by courts and professionals. This has been reinforced by 
political discourses and ideologies of the equal, democratic family that seek to 
reinstate the father in the post-separation family by portraying father-absence as 
detrimental to both children and society and rendering invisible the work involved in 
caring for children and sustaining post-separation contact. The case law and 
literature show that an important ideological effect of these familial discourses is the 
construction of the gendered subjectivities of ‘implacably hostile mothers’ and ‘safe 
family men’ which have increasingly structured professional practice and legal 
decision-making in private law Children Act proceedings. As a consequence, any 
attempt by women to restrict or oppose contact is seen as irrational, pathological, 
selfish or vengeful, generating a harsh response from courts and professionals.  
 
Chapter 3 examines how the presumption of contact worked to erase men’s violence 
against women in legal discourses concerning the family so that contact between 
children and violent fathers came to be actively encouraged by law, despite 
successful attempts in other legal domains to deal more effectively with violence 
against women. The case law and research prior to Re L reveal that domestic 
violence was systematically effaced from political, legal and professional discourses 
concerning the post-separation family even where there was known or suspected 
domestic violence. Domestic violence was minimised by courts and professionals 
and seen as irrelevant to contact. Efforts of professionals were focused on persuading 
mothers to co-operate and agree to contact rather than on the father’s behaviour or on 
women’s and children’s safety, often resulting in unsafe contact arrangements.  
 
The case law and research following Re L show that the guidelines were “more 
honoured in the breach than the observance” as they were inconsistently applied by 
the lower courts and frequently disregarded.
11
 In particular, one of the principal 
                                                 
11
 Craig (n 3) 29 
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recommendations of the Court of Appeal and the CASC – that preliminary fact-
finding hearings should be held on disputed allegations of domestic violence – was 
often ignored principally because domestic violence was not seen as relevant to 
contact. Courts and professionals continued to minimise or neutralise domestic 
violence, and women who raised allegations of domestic violence continued to be 
treated with suspicion, disbelieved, and regarded as obstructive. Risk was rarely 
assessed and courts rarely refused to order contact. Mothers continued to be 
pressurised into agreeing to unsafe contact arrangements, and proposed consent 
orders were rarely scrutinised by courts. It was as a consequence of the research 
discussed in this chapter that Practice Direction 12J was issued, which embodies the 
CASC and Re L Guidelines.  
 
Chapters 4 to 7 present an analysis and discussion of the data obtained from the 
empirical research. The findings from both the interviews and the review of the case 
law are analysed and discussed together in order to present a cohesive picture of the 
perceptions and practices of judicial officers and professionals in applying the 
Practice Direction. Additionally, the findings of contemporaneous research on the 
application of the Practice Direction were incorporated into the analysis and 
discussion.  
 
Chapter 4 explores the way in which professionals and judicial officers understand 
domestic violence, their views on the merits of post-separation contact and on the 
relevance of domestic violence to contact, and their attitudes towards mothers and 
fathers. The interviews and case law, together with other research, demonstrate how 
the presumption of contact and an acontextual approach to domestic violence 
reinforce each other, resulting in the conceptual separation of the father’s conduct 
from his parenting practices. While a significant proportion of family lawyers and 
Cafcass officers have a broad and insightful theoretical understanding of domestic 
violence and some professionals and judicial officers understand its coercive, 
controlling nature, many judges and family lawyers apply a narrow, legalistic 
approach to domestic violence. It was found that nearly all professionals fully 
endorsed the ‘presumption of contact’, which has had the effect of narrowing the 
range of behaviours that may be construed as providing ‘cogent reasons’ to deny 
children the benefits of contact and has meant that their broad theoretical insights 
7 
 
into the nature and effects of domestic violence did not necessarily translate into 
practice. Only recent, ‘severe’ physical violence was seen as ‘relevant’ to contact 
and ‘historic incidents’ of abuse were considered completely irrelevant.  
 
Most interview participants did not see mothers as deliberately malicious and hostile 
to contact, and some acknowledged the extent to which many women support post-
separation contact. However, for significant numbers of professionals and judges, 
women’s fears of domestic violence in all but the most extreme circumstances may 
be met with suspicion, and their concerns for their own safety, well-being and 
autonomy may be seen as expressions of self-interest. Professional and judicial 
attitudes towards mothers contrast sharply with their attitudes towards fathers. 
Family lawyers and judges appear to be very reluctant to perceive fathers in a 
negative light or to impute suspect motives to fathers seeking contact, accepting 
expressions of ‘genuine’ motivation at face value. 
 
Chapter 5 considers whether there has been any change in the extent to which unsafe 
agreements are negotiated by professionals and sanctioned by courts as a 
consequence of pressure put on mothers to compromise and agree to contact. It was 
found that the majority of family lawyers continue to advise mothers to agree to 
contact using various strategies ranging from ‘advice’ on the courts’ approach to 
contact, to more forceful coercion. Further pressure on mothers and on their 
representatives may come from the father’s representatives, the court and Cafcass 
officers, who may themselves be bullied into recommending contact. However, a 
minority of family lawyers and Cafcass officers have a much greater appreciation of, 
and concern about the pressures that can be put on resident mothers to agree to 
unsafe contact. These family lawyers try to avoid replicating the perpetrator’s 
behaviour when representing mothers, and make concerted efforts to stand up for 
their clients. The extent to which judges and magistrates scrutinise proposed consent 
orders seems to vary widely, with some judges being reluctant to go on a ‘fishing 
expedition’ in case the agreement ‘unravels’. It also appears that a great deal of 
‘rubber-stamping’ of consent orders still happens. Cafcass officers may need to be 
very robust if they have concerns about agreements that have, or are about to be, 
made as lawyers and judges may not only ignore their concerns and advice but 
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actively avoid their involvement in cases in order to drive through agreements for 
contact.  
 
Chapter 6 examines preliminary fact-finding hearings, including the willingness of 
professionals to request them and of courts to hold them. It examines also the 
circumstances in which they may be held and the reasons why courts may refuse to 
list them, what happens to disputed allegations of domestic violence if they are not 
held, and participants’ views on fact-finding hearings. The findings of this study are 
strongly indicative of an increase in the numbers of fact-finding hearings held 
following implementation of the Practice Direction in May 2008, with a subsequent 
‘backlash’ following The President’s Guidance in Relation to Split Hearings in 
2010,
12
 and a wide variation in the extent to which different judges and courts are 
likely to direct fact-finding hearings. The narrow, incident-based approach to 
domestic violence, together with professional and judicial perceptions of the 
relevance of domestic violence to contact mean that fact-finding hearings are usually 
restricted to cases involving incidents of recent, severe physical violence. If 
preliminary fact-finding hearings are not held, it appears that ‘composite’ final 
hearings are not very common, which suggests that many disputed allegations may 
be disregarded altogether.  
 
Chapter 6 also explores the way in which evidence and findings of fact are 
constructed in and by family law and in particular, the heavy burden on the mother to 
prove her allegations as a consequence of the operation of the burden of proof and 
dominant familial discourses. This can mean that the uncorroborated oral testimony 
of the mother may be viewed with suspicion and discounted as not being ‘real’ 
evidence. Additionally, the consequences of law’s selective construction of ‘reality’, 
and the potential for a judge’s decision to be considered ‘unjust’ is discussed, 
including participants’ concerns about the harsh consequences for mothers and 
children of law ‘getting it wrong’.  
 
Chapter 7 discusses assessment of risk and of the broader ‘welfare’ factors 
prescribed by the Practice Direction, as well as interim and final orders and 
                                                 
12
 Wall P, The President’s Guidance in Relation to Split Hearings [2010] 2 FLR 1897 
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interventions for perpetrators. There appears to be a mixed approach by courts and 
professionals to the issue of interim contact, with courts being most likely to resolve 
the problem of the ‘dangerous unknown’ by relying on the ‘status quo’. While a 
small minority of family lawyers would strongly support mothers who oppose direct 
contact pending fact-finding hearings, most appear to start from the premise that 
some direct contact will and should take place, so mothers may have to be very 
forceful and tenacious to resist the pressure from their own representatives. If 
domestic violence is proved, it seems that the ‘risk’ posed by the father is most 
frequently determined by his ability to accept the findings made against him. 
Although most fathers appear to be ‘high risk’ because they refuse to accept the 
findings, direct contact is nevertheless the most likely outcome in such cases. 
Pressure on mothers by family lawyers to agree to contact unless very severe 
physical violence has been proved, and the reluctance of many judges to accept that 
an abusive father is motivated by anything other than a desire to see the child, may 
contribute to these outcomes.  
 
Chapter 7 also explores the way in which contact could be ‘made safe’ in the interim 
and where domestic violence is proven, including the preference of courts and 
professionals for contact centres as the ‘solution’ to the problem of making contact 
safe. It appears, however, that in the absence of resources for supervised or 
supported contact, courts and professionals may resort to the nebulous support of 
family or friends, or the mother being left to cope directly with the father in a ‘public 
place’. Finally, participants’ views on interventions for perpetrators are discussed 
and in particular, the over-use of anger management, which some courts and 
professionals confuse with Domestic Violence Perpetrator Programmes [‘DVPPs’], 
or consider to be an appropriate intervention. Alternatively, anger management and 
other inappropriate resources may be used if DVPP provision is unavailable on the 
basis that ‘something is better than nothing’. 
 
This thesis concludes, in Chapter 8, that the strong belief of most judicial officers 
and professionals in the benefits of contact reinforces the narrow, incident-based 
approach to domestic violence and has a powerful normative influence on 
professional and judicial perceptions and practices in contact proceedings where 
domestic violence is an issue. The ambit of when and how domestic violence is 
10 
 
relevant to contact has grown increasingly narrow, and the focus of many courts and 
professionals is still on promoting contact rather than safeguarding mothers and 
children. Dominant parental subjectivities of ‘implacably hostile mothers’ and ‘safe 
family men’ marginalise other subject positions and have important implications for 
the way in which courts and professionals respond to mothers who oppose contact 
and to fathers who perpetrate domestic violence. The notion that domestic violence 
is morally reprehensible and a significant failure in parenting, and that women’s 
desire for safety, wellbeing and autonomy is morally legitimate, finds very little 
expression in current family law. 
 
However, this study also concludes that seeking to regain a valid and authoritative 
voice for women in current family law is not a futile exercise. The fact that some 
judges and professionals have started to demonstrate a broader understanding of the 
coercively controlling nature of domestic violence and its implications for contact 
demonstrates that dominant meanings are not immutable or inevitable and indicates 
the powerful potential of oppositional discourses. While this thesis acknowledges 
that we cannot ‘use’ law to solve social problems, it is nevertheless important for 
oppositional discourses to play a strategic role in maintaining control over the 
direction of law reform. With this in mind, a number of practical recommendations 
are discussed in Chapter 8, including amendment of the Children Act 1989, revision 
of the Practice Direction, training for judicial officers and family lawyers, and 
further research into the way in which litigants in person are managing fact-finding 
hearings. Most importantly, in order to transform the prevailing discursive order and 
create a valid, legitimate voice for mothers, we need to expose and disrupt ‘the 
welfare of the child’ as a mechanism of power and the dominant parental 
subjectivities to which it gives rise, as well as the ‘safe haven’ of law’s ideal family. 
It is hoped that this study makes a contribution to that transformative process.  
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CHAPTER 1   
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This study combined discourse analytic and qualitative approaches, using primarily 
qualitative data gathering methods, namely, a review of cases reported after the 
implementation of the Practice Direction and in-depth interviews with professionals 
(barristers, solicitors and Family Court Advisors employed by Cafcass).  
 
The research methodology of this study will be discussed under the following heads: 
 the theoretical perspectives informing this study 
 choice of methodological approaches 
- a discourse analytic approach 
- a qualitative approach 
- a quantitative approach 
- feminist approaches to research 
 combining methodological approaches 
 operationalising the concepts in the research question 
 the advantages and disadvantages of the methods potentially available for use 
in this project 
 conducting the research, including a consideration of sampling design and 
procedure and the research tools used 
 ethical issues 
 methods of data analysis 
 
2. The theoretical perspectives informing this study 
2.1 Introduction 
It is important for the researcher to make the theoretical assumptions upon which 
empirical work is based explicit, as “it is clear that theory is inseparable from the 
research process”.1 This study places itself within a theoretical framework that aims 
to deconstruct legal and professional discourses informing current family law by 
                                                 
1
 Mary Seneviratne,  ‘Researching Ombudsmen’ in Reza Banakar and Max Travers (eds), Theory and 
Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart 2005) 173 
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drawing on feminist, poststructural perspectives,
2
 as well as perspectives from 
autopoietic, or ‘systems’, theory. These theoretical approaches enable us to explore 
the complexities of the social system within and through which the processes of the 
regulation of women in and by current family law take place, the difficulties for 
women and children in obtaining protection from violent fathers in contact 
proceedings, and the possibilities for, and limitations on, articulating a feminine 
subject with a valid voice and knowledge. These perspectives are also of immense 
utility in deconstructing and analysing the way in which courts and professionals 
constitute parents and children in contact proceedings in which domestic violence is 
an issue, and illuminating the harsh, disciplinary effects on mothers of those 
discursively constructed subjectivities. 
 
What post-structural feminist and ‘systems’ theories share is a rejection of modernist, 
interpretive principles, where individuals are seen as the primary sources of social 
meanings, and where ‘true’ and certain knowledge is considered possible.3 At the 
core of feminist post-structuralist ideas and, it is suggested, Luhmannian thought, “is 
the crucial insight that there is no one truth, no one authority, no one objective 
method which leads to the production of pure knowledge.”4 We can thus see the 
phenomenal world – the world that has meaning for us – as wholly constructed and 
recognise that the unknown, the indecipherable, itself has meaning.
5
 This does not 
mean that the environment – the world ‘out there’ – does not exist and is simply an 
invention of discourse or of social systems. What it does mean is that the meanings 
and perceptions by which we understand that world are structured through discourse, 
or, in autopoietic terms, through social systems’ internal constructs of the external 
world.
6
 This helps us understand how professionals and courts construct and 
                                                 
2
 For similar treatments, see Rebecca Morley and Audrey Mullender, ‘Domestic Violence and 
Children: What do we Know from Research?’ in Audrey Mullender and Rebecca Morley (eds), 
Children Living with Domestic Violence (Whiting and Birch 1994);  Carol Smart, ‘The Legal and 
Moral Ordering of Child Custody’ (1991) 18(4) Journal of Law and Society 485;  Susan Boyd, ‘Is 
there an Ideology of Motherhood in (Post)Modern Child Custody Law?’ (1996) 5(4) Social and Legal 
Studies 495 
3
 See Reza Banakar and Max Travers, ‘Ethnograpy and Law’ in Banakar and Travers (n 1); John 
Patterson, ‘Trans-Science, Trans-law and Proceduralisation’ (2003) 12 Social and Legal Studies 525 
4
 Shulamit Reinharz, Feminist Methods in Social Research (OUP 1991) 7. See also Michael King, 
‘What’s the Use of Luhmann’s Theory?’ in Michael King and Chris Thornhill (eds), Luhmann on 
Law and Politics (Hart 2006) 41 
5
 See Michael King,  A Better World for Children  (Routledge1997) 189 
6
 John Patterson and Gunther Teubner, ‘Changing Maps: Empirical Legal Autopoiesis’ in Banakar 
and Travers (n 1) 235 
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interpret concepts such as ‘the family’, children’s welfare, and gendered violence in 
current family law. 
 
These perspectives recognise that data, like meaning, are constructed, not 
‘discovered’, and reject the purely positivist notion of scientific objectivity, 
including the privileging of ‘scientific’ research, which has been criticised for 
perpetuating patriarchal power relations, and the silencing of women’s voices.7 In 
doing so it rejects the ‘problem-solving’ model of research which assumes that 
research “provides empirical evidence and conclusions that help to solve a policy 
problem.”8 
 
A number of commentators have noted that “despite apparent differences, Luhmann 
and Foucault may be confronted productively with each other.”9 Borch points to 
their “similar epistemological-analytical perspectives – on difference rather than 
identity, on second-order observation rather than positivism, on communication 
rather than subjects.”10  Both systems and post-structural theorists also avoid 
reproducing law’s ideology, by treating law’s self-descriptions as the object of 
analysis.
11
 The focus is therefore on “how the social world becomes represented, and 
how meanings are produced. Texts are therefore seen as social practices, embedded 
with multiple values and vested interests, not the reporting of independent, objective 
judgements.”12 
 
Such perspectives have great utility in enabling us to deconstruct current legal and 
professional discourses informing the issue of child contact and domestic violence, 
                                                 
7
 Tim May, Social Research (Open University Press 1993); Tim May, Social Research Issues, 
Methods and Process (Open University Press 2001);  Charles M Judd, Eliot R Smith and Louise H 
Kidder, Research Methods in Social Relations (6
th
 edn, Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich 1991), who 
assert that social research can never be ‘value-free’. 
8
 Carol H Weiss, ‘The many meanings of research utilisation’ from (1979) 39(5) Public 
Administration Review 426-431 in Clive Seale (ed), Social Research Methods: A Reader (Routledge 
2004) 445 
9
 Christian Borch, ‘Systemic Power: Luhmann, Foucault and Analytics of Power’ (2005) 48(2) Acta 
Sociologica 155-167   
10
 ibid 155 
11
 See further Reza Banakar and Max Travers, ‘Structural Approaches’ in Banakar and Travers (n 1); 
Paterson and Teubner  (n 6) 217 
12
 David E Gray, Doing Research in the Real World (1
st
 edn, Sage 2004) 24-25. See also John W 
Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design (1
st
 edn, Sage 1998) 79, who points to “the need 
to ‘deconstruct’ texts in terms of both reading and writing, examining and bringing to the surface 
concealed hierarchies as well as dominations, oppositions and contradictions.” 
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and in particular, to understand how concepts such as ‘the welfare of the child’ have 
been selectively constructed by the reductive operations of law. By deconstructing 
the notion of ‘the welfare of the child’ and locating it within its historical, social, 
political and ideological context, it can be seen to operate as a mechanism of power 
that serves particular interests. By exposing the contingent, provisional nature of this 
construct, it is hoped that we can create the space for oppositional meanings to 
emerge and for the “shifting of subjectivities” which, as Boyd says, “can, at certain 
junctures, be as crucial and as difficult as shifting economic structures”.13  This 
enables ‘other’, subjugated knowledges to be articulated, as part of the process of 
regaining a feminine subject with a valid voice and knowledge in the context of 
current family law.
14
 
 
2.2 Feminist theory(ies) 
Enlightenment epistemology is structured on the subject/object dualism which 
privileges “the abstract, knowledgeable subject [which is] associated with the 
masculine, the object of knowledge with the feminine” resulting in trivialising or 
rendering irrational the perspective of women.
 15 
 So feminists have sought to critique 
the “dominatory logic of the subject/object model”.16  In so doing, feminists question 
and render problematic the concepts of rationality, impartiality and objectivity by 
showing that these are historically specific and contingent generalisations 
embodying dominant values which, in the process, devalue those attributes 
associated with ‘the feminine’ such as ‘unacceptable’ emotions and desires.17 This 
provides us with useful insights for exploring how courts and professionals construct 
parents involved in contact proceedings and in particular, how dominant maternal 
                                                 
13
 Susan Boyd, ‘Some post-modernist challenges to feminist analyses of law, family and State: 
ideology and discourse in child custody law’ (1991) 10 Canadian Journal of Family Law 79, 113. See 
further Adrienne Barnett, ‘Contact and Domestic Violence: The Ideological Divide’ in Jo Bridgeman 
and Daniel Monk (eds) Feminist Perspectives on Child Law (Cavendish 2000) 132 
14
 Smart (n 2) 
15
 Lois McNay, Foucault and Feminism: Power, Gender and the Self  (Polity Press 1992) 169. See 
also Richard Collier, ‘Feminist Legal Studies and the Subject(s) of Men: Questions of Text, Terrain 
and Context in the Politics of Family Law and Gender’ in Alison Diduck and Katherine O’Donovan 
(eds), Feminist Perspectives on Family Law (Routledge Cavendish 2006) 238 who explains how 
“classic tenets of liberal legalism (for example, individualism, autonomy and so forth) were refigured 
as quintessentially ‘masculine’ values.” See further Vanessa Munro, Law and Politics at the 
Perimeter: Re-Evaluating Key Debates in Feminist Theory (Hart 2007) 42 
16
 McNay (ibid) 169 
17
 ibid 84, 91 
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subjectivities of ‘implacably hostile mothers’, who are seen to deny their children 
contact with fathers for their own selfish reasons, have arisen and been sustained.
 18
 
 
Feminist models such as the ‘difference’ model pioneered by Carol Gilligan or 
Catherine McKinnon’s ‘dominance’ model have been critiqued, inter alia, for their 
essentialism, that is, for failing to question and render problematic the notion of an 
essential ‘womanhood’, as well as for failing to disrupt the binaries of masculinity 
and femininity and of dualistic thought per se.
19
 What is needed is a theoretical 
perspective that recognises “the constructed, partial and politicised nature of these 
binaries between masculinity and femininity, and between public and private 
spheres”, and which is able to demonstrate the interests sustained by competing 
subjective realities.
20
 It is suggested that post-structuralist theories in the 
Foucauldian tradition hold the most cogent explanatory and political potential for a 
feminist study of current family law. 
 
2.3 A feminist post-structuralist approach 
Many feminists are worried about “what the postmodern rejection of metanarratives 
implies for feminist theory and politics”.21 The particular concern is that a 
postmodern relativist perspective reduces feminist values to “just one of many 
equally valid viewpoints”, and deprives ‘women’ as a category of a valid, speaking 
voice,
22
  thereby depriving feminists of political leverage and the ability to engage 
with legal reform. 
23
 
 
It is suggested, however, that poststructuralism can offer a useful, productive 
framework for understanding the gendered mechanisms of power in modern society 
and the possibilities for transforming patriarchal power relations. Poststructuralist 
theories of meaning, power and subjectivity have great utility for feminists in 
                                                 
18
 Iris MarionYoung, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton University Press 1990) 116 
19
 See, eg, Munro (n 15) 24-25 
20
 ibid 13. See also Chris Weedon, Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory (1
st
 edn, Blackwell 
1987) 8-9 
21
 McNay (n 15) 123 
22
 ibid 127. See also Munro (n 15) 36 
23
 Munro (n 15) 113; see also at 129. See also Maria Drakopoulou, ‘The Ethic of Care, Female 
Subjectivity and Feminist Legal Scholarship’ (2000) 8 Feminist Legal Studies 199, 201who argues 
that, in law, questions of subjectivity “destabilise our project and undermine its political and ethical 
legitimacy.”  
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understanding the ways in which the heterogenous forms of power governing social 
relations are exercised, how oppression works, and the possibilities for resistance 
and change, which enables us to see “whose interests are silenced, marginalised or 
excluded and how open it is to change”.24  The task of research, according to a 
poststructuralist perspective, is to examine historically how knowledge (and in this 
context, dominant patriarchal knowledge) and truth in society is produced, to 
deconstruct the processes by which that knowledge is formed, and make visible the 
relations of power that give rise to discursive claims to truth.
25
  
 
The founding insight of post-structuralism is that language constitutes, rather than 
reflects, social ‘reality’, so that meaning and therefore knowledge is not absolute, 
fixed and certain, but is “always bound up with historically specific regimes of 
power and, therefore, every society produces its own truths which have a 
normalising and regulatory function.”26   The power of language derives from its 
ability to portray the meanings it constructs as natural, ‘true’ and obvious. This 
symbiotic relationship between knowledge, truth and power is central to 
poststructuralist thought.
27
  Knowledge is produced and circulated through 
‘discourse’, which Foucault explains as “a system of ordered procedures for the 
production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements” which 
always embodies a standpoint or a claim to truth.
28
 Discourses permit what counts as 
authoritative statements or knowledge, and exclude or marginalise other forms of 
expression.
29
 By denying their own partiality and the interests they represent, and 
marginalising or discrediting alternative or oppositional meanings, an important 
ideological effect of discourse is to present sectional or specific interests as universal 
                                                 
24
 Weedon (n 20) 169; see also at 135 
25
 See May (n 7); Gray (N 12) 
26
 McNay (n 15) 25 
27
 See Susan Boyd, ‘Backlash and the Construction of Legal Knowledge: The Case of Child Custody 
Law’ (2001) 20 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 141-165, 147  
28
 Michel Foucault, ‘Truth and Power’ in Colin Gordon (ed) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews 
and Other Writings 1972-1977 (Pantheon Books 1980) 133. See also Sara Mills, Michel Foucault 
(Routledge 2003); Bettina Lange, ‘Researching Discourse and Behaviour as Elements of Law in 
Action’ in Banakar and Travers (n 1) 177, who describes Foucault’s concept of discourse as 
comprising “not just statements but also the regulated practices which account for statements.”  
29
 Gary Kinsman, ‘Queerness is Not in our Genes: Biological Determinism Versus Social Liberation’ 
in Deborah R Brock (ed), Making Normal: Social Regulation in Canada (Harcourt 2003) 263. See 
also Lange (n 28) 177 
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and hegemonic, so that dominant constructs appear normal, legitimate and ‘true’.30  
Fairclough and Wodak describe how discourse is constitutive in contributing to the 
formation of social identities and objects of knowledge, and in helping to sustain and 
reproduce the status quo, by constituting and reproducing unequal relations of power 
based on, for example, class and gender.
31
  
 
Boyd explains, however, that without an analytical tool, discourse analysis does not 
provide us with a clear idea of how some discourses come to be more powerful and 
privileged than others, and whose interests are being served.
32
 In focusing 
strategically on gender as a tool for analysis, we can make visible the gendered 
relations of power that give rise to discursive knowledge and their ideological and 
normative effects, which enables us to see the way in which “most women are still 
excluded from the production of forms of thought, images and symbols in which 
their experiences and social relations are expressed and ordered.”33 Deploying 
gender as an analytical tool enables us to disrupt and displace the hierarchical bipolar 
oppositions, such as the binary divisions of male/female and public/private that 
structure gendered power relations, as well as the moral validity of objectivity and 
neutrality, thereby creating the space for other ways of knowing and of being a 
subject. As Hekman notes, “feminists cannot overcome the privileging of the male 
and the devaluing of the female until they reject the epistemology that created those 
categories.”34 So rather than obstructing or erasing a feminist voice, a 
poststructuralist perspective can allow “contemporary feminist theorists to move 
towards a more empowering vision of the complexities of male-female relations.”35 
Applying these insights to current family law, the deconstruction and analysis of the 
extent to which the perceptions of professionals and judicial officers construct, 
reinforce and are reinforced by dominant discourses informing private law Children 
                                                 
30
 Alison Diduck, ‘Legislating Ideologies of Motherhood’ (1993) 2 Social and Legal Studies 462. See 
also Weedon (n 20) 98, 108 & 131;  Hubert L Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Harvester Wheatsheaf 1982) 63 
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 Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak, ‘Critical discourse analysis’ from Teun A van Dijk (ed) 
Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction Vol 2 (Sage 2004) in Seale (n 8) 358 
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33
 See Reinharz (n 4) 247. See also Munro (n 15) 128 
34
 Susan Hekman, Gender and Knowledge: Elements of a Post-Modern Feminism (Polity Press 1990) 
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 Vanessa Munro, ‘Legal Feminism and Foucault – A Critique of the Expulsion of Law’ (2001) 28(4) 
Journal of Law and Society 546-567, 552. See also Richard Collier, ‘A Hard Time to be a Father?: 
Reassessing the Relationship Between law, Policy and Family (Practices)’ (2001) 28(4) Journal of 
Law and Society 520-545, 536. 
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Act proceedings enables us to acquire a greater understanding of the difficulties for 
women in articulating a valid, authoritative voice. 
 
Foucault’s ideas on power and its inter-relation with discourse assist us to 
understand how current familial ideologies have gained dominant status and what the 
possibilities are for resistance against them.
36
 For Foucault, power is not something 
to be possessed or owned, but is relational, effected in its exercise, and strategic.
37
  
Munro explains that according to Foucault, power can be conceived of “as a positive 
social presence which exerts itself in all aspects of life and in all directions... 
Foucault has emphasised the notion of power as a fluid source of both oppression 
and resistance”.38  
 
Foucault’s thesis on disciplinary power and the way it is dispersed throughout 
society, immanent in the micro-levels or ‘capillaries’ of everyday practices, as well 
as in discourses such as law and science, 
39
 enables us to see how power is deployed 
“around ideas of what constitutes a good mother, a good father, a ‘good’ parent. 
With questions, that is, of gender.”40 Foucault conceived of three forms of power – 
juridical, disciplinary and governmental – which have not replaced each other but 
can operate simultaneously. The advantages of Foucault’s theses on power are that 
they enable us to recognise “the plurality of powers and resistances which are the 
relations of our real lives”,41 which help us appreciate how law operates increasingly 
through both juridical and disciplinary strategies. For example, at the point when the 
‘implacably hostile mother’ can no longer be disciplined, when she refuses to be 
regulated to permit contact with the non-resident father, law resorts to juridical 
power in the form of the committal, abandoning attempts at disciplining her, and 
downgrading ‘the welfare of the child’ as a guiding precept. 
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 See Munro (n 34) 549 
37
 Barry Smart, Michel Foucault (rev. edn, Routledge 2002) 77. This encapsulates Foucault’s notion 
of the ‘microphysics of power’. 
38
 Munro (n 34) 54  
39
 Michel Foucault, ‘Body/Power’ in Gordon (n 28) 113 
40
 Collier (n 34) 525 
41
 Kevin Walby, ‘Contributions to a Post-Sovereigntist Understanding of Law: Foucault, Law as 
Governance, and Legal Pluralism’ (2007) 16(4) Social and Legal Studies 551-571, 555 
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Law, as discourse, is both the product of relations of power which have arisen out of 
historically specific circumstances, and, according to Foucault, a discursive system 
that masks the circulation of power. The relations of power that law disguises today 
are not monarchical power, but disciplinary power, constituted in current family law 
by legal and scientific discourses.
42
 So we need to expose not only “law’s role as a 
discourse of construction, which is self-legitimating in so far as its power to 
construct is sustained by its own ideological claims to truth”,43 but also the extent to 
which, and manner in which, law’s power to construct is reliant on its legitimation of 
claims to truth of discourses external to law, such as scientific discourses.
44
 This has 
particular relevance for analysing the way in which law interprets science in its 
construction of children’s welfare in the area of post-separation parenting, and how 
that selected construct influences the practices and perceptions of professionals 
involved in contact proceedings. 
 
The empowering aspect of Foucault’s theses on power lies in the recognition that, 
while the power of discourse can have exclusionary, repressive and disciplinary 
effects, “language is not monolithic. Dominant meanings can be contested, 
alternative meanings affirmed.”45  Accordingly, the exercise of resistance is implicit 
in prevailing power structures, rather than constituting an external force.
46
 So, for 
example, exposing the contingent, unstable nature of familial constructs such as ‘the 
welfare of the child’ has the potential for offering “a potentially transformative rather 
than merely subversive agenda.”47    
 
A significant ideological effect of power and discourse is the construction of ‘the 
subject’, which is of particular significance for understanding the ways in which 
family law constitutes mothers and fathers in child contact proceedings. 
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 See Michel Foucault, ‘Power/Knowledge’ in Gordon (n 28); Michel Foucault, Discipline and 
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 Gerald Turkel, ‘Michel Foucault: law, power and knowledge’ (1990) 17 Journal of Law and 
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 Munro (n 15) 103. See also Mairtin Mac an Ghaill and Chris Haywood, Gender, Culture and 
Society (Palgrave MacMillan 2007) 61 
20 
 
Poststructuralism enables us to see subjectivity as an ideological effect of discourse 
that is always historically specific.
48
  Different modes of subjectivity serve specific 
interests and thus the constitution of the subject has political implications by 
reproducing or contesting power relations.
49
 Indeed, at specific historical moments, 
“a dominant construction emerges which could almost be said to over-determine 
legal policy or decision-making or at least structures the debate which gives rise to 
new policy formation. In embracing certain subject positions, others are 
marginalised.”50 This conception of subjectivity assists us in exploring how 
intersecting legal, political and child welfare discourses construct and sustain 
dominant gendered subjectivities of ‘implacably hostile mothers’ and ‘safe family 
men’. This can have harsh disciplining effects on mothers who resist that dominant 
construct, and supports the ideological divide between the ‘safe family man’ of child 
welfare discourses and the ‘dangerous perpetrator’ of domestic violence discourse. 
 
Foucault’s theses on power and resistance thus “opens a space for feminists to 
understand and intervene in the processes through which meaning is produced, 
disseminated and transformed in relation to the changing configurations of modern 
power.”51  In this way, we can see feminist critique as itself a discursive practice 
with the power to transform dominant power relations and the discursive structures 
that they create and sustain. It is because of the relationship between discourse and 
power that language can be an important site of political struggle.
52
 It is hoped that 
this study can make a contribution to that struggle by exposing the shifting, uncertain 
nature of discourse and deconstructing the role of law in constructing the gendered 
subjectivities of current family law, thereby creating the space and opportunity for 
contested, oppositional meanings to emerge.
53
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2.4 ‘Autopoietic’ or ‘systems’ theory 
‘Autopoietic’ or ‘systems’ theory was developed by the German sociologists, Niklas 
Luhmann and Gunther Teubner, who were interested in “how social order was 
possible if the contrary, chaos, was so much more plausible”.54 Where Luhmann and 
Teubner differ from other contemporary social theorists, is in seeing the phenomenal 
world constructed at two distinct levels - the psychic and the social - and it is the 
interaction between them which, at the level of individual consciousness, provides 
people with the information they need to make sense of the external world. We thus 
need to make a distinction between people (conscious or psychic systems) and 
society (social systems).
55
  
 
Since the political and industrial revolutions of the eighteenth century, western 
societies have evolved from stratified and hierarchical differentiation,  to 
functionally differentiated sub-systems such as law, politics, economics and science, 
with no ultimate hierarchical authority.
56
 “[None] of these systems can claim to be 
dominant, in the sense that the authority of one does not preclude the authority of the 
others.”57  What defines and structures these social systems is their communications 
– everything that can be communicated by words, gestures and actions, and 
understood as having meaning. So Luhmann offers “the idea of a social system 
which consists of constructions arising out of communications, not at the level of 
individual interaction, but at that of society”.58 Modern society’s identity and 
conception of itself is the product of the operation of these sub-systems, which 
provide the authority and justification for social communication.
59
  None of society’s 
subsystems can replace the knowledge-creating and interpretive functions of other 
systems or is able to offer an exclusively ‘correct’ view of society: only law may 
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decide what is lawful; politics what is national policy; economics what is profitable; 
science what is scientifically true or false.
60
 Each of these systems has developed its 
own internally generated version of reality and its own internal processes for 
reproducing this image of society and guaranteeing its future.
61
 
 
Law’s function in modern society is to process “normative expectations that are 
capable of maintaining themselves in situations of conflict.”62  This enables us to 
determine in advance whether particular conduct would be answerable to law, and 
what the attitude of law would be towards that conduct. By reducing the range of 
possibilities, law thus “provides a degree of certainty in the face of an always open 
future that no other communication system can.”63   
 
In considering how society functions and how its sub-systems maintain their 
differentiated character, we need to look at Luhmann’s theory of ‘autopoiesis’.64 
Luhmann defines an autopoietic social system as one that “produces and reproduces 
its own elements by the interaction of its elements.”65 Each functional system 
distinguishes itself from its environment through binary codes, which are developed 
by each system itself.
66
 Without such closure, the system would have no way of 
distinguishing its own operations from those of its environment.
67
 Before 
information can be recognised as existing for the system, it has to be reproduced in 
the system’s own terms and can only then enter the system’s programmes.68  In 
modern societies it is law alone that decides whether a conflict is legal or non-legal. 
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Once law has selected a conflict applying its legal/non-legal code, it then applies its 
lawful/ unlawful coding to that conflict and produces communications (decisions) 
based on this distinction.
69
 It is in this way that systems reproduce themselves from 
their own elements. Each system is thus “continually engaged in carrying out the 
self-reproduction (autopoiesis) of the overall social system as well as its own.”70  
This means that each system participates in society’s construction of reality.71  
 
Each functional system is operationally and normatively closed to the external world, 
which means that social systems cannot communicate directly with each other in the 
same way that individuals cannot communicate directly with, or steer, a social 
system. “Information from outside the legal system, for example, cannot enter the 
system as raw data…Instead they have to be coded by the system – that is, given 
meaning within the system’s programmes.”72  For example, political decisions, when 
reconstructed as legislation, enter the legal system as law; however politics then has 
no control over law once its own decisions have entered law’s environment.73    
 
Social systems are, however, cognitively open, that is, they are dependent on other 
social systems producing authoritative communications on which they are able to 
rely.
74
  For example, judges in family proceedings are increasingly reliant on 
information from child welfare science to produce ‘the facts’ to enable them to make 
legal communications/decisions on children’s welfare. Although society’s 
subsystems cannot communicate directly or interpenetrate, there are a variety of 
ways in which they are open to each other and to communications from the external 
world.
75
 A communicative event from one system or from a source external to social 
systems may constitute an ‘irritation’76 or an ‘interference’77 for another system.  
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Whatever cannot be explained using the system’s programmes but nevertheless has 
to be acknowledged by the system as existing is ‘noise’.  The existence of noise 
creates a commitment by the system to reduce that noise, if not by that system, then 
by one or more of society’s other systems.78  This has important implications for 
understanding how concepts such as ‘domestic violence’ and ‘child abuse’ emerged 
and became understood in family law and in political and popular discourses.  The 
selective nature of the production of meanings by social systems, involving a 
reduction in complexity, also has important implications for the way in which the 
concept of ‘the welfare of the child’ has been constructed and understood. 79  For 
family law:  
 
“[T]he space…that was once available for morality has now been filled 
by science...[and] the co-evolution of law with child welfare science has 
left virtually no space for such moral observations. It is the weight of 
scientific evidence which is seen as justifying the correctness of the 
decision, and not morality.”80   
 
However, law does not, and cannot, import wholesale into its programmes and 
communications ‘raw’ science because it is not science. That is, it cannot reproduce 
the complexities, ambiguities and differing theoretical perspectives found within 
scientific discourses on child health and development, but selects and reconstructs 
such knowledge in ways that ‘make sense’ to law, which inevitably leads to 
reductionism.
81
 An important aspect of this study, therefore, is to explore how 
current understandings of children’s welfare and domestic violence have been 
constructed, the extent to which they are reinforced or opposed in and by judicial and 
professional perceptions, and what the implications of those selective constructions 
are for professional and judicial practice. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
synchronisation and co-evolution.” - Michael King and Christine Piper, How the Law Thinks about 
Children (2
nd
 edn, Ashgate 1995) 33-34 
78
 See King (n 5) 91 
79
 ibid 167. See also Reza Banakar, ‘Studying Cases Empirically: A Sociological Method for Studying 
Discrimination Cases in Sweden’ in Banakar & Travers (n 1) who explain how “systems constitute 
themselves by excluding the diversity of their environments.” [149]  
80
 King (n 5) 45 - 46 
81
 See further Adrienne Barnett, ‘The Welfare of the Child Re-Visited: Is Whose Best Interests? Part 
I’ (2009) 39 Family Law 50-54 
25 
 
Systems theory is, above all, based on the notion of observation and in particular, the 
partiality of observation – by first-order observers (observations by systems 
themselves), second-order observers (observers of observers) and so on.
82
 Social 
systems are unable to observe their own selectivity as they are blind to the self-
referential nature of their operations. This enables law to evaluate its own system 
from the ideal of justice by blinding itself to the paradoxes and tautologies of its own 
operations in doing so, as well as to its artificial exclusion of other values,
83
 by 
making “the operations through which this is done invisible” so that, for the system, 
its operations do not appear to be based on self-reference.
84
 Law cannot, therefore, 
“deal with the question whether the distinction between justice and injustice is being 
used justly or unjustly [as this] would lead the system into paradoxes and block at 
least the operations based on this question.”85 So the price to be paid for law’s ability 
to impose legal order upon what would otherwise be inaccessible and chaotic, is a 
blindness to its own paradoxical nature. While justice may represent the ideal for law, 
all law can do is decide with certainty what is legal or illegal. 
 
However, moral observers of society are unable to distinguish between system 
communication and the generalised ideal values that the system constructs. This 
means that whether the court’s decisions are considered ‘fair’ or ‘just’ depends on 
the perspective of the observer of those decisions. However, law itself cannot ‘see’ 
that a decision about ‘the welfare of the child’ can be both just and unjust, depending 
on the perspective of the observer of the system. For example, it is irrelevant to law 
that a court’s decision that a violent father should have contact with a child may be 
seen as both morally ‘wrong’ and legally ‘right’ depending on the moral view of the 
observer, as long as the correct legal procedures have been followed in arriving at 
the decision. Law’s inability to ‘see’ its self-referential decision-making also has 
significant implications for how fact-finding hearings are ‘observed’. So another 
important aspect of this study is to explore whether, and to what extent, professionals 
may observe decisions by judges in fact-finding hearings, and in determining contact 
thereafter, to be ‘just’ or ‘unjust’, and what the consequences of this may be for 
                                                 
82
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parents involved in contact proceedings and for the children who are the subject of 
those proceedings. 
 
There are clearly some important differences between Luhmann’s theories and 
poststructural feminist perspectives as sociological approaches. Most importantly, 
perhaps, what systems theory does not explain (and does not see the role of 
sociology as being to explain) is why specific abstractions are constructed and 
validated by social systems as having particular meanings; nor does it purport to 
explain the discursive and ideological effects of the operation of power in modern 
society. To expect systems theory to answer such questions would be to misconceive 
the theory itself. The task of the sociological researcher, for Luhmann, is to identify 
systems and their operations, not to search for causes and effects, and he is critical of 
a causal notion of power because of the unlimited possibilities for causes and effects: 
“The determination of a causal relation is, thus, a contingent enterprise, an observer-
dependent ascription or attribution that could have been different.”86  If we wish to 
observe and analyse the relations of power that give rise to legal and intersecting 
discourses and their ideological effects, it is suggested that post-structural 
perspectives provide the most productive avenue for a feminist engagement with 
current family law, while recognising the partiality of those perspectives.  
 
Autopoietic theory has great utility in assisting us to understand the selective, 
reductionist construction of concepts such as ‘the welfare of the child’, ‘domestic 
violence’ and ‘findings of fact’, as well as the difficulty in ‘using’ law to achieve 
‘progress’ in protecting women and children. The merit of autopoietic theory lies in 
its acknowledgement of the complexity of society, rather than the denial of such 
complexity arising from descriptions of society that see social change as directly 
achievable through law.  
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3. Choice of methodological approaches 
3.1 A discourse analytic approach 
Potter explains that discourse analysis is not a method, “but a whole perspective on 
social life and research into it”.87 A discourse analytic approach is particularly suited 
to feminist post-structuralist and autopoietic theoretical perspectives and to the 
subject of this research in that it recognises the centrality of discourse in constructing 
social life,
88
  and enables the researcher to examine how knowledge about a topic 
acquires authority at a particular historical moment.
89
  
 
Discourse analysts “are interested in texts in their own right, rather than seeing them 
as a means of getting at some reality that is assumed to lie behind the discourse, 
whether social or psychological”.90  The notion of ‘construction’ is important in 
discourse analysis because it “emphasizes the fact that, in a very real sense, texts of 
various kinds construct our world”.91  In this way discourse analysis can have 
immense utility in making visible the ‘opaque’ aspects of discourse and the way in 
which relations of domination and subordination, and social identities based on 
gender, class and race are signified, constructed and reproduced.
92
 “Researchers can 
investigate how the dominant discourse is produced, how it is disseminated, what it 
excludes, how some knowledge becomes subjugated and so forth.”93 So we need to 
analyse the discourse itself as well as its social, political and historical context.
94
 The 
focus moves beyond analysing whether the text is “an accurate description of the 
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participant’s viewpoint”,95 to “how such discourses order a domain of reality which 
has repercussions beyond those understood or intended by the speaker”.96   
 
Discourse analysis can therefore play an important role in the methodology of this 
study by enabling the researcher to deconstruct pre-existing texts and original 
accounts by social actors and to make visible the extent to which the perceptions and 
practices of professionals and judicial officers both construct, and are influenced by, 
prevailing dominant discourses that currently inform family law.  
 
3.2 A qualitative approach 
Strauss and Corbin describe qualitative research as any kind of research that 
produces findings not arrived at by statistical procedures and other means of 
quantification.
97
 It is clear from the texts on research methods that qualitative, 
ethnographic methods should play an important part in this study, since such 
methods are considered the best way of uncovering the thoughts and experiences of 
the groups under study and of providing a detailed analysis of the research texts.
98
 
Qualitative research also enables us to gain an ‘authentic’ understanding of people’s 
experiences.
99
 A qualitative approach places more emphasis on description and 
discovery, and less on hypothesis testing and verification.
100
 According to 
Polkinghorne: “Qualitative methods are specifically constructed to take account of 
the particular characteristics of human experience and to facilitate the investigation 
of experience.”101 In contrast to a discourse analytic approach, qualitative research 
analyses “a whole range of social interactions, including non-verbal 
behaviour...through entering the social actor’s behavioural world and becoming 
familiar with its perspectives.”102 
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Feminist researchers who have studied similar areas to that explored by this project 
have utilised an ethnographic, qualitative approach.
103
 Maynard explains that the use 
of qualitative methods:  
 
“which focus more on the subjective experiences and meanings of those 
being researched, was regarded as more appropriate to the kind of 
knowledge that feminists wished to make available, as well as being 
more in keeping with the politics of doing research as a feminist.”104  
  
An awareness is needed, however, of the limitations of qualitative research. Because 
qualitative research emphasises the “thick description” of a relatively small number 
of subjects within the context of a specific setting, the possibilities for generalising 
to other subjects and situations are limited.
105
   
 
3.3 A quantitative approach 
The question may be asked whether quantitative methods, which are frequently 
criticised for failing to capture people’s experiences and understandings,106 could 
have any place in this study. Hesse-Biber and Leavy note that “many feminists 
openly question the viability and utility of neutral, value-free research methods and 
the positive concept of objectivity itself”,107 in particular because quantitative 
research is based on and validates the “masculinist” values of neutrality and 
“objective detachment”.108  
 
While recognising the limitations of quantitative methods, it is also important to 
acknowledge the strategic advantages of methods that produce generalisable, 
statistical data, which are considered authoritative by policy-makers, professionals 
and courts and therefore can lend legitimacy to studies that wish to pursue policy 
change. Miner-Rubino and Jayaratne argue that opponents of feminist values “might 
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be particularly likely to distrust qualitative data that convey a feminist message … 
[and] may be more apt to listen to and consider quantitative research legitimate.” 109  
 
3.4 Feminist research methodology 
Feminist commentators have pointed to the fact that there is no one methodology 
that can exclusively be said to be ‘feminist methodology’.110  Reinharz’s approach, 
which was to look at research methods used by feminists, led her to conclude that in 
research, “feminism is not a method but a perspective, which guides feminist 
researchers in the varied methods that they utilise.”111 This means that there is no 
single ‘feminist way’ to do research.112 “The fact that there are multiple definitions 
of feminism means that there are multiple feminist perspectives on social research 
methods.”113 What is most important to acknowledge in feminist research is that 
“most women are still excluded from the production of forms of thought, images and 
symbols in which their experience and social relations are expressed and ordered”.114  
Reinharz calls it a developing “sociology of the lack of knowledge”115 in which we 
examine how and why knowledge is not produced, is obliterated, or is not 
incorporated into a canon, to enable us to understand how such lack of knowledge is 
constructed and to constitute women as subjects in their own right.  
 
The literature on feminist research identifies four aspects that may be said to 
characterise feminist research: 
 
3.4.1 The use of gender as a tool for analysis for deconstructing dominant 
discourses
116
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3.4.2 Some feminist approaches, in the same way as poststructuralist 
perspectives do, refute “the viability of the objective researcher and 
neutral, value-free tools of empirical observation.”117 They emphasise 
social knowledge and ‘truths’ as being historically specific and 
contingent, rather than abstract and fixed,
118
 and the task of the 
researcher is to uncover the “subjugated knowledge that often lies hidden 
from mainstream knowledge building.” 119 
 
3.4.3 Feminist researchers attempt to reduce the distance between researcher 
and reader: “the goals are to establish collaborative and nonexploitative 
relationships, to place the researcher within the study so as to avoid 
objectification, and to conduct research that is transformative.”120  
 
3.4.4 Feminist research is political in nature in seeking to bring about change 
in women’s lives and to produce knowledge that assists in the 
emancipation of women.
121
  
                                
In summary, as knowledge is productive of power, many feminist researchers see a 
dual vision or dual responsibility – to contribute to the interests of women and to 
contribute to knowledge.
122
 There are thus a number of ways in which feminist 
perspectives may impinge on the research process of this study: by acknowledging 
and sharing my theoretical perspectives and understandings with the reader;
123
 by the 
use of gender as a tool for deconstructing current discourses informing the issue of 
child contact and domestic violence; and by attempting to contribute to the process 
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of regaining a valid feminine voice and subjectivity within the context of current 
family law by making visible oppositional meanings.
124
  
 
3.5 Combining theoretical and methodological approaches 
The theoretical perspectives that inform this study suggest a combination of 
approaches that would facilitate an in-depth investigation of the perceptions and 
practices of professionals and tribunals operating in the family justice system, to 
enable me to determine both how they appear to be applying the Practice Direction, 
and how their perceptions and practices influence and are influenced by current 
dominant discourses in family law.
125
 At the same time, it was important to ensure 
that this study would be viewed as sufficiently authoritative by family law 
professionals, courts and policy makers. This suggests a combination of discourse 
analytic and qualitative approaches, as well as the strategic use of quantitative 
methods. 
 
3.5.1 Combining a qualitative and discourse analytic approach 
Both qualitative and discourse analytic approaches recognise the multiple nature of 
social reality, and lend themselves to “the deep involvement in issues of gender, 
culture, and marginalized groups”.126 However, while a qualitative approach sees 
language as representing the social world, from a discourse analytic perspective, 
language is constitutive of the social world.
127
 They also offer different views about 
how theory is generated from the data. Whereas discourse analysis is frequently 
informed by preconceived theoretical concepts, in qualitative research, data are often 
analysed from a ‘grounded theory’ perspective.128   
 
It can therefore be questioned how these two approaches “and in particular their 
criteria for what constitutes ‘good’ data and analysis procedures, can be combined in 
practice.”129 By analysing the meaning of the text from a qualitative perspective, and 
deconstructing the “discursive techniques through which [the discourse] is 
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established” the researcher can approach the texts to gain qualitative data about 
events, practices and attitudes, as well as to examine their discursive construction.
130
 
  
Qualitative data-gathering methods such as interviews provide us with rich original 
text, which can then be analysed to uncover the participants’ understandings of the 
operation of the family justice system and their roles in it, and to deconstruct the 
discourses and discursive practices that both shape, and are shaped by, that 
understanding and those roles. Similarly, case reports can be analysed both for the 
qualitative data they provide about the ‘facts’ of and decisions made in each case, as 
well as for the discursive construction of the judgments.   
  
3.5.2 Combining qualitative/discourse analytic approaches with a 
quantitative approach 
Qualitative and quantitative methods are not mutually exclusive and can enhance 
each other to good effect; it all depends on the subject matter and aim of the 
research.
131
 Bryman observes that it is the strengths and weaknesses of each 
approach that should provide the rationale for integrating them.
132
 Additionally, a 
number of commentators question the idea of a simplistic distinction between 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies, which may “replicate the very biases that 
feminist researchers, for example, seek to address and overcome.”133  
 
Bryman suggests that utilising both approaches can enhance the validity of the 
research findings, for example by “the results of a qualitative investigation [being] 
checked against a quantitative study.”134 So interviews or observation could precede 
or follow a survey.
135
 Quantitative data could also ‘plug gaps’ in a qualitative study 
and may enable claims of representativeness to be made where this could not be 
                                                 
130
 Lange (n 28) combined discourse analysis with a qualitative approach in her study of BAT 
discourse. “The combined approach also allows us to ground [the discourse being studied] in the 
social process.” [179, emphasis in original] 
131
 See Silverman (n 98)  
132
 Alan Bryman, ‘Quantitative and Qualitative Research: Further Reflections on their Integration’ 
from Alan Bryman (ed), Mixing Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Research (Avebury 1992) in 
Seale (n 8) 506. See also See also Rudestam and Newton (n 97) 39; Strauss and Corbin (n 96), who 
advocate a combined approach, where appropriate. 
133
 May, Social Research Issues (n 7) 144. See also Maynard (n 103) 470; Potter(n 86) 139; Reinharz 
(n 4) 47; Cook and Fonow (n 120) 82 & 89;  Miner-Rubino and Jayaratne (n 105) 295 
134
 Bryman (n 131) 506-7 
135
 See May, Social Research Issues (n 7) 112. See also Leckenby and Hesse-Biber (n 108) 286  
34 
 
done on the basis of the qualitative methods alone.
136
 Reinharz suggests that multiple 
methods “increase the likelihood of obtaining scientific credibility and research 
utility” by, for example, using data derived from one method to validate or expand 
on information obtained by other methods.
137
  
 
However, Leckenby and Hesse-Biber caution that “[m]ore is not necessarily better ... 
mixing methods is no substitute for the hard work of conceptual thinking and data 
analysis”.138 Financial and time constraints are also an important factor. 
 
3.6 Summary of Choice of methodological approaches  
It is suggested that a combination of discourse analytic and qualitative approaches, 
which draw on feminist perspectives in the research process, with some quantitative 
methods, where practicable, would best serve the subject-matter and theoretical 
framework of this study. As discussed below, however, it was not always possible to 
undertake the most appropriate methods, and some compromises were necessitated.  
 
4. Operationalisation of concepts 
The research question: what are the practices and perceptions of judicial officers and 
professionals in applying Practice Direction 12J: Residence and Contact Orders: 
Domestic Violence and Harm [2008]
139
 [‘the Practice Direction’], and what are the 
implications of these perceptions and practices for women involved in child contact 
proceedings where domestic violence is an issue? 
 
4.1 Child contact proceedings 
All private law Children Act proceedings where there is a dispute relating to contact 
between children and their non-resident parent, including: 
- those cases where the parent with care opposes all contact between the 
child/children and the non-resident parent; 
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- those cases where contact in principle is not opposed but the form of contact 
and/or the  details and arrangements for contact are in dispute. 
 
The Practice Direction is not limited to proceedings concerning contact only, nor to 
private law Children Act proceedings, but applies to both public and private law 
proceedings where orders for residence and contact are in issue. It should be noted, 
also, that many Children Act cases involve issues relating to both residence and 
contact.
140
 The decision to limit the scope of this study to private law proceedings 
concerning contact only was made because proceedings concerning residence raise 
issues which would extend the scope of this study beyond that which could be 
accomplished within the constraints of this thesis.
141
 Additionally, since the vast 
majority of resident parents are mothers,
142
 contact between children and non-
resident fathers has the most profound implications for women’s safety, well-being 
and autonomy by extending the scope of parenting across households.  
 
4.2 Courts 
Contact cases are heard in the High Court, the county courts and the Family 
Proceedings Courts [‘FPCs’]. The vast majority of such cases are heard in the county 
courts, with a smaller proportion in the FPCs and negligible numbers in the High 
Court. For this reason, this study focuses primarily on the county courts and FPCs.
143
 
 
The judicial officers within those courts who form the subjects of this study are: 
County Courts:  circuit judges; recorders; district judges 
Family Proceedings Courts:  district judges; lay magistrates; legal advisors
144
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4.3 Professionals working in the family justice system 
Barristers:  all those barristers in private practice in England and Wales who 
specialise in family law work 
 
Solicitors:  all those solicitors in private practice in England and Wales who 
specialise in family law work 
 
Family Court Advisors [‘FCAs’]:  officers employed by the Children and Family 
Court Advisory and Support Service [‘Cafcass’]. Cafcass is independent of the 
courts and of public authorities (such as social services, education and health). The 
role of FCAs relevant to this study is to advise the family courts in England on what 
they consider to be the best interests of individual children.
145
 FCAs also undertake 
safeguarding checks and risk assessments, and perform an in-court conciliation 
service at First Hearing Dispute Resolution Appointments [‘FHDRAs’]. 
 
4.4 The Practice Direction 
The Practice Direction was issued by the President of the Family Division on the 9
th
 
May 2008 and came into effect on that date.
146
 It applies to any family proceedings 
in which an application is made for a residence or contact order under the Children 
Act 1989 or the Adoption and Children Act 2002, “or in which any question arises 
about residence or about contact between a child and a parent or other family 
member”.147 The Practice Direction applies in such cases where “it is alleged, or 
there is otherwise reason to suppose, that the subject child or a party has experienced 
domestic violence perpetrated by another party or that there is a risk of such 
violence”.148 The Practice Direction sets out the general principles and the process to 
be followed in all cases to which it applies. The Practice Direction can be found at 
Appendix A. 
 
 
 
                                                 
145
 Cafcass Cymru provides the same service to the courts in Wales 
146
 The Practice Direction was reissued with amendments on the 14
th
 January 2009, and is included in 
the Family Proceedings Rules 2010 as Practice Direction 12J 
147
 The Practice Direction [1] 
148
 The Practice Direction [2] 
37 
 
4.5 Domestic violence 
The problems inherent in the concept of ‘domestic violence’ have been of concern to 
many feminist and other researchers and writers.
149
 For example, Mullender and 
Morley point out its negative connotations in trivialising the violence, and in 
detracting from other ways in which men can abuse women in relationships, such as 
emotional, psychological, sexual and financial abuse.
150
 Morley and Mullender 
encapsulate the gendered power relations involved by describing these abusive 
behaviours as “control tactics, ways of instilling fear and coercing compliance”151 
and suggest the broad definition: “men’s abuse of women in intimate 
relationships”.152 The coercively controlling nature of domestic violence has been 
increasingly understood in ‘mainstream’ spheres since this project commenced, and 
is now incorporated into the cross-government definition of domestic violence as: 
“any incident or pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive or threatening 
behaviour, violence or abuse between those aged 16 or over who are or have been 
intimate partners or family members.”153 This understanding of domestic violence 
was also included in Cafcass’s Domestic Violence Toolkit.154 
 
Because the operation of the Practice Direction is the subject of this study, it was 
decided that the definition of domestic violence contained in the Practice Direction 
should be the starting point for operationalising this concept, and that respondents 
should be specifically asked to express their view on this definition. The description 
of domestic violence in the Practice Direction is set out in Chapter 4.  
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5. Choice of research methods 
This section will seek to identify the specific methods of research most appropriate 
to the subject matter and theoretical perspectives of this project, and any limitations 
on and compromises to the research methodology. It is important to acknowledge 
that considerations such as available resources and the nature of what is being 
investigated can affect choice of method.  
 
A key issue is whether the chosen methods yield valid research data, that is, whether 
the data shed accurate light on the research question. The type of ‘good’ data 
required from a qualitative approach “should report truthfully about the social world 
researched and the way in which it is constructed by social actors.”155 Discourse 
analysis also strives for ‘naturalistic’ data, but the focus is not on whether the 
accounts given are ‘truthful’ but on the way in which the discourse is constituted.156 
  
Finally, it should be noted that there are advantages in triangulation by the use of 
more than one method. Cook and Fonow suggest that triangulation is particularly 
appropriate for feminist research in that, by combining both qualitative and 
quantitative methods, the problems of the “dichotomous subject/object is 
resolved”.157 Gray points out that multiple methods assist not only in data 
triangulation but help “balance out any of the potential weaknesses in each data 
collection method”.158 Combining methods is one way of enhancing the internal 
validity of the study, for example, a review of written records being complemented 
by interviews or observation. 
 
5.1 Documentary research 
Documentary review can be an important research tool, particularly for studies 
utilising a qualitative/discourse analytic approach.
159
 Texts can be utilised in two 
ways: to access attitudes and find out about events that are revealed by the content of 
the texts (a qualitative approach) and by approaching and analysing texts in order to 
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explore their construction within the social context in which they were produced (a 
discourse analytic approach).
160
 Documents can be of interest “for what they leave 
out, as well as what they contain. They do not simply reflect, but also construct 
social reality and versions of events.”161  
 
Legal texts can be viewed as a source of sociological data, which can enable 
researchers to shed light on how institutional facts are constructed and how law is 
socially organised.
162
 From the perspective of autopoietic theory, legal texts “can be 
studied as empirical indicators of the way law organises itself internally, interacts 
with its social environment and constructs its images of social relations.”163  
 
Feminist researchers have found the study of written texts helpful in addressing 
feminist issues, for example, to understand “the social relations that underlie the 
production of the text as well as the ways in which it is heard or read.”164  
  
It was decided, therefore, that documentary research, including the study of legal 
texts, should form an important component of this project, and should comprise three 
aspects: 
 
5.1.1 The preliminary stages of the research involved a review of the academic 
literature and research on historical and current legal and child welfare 
discourses relating to child contact and domestic violence, as well as 
governmental and parliamentary reports and consultation papers relating 
to private law Children Act proceedings.
165
 
 
5.1.2 Primary data was obtained from a review and analysis of all reported 
cases relevant to the issue of contact and domestic violence after the 
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Practice Direction was issued in May 2008, as well as the most pertinent 
cases reported prior to its implementation. 
 
5.1.3 A review of selected court records was to be a principal source of both 
quantitative and qualitative data for this project. For the reasons 
explained below, however, it was not possible to undertake this 
review.
166
 
 
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of documentary research and textual 
analysis. Banakar and Travers point out that the empirical data provided by the study 
of cases can be limited because the information they contain can be very selective.
167
 
Banakar therefore doubted “that one could conduct a sociologically informed 
empirical study solely on the basis of legal cases”.168 For these reasons, it was 
acknowledged that primary documentary research in the form of a case review and 
analysis and a review and analysis of court records should be supplemented and 
complemented by other forms of methodological inquiry.
169
  
 
5.2 Interviews with judicial officers, barristers, solicitors and 
officers of Cafcass 
Interviews are the most appropriate method for “understanding how individuals 
make sense of their social world and act within it”, thus providing an understanding 
of, and explanation for, social events and relations.
170
 Many qualitative researchers 
see in-depth interviews as the best way in which to understand how people interpret 
and act within their social universe,
171
 and they are also more effective than survey 
research in dealing with complex issues.
172
 Although they tend to be more costly and 
time-consuming to undertake than survey research, interviews allow for the more 
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direct involvement of the interviewer in terms of probing and clarification of 
responses.
173
 
 
Interviewing is a popular method among feminist researchers, for its versatility and 
compatibility with feminist concerns.
174
 For example, it enables respondents to be 
actively involved in constructing the data about their own lives, thus avoiding the 
hierarchical nature of traditional scientific research methods.
175
    
 
Interviews are also used extensively in discourse analysis, as they enable the 
researcher to “identify and explore the participants’ interpretive practices”.176 
Silverman suggests that instead of treating interviews as ‘true’ or ‘false’ reports on 
reality, we can “treat interviews as giving us access to the repertoire of narratives 
that we use in producing accounts”.177  Ultimately, however, the theoretical 
perspectives informing the study, and its nature and purpose, should guide the 
researcher in the epistemological approach to be taken to interviews, which can 
combine both qualitative and discourse analytic approaches.
178
 
 
Seneviratne highlights the advantages of using interviews together with documentary 
research, as they enable the researcher “to investigate in more detail the information 
found in the documents, and to discover perceptions of the system. They can reveal 
any gaps in the documentation, and the underlying motives and assumptions of the 
[research subjects]”.179  
 
It was decided that interviews should form an integral part of my research 
methodology, for their ability to gather in-depth qualitative data and their 
compatibility with feminist research practices and with a discourse analytic 
approach. I therefore needed to consider whether to utilise informal, unstructured 
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interviews, semi-structured interviews, or a structured questionnaire. Hesse-Biber 
suggests that we can: 
 
“think of the interview method running along a ‘continuum’…A move 
from the informal end of interviewing to the more formal, structured end 
is to move from an exploratory data gathering and in-depth 
understanding goal of a project to a more theory testing set of goals.”180  
 
Structured interviews are often utilised by researchers with a positivist approach.
181
 
The researcher has total control over the interview and all participants are asked the 
same set of questions in the same specific order.  
 
Informal interviews are the most common method in ethnographic work, for their 
ability to uncover respondents’ thoughts and to compare their perceptions.182   By 
allowing interviewees “to talk about the subject within their own frames of 
reference... it thereby provides a greater understanding of the subject’s point of 
view.”183 However, they are more time-consuming to analyse than structured or 
semi-structured interviews,
184
 and may be unfeasible to undertake with large 
numbers of respondents.
185
 
 
Semi-structured interviews are conducted with an interview schedule listing specific 
questions, but it does not matter in which order they are asked, and the interviewer is 
free to probe.
186
 They are “most valuable when the fieldworker comprehends the 
fundamentals of a community from the ‘insider’s’ perspective”.187 They have the 
advantages of providing a greater structure to the interview, which facilitates 
analysis and comparison of responses, while at the same time enabling participants 
to respond more on their own terms, thus providing more qualitative depth than fully 
structured interviews.
188
 Additionally, semi-structured or unstructured interviews are 
the forms most often associated with feminist perspectives because they enable more 
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freedom to participants to respond than structured interviews.
189
 For all these reasons 
it was decided that semi-structured interviews would be the most appropriate 
interview format for this study. 
 
5.3 Survey Research 
Many commentators observe that self-administered postal or online questionnaires, 
which are utilised as a primary means of obtaining quantitative data, are not 
appropriate for a qualitative, ethnographic study.
190
 Survey research does not enable 
the researcher to understand how people’s perceptions are formed because the 
interviewer and participant cannot interact in the way they can during interviews and 
the researcher cannot probe beyond the answers given. In this way survey research 
tends to simplify a complex social world and does not enable the researcher to 
understand “the ways in which people interpret the world around them and act within 
their social universe.”191 For these reasons, and because of its implicit endorsement 
of the positivist ‘masculine’ approach, feminist researchers have also been concerned 
about the use of survey research.
192
 However, Reinharz points to the advantages of 
utilising surveys when “it is extremely important to the feminist researcher that her 
results be accepted as generalizable to a larger population.”193 Additionally, 
questionnaires are the only realistic way of obtaining the views of a large number of 
people,
194
 and of demonstrating that a problem is widespread.
195
  
 
It was therefore concluded that the use of a survey would be a useful, but not the 
primary, data-gathering method for this project.
196
 My ideal approach would have 
been for the qualitative data obtained from the semi-structured interviews to be 
tested over a broader population by means of a survey. However, this was not 
possible for reasons of time and resources. Fortunately, during the latter stages of 
this study, research was published by the Family Justice Council, which gathered 
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quantitative (and some qualitative) data on the operation of the Practice Direction by 
means of a national online survey.
197
 Since many of the themes of that project were 
the same as those of this study, it was possible to utilise the data obtained from the 
survey to enhance the findings of this project. The survey gathered responses 
between October and December 2011 and received 623 usable responses from circuit 
judges, district judges, family magistrates, Justices’ legal advisers, Cafcass officers, 
solicitors and barristers across all HMCTS regions. 
 
5.4 Observation 
A principal method of qualitative research is observation, for the way in which it 
enables a deep understanding of events, processes and interactions to emerge.
198
 
Observation also assists in the construction of good, clear questionnaires, and 
enables the researcher to become familiar with the thoughts, terminology and 
practices of the study subjects.
199
  
 
However, since the researcher is already familiar with the language, practices and 
work ethic of the study population,
200
 it was considered that observation was not an 
essential component of this study’s methodology.201 Additionally, as observation can 
be time-consuming, undertaking this method would have been problematic for 
reasons of time and resources.
202
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5.5 Summary of choice of methods 
It was decided to utilise documentary research, together with in-depth interviews of 
barristers, solicitors, Cafcass officers, judges and magistrates.
203
 
 
6. Discussion of chosen research methods 
6.1 Case review 
All reported cases relating to contact proceedings in which domestic violence is an 
issue that were decided after the implementation of the Practice Direction were 
reviewed, as well as the most relevant cases reported prior to May 2008. The sources 
for the case review were the official law reports,
204
 as well as cases reported online 
on Lawtel and Bailli. This was a substantial enterprise involving a detailed and 
thorough examination of the cases in order to ascertain the ‘facts’ of the case, as 
presented by the judgments, and also to analyse and deconstruct the discourses that 
informed the judgments. 
 
6.2 Review of court records 
It was intended that court files relating to a sample of private law Children Act cases 
in selected county courts and FPCs would be reviewed. For the reasons detailed 
below, despite a lengthy and exhaustive application process, it was not possible to 
obtain access to such records. However, since the process of selecting the particular 
courts and cases for the proposed research involved a substantial amount of time and 
resources, and it assisted in identifying the regions from which the interview 
participants were selected, it is set out below.  
 
It was anticipated that information on the following themes was likely to be gleaned 
from a review of court records: identifying domestic violence as an issue; the 
practice of courts in relation to consent orders; the practice of courts and 
professionals in relation to fact-finding hearings; the types of interim and final orders 
made and the factors courts take into account when making such orders; the types of 
safeguards put in place when orders for direct contact are made; the extent to which 
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attendance at a perpetrator programme is required.
205
 It was envisaged that the 
documents most likely to reveal this information would be application and C1A 
forms, parties’ statements, orders and directions, Cafcass reports including 
safeguarding enquiries, other Section 7 reports (eg, from social services) and 
judgments (if any). 
 
6.2.1 Sampling method 
As noted above, my study population of courts was defined as: all county courts and 
FPCs that hear private law Children Act cases. A complete list and basic details of 
all such courts were obtained from the HMCS website,
206
 which was current at the 
date of review.
207
 The resulting sampling frame comprised 75 county courts and over 
300 FPCs in England and Wales. Given sufficient time and resources, I would have 
conducted a power analysis to ensure that my sample size was representative of the 
parent population.
208
 Since my sample size would have to be limited by restraints of 
time and resources in any event, it was decided that this was not feasible or 
necessary. 
 
In order to ensure that I covered as representative as possible a selection of courts in 
terms of geography and demographics, I would ideally have wished to select at least 
one county court and one FPC within each of the seven HMCS regions in England 
and Wales.
209
 However, this would have meant reviewing the records of at least 14 
courts, which would have been extremely difficult for reasons of time and resources. 
On the basis that the maximum number of courts whose records would be practicable 
to review was six, I decided to select courts in: a large inner city area with a high 
number of applications;
210
 a smaller rural area in the South West with low numbers 
of applications; and a provincial town in the North East with a medium number of 
applications, thus covering a diverse geographical and demographic area. Similar 
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studies that have involved a review of court records have selected three courts 
covering similar diverse catchment areas.
211
 
 
I obtained the information upon which the selection of the specific courts was based 
from a review of all the HMCS Annual Family Court Reports, which are available 
for all county courts in England and Wales.
212
 This was a substantial task involving 
the review of nearly 75 county court reports. The latest reports at the date of review 
(2008) covered the period from April 2006 to March 2007.
213
 The reports provide the 
figures for the total numbers of private law Children Act applications per court per 
year. These figures were categorised into courts with low numbers of such 
application per year (1 – 299), medium numbers of applications per year (300 – 699) 
and high number of applications per year (700 and above).  
 
In order to ensure that the courts reviewed also covered a broad range in terms of the 
numbers of solicitors available to represent parties in private law Children Act 
disputes, I reviewed the entire list of Resolution members based in each county court 
city and town.
214
 This enabled me to estimate the number of solicitors most 
commonly available to undertake family law work for each of those court areas.
215
  
 
Utilising the information from the HMCS Family Court Reports and Resolution’s list 
of members, I selected the Principal Registry of the Family Division (‘the PRFD’) in 
London, a provincial town in the North East and a rural town in the South West for 
the case review.
216
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It was not possible to determine the numbers of applications made each year to the 
FPCs, because these figures are not currently published by HMCS.
217
 I therefore 
decided to select FPCs in each of the towns selected for the county court review for 
reasons of time and resources. This process enabled me to acquire a sample of courts 
that was as representative as possible in terms of geography and demographics, 
within the limits of time and resources available to me.  
 
6.2.2 Selection of cases for review  
I intended to select 20 cases from each county court
218
 and six cases from each FPC 
for review. The reason for the lower number of cases for review in the FPCs was 
because those courts receive far fewer private law Children Act applications than the 
county courts.
219
 
 
I decided to select for review those cases initiated after the Practice Direction had 
been in effect for at least three months, to enable the courts and practitioners to 
become familiar with its operation. Ideally I would have wished to review cases that 
started and finished during the review period. Since it is clear from the HMCS court 
reports that the target for each court is to complete a case within 40 weeks,
220
 I 
decided to review a sample of cases initiated in each selected court from the 
beginning of September 2008, the majority of which it was anticipated would have 
been completed by the time of my planned main stage review of courts records in 
August 2009. The first stage of the selection process was to be a feasibility study to 
identify the specific cases to be reviewed. I hoped to be able to undertake this phase 
of the research by June 2009.  
 
6.2.3 Obtaining access to court records 
After communicating with the Ministry of Justice Research Unit and the secretary to 
the President of the Family Division, I was informed on 3
rd
 September 2008 that, 
                                                 
217
 Information from the county courts is provided to HMCS from the computer system, FamilyMan; 
the FPCs do not use FamilyMan. Information for 2007 and previous years was sourced manually – 
see Ministry of Justice, Judicial and Court Statistics 2007 (Cm 7467, 2008) 203 
218
 This figure was determined on the basis that it constituted the largest sample of cases that would be 
feasible to review within the time constraints of this project, but was also large enough to obtain 
useful data. 
219
 HMCS (n 216). In the year April 2006 to March 2007 the total number of private law applications 
made to the county courts was 86,771 and to the FPCs was 19,600 
220
 The degree to which this target is met varies, but is generally well above 70 per cent. 
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subject to methodology, the President had no objection in principle to my proposed 
research. I was provided with access to the relevant application form and 
accompanying information. The application form requests detailed information on 
the proposed research, including full details of the methodology, in order to obtain a 
Privileged Access Agreement [PAA].
221
 HMCS produces Annual Data Requirements 
(ADR); the ‘gatekeeper’ role is undertaken by the HMCS Data Access Panel 
[‘DAP’].222 The process to be followed in order to obtain approval for such a request 
comprises: completion of the application form, which is submitted to the HMCS 
Data Access Panel Secretariat, who will approach an HMCS Business Area to act as 
sponsor. Once sponsorship is granted, the application will be considered by the 
HMCS Data Access Panel, which then makes a recommendation to the HMCS 
Performance Committee. A full chronological account of my attempts at obtaining a 
PAA is set out in Appendix C. 
 
The form took a substantial amount of time to complete, due to the detailed 
information required. The completed form and supporting documents were submitted 
on 30
th
 March 2009.
223
 These can be found at Appendix D.     
 
On 2nd June 2009 I was informed by my allocated sponsor from the Family Law and 
Justice Division of the Ministry of Justice that my application had been rejected. The 
primary reason given was that the President’s office had advised that the Practice 
Direction was being revised and was likely to change by the end of 2009. The 
President therefore considered that it would be best to defer my research until the 
new revisions were effected, cases were completed under the new provisions, and 
could then be analysed. Shortly thereafter, I learnt that no further revisions were 
planned to the Practice Direction, although the Private Law Programme was to be 
revised.  I therefore contacted the DAP to ask if my request for access to court 
records could be reconsidered, having incorporated suggested amendments in my 
application form.  
                                                 
221
 The reason for this is that court files are closed to the public until they are at least 30 years old. 
This has not been altered by the Freedom of Information Act 2000. 
222
 See Ministry of Justice, http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/research-and-analysis/courts, last 
accessed 12.10.13 
223
 Supporting documents comprised: Aims and Objectives; Methodology; Data Collection Themes; 
CV of researcher and her supervisor  
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On 22nd July 2009 I received an email from the representative of the Civil and 
Family Unit advising that my proposal had been considered but that it was of limited 
usefulness due to further changes being considered in the area of private law 
proceedings, which could alter the process further. Additionally, I was informed that 
as the current Practice Direction is still in the process of being ‘bedded-in’, it could 
not properly be evaluated at this stage. I was also informed that there were concerns 
about access to court material “due to the significant increased emphasis on 
information security across government, and secondly due to the pressure on court 
staff resources which would be required to help facilitate the research.” 
 
Thus, unfortunately, 16 months after initiating my request for access to court 
records, and having undergone an extensive application process, my request was 
refused so it was not possible to undertake this method of research. It was decided 
therefore that the interviews would need to constitute the primary data-gathering 
methodology, and that reliability could be enhanced by increasing the numbers of 
judicial officers and professionals interviewed by broadening the sample areas to six 
HMCS regions. The interview methodology will now be considered. 
 
6.3 Interviews with members of the judiciary 
Permission to interview members of the judiciary needs to be obtained from the 
President of the Family Division by means of a Senior Judicial Agreement. In 
September 2009 I contacted the Ministry of Justice and was provided with a list of 
the relevant information required. This included the background and aims of the 
project; methodology including number of interviews sought and type of judiciary to 
be interviewed; timeframe for the interviews; and foreseeable use or benefit of the 
interviews for the court service, Ministry of Justice, judiciary and others. The first 
draft of my proposal and the draft interview schedule were completed at the end of 
December 2009, and finalised in February 2010.
224
 The proposal, interview schedule 
and revised data collection themes were completed and sent to the Ministry of 
                                                 
224
 The delay in completing the documentation was caused by my professional involvement in a large 
case that ran from October 2009 until January 2010. 
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Justice Representative on the 14th February 2010.
225
 The interview schedule can be 
found at Appendix E. 
 
After further communications with the Judicial Office for England and Wales I was 
advised by the President of the Family Division, Sir Nicholas Wall, that since my 
research was approved by Sir Mark Potter in September 2008,
226
 there had been two 
significant developments: the revised Private Law Programme was introduced and 
would be fully operative by October 2010, and the Guidance on Split Hearings was 
issued in May 2010. On advice from the Judicial Office, in November 2010 I sent an 
addendum to my original proposal and an amended interview schedule, to take these 
developments into account. On 23rd December 2010 I received a letter on behalf of 
the President saying that the introduction of the revised Private Law Programme and 
the Guidance on Split Hearings had both changed the landscape in which I would be 
conducting my research and had “diminished the potential benefits of any findings of 
the proposed research project”, particularly as there would be insufficient time for 
the revised Private Law Programme to work through the system and it would “not be 
possible in many cases for the judiciary to answer the many and complex questions 
posed.” The President therefore could not support my request to interview the 
judiciary. 
 
For these reasons, it was not possible to include interviews with members of the 
judiciary in my research methodology. The interviews were therefore limited to 
solicitors, barristers and FCAs. Accordingly, the review of the reported case law 
gained additional significance in providing some relevant data on the perceptions 
and practices of judicial officers that could not be obtained directly from them. 
 
6.4 Interviews with Professionals 
6.4.1 Sampling strategy 
The first question to consider was whether to utilise probability or purposive 
sampling. The principal advantage of probability sampling is that, because it is 
representative of the parent population, it enables statistical generalisation, thus 
                                                 
225
 The documents were revised following my review of research by Hunt and McLeod (n 141) on the 
outcomes of applications to court for contact orders 
226
 Sir Mark Potter was the previous President of the Family Division 
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maximising the study’s external validity.227 It is thus “particularly useful if the goal 
of the research is to inform public policy regarding women’s issues”.228 May points 
out, however, that it is not always possible or necessary to utilise probability 
sampling.
229
 Where the “goal is to look at a ‘process’ or the ‘meanings’ individuals 
attribute to their given social situations” it may not be necessary to make 
generalisations.
230
 Polkinghorne goes further and positively advocates the use of 
purposive sampling for qualitative studies. “[T]he selection should not be random or 
left to chance…The concern is…whether the data that were collected are sufficiently 
rich to bring refinement and clarity to understanding an experience.”231 Additionally, 
non-probability (or purposive) sampling is relatively inexpensive and less time-
consuming than random sampling, and can allow for more in-depth data-gathering 
than samples that are large enough to enable generalisations to be made.
232
  
  
It was decided that non-probability sampling would be utilised to select the interview 
participants, in order to ensure that the respondents would be able to provide the data 
necessary for this project, for reasons of time and resources, because the number of 
participants to be interviewed would not in any event allow for statistical testing, and 
because the purpose of this project is to obtain in-depth information on processes and 
meanings. However, it was still considered important to ensure that the 
characteristics of the parent population were broadly represented, in terms of 
seniority and geographical spread, so that the findings would be indicative of the 
views of the broader population. In deciding to utilise purposive sampling, the 
limitations and drawbacks were borne in mind, principally, the inability to generalise 
to the parent population. “Exercising care not to overgeneralize from purposeful 
samples, while maximising to the full the advantages of in-depth, purposeful 
sampling, will do much to alleviate concerns about small sample size.”233 
 
 
                                                 
227
 The defining characteristic of probability sampling is that participants are selected at random, but 
can include systematic random sampling – see further  Babbie (n 171); Judd, Smith & Kidder (n 7); 
May, Social Research Issues (n 7).   
228
 Miner-Rubino and Jayaratne (n 105) 309 
229
 May, Social Research Issues (n 7) 
230
 Hesse-Biber (n 118) 119 
231
 Polkinghorne (n 100) 140 
232
 See Miner-Rubino and Jayaratne (n 105) 
233
 Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods (3
rd
 edn, Sage 2002) 246 
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6.4.2 Sampling method 
At the stage when the review of court records still formed a component of my 
methodology, it was decided that the interview sample would comprise a small 
number of professionals and members of the judiciary from each of the three areas in 
which I would be reviewing court records, namely, two barristers, two solicitors, two 
Cafcass officers, one judge and one magistrate, providing a total sample of 24 
interviewees. This was considered a feasible number to interview, in view of the 
amount of time that would be involved in reviewing court records.  
 
When it became clear that I would not be able to access court records and the 
interviews would comprise my primary research method, I decided to broaden my 
sampling frame to five HMCS areas, within which I would select interviewees based 
in two large cities, two provincial towns and two small rural towns. This would 
enable me to cover a diverse geographical and demographic population, within the 
time constraints and resources available to me. It was decided that the interview 
sample would comprise one professional from each area, and one circuit judge, one 
district judge and one magistrate, providing a total sample of 36 interviewees. 
 
The regions from which the samples were selected were:
234
 
 London: the busiest HMCS area nationally and is serviced by the greatest 
numbers of solicitors and barristers.
235
 
 A large city in the North West which is the third busiest HMCS area 
nationally.
236
 At a later stage I decided that interviewees would be 
selected from another, demographically similar, large city in the North 
West because of the very low response rates from professionals in the city 
originally selected.
237
  
                                                 
234
 The cities and towns themselves are not identified herein in order to preserve the anonymity of the 
interview participants. 
235
 In the year April 2006 to March 2007 county courts in the London region (including the Principal 
Registry of the Family Division which is the county court for the whole of the Inner London area) 
received a total number of 7,494 private law Children Act applications. 
236
 In the year April 2006 to March 2007 county courts in and around this city received a total of 
2,649 private law Children Act applications. 
237
 The city in which participants were ultimately selected is the largest HMCS area outside London. 
In the year April 2005 to March 2006 (the latest year that was available for Family Court Reports 
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 A town in the North East HMCS region; however it was necessary to 
broaden this area to include a neighbouring city, as many barristers and 
solicitors who undertake cases in the town’s courts are actually based in 
the city, and a low response rate was received from legal professionals 
based in the town 
 Two towns in the South East HMCS region238 
 Two small towns in the South West HMCS region.239 It was necessary to 
extend the sample of barristers to a South West city where the majority of 
barristers who undertake family law work in the selected South West 
region are based.  
 
Because it was not possible to interview members of the judiciary, I decided to 
increase the number of professionals to be interviewed in each selected area to two, 
yielding a total sample of 30 interviewees. It is recognised that the relatively small 
size of this sample would not enable statistical generalisations to be made. However, 
qualitative interview studies are often conducted with small samples,
240
 and Lange 
observes that “discourse analysis focuses on a detailed, in-depth analysis of the 
construction of the discourse itself and hence only a small sample can be entirely 
sufficient”.241  Additionally, since my study population is fairly homogenous, it is 
suggested that a very large sample size would not be necessary.
242
 Researchers 
undertaking studies of a similar nature have also utilised small samples for 
interview.
243
  
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
applying to that city) county courts in the area received a total of 3,179 private law Children Act 
applications. 
238
 Two towns were selected, as the professionals practising in those areas cover the county courts and 
FPCs in both towns. From April 2006 to March 2007 county courts of both towns combined received 
1,178 private law Children Act applications. 
239
 It was decided to include two towns because the solicitors and barristers practising in those areas 
typically cover cases in the county courts and FPCs in both towns. In the year April 2006 to March 
2007 the county courts of both towns together received 467 private law Children Act applications. 
240
 See Rudestam and Newton (n 97); Silverman (n 98)  
241
 Lange (n 28) 183 
242
 The less varied the parent population is, the smaller the potential sampling error will be – Kane (n 
183)  
243
 See Christine Piper and Felicity Kaganas, ‘The Family Law Act 1996 s1(d): How Will “They” 
Know There is a Risk of Violence?’(1997) 9(3) CFLQ 279-289, who interviewed a sample of 36 
solicitors selected from firms in two geographical areas for their study on disclosure of domestic 
violence under the Family Law Act 1996. 
55 
 
 
6.4.3 Compiling the sampling frames 
Barristers 
My study population of barristers was defined as all barristers in England and Wales 
who describe themselves in directories and on their chambers’ websites as practising 
predominantly in family law. There is, however, no complete list of such 
barristers.
244
 The most comprehensive list available would be that held by the Bar’s 
professional indemnity insurers.
245
 However, it was not possible to obtain access to 
that list, nor to the membership list of the Family Law Bar Association, for reasons 
of confidentiality. 
 
I therefore compiled a list of barristers who specialise in family law in the five 
selected areas by reviewing the websites of all chambers in those and surrounding 
areas.
246
 I cross-checked the accuracy of the resulting list against all barristers in 
those areas who are listed in Waterlow’s Directory as undertaking family law work 
as their sole or main area of practice,
247
 as well as all leading family practitioners 
listed in Chambers Directory.
248
 I excluded barristers over 20 years’ call as they are 
unlikely to undertake a significant amount of private law Children Act work. The 
resultant sampling frame was as follows: 
North East towns: 12 barristers 
North West town: 13 barristers 
South East towns: 26 barristers 
South West city: 8 barristers 
London: a complete sampling frame of all barristers based in London who undertake 
private law Children Act work was not compiled because the total number would 
have been extremely large in proportion to the actual interview sample of two 
                                                 
244
 The Bar Directory contains a full list of all barristers in private practice in England and Wales; 
while areas of practice are listed for some individual barristers, this does not apply consistently 
throughout. 
245
 Professional indemnity insurance with the Bar’s own scheme is compulsory for all barristers in 
private practice; they have to indicate on the application form each year the types and proportions of 
work which they undertake. 
246
 The areas of specialism of all members of chambers are indicated on the websites 
247
 Waterlow’s Directory lists all barristers in private practice in England and Wales and includes a 
note of each barrister’s areas of practice, but only where the barristers themselves have supplied this 
information. See Waterlow’s Solicitors’ and Barristers’ Directory (Waterlow Publishing 2010) 
248
 Chambers Directory describes itself as listing leading solicitors and barristers in private practice. 
See www.chambersandpartners.com last accessed 15.10.11 
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barristers.
249
 Additionally, because of my own professional practice, I frequently 
appeared in court against many of the barristers in London who undertake family law 
work, and it was therefore necessary to screen out those barristers with whom I was 
closely acquainted. The two interviewees were purposively selected on the basis of 
the high proportion of private law Children Act work that they undertook. 
 
Solicitors 
My study population of solicitors was defined as all solicitors in England and Wales 
who specialise in family law work. A complete list of all such solicitors is not 
available. I therefore compiled a list of solicitors who specialise in family law in the 
five selected areas by reviewing the Resolution website,
250
 which enables a search of 
all members of Resolution by town. I then cross-checked each individual solicitor 
against their entries in their firms’ websites to screen out solicitors who only 
undertake public law or financial divorce work.
251
 The resulting sampling frame was 
as follows: 
 
North East towns: 25 solicitors 
North West town: 26 solicitors 
South East towns: 35 solicitors 
South West towns: 17 solicitors 
London: as with barristers, a complete sampling frame of all solicitors based in 
London who undertake private law Children Act work was not compiled because the 
total number would have been extremely large in proportion to the actual interview 
sample of two solicitors.
252
 The two interviewees were purposively selected on the 
basis of the high proportion of private law Children Act work that they undertook. 
 
 
 
                                                 
249
 55 sets of chambers in London have a significant number of barristers who specialise in family law 
work. 
250
 Resolution, formerly the Solicitors’ Family Law Association, is the Law Society’s membership 
sub-group of solicitors who specialise in family law 
251
 I also excluded those solicitors who did not specify the type of work they undertook but did not 
undertake publicly funded cases as it was considered that they may not undertake a significant amount 
of private law Children Act work, and because in some areas the sampling frame would have been 
extremely wide. 
252
 During the sampling period there were nearly 700 Resolution members in the London region. 
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Cafcass officers 
My study population of Cafcass officers was defined as all FCAs employed by 
Cafcass in England. The respondents were selected by the service managers of the 
Cafcass offices in each of the five sample areas, who circulated a request to their 
staff. The sampling frame comprised those FCA’s who contacted me as a result of 
that request. A full account of the process of obtaining permission to interview 
Family Court Advisors is set out below. 
 
6.4.4 Drafting the interview schedules 
As discussed above, I decided to utilise semi-structured interview schedules, 
comprising open-ended questions, while retaining uniformity in the sequence and 
format of the questions. Open-ended questions are the most effective route by which 
to gather an ‘authentic’ understanding of people’s views and experiences, and give 
respondents greater freedom in the way they answer questions.
253
 Closed questions 
were not utilised in the interview schedule as, although they are easier and quicker to 
analyse, they tend to compartmentalise responses.
254
 The use of prompts and probes 
enabled me to maintain a flexible format, and to encourage the respondents to 
elaborate on their responses.
255
  The use of open-ended questions enables the 
interviewer to enhance the in-depth qualitative data sought, while the standardised 
format increases the reliability of the data, enables the researcher to control the 
direction of the interview to ensure that the data sought is obtained, and facilitates 
analysis.
256
  The use of open-ended questions with a standardised format has been 
used by other researchers to good effect.
257
  
 
In order to facilitate the interview process and put the respondents at their ease, I 
placed broader, less demanding questions at the start of the interview.
258
 Two 
hypothetical case studies, which covered issues already examined in direct question 
                                                 
253
 May, Social Research Issues (n 7); Silverman(n 98)  
254
 May, Social Research Issues (n 7), notes that convenience of analysis should not be a reason for 
choosing a particular format of interview; it is the aim of the research that should guide the method. 
255
 See Fetterman (n 97); Hesse-Biber(n 118) 126 
256
 May (2001) op cit FN 4; Fetterman (1989) op cit FN 31 
257
 For example, Kathleen Daly utilised this method in her study of ‘judicial paternalism’ when she 
interviewed judges to determine if their sentencing differs for men and women defendants – see 
Reinharz (n 4) 39 
258
 This is recommended by a number of commentators, such as Hesse-Biber (n 118) 
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format, were used to increase the reliability of the interviews and enable further 
exploration of participants’ practices and perceptions.  
 
All interviews, including the pilot interviews, were recorded digitally, to overcome 
the limitations on manual transcription and recollection, to enable precise 
observations to be made, and to provide direct access to the data by other 
researchers.
259
  
 
The interview schedule for barristers and solicitors was completed by December 
2009, and for FCAs in March 2010. The same interview schedule was utilised for 
both barristers and solicitors; certain questions were adapted for each group of 
professionals, where necessary. The interview schedules can be found at Appendices 
F and G. 
 
6.4.5 Piloting the interviews 
Pilot interviews were undertaken between December 2009 and March 2010 with a 
junior barrister (under 10 years’ call), a senior solicitor (over 10 years’ practice) and 
a solicitor of 12 years’ practice who had transferred to the Bar five years 
previously.
260
 Convenience sampling was used for selecting the barristers and 
solicitors for the pilot study, bearing in mind that while convenience sampling is 
rarely an adequate sampling method, it has utility in pilot studies.
261
 When piloting 
the interviews, I sought the opinion of the respondents on the nature of the questions 
and any difficulties they experienced in answering them, and adjusted the interview 
schedule accordingly. The pilot interview with the senior solicitor in London was 
particularly useful, and since I had not revised the interview schedule significantly 
since that interview, I decided to utilise it as my second solicitor respondent for the 
London area.
262
 
 
 
 
                                                 
259
 See May, Social Research Issues, (n 7) 138; Silverman (n 98) 119 
260
 Silverman (n 98) 149, observes that pre-testing an interview schedule is important for improving 
the reliability of qualitative research that is concerned with narrative structure. 
261
 Babbie (n 171) 
262
 This was the last pilot interview, conducted on 9th March 2010; the interview schedule had already 
been adjusted following the earlier two pilot interviews. 
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6.4.6 Interviews with Cafcass officers  
Obtaining permission for the interviews  
The process for obtaining permission to interview FCAs commenced in January 
2010. After substantial enquiries over a period of almost six months, I was contacted 
in June 2010 by Cafcass’s new research officer, who provided me with the relevant 
application forms and supporting documents. A significant amount of information 
was required about the project, including the research process, aims and objectives, 
and benefits to Cafcass. By the beginning of December 2010 the proposal and 
supporting documents were complete and sent to Cafcass.
263
  
 
On 11th January 2011 I was informed that my research had the full support of 
Cafcass’s Research Governance Committee, subject to certain conditions relating to 
the acknowledgement of Cafcass in my final report and the provision of the report to 
Cafcass. On 28th January 2011 I signed the letter of agreement, and requested 
information about the appropriate procedure for identifying interviewees. At the 
beginning of February 2011 I was advised to write to the service managers of the 
local Cafcass offices to seek their assistance in identifying respondents to interview. 
Cafcass’s research officer also very helpfully sent internal emails to some of the 
service managers, encouraging them to assist me in my research. 
 
Identifying FCAs and the interview process 
The process of identifying FCAs to interview took a substantial amount of time and 
involved repeated attempts to contact individual service managers.
264
 Because of the 
difficulties experienced when attempting to conduct the interviews while at the same 
time meeting the demands of my professional practice, I took a short sabbatical from 
my professional practice and conducted all the interviews in May 2011, apart from 
those in London which were undertaken in June 2011.
265
 All interviews were held at 
the local Cafcass offices. 
 
                                                 
263
 The documents submitted to Cafcass, as required by their research governance procedures, 
comprised: the application form; research proposal; draft interview schedule; data collection themes; 
research participants’ information sheet; informed consent form; CV for the researcher and her 
supervisor. 
264
 It should be noted that all service managers were extremely helpful in identifying interviewees. 
265
 These difficulties experienced in the interview process are detailed more fully below. 
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London Cafcass: I first attempted to contact the service manager of Cafcass at the 
PRFD on 22nd March 2011. Numerous attempts to contact her, by email, letter and 
telephone, were made, including two personal visits to Cafcass at the PRFD. On my 
second visit to the PRFD in June 2011, the service manager helpfully offered to 
identify two Cafcass officers immediately, who made themselves available for 
interview later that day.  
 
South East Cafcass:  On 22nd March 2011 I wrote to the service manager of Cafcass 
in one of the South East towns,
266
 and followed up the letter with telephone calls and 
an email. An FCA emailed me directly; the interview took place on 9th May 2011.  
Unfortunately the only other FCA employed by Cafcass in the South East office was 
under too much pressure of work to participate in an interview.
267
 The interview 
undertaken with the FCA on 9th May 2011 was, however, very detailed and 
informative. 
 
North West Cafcass:  On 22nd March 2011 I wrote to, and telephoned, the service 
manager of Cafcass in the North West town. On 8th April 2011 I received telephone 
calls from two FCAs who both agreed to be interviewed; the interviews were held on 
25th May 2011. 
 
South West Cafcass
268
: On 22nd March 2011 I wrote to the local service manager, 
followed by a number of telephone messages and emails. The service manager 
advised me on 15
th
 April 2011 that he would request volunteers for the interviews 
and, following a number of ‘chasing’ emails, on 12th May 2011 I was sent a list of 
five Cafcass officers who were willing to be interviewed. I emailed all the Cafcass 
officers on the list; three FCAs responded and interviews were undertaken with two 
FCAs on 18th May 2011, and the third on 27th May 2011.
269
 
 
North East Cafcass:  On 22nd March 2011 I wrote to the Cafcass service manager 
and followed this up with a number of telephone messages and emails. I eventually 
                                                 
266
 The Cafcass office in that town also covers the other South East town. 
267
 The South East was the only area in which it was not possible to interview two Cafcass officers. 
268
 One Cafcass office covers both of the small towns in the South West from which participants were 
selected. 
269
 I decided to interview the third Cafcass officer in the South West, as my research sample only 
included professionals from one small town and this Cafcass office covers a wide geographical area.  
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managed to speak to the service manager on 21st April 2011, who said that she 
would make enquiries of her staff and contact me thereafter. After a number of 
‘chasing’ emails, I received a telephone call from an FCA on 6th May 2013 who 
agreed to be interviewed and indicated that a colleague from her office may also 
agree to do so. Both FCAs were interviewed on 10th May 2011. 
 
6.4.7 Interviews with barristers and solicitors: conducting the 
interviews 
 
It was decided that three or four professionals from each sampling frame in each area 
would be contacted initially, by email or by letter (if no individual email address 
could be located). If no response was received after follow-up emails, letters or 
telephone calls were made, the other professionals contained in the sampling frame 
would be contacted.  
 
London and the South East 
Some of the interviews in London and the South East were undertaken first, for 
reasons of time and resources. The potential respondents were contacted in April 
2010. Two solicitors in the South East were interviewed in May 2010, and two 
solicitors and a barrister in London were interviewed in March and May 2010.
270
  
 
Difficulties arose, however, in arranging dates for the interviews with the other 
barrister in London and the barristers in the South East. Although the second 
barrister in London agreed to be interviewed, this did not take place, despite 
protracted attempts at setting a date, due to the barrister’s and my own professional 
commitments. I therefore contacted the next barrister in the sample in June 2011, and 
interviewed her at the beginning of September 2011. Two of the four barristers in the 
South East who were initially contacted in May 2010 agreed to be interviewed; after 
a large number of cancelled appointments due to their professional commitments, the 
interviews were eventually undertaken at the beginning of May 2011. 
 
 
 
                                                 
270
 The solicitor interviewed in March 2010 comprised the last pilot interview, as noted above. 
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The North West 
Ten solicitors in the original North West city selected were contacted but none 
responded to the request, despite ‘chasing’ emails being sent. Only one barrister was 
interviewed (in December 2010). By the end of December 2010 it became apparent 
that, because of my professional commitments and those of the interviewees, it 
would not be possible for me to undertake any of the interviews while still 
practising, as I needed the time and flexibility to accommodate the constant changes 
in the work diaries of the respondents. I therefore decided to take a professional 
sabbatical and conduct all the remaining interviews in all regions in May 2011. 
 
Because of the lack of response from solicitors in the original city selected in the 
North West, I decided to revise the sampling area to another, demographically 
similar city. Of a total of eight solicitors contacted during April and May 2011, only 
one responded and agreed to be interviewed. However, two other solicitors at his 
firm joined in with that interview, which was conducted at the beginning of July 
2011. Four barristers were contacted at the end of March 2011, two of whom were 
interviewed on the 24th May 2011.  
 
The South West 
A total of 12 solicitors in the South West were contacted. One from each town 
agreed to be interviewed and the interviews took place in May 2011. Four barristers 
were initially contacted – two based in chambers in one of the South West small 
towns, the other two based in the South West city.
271
 The barristers based in the 
small town never responded; two barristers based in the city responded positively 
and were interviewed in May 2011.  
 
The North East 
A total of six solicitors in the North East town were contacted between March and 
May 2011; none responded positively. Of five barristers in the North East who were 
contacted during 2010 and 2011, only two agreed to be interviewed but because of 
their work commitments it was not possible to undertake either face-to-face or 
telephone interviews. Accordingly, I decided to contact solicitors and barristers in 
                                                 
271
 The other South West small town had no sets of barristers’ chambers. 
63 
 
the neighbouring city, as practitioners based in the city also undertake cases in the 
county court in the North East town. Two solicitors out of the nine I had contacted 
responded positively; they were interviewed in the second and third week of May 
2011. All six barristers based in the North East city who appeared to undertake a 
substantial amount of private law Children Act work were contacted but despite 
follow-up letters and telephone messages, none responded to my request. 
Accordingly, no interviews were undertaken with barristers in the North East.  
 
6.4.8 Addendum questionnaires 
Because the initial interviews were undertaken in 2010, prior to the implementation 
of the revised Private Law Programme, and when the Guidance on Split Hearings 
had only just been issued, a brief questionnaire, comprising a limited number of 
open-ended questions, was sent to those respondents who were interviewed in 2010. 
Despite follow-up requests being sent, only one response (from a barrister in 
London) was received.
272
  
 
7. Ethical Issues 
A number of aspects of this project raised ethical issues, primarily arising out of the 
use of interviews as a research method, namely, ensuring the voluntary participation 
and informed consent of the participants, maintaining their confidentiality, and 
striving for honesty and openness in the research process. 
 
These issues have, at their core, the recognition that research participants are not 
‘objects of study’ but are to be valued and appreciated by developing non-
exploitative relations between researcher and participant.
273
 Reinharz advocates 
developing non-exploitative relations with participants without attempting to achieve 
‘rapport’ or ‘intimacy’ with them. “Relations of respect, shared information, 
openness, and clarity of communication seem like reasonable substitute goals.”274  
 
In order to ensure that all respondents participated voluntarily in the research and 
had sufficient information about the research to give their informed consent, I sent a 
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‘Research Statement’ providing basic details of the research, together with an 
‘Informed Consent Form’ in advance to all participants. It was made clear in those 
documents that if, at any stage before or during the interview, the participant wished 
to terminate it, they would be free to do so. Confidentiality and anonymity of the 
participants was maintained by only the researcher and her supervisors having access 
to information that could identify the participants,
275
 and the use of pseudonyms for 
all participants. The small number of Cafcass officers employed in some areas could 
have led to their identification; as a consequence, none of the towns and cities in 
which participants were based have been identified. Additionally, a number of 
examples of cases provided by participants had highly unusual facts, which could 
have led to the parties to the proceedings and the children being identified. Where 
such cases have been referred to in this thesis, any such facts have been omitted or 
have been altered slightly to preserve anonymity. 
 
My application for ethics clearance was submitted to the Brunel Law School 
Research Ethics Committee in November 2008. The work undertaken to complete 
the Expedited Review Checklist involved identifying and writing up my sampling 
procedure for the selection of barristers and solicitors to interview and explaining my 
rationale for the use of human participants. I also submitted my interview schedule, 
the research participant information sheet and informed consent form. Ethical 
approval was granted on 14th January 2009. 
 
Finally, I had to consider my position as an ‘insider’. On the one hand, being an 
‘insider’ can help establish credibility among participants, and the quality of 
interview data and reliability can be enhanced when the researcher is knowledgeable 
about and integrated into the community under study.
276
 ‘Insider status’ can also 
assist in obtaining co-operation and rapport with participants.
277
 On the other hand, 
there are advantages to being an ‘outsider’, as participants may perceive the 
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researcher to be less biased, and the researcher will be more likely to ask questions 
on issues that she might otherwise take for granted as ‘shared knowledge’.278  
 
8. Analysis 
The data obtained from the interviews and case review were analysed thematically, 
utilising initial categories or themes derived from the Practice Direction itself and 
from existing research on the subject of this study.
279
 
 
Hesse-Biber observes that: “The key to data analysis is to search for meanings within 
the data.”280 This essentially involves “breaking down the data and reconfiguring 
them into new forms”.281 Memoing and coding are considered two important 
components of such analysis.  Coding is a technique used to conceptualise the raw 
data.
282
  Data can be coded either inductively or into preconceived code categories, 
and can be quite literal and specific, or larger and more conceptual in nature.
283
  
Memoing involves the process of writing up the researcher’s interpretations of the 
data. Meaning emerges from the ongoing process of coding and memoing.  
 
When undertaking discourse analysis, it is important to read and re-read the texts in 
order to ‘immerse’ oneself in the data. Gill recommends that coding be undertaken as 
inclusively as possible.
284
 The researcher should search for patterns in the data, both 
with respect to variability (differences within and between accounts) and 
consistency, followed by attempts to identify the functions of particular features of 
the discourse.
285
 From a feminist perspective, discourse analysis assists in 
deconstructing the text “to see not only what is there but also what is missing, 
                                                 
278
 ibid. However, Hesse-Biber points out that insider/outsider status is fluid and can even change 
during the course of the interview. Indeed, I found myself to be very much an ‘outsider’ with respect 
to some data provided by FCAs. 
279
 A copy of the initial Data Collection Themes can be found at Appendix H 
280
 Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber, ‘Putting it Together: Feminist Research Praxis’ in Hesse-Biber and 
Leavy (n 92) 332 
281
 Creswell (n 12) 20 
282
 Anselm M Strauss, Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists (CUP 1987) 20-21. See also Hesse-
Biber (n 279) 333 
283
 See Leavy (n 93) 231. See also Hesse-Biber (n 279) 344 
284
 Gill (n 87) 145 
285
 ibid 146 
66 
 
silenced, or absent. The goal of this kind of research is…to deconstruct the text to 
see what is revealed, what emerges, what juxtapositions develop.”286  
 
Because the Practice Direction itself breaks down into categories the areas of interest 
and concern to this project, it was possible to formulate tentative broad data 
collection themes in advance of analysis.
287
 This had the advantages of providing a 
broad structure to the interview schedules, and facilitated the analysis process, while 
at the same time it enabled me to be sensitive to new or different categories that 
emerged. Formulating broad pre-conceived categories also enhances reliability by 
setting out transparently what the data collection themes are, and the method of 
coding the raw data.
288
  
 
Lange suggests a two-stage analysis process in order to encompass the differing 
approaches to data analysis demanded by qualitative and discourse analytic 
research.
289
During the first stage, the data is searched for consistency “in order to 
identify key themes, while trying to remain sensitive to detecting variation.”290 From 
a discourse analytic perspective, the data is then coded into large sections “in order 
not to lose a feeling for the...discourse as a whole” while at the same time 
interrogating the themes to determine their function.
291
 The coding categories can 
then be linked to detect patterns in the data. The data, from a qualitative perspective, 
can then be treated as ‘evidence’. During the second stage, the data can be more 
closely analysed from a discourse analytic perspective to determine how the 
narrative is constructed and through what discursive techniques arguments are built.  
 
The interviews were analysed with the assistance of NVivo software by coding them 
into a total of 60 detailed categories within the broad functional themes set out in 
Appendix H.
292
 Simultaneously, memos were written up and linked to the codes to 
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assist with the final analysis and discussion. The codes were then grouped into 
broader categories as patterns in the data emerged, namely:  
 
 Understanding domestic violence: 
 Professionals’ perceptions of domestic violence 
 Participants’ views on the description of domestic violence in the Practice 
Direction 
 Judicial perceptions of domestic violence 
 The ‘presumption of contact’ 
 Judicial and professional attitudes to mother and fathers: 
 When is domestic violence ‘relevant’ to contact 
 Seeking agreement for contact: advice or coercion? 
 Consent orders 
 Fact-finding hearings: 
 Frequency of fact-finding hearings 
 Effect of the Guidance on Split Hearings on fact-finding hearings 
 Are fact-finding hearings held when listed? 
 What happens to disputed allegations of domestic violence if separate 
fact-finding hearings are not held? 
 Willingness of judicial officers to hold fact-finding hearings and of 
family lawyers to request them 
 Reasons why fact-finding hearings may not be held 
 Are fact-finding hearings held where appropriate? 
 Participants’ views on fact-finding hearings 
 The nature, effect and consequences of ‘findings of fact’ and ‘evidence’ 
 Interim orders: 
 What orders do courts make for contact pending fact-finding hearings? 
 Recommendations by Cafcass officers for interim contact 
 Lawyers’ advice to parents on interim contact pending fact-finding 
hearings 
 Assessing ‘risk’ after the fact-finding hearing 
                                                                                                                                          
discussion of this study as they are not directly relevant to the theoretical approach guiding this thesis. 
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 Application of Paragraph 27 of the Practice Direction after findings of fact 
are made 
 Advice by family lawyers to parents about outcomes where domestic 
violence is proved or admitted 
 Orders when findings of domestic violence are made 
 Ensuring safety if final orders for contact are made 
 Domestic violence perpetrator programmes and other interventions for 
perpetrators 
 
The interviews were further closely interrogated within these categories to uncover 
the discursive techniques and narrative repertoires employed by professionals.  
 
The reported cases were analysed thematically utilising a discourse analytic 
approach, to examine how the ‘facts’ of the cases were constructed, how the 
discursive context influenced the judges, and how the  judgments both reinforce, and 
are reinforced by prevailing discourses and ideologies informing current family law. 
As Smart observes: “Cases, taken over time, can of course indicate how influential 
new forms of narratives are becoming.”293 Additionally, a qualitative approach was 
adopted to ascertain, as far as possible, the extent to which, and manner in which, the 
lower and appellate courts follow the provisions of the Practice Direction. When 
analysing the case law, it should be borne in mind that the judgments will not 
provide the reader with a full account of all aspects of the case but are limited to the 
issues upon which the court is adjudicating and/or are the subjects of the appeal. The 
‘facts’ of the case reported are those considered by the judge as relevant to those 
issues or that appeal.  
 
The results of the case analysis are included in the analysis of the interviews in order 
to present a cohesive picture of the perceptions and practices of judicial officers and 
professionals in contact cases to which the Practice Direction applies. Additionally, 
the findings of current research on the application of the Practice Direction were 
included in the analysis and discussion. The findings and discussion are presented in 
Chapters 4 to 7 of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
 THE PRESUMPTION OF CONTACT: LEGAL 
CONSTRUCTIONS OF CHILDREN AND 
PARENTS 
 
The way in which children and parents are constructed in and by legal discourse 
has profound implications for the way in which courts and professionals respond 
to contact cases in which domestic violence is an issue. The importance attached 
to contact between children and non-resident fathers, and the familial images that 
are evoked by selective constructions of children’s welfare, can have a 
significant impact on the ability of women to articulate a valid subject position in 
law, and achieve recognition of the moral value of their own needs for safety, 
protection and autonomy. 
 
1. Legal constructions of children’s welfare 
 
“For a long time now it has been accepted by everybody who has 
much experience  in these sad cases of broken unions of parents that, 
save in exceptional circumstances, it is of very real importance in the 
interests of a child’s emotional health as he or she grows up that there 
should be contact with the non-custodial parent.” 
 
This was the view expressed by Mr. Justice Latey in Re B (A Minor) (Access) 
[1984].
1
 It is a view that has remained at the core of contact proceedings for the 
past forty years, and is based on the virtually incontestable assumption that the 
psychological and social science clinical findings, research and literature all 
support the proposition that children ‘need’ contact with non-resident fathers for 
their emotional, psychological and developmental health. This construction of 
children’s welfare has increasingly been underpinned by, and has shaped family 
policy since the late 1970s as well as legal decision-making and professional 
practice in private law Children Act proceedings. 
 
                                                 
1
 Re B (A Minor) (Access) [1984] 1 FLR 648, 649 
70 
 
However, children’s welfare has not always been constructed in this way, and the 
‘welfare principle’ has not always been family law’s guiding precept. Until the 
mid-nineteenth century, fathers had absolute rights by common law over 
legitimate children; this paternal authority was portrayed as crucial to the familial 
and social order and in this way, masculine authority was naturalised.
2
  By the 
1950s, however, women’s roles as mothers were seen as increasingly important 
for children’s emotional and psychological welfare, and their position in the 
home was reinforced by ‘maternal deprivation’ theories, which coincided with 
the political imperative to reduce the female workforce.
3
 The breadwinner 
ideology worked to ensure a role for the father in the family by the enforced 
dependence of women and children on the male breadwinner.
4
  
 
The breadwinner ideology went largely unchallenged until the early 1970s, when 
a range of social, cultural and economic developments combined to render the 
construction of the father as economic provider increasingly problematic.
5
 There 
was a vast increase in lone-parent families and in the proportion of lone parents 
dependent on state benefits.
6
 The ideology of the ‘normal’ family with male 
breadwinner/female carer therefore increasingly diverged from reality.
7
 This 
contributed to a moral panic about, and an increasing fear of autonomous 
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motherhood, and threw into question the ideology of paternal subjectivity based 
on the centrality of work.
8
 
 
A crucial shift in material and ideological conditions occurred from 1979, when 
the Conservative government came into power with the aim of ‘rolling back the 
frontiers of the state’.9 The New Right, which espoused laissez-faire 
individualism and which was characterised by moral authoritarianism, sought to 
reinstate and reinforce the family form that could best be ‘privatised’ – the 
traditional nuclear family with its breadwinner ideology – in order to ensure 
more effectively that the family and not the state was responsible for its own 
fortunes and misfortunes.
10
 Lone motherhood was strongly condemned and 
constructed as a major social problem,
11
 and the traditional nuclear family was 
reasserted as the key to national prosperity, economic self-sufficiency and moral 
and social order.
12
 
 
The developments that occurred during the late 1960s and the 1970s led to a 
perceived crisis for the father’s role in the family whereby men were portrayed as 
‘losing out’ to increasingly empowered women,13 and the law was seen as 
contributing to the construction of fathers as outside of, and even inimical to, the 
mother and child unit.
14
 So while the father’s legal authority waned, it was 
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through the ‘welfare of the child’ that law constructed the father “as a desirable 
presence in the family”,15 by regarding him “as more and more central to the 
family in emotional and psychological terms.”16 The ‘logic of durability’ 
therefore emerged primarily because of the need for a new means to tie men to 
children.
17
 So the way in which the welfare principle has developed indicates that 
it has always been constituted and underpinned by gendered relations of power 
that arise out of specific historical, material and social conditions that sustain 
dominant interests. 
 
1.1 Narrowing the ‘welfare principle’- the presumption of 
contact 
 
Although social theorists in recent years have begun to see childhood as a 
socially constructed and variable concept, social, political and popular discourses 
still reflect and are underpinned by enlightenment discourses of rationality and 
universality which raised and reinforced images of children as incomplete beings 
on the way to becoming fully rational adults.
18
 It was these discourses that led to 
universal, developmental notions of childhood, by which it was assumed that all 
children “progress through an inevitable process of maturation on their way to 
becoming ‘finished products’.”19 These discourses inform private law Children 
Act proceedings, which are dominated by images of the dependent, ‘unfinished’ 
child, whose physical, psychological and developmental ‘needs’ must be met in 
order to enable her or him to reach competent, well-adjusted maturity. Just as the 
notion of ‘childhood’ is constructed, so “children’s needs are socially defined, 
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socially sustained and socially adjusted to conform with prevailing values and 
expectations.”20 Since the 1970s, these ‘needs’ have been increasingly and now 
almost exclusively defined in contact proceedings in terms of contact with non-
resident fathers. 
 
Case law since the 1970s demonstrates an increasing reliance on, and 
endorsement of, the child’s ‘need’ for contact with non-resident fathers, 
providing courts with a basis for decision-making that enabled them to narrow 
the indeterminacy of the welfare principle.
21
 In some cases courts used a 
complex interaction of rights and welfare discourses, together with forceful 
appeals to ‘nature’ and common sense. “[A] child, by the principle of law and 
nature, had the right to benefit from contact with his lawful or biological 
parent.”22    
 
Before the Children Act 1989 was introduced courts were more willing to inquire 
into the particular circumstances of the case, including the quality of contact, 
and, on occasions, found the father wanting. For example, in Starling v Starling 
(1983),
23
 the Court of Appeal said of the father, who had had no involvement in 
the child’s life, that he “had put forward no positive benefit to the child from 
having any further contact and the judge failed to apply his mind to the very 
strong reasons that exist for denying access.”24  
 
The endorsement of the child’s perceived need for contact increased in intensity 
and focus after the implementation of the Children Act 1989, which introduced 
the gender-neutral concept of ‘parental responsibility’, which has underpinned 
family law ever since, and which evokes a powerful normative ideology of 
permanent dual parenting to which all parents should aspire in the interests of 
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their children.
25
 However, by framing parental responsibility as a status, distinct 
from the exercise of care, the effect of the Children Act was to elevate parental 
rights to decision-making rather than to encourage responsibility for childcare, so 
that the practice of caring for children became increasingly invisible as the status 
of fatherhood gained political, legal and popular currency.
26
 These developments, 
and in particular the increasing alignment of children’s and fathers’ interests, 
gave a new voice to fathers and meant that it became increasingly difficult for 
mothers to articulate a valid voice and authority in relation to their children, as 
“the changed deployment of the welfare principle with equality claims have 
combined to make fathers’ claims virtually unanswerable.”27  
 
It is in this context that case law developed which interpreted the welfare 
principle almost solely in terms of the child’s ‘need’ to maintain contact with 
non-resident parents.
28
 According to Butler-Sloss LJ: “It is the general 
proposition, underpinned undoubtedly by the Children Act 1989…that it is in the 
interests of a child to retain contact with the parent [with whom he does not 
live]”.29 By emphasising the biological link and portraying contact as therefore 
‘natural’, the benefits of contact do not need to be questioned.30 In this way, the 
‘welfare of the child’ operates as a device to erase the father’s conduct from legal 
discourse informing child contact proceedings. Rather than considering how 
contact could benefit the child, courts framed the question in the alternative, as 
exemplified by the judgment of Balcombe LJ in Re D (A Minor) (Contact: 
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Mother’s Hostility),  the leading authority on the ‘general principles’ to be 
applied by courts in contact cases:  
 
“No court should deprive a child of access to either parent unless it 
was wholly satisfied that it was in the interests of the child that 
access should cease, and that was a conclusion at which the court 
should be extremely slow to arrive. … the test to be applied was 
whether there were cogent reasons why the child should be denied 
the opportunity of access to their natural father.”31  
 
Not only is contact viewed as beneficial to children; lack of contact is seen as 
positively detrimental and harmful. In Re O (Contact: Imposition of Conditions)  
Balcombe LJ said:  
 
“Where parents of a child are separated and the child is in the day-to-
day care of one of them, it is almost always in the interests of the 
child that he or she should have contact with the other parent. The 
reason for this scarcely needs spelling out. It is, of course, that the 
separation of parents involves a loss to the child, and it is desirable 
that that loss should so far as possible be made good by contact with 
the non-custodial parent.”32  
 
So we can see how “[t]he complex problem of child welfare has been reduced to 
the simple ‘solution’ of contact, which is being applied across the board 
regardless of the reality of parental and parent/child relationships.”33 
 
1.2 Political constructions of children’s welfare 
The perceived importance of fathers for children’s welfare continued to underpin 
and to be reinforced by New Labour government policy, but with a new and 
distinctive paradigm shift towards co-parenting as opposed to mere ‘father-
presence’, and “the belief that the promotion and encouragement of ‘active 
parenting’ on the part of men is something which is, or should be, a desirable 
                                                 
31
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(Contact) [1993] 2 FLR 762; Re H (Contact)(Principles) [1994] 2 FLR 969; Re O (Contact: 
Imposition of Conditions) [n 30]; Re M (Contact: Welfare Test) [1995] 1 FLR 274;  Re O 
(Contact: Withdrawal of Application) [2003] EWHC 3031 (Fam), [2004] 1 FLR 1258 [6] (Wall J 
as he then was). See also Wall LJ, ‘Enforcement of Contact Orders’ (2005) 35 Family Law 26-32, 
27 
32
 Re O (Contact: Imposition of Conditions) [n 30] 128 ( Balcombe LJ) 
33
 Carol Smart and Bren Neale, ‘Arguments Against Virtue – Must Contact be Enforced?’ (1997) 
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objective on the part of liberal democratic governments.”34 The ‘participant 
father’ was valorized in political and popular discourses in such a way that both 
fathers and children were seen as ‘suffering’ if this relationship was denied.35    
 
Central to the promotion of New Labour’s communitarian vision was a model of 
the family marked by “emotional and sexual equality, mutual rights and 
responsibilities, a negotiated authority over children, co-parenting and … a clear 
belief in promoting the commitment on the part of both women and men to 
lifelong obligations to children.”36  The Fathers’ Rights Movement [‘FRM’], 
together with discourses of the New Fatherhood,
37
  strongly influenced and 
shaped, and was bolstered by, the prevailing notions of gender equality, as their 
arguments “would, on the surface at least, appear to chime in a number of 
respects with the dominant welfare discourse,” and with New Labour’s ideal of 
the democratic, participant family.
38
 The FRM was effective in appealing to 
policy-makers, the media and the public, and in impacting on the construction of 
legal knowledge, by utilising not only the language of rights and equality 
developed by feminists but also on ‘welfare’ and ‘care’ talk.39  The fathers’ rights 
movement has not, however, sought to transform parenthood per se by promoting 
co-parenting in ‘intact’ families, but is “situated in the context of post-separation 
parenting,” in opposition to mothers.40  So the FRM is able to “draw strategically 
on this caring, sharing image, without this translating into any kind of shift in the 
gendered division of caring labour.”41 
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Indeed, a vast body of empirical research is available which suggests that the 
ideal is not matched by the reality, as parenting practices remain highly gender-
specific.
42
 Trinder refers to research findings indicating that: “Over the last 
decade father involvement in child care in intact families has increased, but still 
remains significantly lower than for mothers, even in dual earner families.”43  
 
What is therefore effaced by the debates around the ‘new fatherhood’, the 
rhetoric of parental responsibility and the assumptions of gender-neutrality, is the 
still-entrenched sexual division of labour and the ability of men to ‘opt out’ of 
caring.
44
  This results in a valorisation of abstract ‘fatherhood’, “and an implicit 
devaluing of ‘mothering’ and the caring work that it has traditionally entailed,”45 
so that the work of caring for children is disregarded or rendered invisible in 
family policy as well as by family courts and professionals in contact 
proceedings. 
 
The promotion of the permanent dual-parent family meant that the issue of 
contact moved up the political agenda under New Labour.
46
 Parents, according to 
the New Labour government, needed to be ‘educated’ to make rational decisions 
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about their children, and in order to act rationally, they needed to co-operate to 
enable conflict-free contact to take place.
47
 In 2000 a consultation into the 
facilitation and enforcement of contact was initiated and during the course of the 
ensuing years the ‘presumption of contact’ became increasingly entrenched in 
political discourses.
48
 The target set by the 2001 Public Service Agreement of the 
Lord Chancellor’s Department was to increase contact between children and non-
resident parents.
49
 In the subsequent government green and white papers, Making 
Contact Work, the promotion of post-separation contact was explicitly stated to 
be government policy,
50
 and the ‘benefits’ of such contact were presented as an 
‘obvious’ and incontestable truth: “After separation, both parents should have 
responsibility for, and a meaningful relationship with, their children, so long as it 
is safe. This is the view of most people in our society.”51 ‘Obstinate’, gate-
keeping mothers were portrayed as the primary obstacle to contact, and the 
solution was seen as disseminating ‘information’, promoting education, and the 
imposition of  more overtly coercive measures to “teach them how to be good 
parents and why the other parent matters because we want children to have both 
parents.”52   
 
These relentless messages had their intended effect on courts and professionals 
working in the family justice system, as mothers became subjected to an 
increasingly harsh response from the courts if they sought to limit or restrict 
contact between children and fathers. In this way, the ‘civilising offensive’ of 
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law and politics has gendered disciplinary and governmental effects – of 
governing the family through women, and disciplining women through the 
promotion of the egalitarian family.
53
 
 
1.3 How law selectively constructs children’s welfare 
As we have seen, the ‘benefits’ of contact have become indisputable and 
unchallengeable, and “in the hands of the courts, this ‘truth’ has become 
embedded in the law.”54 However, the vast majority of professionals and judicial 
officers working in the family justice system have not reviewed the studies and 
findings emanating from psychiatric, psychological and social science research 
about children’s welfare.55 Rather, they rely on the views expressed principally 
by the courts and by other professionals, which gives rise to a legal discourse that 
self-validates the presumption of contact. As discussed in Chapter 1, however, in 
contemporary society it is not law but the experts within the field of ‘child 
welfare science’ who alone can claim authoritatively to ‘know’ what is good or 
bad for children, and it is to such experts that law and other social systems turn 
for ‘the truth’ about children’s welfare.56  
 
However, because of its self-referential nature, law cannot directly import all the 
factors that science would recognise as capable of affecting children’s welfare – 
genetic, financial, educational, environmental and relational – but has to confine 
itself “to consideration of the individual means, behavior and relationships of the 
family members involved.”57  
 
Yet even this depoliticised, individualistic conception of child welfare presents 
courts with difficulties because of the indeterminate nature of the welfare 
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principle. Indeed, a problem that has taxed family courts for many decades is 
how to decide disputes concerning residence and contact without appearing 
arbitrary, unjust and uncertain. Partly for this reason, law has selected 
information from the ‘psy’ discourses and portrayed this as arising out of a 
consensus within these scientific discourses and therefore representing ‘the truth’ 
about children’s welfare.58 The result of this selective construction is that, within 
the world constituted by law, the impression can be given that it is able to 
advance children’s welfare by applying these scientific ‘truths’. However, the 
evidence from child welfare ‘science’ itself does not support law’s selective 
interpretation of it. 
 
Prior to the 1970s, child psychologists had promoted the idea that psychological 
damage was caused to children by the separation of their parents. By the end of 
the 1970s mental health professionals, such as Wallerstein and Kelly,
59
 were 
concluding that many post-separation problems in children also stemmed from 
conflict arising from custody and access problems, and that such ‘harm’ to 
children is best avoided by both parents cooperating and maintaining contact 
with the children. Judges, lawyers, child welfare professionals and policy-makers 
interpreted the vast body of social scientific and psychological literature as 
demonstrating a consensus among the ‘experts’ that contact, preferably arranged 
harmoniously by parents, benefits children, and lack of it causes them emotional 
and psychological harm.
60
  In Re F (Minors) (Contact: Mother’s Anxiety) 
Balcombe LJ referred to “the risk, well documented by medical and legal 
literature and cases that the children could be damaged by not having the right to 
know their own father.”61 Similarly Willbourne and Stanley (barristers) express 
the view that “most researchers agree that the long-term outcomes are better for 
children when they have contact with the non-residential parent.”62 
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However, law cannot directly import and reflect the complexities, ambiguities 
and differing theoretical perspectives found within scientific discourses on child 
health and development.
63
 Behind the hegemonic status of the assumption that 
children ‘need’ contact with non-resident parents lies a contingent, complex, 
contradictory and ambiguous body of research and theoretical literature that 
reveals no firm conclusions on how children’s welfare on parental separation can 
best be served.
64
 
 
Research from the late 1970s and early 1980s has been superseded by more 
methodologically sophisticated studies, some of which show “no correlation 
between child welfare and the amount of contact with the father.”65 Elliott et al 
note, with respect to psychological research on children and divorce over the 
previous decade that: “The picture this research gives is a complex one with no 
simple answer of how children are affected. There are many different children 
and many kinds of divorce.”66  
 
Much research yields contradictory or equivocal results.
67
  While Dunn’s study68 
reported ‘unequivocal’ findings that more contact with non-resident parents was 
associated with fewer adjustment problems in children, Smith’s study69 found no 
such effect at all. Amato and Keith examined fifteen studies on the outcomes of 
contact for children which pointed in different directions.
70
 Pryor and Rogers 
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conclude that “the assumption that contact per se is measurably good for children 
does not stand up to close scrutiny.”71  
 
A large number of studies have found that the quality of contact is more 
important for children’s wellbeing than frequency. Lewis concludes, from her 
review of the research, that “while the evidence that contact is good for children 
is mixed…it does seem that it is the nature and quality of the parenting by the 
contact parent that is important, rather than contact in and of itself.”72 Some 
studies have found that even good quality contact is not likely to be the most 
significant factor affecting children’s overall welfare on parental separation. 
From the 1990s, some researchers and clinicians emphasised the quality and 
stability of a child’s care and relationship with the primary carer as factors of 
major influence. In particular, the primary carer’s own emotional and mental 
health and well-being were found to be crucial to children’s welfare.73  
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What is also absent from legal/ political constructions of children’s welfare are 
the negative or ‘harmful’ aspects of contact, despite the existence of substantial 
literature on this issue.
74
  In their report to the Court of Appeal in Re L, Doctors 
Sturge and Glaser advised that: “Contact can only be an issue where it has the 
potential for benefiting the child in some way.”75 They list the benefits that can 
be derived from contact with fathers, as against the risks of contact, which 
include “failing to meet and actually undermining the child’s developmental 
needs or even causing emotional abuse and damage – directly through the contact 
or as a consequence of the contact.”76    
 
Many participants in Fortin et al’s research felt that there should be no contact if 
it did not positively promote children’s welfare, and that “no contact was better 
than bad contact.”77  
 
“One of our clearest findings is that it depends entirely on the 
individual child and parents in question whether contact will benefit 
that child in the short or long term. Successful contact is associated 
with a number of complex and inter-related factors, including such 
matters as a good quality relationship between the non-resident 
parent and child, the absence of conflict or domestic violence, no 
serious concerns about the non-resident parent’s caring abilities, the 
child’s own willingness to have contact.”78   
 
                                                 
74
 Diduck and Kaganas (n 26) 318 
75
 Claire Sturge and Danya Glaser, ‘Contact and Domestic Violence – The Experts’ Court 
Report’ (2000) 30 Family Law 615-629 
76
 ibid 620. See also Paul Amato, ‘Children of divorce in the 1990s: An update of the Amato and 
Keith (1991) meta analysis’ (2001) 15 Journal of Family Psychology 355;  James Pirrie, ‘Making 
Contact Safe’ (2004) 34 Family Law 837-843, reporting on a speech by Brian Cantwell at 
‘Making Contact Safe’ conference, London, September 2004;  Gordon Harold and Mervyn 
Murch, ‘Inter-parental conflict and children’s adaptation to separation and divorce: theory, 
research and implications for family law, practice and policy’ (2005) 17 CFLQ 185;  Steve 
Adams, ‘Parents’ Rights v Children’s Needs in Private Cases’ (2007) 37 Family Law 257-261, 
260; Gordon Harold and Leslie Leve, ‘Parents as partners: How the parental relationship affects 
children’s psychological development’ in Andrew Balfour, Mary Morgan and Christopher 
Vincent (eds), How couple relationships shape our world: Clinical practice, research and policy 
perspectives (Karnac 2012); Jane Fortin, Joan Hunt and Lesley Scanlan, Taking a longer view of 
contact: The perspectives of young adults who experienced parental separation in their youth 
(University of Sussex Law School 2012)  
77
 Fortin, Hunt and Scanlan (n 76) xii. Fortin et al interviewed young adults who had experienced 
parental separation in childhood. 
78
 ibid xvii. See also Jane Fortin, ‘Taking a longer view of contact: forthcoming research’ (2012) 
42 Family Law 906-908, 907 
84 
 
This review of the varied research and clinical findings on children’s welfare 
after parental separation supports Gilmore’s observation that “it is difficult to 
find support in research evidence for the view that there should be an assumption 
that contact is beneficial.”79  
 
It should be made clear that it is not being asserted that the research discussed 
above presents a ‘correct’ or a ‘truer’ picture of children’s welfare on parental 
separation, nor that the promotion of contact in individual cases is necessarily 
‘mistaken’. On the contrary, what is being explored is the contingent and 
provisional nature of the concept of ‘the welfare of the child’. Once we accept 
that concepts like the ‘welfare of the child’ are constructed, it follows that there 
may be numerous constructions, no final arbiter of which is ‘correct’, and 
numerous reasons why particular constructions arise, become dominant, and 
achieve hegemonic status. The difficulty is that by designating as a scientific 
‘truth’ that continued contact between non-resident parents and children is 
necessarily in their best interests, legal discourse can disadvantage many children 
by silencing other ways of talking about their interests.  
 
The need for law to reduce the complexities of child welfare science does not in 
itself explain why the prevailing legal construction of ‘the welfare of the child’ 
arose and acquired dominant status in current family law.  Law, as a generalised 
medium of communication for politics, incorporates dominant understandings of 
what is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for children, which arise out of the social, political and 
ideological conditions that pertain at any historical moment, and which will be 
consistent with the interests, objectives and political imperatives of those forces 
and groups that dominate at particular periods.
80
   
 
“Research studies recommending conflict-reduction and contact have 
articulated objectives that have been consistent with those of 
government, those of professional groupings such as mediators and 
court welfare officers, and those of the New Right and fathers’ 
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lobbies: they fit neatly into the political and economic priorities that 
have dominated family policy since the 1980s.”81   
 
This explains why “the law has constructed the modern ‘good father’ as a 
desirable presence in the family,”82 and thus how the current legal construction 
of ‘the welfare of the child’ operates as a mechanism of power to regulate the 
lives of mothers after parental separation.  Kaganas points out that law could 
have selected ‘other’ constructions of children’s welfare, for example, that 
‘conflict’ could be avoided by refusing to order contact against the wishes of the 
resident parent or in ‘high conflict’ cases. “And on either of these views, it would 
be legitimate to abandon efforts to continue or to enforce contact where conflict 
is making it unworkable.”83 The reasons for not doing so are that giving mothers 
a ‘veto’ over contact, and abandoning attempts at making contact ‘work’ would 
be “inconceivable in the context of a strongly pro-contact culture.” 84 For law to 
retain credibility, it could not construct a version of children’s welfare that runs 
counter to prevailing political, professional and popular discourses and familial 
ideologies. Law, in turn, re-affirms dominant understandings and discourses.  
 
The current application of the welfare principle can have extremely problematic 
consequences for many children whose welfare is supposed to lie at the heart of 
current family law. The reluctance of courts to ‘abandon hope’ of contact taking 
place can mean that children are subjected to protracted, conflict-ridden court 
proceedings. In Re S (Contact: Promoting Relationship with Absent Parent) 
Thorpe LJ stated:  
 
“Whatever the difficulties, however scant the prospects of success, 
the courts must not relent in pursuit of the restoration of what had 
been a natural relationship between father and daughter, absent 
compelling evidence that the welfare of the child requires respite.”85  
 
Additionally, to ignore the care arrangements and responsibility for domestic 
labour prior to separation, and downgrade them in favour of the ‘theoretical 
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benefits’ of contact could place children in unfamiliar, inexperienced and even 
abusive care regimes and make other difficulties for children invisible to courts 
and professionals. This can be seen in the way in which courts focus on ‘long 
term gain’, which disregards the interests of the child in the ‘here and now’ and 
can cause current harm to children of a nature and degree that would not be 
tolerated in a public law context, “and arguably demonstrates a lack of child-
centred thinking.”86  
 
In Re O (Contact: Imposition of Conditions) Sir Thomas Bingham MR said:  
 
“The courts should not at all readily accept that the child’s welfare 
will be injured by direct contact. Judging that question the court 
should take a medium-term and long-term view of the child’s 
development and not accord excessive weight to what appear likely 
to be short-term or transient problems.”87   
 
We also find that the voices of children themselves are filtered through dominant 
constructions of their welfare, so that “frequently children who consistently say 
they do not want [contact] are ignored. Indeed it is likely to be assumed that the 
resident parent is behind the child not wanting contact.”88 Children’s views are 
presented either as influenced by the resident parent, or as evidence that the child 
does not really know ‘what is good for them’. 89  Despite the fact that courts are 
obliged to take into account the wishes and feelings of the child,
90
 law “attends to 
those wishes and feelings only when they correspond to preconceived ideas of 
welfare.”91  Prevailing constructions of children’s welfare have even led, 
paradoxically, to children’s ‘rights to contact’ overruling their wishes and 
feelings. In Re W (Contact: Joining Child as Party)
92
 Butler-Sloss P said: “The 
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child has a right to a relationship with his father even if he does not want it. The 
child’s welfare demands that efforts should be made to make it possible”.   
 
1.4 Encouraging agreement for contact 
The current construction of children’s welfare may be used by professionals to 
encourage ‘agreements’ for contact, so that it becomes a regulatory and 
disciplinary tool, an important part of the strategy to get parents, principally 
mothers, to agree to, and cooperate with contact.
93
 This explains why judges 
rarely adjudicate on contact disputes,
94
 and most orders are made ‘by consent.’95  
The strong preference of courts and professionals for agreement rather than 
adjudication is based on the perception that agreements for contact are ‘better’ 
for children and more likely to ‘succeed’ and that adjudication encourages 
acrimony and conflict.
96
   
 
The result of this emphasis on agreement is that parents, particularly mothers, 
encounter varying degrees of pressure from courts and professionals to permit 
contact, even in circumstances where serious welfare concerns are raised, and if 
they seek to ‘renege’ on previously ‘agreed’ orders, they may be treated even 
more harshly.
97
 Such pressure is exerted mainly by lawyers, but also by the 
judiciary, fathers and Cafcass officers.
98
 Hunt and Macleod found that in most of 
the cases in their study, “the impetus throughout was to try to move contact on, 
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sometimes in very inauspicious circumstances.”99  If encouragement and 
persuasion of mothers failed to achieve the desired outcome of agreement for 
contact, a harsher, more coercive approach was adopted, including ‘robust’ 
homilies, ‘straight talking’ and criticism of mothers perceived as uncooperative 
or insufficiently ‘committed’ to contact and, on occasions, threats of change of 
residence.
100
   
 
2. Legal constructions of parents 
The mothers and fathers who come before the courts in contact cases are already 
imbued with images arising out of the legal, professional and political discourses 
that construct and sustain them, which have a profound impact on the ability of 
women to separate and protect themselves and their children from violent fathers.  
 
Up until the early 1980s, courts were willing to look at the father’s behavior and 
consider whether the mother’s opposition to contact was justified. In Sheppard v 
Miller (1982) Ormrod LJ warned that “it is as well to bear in mind that such 
implacable opposition may have some justification in practice.”101 However, the 
reinforcement of the perceived importance of the father’s position in the post-
separation family following the enactment of the Children Act 1989 led to 
important changes in the construction of maternal subjectivities. A harsher, more 
punitive stance towards mothers developed at the same time as the interests of 
children and mothers were increasingly seen as separate.
102
 A key factor in law’s 
construction of the ‘welfare of the child’ (and a product of the ‘gender-free’ 
concept of parental responsibility) is the notion that it is “possible to define 
children’s interests independently when they are conceptually separated and set 
apart from parental interests.”103  This enables the child to be conceptually 
detached from the relationships in which she or he lives, resulting in the 
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inscription of the carer-child relationship as “mere collections of individuals 
whose interests are often in conflict.”104   
 
Furthermore, by emphasising the status of parental responsibility, it is seen by 
courts as “conceptually divorced from the practice of child care,” so the father’s 
‘traditional’ decision-making role is enhanced as the value of caring for children 
is downgraded.
105
 What the concept of parental responsibility has done, therefore, 
is not ‘make’ parents take more responsibility for their children but has created 
the ideological arena in which mothers’ ‘duty’ to allow contact with non-resident 
fathers can be more strenuously imposed.    
 
Several commentators have written about the erasure of the ‘bad father’ from 
legal discourse on the family, and the predominance in family law of the ‘bad 
mother’.106 The selected construction of the welfare of the child lies at the heart 
of these familial constructs and at the core of attempts by politics and/through 
law to reconstruct the nuclear family. It is this process that silences ways of 
talking about familial relations that challenge the increasingly hegemonic status 
of the importance of the father within the modern family, and gives rise to 
dominant feminine and masculine subjectivities which structure legal decision-
making and professional practice in this area – the ‘implacably hostile mother’ 
and the ‘safe family man’.   
 
2.1 ‘Implacably hostile mothers’ 
The more law and politics have elevated and valorised fatherhood, the more 
invisible fathers’ conduct has become, and the more visible and under scrutiny 
are mothers, so that ‘the problem’ is reconstructed as primarily the mother’s 
opposition to contact.
107
 This has given rise to, and reinforced, the predominant 
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feminine subjectivity in the area of child contact – the ‘implacably hostile’ or 
‘no-contact’ mother who, through selfishness and unreasonableness, damages her 
child by stubbornly refusing to allow contact with the father.
108
 Because of the 
erasure of the father’s conduct, the mother’s fears and concerns are reconstructed 
as obduracy and irrational or pathological self-interest, reinforcing further the 
need to regulate and discipline mothers.
109
  In this way, mothers are constructed 
in opposition to fathers and children, and are seen as selfishly unable to put their 
children’s needs before their own, because the dominant construction of 
children’s interests aligns them so closely with fathers.110 In Re O (Contact: 
Imposition of Conditions) Sir Thomas Bingham MR said:  
 
“Neither parent should be encouraged or permitted to think that the 
more intransigent, the more unreasonable, the more obdurate and the 
more uncooperative they are, the more likely they are to get their 
own way.”111    
 
While both parents in ‘intractable contact disputes’ are frequently characterised 
as emotional and irrational, mothers tend to be singled out for particular criticism 
if they voice ‘unreasonable’ concerns about contact.  As Smart observes:  
 
“While fatherhood now represents equality (an element of higher 
moral reasoning) and welfare represents the interest of the child or 
weakest member, motherhood represents some atavistic, pre-new 
enlightenment claim which would drag us back into selfish emotion 
and a satisfaction of the sense rather than a meeting of objective 
needs.”112 
 
It is therefore difficult for mothers to assert a contrary opinion to that expressed 
by the courts or professionals, who have the ‘rationality’ and ‘objectivity’ to 
know what is in the child’s best interests, which over-emotional mothers lack. So 
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where mothers may see “the courts requiring them to expose their children to bad 
fathers,” courts and professionals may see mothers as unreasonable.113 Mothers 
are made to feel that they are making a “fuss about nothing” or being 
“unnecessarily difficult” if they raise even serious welfare concerns.114 Yet 
research has found that concerns about contact raised by resident parents are 
frequently very serious, such as domestic violence, child abuse or neglect, drug 
or alcohol abuse and mental illness, but that courts and professionals sideline 
these concerns and ‘bend over backwards’ to try to achieve contact.115   
 
The ‘implacably hostile mother’ may not only be irrational; she may even be 
pathological. In Re H (A Child) (Contact: mother’s opposition) [2001], the Court 
of Appeal found that the mother’s strong opposition to contact had no “objective 
foundation”, “and might well be indicative of a disordered personality or at least 
disordered emotions leading to disordered thinking.”116   In the interestingly 
entitled Re S (Unco-operative Mother)
117
 Thorpe LJ regarded the mother’s 
‘unreasonable’ failure to engage in family therapy as grounds for a court to draw 
adverse inferences against her.
118
 Even parents who are found to be ‘mentally 
sound’ are encouraged to engage in therapy. In Re P (Children)119 both parents 
were urged to attend counselling, even though the court had given the mother a 
‘clean bill’ of mental health. This was so that the father would feel ‘better’ about 
attending therapy himself, thereby, as the court saw it, reducing conflict. These 
views are entrenched in the professional discourse through articles by legal and 
child welfare professionals,
120
 who even argue that the child should be removed 
from, and have no contact with the mother, so that her ‘pathology’ can be 
treated.
121
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A more condemnatory approach towards mothers can be discerned from 2004, at 
a time of visible protest action by fathers’ rights groups, and a focus on the issue 
of contact by policy-makers. In Re J (A Minor) (Contact) [2004] the Court of 
Appeal stressed that “there are … strong policy reasons for saying that a 
recalcitrant parent should not be allowed to frustrate what the court considers the 
child’s welfare requires.”122 Although the father’s appeal in that case was 
dismissed, Balcombe LJ said, obiter:  
 
“[J]udges should be very reluctant to allow the implacable hostility of 
one parent (usually the parent who has a residence order in his or her 
favour), to deter them from making a contact order where they 
believe the child’s welfare requires it. The danger of allowing the 
implacable hostility of the residential parent (usually the mother) to 
frustrate the court’s decision is too obvious to require repetition on 
my part.”123  
 
Since Re J (A Minor) (Contact) [2004], the courts took an increasingly harsh, 
almost vengeful, attitude towards mothers who opposed contact.  In the highly 
publicised case of Re D (Intractable Contact Dispute: Publicity) Munby J (as he 
then was) constructed the father as the ‘victim’ of both the mother and the court 
system’s failure to get to grips with the mother’s “threadbare excuses”, 
“groundless assertions”, and unwavering “sabotage” of contact arrangements.124 
Ward LJ was reported in the national press speaking about “child contact cases 
where the ‘drip, drip, drip of venom’ from vengeful mothers can leave good 
fathers helpless to see their children.”125   
 
Images of implacably hostile mothers unwittingly or deliberately ‘poisoning’ 
their children against their fathers are prominent in the case law, even in those 
cases where there is ample evidence to attribute the child’s reluctance to see him 
to the father’s own conduct. In Re C (A Child) [2008] Ward LJ referred to the 
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mother’s “viciously corrupting influence” on the child.126 However, Fortin et al 
found no evidence to support the contention that mothers commonly ‘alienate’ 
children against fathers,
127
 and Herring points out that it is “far more common for 
non-resident fathers to seek to turn children against their resident mothers than 
vice versa.”128 
 
These messages radiating from the higher courts about mothers have had an 
impact on the lower courts and are “a powerful interpretive lens in shaping how 
family law professionals respond to mothers and fathers involved in custody 
disputes, as well as media representations of these disputes.”129 Hunt and 
Macleod found that both the courts and Cafcass officers demonstrated “a 
readiness to criticize resident parents who were seen to be uncooperative and/or 
not sufficiently committed to moving contact on, even where their original fears 
might seem to be well-grounded.”130 Professionals tended to ‘blame’ mothers for 
delay in proceedings, by “not co-operating with the court or more commonly 
‘spinning it out’, ‘playing the system’, taking advantage of the court’s duty to 
investigate allegations of potential risk to the child from contact.”131 Shaw and 
Bazley have a dim view of all parents in intractable contact disputes who they 
describe as “amongst the rudest and intransigent [sic] people you are likely to 
meet.”132 But their particular focus is on resident parents/mothers, who are 
repeatedly described as ‘alienating’, ‘implacably hostile’ and ‘intransigent’.   
 
Despite this perception that fathers are the victims of vengeful mothers and that 
the courts fail to deal with them robustly, the numbers of contact applications 
actually refused by courts have been steadily decreasing to the point where they 
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are miniscule,
133
 and direct contact is the expected outcome in the vast majority 
of cases, even when mothers have serious welfare concerns.
134
 Furthermore, 
when contact does not ‘work’, Diduck and Kaganas point out that “there is no 
evidence to support the suggestion that it is malevolent mothers who constitute 
the primary obstacle to contact.”135 Walker et al found that there are many 
complex reasons why contact does not happen,
136
 and Elizabeth et al’s study 
indicated that “accusations of mothers’ hostility by some fathers and family law 
professionals are seldom likely to be in keeping with a much more complex 
reality”.137 On the contrary, Fortin et al found that:  
 
“a strong and consistent theme…[of their research] was the extent to 
which resident parents had encouraged the relationship between their 
children and non-resident parents, and in some cases even when they 
had themselves suffered from the non-resident parent’s violence and 
even when the children themselves opposed contact.”138  
 
Indeed, in the combined appeals of Re B (A Child); Re O (Children),
139
 Wall LJ 
pointed out that it was far more common for contact to break down because of 
the father’s behaviour than because of the attitude of the mother, and was at 
pains to dispel the ‘myth’ that the family justice system was biased against 
fathers. This attempt to ‘redress the balance’ appears to have had little effect on 
the lower or higher courts.  
 
Despite these statistics and findings from research that courts invariably accede 
to fathers’ claims for contact, and that mothers are generally supportive of such 
contact, the demonised figure of the implacably hostile mother enables courts to 
enforce contact orders against women more punitively, while still maintaining 
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that the welfare of the child is being advanced.
140
 Before the Children Act 1989 
was introduced, courts held that imprisoning mothers could harm children and do 
nothing to foster a relationship between father and child, so that enforcement of 
contact by committal should be rarely, if ever, be used.
141
 From the mid to late 
1990s, however, a distinct sea-change could be observed in the courts’ attitudes 
towards imprisoning mothers, viewing it as no longer harmful to the child as the 
mother has made herself inimical to the child’s interests by her selfish hostility to 
contact. In the leading case of A v N (Committal: Refusal of Contact), the Court 
of Appeal held that any harm caused to the child by imprisoning the mother is 
caused by the mother herself.  
 
“[I]t is perhaps appropriate that the message goes out in loud and in 
clear terms that there does come a limit to the tolerance of the court 
to see its orders flouted by mothers even if they have to care for their 
young children. If she goes to prison it is her fault .”142   
 
So ‘bad’ mothers pose a threat to their children’s welfare and have to be dealt 
with robustly.
143
 In doing so, juridical power has to be invoked to retain law’s 
authority, which takes precedence over children’s immediate welfare. The 
intensified focus on contact enforcement during the contact ‘reform’ process 
initiated in 2000, responding to the demands of the FRM for stronger 
enforcement measures, led to more ‘robust’ responses from the judiciary. In Re D 
(Intractable Contact Dispute) Munby J (as he then was) said: “A flabby judicial 
response sends a very damaging message to the defaulting parent.”144 An 
                                                 
140
 See Miranda Kaye, ‘Domestic violence, residence and contact’ (1996) 8(4) CFLQ 285; Smart 
and Neale (n 33); Julie Wallbank, ‘Castigating Mothers: The Judicial Response to Wilful Women 
in Cases Concerning Contact’ (1998) 20 JSWFL 357-377; Smart and Neale (n 65) 
141
 See Sheppard v Miller  (n 101); Churchyard v Churchyard [1984] FLR 635; Patterson v 
Walcott [1984] FLR 408; Thomason v Thomason [1985] FLR 214;  Re M (Minors) (Access: 
Contempt: Committal) [1991] 1 FLR 355  
142
 A v N (Committal: Refusal of Contact) [1997] 1 FLR 533, 541 (Ward LJ); see also judgment 
of Beldam LJ. It should be noted that in this case, the father had served a term of imprisonment 
for assaulting the mother. See also Re W (A Minor) (Contact) [1994] 2 FLR 441; Re S (Contact: 
Grandparents) [1996] 1 FLR 158;  Z v Z (Refusal of Contact: Committal) [1996] 1 FCR 538;  F v 
F (Contact: Committal) [1998] 2 FLR 237 
143
 Felicity Kaganas and Shelley Day Sclater, ‘Contact and Domestic Violence: The Winds of 
Change?’ (2000) 30 Family Law 630-636, 632 
144
 Re D (Intractable Contact Dispute: Publicity) (n 124) [56] (Munby J as he then was) 
96 
 
increased willingness to change children’s residence when mothers were 
perceived to be thwarting contact could also be detected.
145
 
 
Barnett found that barristers, too, adopted a punitive approach to the enforcement 
of contact orders on unwilling mothers.
146
 Most barristers interviewed indicated 
that they could understand why a court may be justified in imprisoning an 
‘implacably hostile’ mother: “Because it’s sick and tired of mothers running 
implacable hostility cases and the message had to be sent to mothers that it’s for 
the court to decide, and not for the mother to decide, about contact.”147 
 
2.2 ‘Good’ mothers 
Abstract notions of ‘welfare’ and ‘equality’ informing legal discourse have 
rendered the importance of the work of ‘caring for’ children invisible and 
valueless, and mask the gendered dimensions of parenting experiences.
148
 
Drawing on the work of Tronto, Smart identifies two modes of caring – caring 
about and caring for – and argues that “in orthodox moral theory caring for is not 
seen as a moral activity, whilst caring about…is. [In this way] if fathers care 
about they are treated as good moral actors who merit recognition.”149 As a 
consequence of ‘caring for’ being taken for granted and disregarded, fathers’ 
abilities to care in the future are not questioned.
150
 
 
A number of researchers have found that mothers do regard the work they 
undertake in caring for children as a moral practice, as ‘counting for’ something. 
Day-Sclater and Kaganas found, in their study of parents who had been involved 
in protracted contact disputes that, for the mothers: 
 
                                                 
145
 See Re M (Intractable Contact Dispute: Interim Care Order) (n 111); V v V (Contact: 
Implacable Hostility) (n 111);  A v A (Shared Residence) [2004] EWHC 142 (Fam), [2004] 1 
FLR 1195 
146
 Adrienne Barnett, ‘Contact and Domestic Violence: The Ideological Divide’ in Jo Bridgeman 
and Daniel Monk (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Child Law (Cavendish 2000) 
147
 ibid 146 (Mr T, Barrister) 
148
 See Wallbank (n 14); Diduck (n 19) 
149
 Smart  (n 11) 176-177 
150
 See Smart (n 11) 195; Diduck (n 19); 86;  Van Krieken (n 66) 37; Collier, ‘Fathers 4 Justice, 
Law and the new politics of fatherhood’ (n 13) 524; Collier, ‘ “The Outlaw Fathers Fight Back”’ 
(n 34) 66 
97 
 
“[C]ontact is a moral issue that has its roots in the practical realities 
of relationships and childcare…Motherhood, in this talk, is about 
‘caring for’, with all that that entails, on an everyday basis. 
Fatherhood, by contrast, is about ‘caring about’ – something that is 
emotional, not necessarily devoid of self-interest, and that lacks 
evidence of any practical engagement or commitment.”151  
 
In the same way as the work of caring for children is devalued in/by law, 
similarly the work of sustaining contact between children and non-resident 
fathers is rendered invisible. Reece points out that not only do mothers remain 
responsible for the work that they performed during the relationship, they are 
also primarily responsible for a new kind of work – oiling the wheels of post-
separation parenting.
152
  Indeed, the father’s relationship with the children may 
deteriorate simply because the mother is not prepared to shore it up. 
 
The alter ego, then, of the ‘implacably hostile’ mother is the ‘good’, ‘reasonable’ 
mother who is prepared to allow and facilitate contact between father and child, 
irrespective of the particular circumstances.
153
  “The ‘good’ post-separation 
family needs a ‘good’ post-separation mother to sustain it…When mothers refuse 
to take on this additional task, they become identified as bad or vindictive 
mothers.”154 Women’s positioning as ‘good’ moral agents is increasingly seen 
“in terms of the woman’s responsibility to ensure contact happens.”155 
 
“It would seem that the work of sustaining access is like housework: 
it is only visible when it is not done. When it is done it is expected, 
like virtue, to be its own reward, but when it is not done, the mother 
becomes morally blameworthy or denounced as emotionally 
immature.”156    
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‘Good’ mothers must not only permit contact, they must encourage and facilitate 
it, and ‘go the extra mile’ to ensure that contact not just happens, but ‘works’, 
whatever the behavior of the father might be.
157
 In this way they are expected to 
be “self-denying, to sacrifice their interests to those of their children and to cope 
with the vicissitudes that contact may bring them.”158 In Re T (Parental 
Responsibility: Contact) Butler-Sloss LJ expressed the view that:  
 
“The courts generally set their face against depriving a child of such 
contact and urge reluctant caretaking parents to make contact work, 
however difficult it may be for that parent who very often does not 
understand the importance of that continuing contact.”159  
 
In Re P (Contact: Supervision) the Court of Appeal said that, although the 
mother has a “special burden” because of her mental state and her abusive 
treatment at the hands of the father, what was being asked of her was “very 
limited”:  
 
“She should be able to cope. Whatever she does, these children will 
want to know their father as they grow up, and if she continues to 
obstruct contact she will in my judgment simply be storing up trouble 
for herself.”160  
 
 
However, in some cases even facilitating and encouraging contact is not enough 
if women wish to earn the title of ‘good mother’. In Re O (Contact: Withdrawal 
of Application),
161
 the trial judge and the appellate court were highly critical of 
the father’s conduct and firmly laid the blame on him for his failure to achieve 
contact. The mother, on the other hand, had taken ‘responsibility’ for her 
‘behaviour’ during the marriage and was willing to promote and encourage 
contact. It may, therefore, be thought that this mother fulfilled every criterion for 
the ‘good’ post-separation mother. However, the trial judge still criticised her 
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because “she does not push it as far as she properly might,”162 and Wall J (as he 
then was) questioned whether the mother was being: 
 
“[A]s helpful and as positive towards the reintroduction of contact 
between her son and her former husband as she could be? Is she 
doing it as a distasteful duty or is she recognising that this child 
would gain if he could renew a contact arrangement with his father in 
which he had pleasure in the past?”163  
 
So we can see that even active encouragement of contact is insufficient to 
constitute the ‘good’ mother; to earn this accolade she must embrace the benefits 
of contact with the ‘right’ attitude. So strong are images of ‘implacably hostile 
mothers’ that even the ‘good’ mother could be ‘better’. 
 
So an enormous responsibility is placed on mothers to reconstitute the post-
separation ‘good’ family and “there is little scope for mothers within 
contemporary family law to legitimately contest the terms and form of father-
child contact.”164 As Eriksson and Hester observe: “motherhood has come under 
continual scrutiny, with the role of the good-enough mother probably impossible 
to fulfill and easily open to criticism and blame.”165 
 
2.3 ‘Good’ fathers 
In contrast to the difficult and sometimes impossible task of fulfilling the role of 
the ‘good’ mother in family law, the role of the ‘good’ father demands very little 
of fathers involved in contact proceedings. As Kaganas points out: “If a father 
seeks a contact order, the fact that he wishes to see his child suffices to place him 
in the category of ‘good’ fathers.”166   
 
Since the ‘benefits’ of contact are ‘obvious’ and unquestionable, the simple fact 
of biological parenthood is considered sufficient for ‘good’ fatherhood, and 
“virtually any involvement by fathers with their children increasingly has come 
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to be considered good-enough fathering.”167 In Re J-S (Contact: Parental 
Responsibility)  Ward LJ held that: “There are reasons why, since contact has to 
be restored, in my judgment, this father should be entitled to play the natural role 
which fatherhood ordains for him by the very fact of his being a father.”168 
Resident mothers interviewed by Smart et al reported feeling powerless, because 
“fathers could get whatever they wanted, even if they had never shown an 
interest in the children before the separation…[but] there was no means of 
complaining about this because the ‘pro-contact’ ethos was so strong.”169 
 
This means that to “warrant description as ‘bad’, fathers must have behaved in 
exceptionally callous or irresponsible ways, be practically a ‘monster’, for his 
behaviour to deserve the court’s attention.”170 In Re S (Contact: Promoting 
Relationship with Absent Parent) [2004], despite the father having an almost 
non-existent relationship with the child, and the Recorder and the Court of 
Appeal describing him as “aggressive” and “unrealistic in his approach to 
contact,” he still earned the title of ‘good enough father’ simply by virtue of his 
biological parenthood, and his “genuine” and “impressive” desire for contact.171 
This illustrates Collier’s observation that, as in fathers’ rights discourse, in law a 
‘good’ father is one who fights for his children.172 So a father is positioned as 
‘good’ if he rigorously pursues his own agenda, but a mother is ‘bad’ if she does 
so, because fathers’ agendas are taken to be synonymous with children’s interests. 
 
Even in those cases where the father is found to fall short of the role of ‘good’ 
father, courts tend to downplay his shortcomings, or portray the mother as 
equally ‘deficient’. In Re O (Contact: Withdrawal of Application)173 the trial 
judge was highly critical of the father, describing him as ‘irrational’ in his 
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attitude, and castigating him for blaming the mother and ‘the system’ for his 
failure to achieve contact, rather than accepting responsibility himself. 
Nevertheless, Wall J (as he then was) tried to ‘equalise’ the position of the 
parents: 
 
“It would not do the father any harm to wonder – as all grown ups 
ought to wonder – whether their own perception of themselves is 
necessarily the perception of others. That also applies to the mother. 
Is she being as helpful and as positive towards the reintroduction of 
contact between her son and her former husband as she could be?… 
Both parents need to re-examine themselves; everybody does, and 
they particularly need to do so in the context of this case.”174  
 
2.4 Autonomy for mothers and fathers? 
One of the harshest consequences for women of the new familial order in law is 
the restriction on the ability of mothers to control their own lives as a 
consequence of law’s efforts to sustain the post-separation family, and the 
differential ability of men to do so. Smart and Neale suggest that different forms 
of power in relationships relate to different ideas of the self.
175
 They draw a 
distinction between debilitative power, where a partner is prevented from 
exercising personal growth and autonomy, is stopped “from becoming a new self 
or from rediscovering their old selves”,176 and situational power, which is 
“depicted as one having control or mastery over one’s situation.”177 Within 
current legal, political and popular discourses informing the issue of post-
separation parenting, it is the father who is constructed as having lost 
‘situational’ power and accordingly “divorce law takes seriously only the 
balancing of situational power, and fails to understand or recognise the issues of 
debilitative power.”178 So family law constitutes women who resist the gendered 
relations of power that constrain their articulation of an autonomous, independent 
subject position, as unreasonable and selfish.  
 
“This means, for example, that a woman’s need, on separation from 
her partner, to reconstitute herself with a fresh start and some 
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measure of independence…cannot be seen as also in her child’s 
welfare, rather it is rephrased as the selfish attitude of a bad 
mother.”179   
 
 It is through current constructions of ‘the welfare of the child’ that debilitative 
power is exercised against mothers and constrains them from realising an 
autonomy that is readily available to fathers.
180
 Ideologies of motherhood, 
involving self-sacrifice and unconditional love, mean that: “It has become taboo 
to emphasise women’s issues when the interests of children are being addressed, 
especially in the face of expectations that mothers should be selfless in relation to 
children.”181   
 
Research findings demonstrate how mothers involved in post-separation 
parenting experience the restrictive effect of debilitative power exercised by 
fathers through the courts and professionals. Kaganas and Day Sclater found that:  
 
Some mothers find that the emphasis on contact exists in profound 
and continual tension with their own need to break free altogether 
from the past, from a failed or even abusive relationship, and from 
the former partner. For these mothers, the meaning of the welfare 
discourse takes shape against a background of their own practical and 
emotional needs.
182
   
 
Fathers, however, are allowed “a capacity for self-determination and 
ambivalence in relation to their parenting that is denied to the child’s primary 
carer.”183  This means that the coercion experienced by mothers in contact 
proceedings is not applied to fathers, who can ‘opt in’ or ‘opt out’ of their 
children’s lives without legal or moral sanction.184  Indeed, if children’s welfare 
were best served by relationships with fathers after parental separation, it should 
follow that children and resident parents should be able to apply for orders 
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requiring the non-resident parent to have contact with the child. However, 
despite the importance ascribed to contact, the law does not enforce contact on 
unwilling fathers.
185
 Eriksson and Hester, drawing on Nordborg, call this 
inability to impose contact on unwilling fathers a “lawless space”.186  “[T]he 
implication of this lawless space is that fatherhood is voluntary and further 
underlines that the child’s right is, in fact, the father’s right.”187   
 
Findings from research suggest that mothers are often unhappy about fathers’ 
ability to ‘opt out’ of their children’s lives and their own inability to compel 
fathers to see their children.
188
 Yet this is not questioned by the courts, 
professionals or policy-makers.
189
  The New Labour government expressed 
concern “about the implications that would arise if contact orders were to be used 
to force someone, against their wishes, to have contact with a child.”190 Similar 
concerns have been expressed by professionals. According to a barrister 
participating in Barnett’s study of barristers’ representation of women involved 
in contact disputes:  
 
“I don’t see how the court could order a man to have contact with his 
children … And I think that, if somebody really does not want to see 
their children, well, that is something the child is going to have to 
come to terms with.”191  
 
As Wegelin observes: “[W]here the father doesn’t bother with access, no-one 
else bothers either.”192 
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3. Conclusions 
We have seen how, during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the father has 
lost his legal authority whilst being regarded as more and more central to the 
family in emotional and psychological terms, and the ‘welfare of the child’ is 
constructed almost entirely in terms of the importance for children of 
maintaining contact with non-resident fathers after parental separation. The 
proposition that contact with a non-resident parent is generally in children’s best 
interests has “passed into the realms of uncontestable truth”193 so that arguing 
against contact is now equivalent to “arguing against virtue” and therefore 
outside the permitted terms of the debate.
194
 The current selectively constructed 
version of children’s welfare operates as a mechanism of power to sustain the 
post-separation family by constraining women’s autonomy, and gives rise to the 
discursively constructed subjectivities of mothers and fathers that dominate 
current family law. 
 
The valorisation of fatherhood in political, legal and popular discourses, 
reinforced by images of the democratic, equal family, has reinscribed 
motherhood as a selfish, atavistic domain, which has led to increasingly 
disciplinary policy initiatives designed to regulate and control mothers. This has 
had the effect of silencing moral claims based on the work of childcare and 
domestic labour, and of rendering invisible the burden on mothers to facilitate 
and sustain post-separation contact between children and fathers. Such claims are 
even reconstructed as evidence of hostility and self-interest because mothers no 
longer have a “legitimate language in which [they] can frame moral claims based 
on this work.”195  
 
The strong presumption of contact, and the images of ‘hostile’ mothers and 
‘good’ fathers to which it gives rise, means that  mothers’ concerns about, or 
opposition to contact are rendered ‘illegitimate’ and constructed as evidence of 
selfishness, or of irrationality or pathology,
196
 generating a harsh response from 
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the courts and professionals.
197
 Consequently, it is extremely difficult for 
mothers to oppose orders for direct contact, as judges rarely deny or curtail 
contact, which is demonstrated by the negligible number of contact orders 
refused.  
 
The prescriptive application by the courts of the welfare principle could have 
serious implications for the safety and wellbeing of mothers who are subjected to 
domestic violence from fathers seeking contact, and of the children who are 
exposed to that abuse. The impact of domestic violence on legal and political 
discourses informing the issue of post-separation contact, and the effect of this 
on judicial and professional perceptions and practice prior to the implementation 
of the Practice Direction, will now be considered. 
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CHAPTER 3  
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE 
PRESUMPTION OF CONTACT 
 
A threat to the promotion of the ‘safe family man’, the construct which underpins 
familial masculinity and the equivalence discourses, is his alter ego, the domestic 
violence perpetrator. As Collier points out:  
 
“In order to reinstate fathers at the centre of the family, it has been 
necessary to render fatherhood ‘safe’. … For fathers to be equal partners 
in the family, it is important that they do not embody the ‘threat of the 
undomesticated male’.” 1  
 
It is through the discursive and ideological separation, in family policy and law, of 
domestic violence and father-involvement, both pre- and post-separation, that the 
figure of the ‘safe family man’ has been constructed. 
 
1. The prevalence of domestic violence and its effect on 
children 
 
Domestic violence is highly prevalent in the general population, irrespective of race 
and class,
2
 accounting for between 16 percent and 24 percent of all recorded violent 
crime.
3
 Victims of domestic violence are more likely to experience repeated violence 
than victims of any other types of crime.
4
 Furthermore, despite attempts by violent 
men and fathers’ rights groups to portray women as just as likely to be perpetrators 
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of domestic violence as men, research and statistics demonstrate clearly that it is a 
gendered issue, perpetrated predominantly by men against female partners or former 
partners.
5
 Nearly one million women experience at least one incident of domestic 
abuse each year.
6
 CPS spot figures for domestic violence cases in 2006 found that 89 
per cent of victims were females and 94 per cent of defendants were males.
7
  Indeed, 
the actual numbers of women experiencing domestic violence are likely to be higher 
than ‘official’ statistics indicate because of under-reporting.8 The nature and severity 
of domestic abuse is also seen to be gendered, with women being subjected to more 
repeat incidents of violence than men,
9
 being more likely to sustain more serious 
injuries than men, and demonstrating higher levels of fear.
10
 Women are also far 
more likely than men to end relationships because of domestic violence, and to raise 
domestic violence as a contact-related problem.
11
 The gendered nature of domestic 
violence was highlighted by Wall LJ (as he then was):  
 
“[D]omestic violence is a largely male problem. … The overwhelming 
number of those inflicting domestic violence on their spouses and 
partners and children are men. The first step to sweeping domestic 
violence under the carpet is for men to make the statement that it is a 
problem which affects both sexes. Of course it does, but the statistics are 
a chilling reminder of the fact that the overwhelming majority of 
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perpetrators are men…This is predominantly a male problem and men 
must face up to the fact.”12 
 
The incidence of domestic violence is particularly high in families with children.  
Mullender notes that: “The presence of children in the household is associated with 
nearly double the risk of domestic violence for women.”13 These findings are 
attested to by the very high numbers of children on child protection registers where 
domestic violence is a reason for the registration or at least a feature of the 
household, estimated eight years ago at approximately 75 per cent.
14
  
 
It is also apparent that while legal and political discourses portray domestic violence 
as a feature of ‘the past’ relationship and therefore irrelevant to the future 
arrangements for children, research and statistics demonstrate that the risks of 
domestic violence are particularly high on or after relationship breakdown. 
Buchanan et al’s study of children’s and parents’ experiences of the court welfare 
service found that 78 per cent of parents experienced domestic violence or fear, 
which continued after the relationship in 64 per cent of cases.
15
  Not only does 
domestic violence tend to continue after separation, but there is substantial research 
revealing that it can intensify and increase in severity.
16
  Humphreys notes that “the 
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most recent study of police domestic violence incidents in the UK indicated 50% 
were post-separation and most occurred around arrangements for child contact.”17 
 
These findings strongly suggest that a large proportion of child contact arrangements 
take place within a context of domestic violence, and that women and children may 
be even more at risk from violent men than they were during the subsistence of the 
parents’ relationship.18 Estimates by Cafcass officers indicate that the prevalence of 
domestic violence in the contact cases in which they are involved may be even 
higher than that found by other research. A parliamentary inquiry into domestic 
violence found that: “Up to 50% to 60% of Cafcass’s caseload is domestic violence, 
and those figures increase every year as domestic violence is better identified.”19  
HMICA estimated the proportion to be up to 70 per cent or more,
20
 and observed 
that, anecdotally, “CAFCASS practitioners place the incidence of domestic violence 
in the region of 90% or more of cases they deal with.”21 
 
It is clear, therefore, that many children live with domestic violence, both before and 
after parental separation. A large body of clinical and research findings and literature 
has been available since the early 1970s on the profound effects on children of living 
with domestic violence and of sustaining contact with the perpetrator.  
 
Children are frequently witness to, or in some other way aware of, the violence and 
abuse perpetrated against their mothers. Hughes found that in 90 percent of cases of 
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domestic violence children are in the same or the next room.
22
 Children can sustain 
physical injuries when they try to intervene to stop the violence or get caught in the 
crossfire.
23
 There is also substantial evidence that “a high proportion of domestically 
violent men also physically and emotionally abuse their children.”24 
 
Children can also be used by violent men to control and physically abuse mothers, 
by threats to abuse or abduct children, hurting or killing pets or using children to 
relay abusive messages.
25
 Some children are forced to participate in physical 
assaults, while many try to be ‘good’ and ‘quiet’ to protect themselves and their 
mothers, and may feel they have failed if a violent incident occurs.
26
   
 
Living with domestic violence can impact seriously on children’s development. A 
range of psychological, behavioural, developmental and emotional problems, 
disorders and traumas is associated with children’s experiences of violence against 
their mothers. These range from emotional disturbances which can result in problems 
such as wetting and soiling, anxiety, depression and sleeping and eating disorders to 
behavioural problems in toddlers as well as older children, such as aggression, 
truancy, suicidal behavior, bullying, hyperactivity, and speech delay.
27
 Studies have 
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shown that some children show signs of post-traumatic stress disorder “particularly 
when there are high levels of fear associated with on-going incidents,”28 and that 
children exposed to domestic violence “may be the most distressed in the 
population.”29  The adult daughter of an abused mother interviewed by Hague and 
Wilson described the devastating effect on her life: “It dominated my life. I feel that 
my childhood was destroyed…Unable to complete my own healthy development, 
emotionally scarred…and guilty all the time.”30  
 
Children can, however, recover from the effects of domestic violence when they are 
in a safer environment,
31
 but ongoing contact with the abusive parent can create 
difficulties for children’s ability to recover and sustain recovery.32  
 
Domestic violence can also have a significant effect on the mother’s ability to care 
for the children. This can take the form of directly undermining the relationship 
between the mother and children by “criticising and insulting the mother in front of 
the children, encouraging the children in abusive behaviour towards their mothers, 
and involving children in secrecy about the abuse within the family.”33 The mother’s 
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ability to parent her children can also be adversely affected because of the impact of 
the abuse on her emotional and mental health and functioning, and continuing post-
separation violence can impact on the mother’s recovery.34  
 
2. Family policy on domestic violence and contact 
Despite the gendered prevalence of domestic violence and its effects on women, 
numerous researchers have pointed to the problems women have had in gaining 
official recognition of the violence that they sustain at the hands of male partners, as 
well as the culture of silence and shame that surrounded the issue of domestic 
violence during much of the twentieth century.
35
 From the end of the 1960s, however, 
work began to emerge from feminists which revealed that the family is a place where 
abuse occurs, and had a significant impact on law reform in the area of domestic 
violence protection.
36
 Yet these changes occurred entirely separately from policy on 
the family, and male violence towards women was seen as entirely separate from 
children’s welfare.37 The large body of clinical and research findings and literature 
discussed above, on the profound effects on children of living with domestic 
violence and sustaining contact with the perpetrator, failed to find any expression in 
debates surrounding, and Law Commission reports concerning, the Children Act 
1989 or the Family Law Act 1996.
38
  
 
Under the New Labour government, concern over family breakdown and the ‘loss’ 
of fathers for children predominated in family policy and in legal and popular 
discourses, rather than the heightened awareness of domestic violence and its 
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consequences for women, children and society.
39
 As a consequence, fathers within 
family policy continued to be constructed entirely separately from the ‘dangerous 
masculinity’ of domestic violence discourse. 
 
The New Labour Government placed the issue of tackling domestic violence 
relatively high on its agenda. In 2003 it issued a consultation paper setting out 
government strategy regarding domestic violence.
40
 This led to the enactment of the 
Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 which reformed the law on 
injunctive relief.
41
  Further, in 2009, as a result of a concerted campaign by the End 
Violence Against Women Coalition,
42
 the government initiated a consultation 
exercise on ending violence against women and girls.
43
 Absent from these 
government documents was any recognition of, or attempts at tackling the problem 
of violence and abuse in the context of post-separation parenting. Work towards 
eradicating domestic violence took place entirely separately from the government’s 
promotion of paternal involvement in the pre- and post-separation family.  
However, during the 2004-2005 ‘Making Contact Work’ consultation, the 
government and policy-makers were compelled to confront and respond to the 
problem posed by domestic violence for post-separation parenting, as a result of 
strong and sustained campaigning and work by feminists and academics which 
highlighted the risks for children and mothers of continued contact with violent 
fathers.
44
 However, the consultation took place within the context of dominant 
familial discourses and ideologies which underpinned and were reinforced by the 
political imperative to reconstitute ‘the family’ after parental separation. As a 
consequence, images of hostile mothers and victimized fathers, which were 
promoted by men’s groups and pro-father MPs, flourished, so that ‘the problem’ was 
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reconstructed in parliamentary debates as one of ‘tactical delays’ and false 
allegations by devious mothers to exclude fathers.
45
 The result was a watered down 
compromise by the government to side-step the opposing demands of women’s 
groups and academics, who were seeking stronger safety measures, and the fathers’ 
lobby which opposed such measures.
46
  
 
3. Legal discourse on contact and domestic violence prior 
to Re L 
Just as domestic violence has been systematically effaced from political discourses 
informing the (pre and) post-separation family, legal and professional discourses 
have, until relatively recently, virtually ignored the issue of domestic violence in the 
arena of child contact proceedings. The connection between the welfare of children 
on parental separation, and the perpetration of domestic violence by fathers was 
almost totally absent in family law. The perceived importance for children of 
maintaining contact with non-resident parents, and the consequent images of 
‘implacably hostile mothers’ and ‘safe family men’, reinforced the invisibility of 
domestic violence in private law proceedings concerning contact and residence. 
 
A number of commentators have pointed to the separate and distinct ways in which 
men and masculinities are constructed in different legal contexts, and sometimes 
even in the same context, which can “serve to obscure men’s multiple identities.”47  
So in the criminal justice context, violent men are constructed as perpetrators and 
offenders, while in private law Children Act proceedings men are primarily 
constructed as caregivers, underpinned by safe, familial masculinities.
48
 “[T]he 
authority of law is ‘challenged’ when the external world produces reality 
constructions that are difficult for law to reconstruct and, thereby, absorb into its 
‘thinking’.”49 Men’s violence in the child contact sphere was for many years ‘noise’ 
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to law because it cannot easily be accommodated within dominant constructions of 
children’s welfare. 
 
Many contact cases that involved serious physical violence contained no mention of 
the father’s behaviour in the judgments, focusing instead on the mother’s ‘hostility’, 
and failing to consider her safety.
50
 Additionally, courts often minimised the 
violence, describing it as “difficulties” between the parents51 or as “mutual 
conflict.”52 There was also an increasing refusal to recognise domestic violence as a 
reason for opposing contact. In Re M (A Minor) (Contact: Conditions) Wall J (as he 
then was) asserted that the father’s severe violence against the mother, which was 
witnessed by the child “[does] not amount to cogent reasons for denying all future 
contact.”53   
 
The erasure of violence perpetrated by fathers was so pervasive that it was even 
dangerous for mothers to resist contact on the basis of such violence because they 
risked being constructed as implacably hostile.
54
  In Re P (Contact: Supervision), it 
was not the father’s extremely violent conduct that was considered harmful but the 
‘danger’ that if contact was not ordered, “the intransigent parent would get her own 
way.”55 Even in cases where courts refused fathers contact because of their violent 
behaviour, they still exhorted mothers to keep the ‘door open’ to contact, appealing 
to their wish to be seen as ‘good’ mothers.56 Courts also failed to understand how 
violent and controlling men could use the court process itself to continue to harass 
mothers.
57
 This is not to say that, before Re L, courts never focused on the father’s 
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violence, or condemned his behaviour. But it seemed that the father had to be 
excessively physically violent, practically a ‘monster’, to deserve this attention.58  
 
A shift was first detected in the case law in 1997, with the judgment of Hale J (as she 
then was) and Staughton LJ in Re D (Contact: Reasons for Refusal)
59
 in which the 
Court of Appeal upheld a decision of the trial judge to order no contact on the basis 
of the father’s violence towards the mother, which, it was held, posed a risk to the 
child.  Hale J warned against applying the term, ‘implacable hostility’ to cases where 
the mother’s fears may be “genuinely and rationally held.”60 
 
The increased willingness of the courts to consider domestic violence as capable of 
constituting a ‘cogent reason’ for denying contact emerged in a number of post-1997 
cases. In Re P (Contact: Discretion)
61
 Wilson J (as he then was) held that the 
mother’s hostility to contact in circumstances of domestic violence could provide a 
reason for contact to be refused, even if her fear was ‘irrational’, if it could create a 
serious risk of emotional harm to the child. These decisions by the appellate courts 
sent strong messages to the lower courts not to view mothers as ‘implacably hostile’ 
for opposing contact if they feared violence from the father.
62
 The Court of Appeal 
also urged the lower courts to focus more directly on the father’s behaviour and to 
consider properly the effect of that behaviour on the child and mother. In Re M 
(Contact: Violent Parent) Wall J (as he then was) held:  
 
“It is often said that, notwithstanding the violence, the mother must none 
the less bring up the children to be available for contact. Too often it 
seems to me the courts neglect the other side of the equation, which is 
that a father, like this father, must demonstrate that he is a fit person to 
exercise contact; that he is not going to destabilise the family; that he is 
not going to upset the children and harm them emotionally.”63  
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In G v F (Contact: Allegations of Violence) [1999]
64
  Wall J went even further and 
held that contact should not be ordered without allegations of domestic violence 
being fully investigated. The father’s motivation, ability to change and to recognise 
the effects of his violence, were also highlighted by Wall J in a number of cases.
65
  
 
Despite the significant change in the attitudes of the appellate courts to domestic 
violence at this time, they continued to endorse unequivocally the overriding 
importance of contact, even where ‘serious’ domestic violence was found to have 
occurred,
66
 and demonstrated a reluctance to ‘give up’ on contact.67 Additionally, in 
many cases the focus remained on the mother and her opposition to contact as the 
determinant to whether contact should take place, rather than on the father and his 
conduct, even where that conduct was found to be reprehensible.
68
    
 
4. Research on contact and domestic violence prior to Re 
L 
What research tells us about the prevalence of domestic violence in families with 
children, and the effects of that violence on women and children should encourage us 
“to question our cultural norm that it will always be good for children to have a 
relationship with their father.”69 It is perhaps because that ‘cultural norm’ grew in 
strength from the early 1990s that research was initiated in 1992 which looked 
specifically at how the courts and professionals manage contact and residence cases 
where allegations of domestic violence are made. Hester and Radford explored 
“women’s experiences of negotiating and making arrangements for contact in 
circumstances of violence from male partners.”70 In particular, they focused on the 
practices and perceptions of the professionals involved in such contact arrangements 
and court proceedings.
71
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All professionals (although not usually refuge workers) endorsed the presumption of 
contact even when the mother’s safety was in jeopardy; the quality of contact, and 
the child’s relationship with the father, were rarely examined by professionals. 
Despite most women making great efforts to set up contact, professionals 
interviewed believed that mothers were generally resistant to, and obstructive of 
contact.
72
 Thus efforts of professionals were focused on persuading mothers to co-
operate, rather than on the father’s behaviour, or on women’s and children’s safety. 
Women’s accounts of violence by fathers and concerns over children’s safety were at 
best minimised, or even treated as evidence of the mother’s ‘hostility’. 
 
Most professionals were not aware of, and did not understand, the experiences of 
women and children living with domestic violence, nor the effects on children of 
witnessing violence towards their mothers.
73
  Even if women were able to make 
professionals aware of abuse they had sustained, these experiences “often 
disappeared as they went through the process of negotiating contact.”74 Most of the 
professionals interviewed by Hester and Radford did not consider domestic violence 
relevant to current contact and “saw women’s experiences of violence and abuse as 
separate from the impact of the violence on the welfare of children.”75 They rarely 
questioned how a man’s use of violence might impinge on the quality of contact for 
the child, and saw children’s opposition to contact as stemming from the mother’s 
influence.  
 
Women felt under pressure from their solicitors to agree to unsafe contact 
arrangements, rather than be viewed as ‘hostile’ or ‘unreasonable’ by courts.76 Very 
few of the contact arrangements made by mothers were ultimately safe, for mother 
and/or child,
77
 and many women reported that the onus of making contact safe fell 
on them. Professionals were unwilling to support the mother in stopping contact 
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unless there was clear, ‘professional’ evidence that the child had been abused 
because of the strong perception that courts did not consider violence towards the 
mother as constituting grounds for the cessation of contact.  
 
Hester, Pearson and Radford followed up their 1996 research with a study of (what 
were then called) court welfare officers and mediators.
78
 They found that, largely as 
a result of their earlier research, there had been a greater focus on domestic violence 
by both groups of professionals (though to a lesser extent by mediators). Court 
welfare officers “were seeing an increasingly wide range of behaviours as 
constituting domestic violence” and showed more awareness of the gendered power 
relations underpinning domestic violence and of its impact on children.
79
 Mediators 
were still minimising the existence and impact of domestic violence, and neither 
court welfare officers nor mediators had systematic screening policies. Some court 
welfare officers even considered that “any emphasis on screening would only 
‘invite’ unnecessary and malicious allegations.”80Although court welfare officers 
showed an increasing awareness of the need for safety in contact arrangements, this 
was not being translated into practice, since most still operated from the position of 
the paramountcy of contact, and felt that it was pointless to raise the issue with the 
courts.
81
   
 
Subsequent research supported the findings made by Hester et al, and suggests that 
there was little change in professional and judicial practice during the subsequent 
years. In a small-scale study of barristers’ representation of mothers involved in 
contact disputes where domestic violence was an issue, all but one barrister 
supported the presumption of contact, or at least did not query it; violence by the 
father did not, in itself, alter the beliefs of most barristers in the benefits of contact.
82
 
Although barristers did not perceive ‘domestic violence’ as limited to physical abuse, 
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they tended to see it on a scale of severity, and some barristers doubted the truth of 
their client’s allegations of violence.83     
 
With regard to the disclosure of domestic violence, research undertaken by Piper and 
Kaganas found that while a few solicitors were prepared to be persistent and patient 
in finding out about domestic violence from clients, many others took few active 
steps to encourage it, as they considered that they would ‘know’ if domestic violence 
was an issue.
84
  Similarly, most barristers in Barnett’s study relied on domestic 
violence ‘coming up’ spontaneously in discussions with the client, and some would 
even avoid asking about such issues for fear of ‘putting ideas’ into the client’s 
head.
85
 A few barristers showed a marked reluctance to raise issues of domestic 
violence with the court, for fear of being thought confrontational, not wishing to be 
contaminated by the mother’s hostility.86   
 
Most barristers in Barnett’s study felt that the mother’s safety was only relevant if it 
was directly linked to the child’s welfare, while a significant minority considered 
domestic violence to be wholly irrelevant to issues of contact. Similarly, comments 
made by some of the solicitors interviewed by Kaganas and Piper implied that 
domestic violence was an obstacle to be overcome on the way to agreeing contact, 
rather than “in terms of the client’s safety or freedom from intimidation .”87  
Anderson found that mothers’ and children’s wishes and fears about contact were 
generally ignored or discounted by solicitors and court welfare officers.
88
 
 
As a consequence, women involved in contact disputes could continue to find 
themselves subjected to unsafe contact arrangements. Women’s Aid reported that 
women’s solicitors frequently persuaded them to agree to contact arrangements 
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which resulted in women and children experiencing further threats and abuse, and in 
some cases being traced to a refuge.
89
 While barristers understood that mothers 
should not have to come into direct contact with violent fathers, they did not appear 
to be aware of how contingent and hard to sustain many ‘standard’ safety measures, 
such as contact centres or third party handovers, can be.
90
   
 
Research findings also reveal that women continued to experience difficulty 
persuading courts and professionals to stop contact. Anderson found that women 
only managed to stop contact where the children themselves had been physically or 
sexually abused.
91
 Similarly Barnett found that barristers did not consider a threat to 
the mother’s safety arising out of contact as sufficient reason to stop contact.92 
 
5. The Children Act Sub-Committee: Report and Guidelines 
As a result of the research by Hester et al and pressure from women’s groups, in 
1999 the Children Act Sub-Committee of the Advisory Board on Family Law (‘the 
CASC’) initiated a consultation process, which resulted in recommendations to the 
Lord Chancellor’s Department in April 2000.93 The CASC’s principal 
recommendation was that there should be ‘good practice’ guidelines for the judiciary 
setting out the approach to be taken when domestic violence was put forward as a 
reason for denying or limiting parental contact, which should be introduced by way 
of a Practice Direction. The CASC was not, however, persuaded that there was a 
need to amend the Children Act 1989 to introduce a legislative presumption against 
contact where domestic violence was established. 
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The main guidelines published by the CASC include:
94
 
 the court should, at the earliest opportunity, consider allegations of domestic 
violence and decide whether the nature and effect of the violence is such as to 
make it likely that the order of the court for contact will be affected if the 
allegations are proved or admitted 
 if the court’s order is likely to be affected by proven allegations of domestic 
violence, the court should consider whether there should be an initial fact-
finding hearing, which should be heard as speedily as possible 
 where findings are made, the court should consider the conduct of both 
parents towards each other and towards the child and in particular, the effect 
of the violence on the child and the resident parent; the motivation of the 
parent seeking contact and their capacity to appreciate the effect of past and 
future violence on the child and the other parent; the likely behaviour of the 
parent seeking contact during contact and its effect on the child; whether the 
parent seeking contact has the capacity to change. 
 
6. The decision in Re L 
Shortly after the CASC reported, the Court of Appeal heard four combined appeals 
against orders refusing fathers’ applications for direct contact.95 In each case, the 
fathers had perpetrated severe physical violence on the mothers. The Court of 
Appeal in Re L laid down a novel precedent for how courts should determine contact 
cases where allegations of domestic violence are made, and sent a clear message to 
the lower courts to recognise the importance of domestic violence in terms of harm 
to children and risk to both children and primary carers. However, this was done 
with a simultaneous endorsement of the presumption of contact and a concern not to 
elevate domestic violence too highly as a factor that could militate against contact. It 
is not surprising, then, that in the ensuing years, an ambivalence on the part of the 
Court of Appeal to the issue of domestic violence in private law Children Act cases 
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could be discerned, with repercussions for the application of the guidelines by the 
lower courts.  
 
The Court of Appeal was materially assisted by a report by Dr. Claire Sturge and Dr. 
Danya Glaser, child and adolescent psychiatrists (‘the experts’ report’), which 
highlighted the effects on children of living with domestic violence.
96
 Sturge and 
Glaser questioned, as a moral and child welfare issue, whether children should be 
encouraged “to have relationships with fathers who have behaved criminally and in a 
way that specifically denigrates the mother and specifically undermines and distorts 
the caring and protective roles of parents?”97 They argued forcefully that there 
should be an assumption against contact where the non-resident parent was violent to 
the other parent, which should only be offset if the non-resident parent can show 
positively why contact is in the child’s interests,98 and emphasised that:  
 
“Domestic violence involves a very serious and significant failure in 
parenting – failure to protect the child’s carer and failure to protect the 
child emotionally (and in some cases physically – which meets any 
definition of child abuse.)”99  
 
They set out a list of requirements that violent parents should fulfil in order to tip the 
balance in favour of contact, including acknowledgement of the violence and 
acceptance of responsibility for it; a wish to make reparation to the child; an 
expression of regret; and an understanding of the impact of their behaviour on the 
resident parent.  
 
The Court of Appeal endorsed the experts’ report and issued strong pronouncements 
in the judgments about the harm caused to children and resident parents by domestic 
violence and the need for there to be a greater awareness of these issues. They also 
recognised the effect that the presumption of contact may have had in such cases.   
 
“There has, perhaps, been a tendency in the past for courts not to tackle 
allegations of violence and to leave them in the background on the 
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premise that they were matters affecting the adults and not relevant to 
issues regarding the children. The general principle that contact with the 
non-resident parent is in the interests of the child may sometimes have 
discouraged sufficient attention being paid to the adverse effects on 
children living in the household where violence has occurred. It may not 
necessarily be widely appreciated that violence to a partner involves a 
significant failure in parenting – failure to protect the child’s carer and 
failure to protect the child emotionally.”100 
 
However, all three Court of Appeal judges strongly affirmed what Thorpe LJ 
described as “the assumption of contact”,101 of which he had “no doubt of the secure 
foundation,” a view that was, he said, “shared by the majority of mental health 
professionals”.102 As a consequence, Butler-Sloss and Thorpe LJJ both expressed 
concern that a heightened focus on domestic violence should not “move the 
pendulum too far and thus to create an excessive concentration on past history and an 
over-reflection of physical abuse within the determination of individual cases”.103 
Nor, they said, should there be “any presumption that, on proof of domestic violence, 
the offending parent has to surmount a prima facie barrier of no contact”.104  
 
In dismissing all four appeals, the Court of Appeal laid down the following 
guidance:  
 domestic violence does not, in principle, create a bar to, or presumption 
against, contact; it is one highly material factor to put into the delicate 
balancing exercise in applying the welfare principle and the welfare 
checklist; 
 where allegations of domestic violence are made which might have an effect 
on the outcome, then they ought to be adjudicated on and findings of fact 
made; 
 the resident parent’s justified fears of domestic violence, where it is proved, 
must be distinguished from cases of implacable hostility; 
 on an application for interim contact, when the allegations have not yet been 
adjudicated on, the court should give particular consideration to the likely 
risk of harm to the child if contact is granted or refused; 
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 in assessing the weight to be given to past domestic violence, it is highly 
material whether the perpetrator has shown an ability to recognise the wrong, 
to acknowledge the need to change and make genuine efforts to do so, and to 
correct the behaviour; 
 the court should consider the conduct of the parties towards each other and 
towards the child, the effect on the child and the resident parent, and the 
motivation of the parent seeking contact; 
 the court should take steps to ensure that the risk of harm is minimised and 
the safety of the child and resident parent is secured  before, during and after 
contact. 
 
By laying down these guidelines and endorsing the government’s view that neither 
legislation nor a Practice Direction was necessary, implementation of the 
recommendation of the CASC for a Practice Direction to be issued was delayed for 
over eight years. 
 
7. Post-Re L case law on contact cases where allegations 
of domestic violence are made 
 
Following Re L, the Court of Appeal dealt with a number of appeals in which they 
were critical of the lower courts’ failure to follow the Re L and CASC guidelines. 
The cases also reveal how the professionals at times also disregarded the CASC and 
Re L guidelines, exacerbating the courts’ failure to do so. At the same time, the Court 
of Appeal’s bifurcated approach in Re L, together with the importance ascribed to the 
involvement of fathers in families after parental separation in legal, professional and 
political discourses, led to an inconsistent application of the guidelines by the lower 
courts, and an ambivalent attitude towards them by the higher courts. 
 
7.1 Failure to hold fact-finding hearings 
In a number of cases the Court of Appeal criticised trial judges for not conducting 
fact-finding hearings.  In Re M and B (Children) 
105
 the father had been extremely 
violent towards the mother, was convicted of rape, indecent assault and actual bodily 
harm against her and was committed to prison for breaches of injunctions. The Court 
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of Appeal held, inter alia, that the judge erred in not following the CASC guidelines 
and that the importance of conducting a fact-finding hearing had not been 
sufficiently brought to the judge’s attention by the parties’ representatives.106   
 
Similarly in Re K and S (Children) (Contact: Domestic Violence),
107
 no fact-finding 
hearing was held and direct contact was ordered. Although the Court of Appeal 
dismissed the mother’s appeal, it was held that the failure to hold a fact-finding 
hearing and to have any regard to Re L was a serious deficiency, as was the failure of 
the parties’ representatives’ to draw the judge’s attention to Re L.  
 
Even if fact-finding hearings are listed, they could ‘disappear’ during the course of 
proceedings, mainly because the judges did not consider the violence to be relevant 
to contact, or because they ignored the violence and blamed the mother for 
‘thwarting’ contact. In Re C (Children Proceedings: Powers of Transfer)108 fact-
finding hearings on the mother’s allegations of violence against the father were listed 
on two occasions. On the first occasion, the magistrates declined to conduct the 
hearing on the basis that the allegations were not relevant; on the second occasion 
the fact-finding hearing was vacated by the trial judge on his own motion. The Court 
of Appeal was highly critical of the judge’s actions, allowed the appeal and ensured 
that a fact-finding hearing was listed before a different judge. However, a 
contradictory approach was taken by the Court of Appeal in Re C (Contact: Conduct 
of Hearings), where the trial judge’s refusal to hold a fact-finding hearing because of 
her “preference to look forward rather than backward” was approved.109 
 
It would seem, therefore, that fact-finding hearings were not held either because the 
judiciary and the professionals were not aware of the Re L and CASC guidelines, or 
because they did not consider fact-finding hearings to be necessary as they did not 
consider the father’s conduct to be relevant to the issue of contact.    
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Despite the criticisms by appellate judges of the lower courts failure to hold fact-
finding hearings, from 2005 the Court of Appeal started to express concern that fact-
finding hearings were ‘clogging up’ the court system. In Re F (Restrictions on 
Applications) Thorpe LJ said that Re L hearings were burdening “the already 
stretched resources of the trial courts with difficult factual investigations into past 
events and past relationships. That has undoubtedly had an impact on the 
productivity and speed of the family justice system.”110 It is difficult to reconcile this 
view with the simultaneous concern of the Court of Appeal about the lower courts’ 
failure to hold fact-finding hearings where appropriate, and the findings of Hunt and 
Macleod, HMICA and other researchers of the rarity of fact-finding hearings.
111
 
 
7.2 Judicial perceptions of domestic violence 
A number of reported cases demonstrate the way in which the courts continued to 
minimise and ‘neutralise’ domestic violence, even in cases of extremely severe 
physical violence. In Re L (Contact: Genuine Fear),
112
 there was a history of severe 
physical violence by the father towards the mother, as well as towards his previous 
wife, her boyfriend and even her solicitor some years previously, for which he had 
served a five-year prison sentence for grievous bodily harm. The Recorder described 
the father’s violence as “fairly low level and sporadic” compared to “what one often 
hears of in these courts.”113 Similarly in Re S (Contact: Promoting Relationship with 
Absent Parent)
114
 both the Cafcass officer and the trial judge minimised the father’s 
violence and portrayed it as ‘mutual conflict’. The Cafcass officer expressed the 
view that the child “might be at greater risk of emotional damage from the conflict 
between her parents than from the overspill of physical violence”,115 and the recorder 
concluded that the “incidents complained of by the mother were basically at a very 
minor level,”116 despite the fact that the mother had obtained two non-molestation 
orders against the father. 
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However, in a few cases, judges in the lower courts demonstrated a greater insight 
into domestic violence and its effects than before Re L, and appeared more willing to 
confront the father’s conduct. In Re A (Contact: Risk of Violence)117 Black J (as she 
then was) made findings against the father after a fact-finding hearing and 
demonstrated a rare insight into the problems for women leaving abusive 
relationships and being able to provide medical and police evidence.  
 
7.3 The presumption of contact  
The extent to which the ‘presumption of contact’ continued to impact on the courts’ 
application of the Re L and CASC guidelines was demonstrated in a number of post-
Re L cases. In Re L (Contact: Genuine Fear) the trial judge said that the father’s 
“wholly unacceptable” violence did not justify the mother’s “fervent opposition” to 
contact.
118
  The courts’ relentless pursuit of contact, even in circumstances of severe 
domestic abuse, can be seen in Re W (Contact).
119
 The father had been sentenced to a 
suspended prison sentence for breaching a non-molestation order obtained by the 
mother. A consent order for direct contact, including staying contact, was varied to 
indirect contact because of the father’s aggressive behaviour and the children’s 
resistance to contact. The Court of Appeal allowed the father’s appeal to enable him 
to seek a referral to a family support service, so that “the relationship which endured 
between father and children up to June 2006 could be restored in some way.”120 
 
The desire to avoid ‘conflict’ and promote contact meant that, in some cases, the 
lower courts actively discouraged mothers from pursuing allegations of domestic 
violence, with the approval of the Court of Appeal. In Re G (Children)
121
 Ward LJ 
commended the mother for withdrawing her allegations of serious domestic violence 
on the day of the fact-finding hearing so that some agreement could be reached; the 
issue was then ‘simply’ one of whether or not contact should be supervised. He also 
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implicitly criticised the mother for ‘insisting’ on supervised contact.122 So on the 
basis of these judgments, the ‘good’ mother is potentially one who fails to protect 
herself and her children from the father’s violence. The discouragement to pursue 
allegations of domestic violence and the encouragement to look ‘to the future’ and 
not ‘the past’ indicates that courts considered even extremely severe abuse to be less 
important than contact. 
 
7.4 Courts’ attitudes towards fathers and mothers 
The cases demonstrate that the belief in the ‘benefits’ of contact, and images of 
implacably hostile mothers, continued to dominate judicial perceptions after Re L, so 
that the father’s violence, and his attitude towards it, were marginalised and the 
‘problem’ continued to be portrayed in numerous cases as the mother’s opposition to 
contact.  
 
In a number of cases the Court of Appeal was highly critical of trial judges for 
failing to follow the Re L guidelines by not taking into account the father’s attitude 
towards the violence perpetrated by him. In Re M and B (Children) 
123
 the Court of 
Appeal held that the judge should have paid far greater regard to the father’s past 
misdeeds, his absence of contrition and his failure to acknowledge that he was the 
one who needed psychological help. Similarly, in Re J (Children)
124
 the Court of 
Appeal held that the judge had paid little attention to a combination of factors that 
might have suggested that the father had difficulty meeting the children’s emotional 
needs, such as his views on women and on his own violence. 
 
The most serious failure to follow the Re L guidelines in this respect can be found in 
the case of Re H (A Child) (Contact: Domestic Violence),
125
 in which Judge Cockroft 
found some of the mother’s allegations of very severe physical violence against the 
father proved. After extremely protracted proceedings, Judge Cockroft ordered six 
sessions of supervised contact. The Court of Appeal condemned the judge’s hostility 
towards the mother and held, allowing the mother’s appeal, that it was wholly 
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unacceptable for the judge to have ignored Re L and the Sturge/Glaser report in his 
judgments, and that this was all the more inexcusable because the Cafcass officer 
had set out the principles of the experts’ report in her report. The critical area of the 
guidelines which the judge did not appear to have addressed were: “the capacity of 
the parent seeking contact to appreciate the effect of past and future violence on the 
parent and the children concerned” and “the attitude of the parent seeking contact to 
past violent conduct by that parent.” Wall J (as he then was) attached the CASC 
guidelines to his judgment: 
 
“[I]n the hope that this court will not again be presented with a case such 
as the present, which not only ill-serves the parties and the child, but 
does the system discredit, and helps to devalue the valuable and 
conscientious work which courts up and down the country are 
undertaking in an attempt to tackle the scourge of domestic violence and 
to minimise the effect which it has on parties and children.”126 
 
On the other hand, some judgments reveal an increased focus by the lower courts on 
the father’s behaviour and attitude. In M v A (Contact: Domestic Violence),127 HHJ 
Cryan rejected the father’s appeal against an order of the Family Proceedings Court 
refusing him direct contact and found that the father “showed little insight into the 
impact of past events and the difficulties which these are likely to give rise to if 
direct contact is to be embarked upon in the near future.”128 In Re O (Contact: 
Withdrawal of Application),
129
 the trial judge was highly critical of the father, whom 
he described as ‘irrational’ in his attitude, and castigated him for blaming the mother 
and ‘the system’ for his failure to achieve contact, rather than accepting 
responsibility himself.
130
  
 
However, in a number of cases both the lower and appellate courts downgraded the 
Re L factors relating to the father’s conduct and attitude so that the mother’s 
opposition to contact was the focus of attention. In Re L (Contact: Genuine Fear)
131
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the Recorder criticized the father for his propensity for violence, his inability to show 
remorse for his behaviour, and his clear contempt for the mother. Despite this, the 
entire focus of the case was on the mother, both in relation to whether her fears were 
‘genuine’ and whether she was mentally able to cope with contact. The court, 
professionals and experts downplayed and sidelined the father’s violence so that, as a 
consequence, the mother’s opposition to contact was ‘irrational’ and even 
‘pathological’, and attention was therefore on attempting to ‘treat’ her ‘pathology’. 
The father, on the other hand, had “genuine” motivation for seeking contact, and a 
“genuine commitment” to the child.132 Sir Bruce Blair QC expressed “a great deal of 
sympathy” with the father because of the mother’s opposition to contact.133  
Similarly in Re S (Contact: Promoting Relationship with Absent Parent)
134
 despite 
the Recorder acknowledging that the father came across as aggressive, belligerent 
and insensitive, he had no doubt that “his desire for contact was genuine and the 
failure of contact was to be laid principally on the shoulders of the mother who had 
no intention of making contact work.”135 The mother, he found, had influenced the 
child against the father so that “the child’s beliefs were a direct result of the beliefs 
of the mother.”136 So the father’s ‘genuine motivation’ and commitment constituted 
him as a ‘good father’ and counted for more than his violence; the mother inevitably, 
then, became the ‘problem’. The readiness of courts to accept fathers’ bare assertions 
that they have ‘changed’ was also seen in Re E (Children).137 Despite findings of 
serious violence having been made against the father, the judge accepted his ‘door of 
the court’ conversion as evidence that the father had sincerely ‘reformed’. The 
judge’s approach was approved by the Court of Appeal.  
 
In Re J-S (Contact: Parental Responsibility)
138
 the father’s abusive behavior was 
even reconstructed as evidence of his ‘commitment’ and ‘positive motivation’ 
towards contact.  The trial judge found the mother’s allegations of serious physical 
violence, harassment and abuse proved, and concluded that the father was using 
contact as a means of controlling the mother. At a later hearing the judge terminated 
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contact following the father’s repeated complaints to social services about the 
mother, which were found to constitute a malicious and controlling attempt to harass 
her. On the father’s appeal, Ward LJ reframed the father’s conduct as evidence of a 
concerned, ‘good’ father, by describing him as “over-anxious” and “over-protective” 
rather than malicious, and as a man of “intensity and passion.”139 On the other hand, 
Ward LJ was highly critical of the mother, and gave her no credit for agreeing to 
direct contact, and implicitly portrayed her as scheming and obstructive. 
 
In conclusion, we have seen that the cases reveal on the one hand, an increasing 
frustration by the Court of Appeal at the failure of the lower courts and professionals 
to apply the guidelines, and on the other hand an affirmation of the very approach 
that the Court of Appeal criticised in Re L. Concern about the failure of the courts 
and professionals “to recognize domestic abuse and deal with it in an appropriate 
way” was expressed by Wall J (as he then was) in 2004,140 and by Elizabeth Lawson 
QC who criticised the courts: 
 
“[F]or the inappropriate lengths to which they go to encourage 
agreement, which in effect presents the abused mother with a 
steeplechase to the goal of protection that many cannot complete. Too 
often the real issue of domestic abuse is swept under the carpet despite 
the needs of the victim and the children: ‘he may be violent but he is still 
a good dad’.”141  
 
 
8. Post Re L research  
Monitoring of the Re L and CASC guidelines by the Lord Chancellor’s Department 
supports the findings of this review of the case law.
142
 It was found that their 
application was inconsistent and ‘patchy’ and that the guidelines were frequently 
ignored, that fact-finding hearings were not always held where appropriate, and that 
issues of safety were frequently not addressed. “Despite Re L, it appeared that the 
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courts continued to assume contact was in the child’s best interests and to order it 
without a thorough analysis of the risks to the child and carer.”143   
 
These concerns were supported by research undertaken into contact proceedings 
following Re L, which encountered similar concerns to those found in the pre-Re L 
research. The promotion of post-separation contact and the preference for agreed 
outcomes by courts and professionals continued to lead to women being pressurised 
into agreeing to unsafe contact arrangements,
144
 and courts being reluctant to restrict 
contact. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Court Administration (‘HMICA’), in their 
evaluation of how Cafcass deal with private law cases involving domestic violence, 
found that the presumption of contact and the preference for agreement drove and 
constrained Cafcass practice, even where Cafcass officers did not necessarily agree 
with it.
145
 Some women reported being under pressure to agree contact, and then 
being accused of accepting that the violence could not have been that bad because 
they had ‘agreed’. Mediation was often suggested by Cafcass officers, irrespective of 
the presence of domestic violence. Solicitors themselves told Hunt and Macleod that 
they participated in the pressure on clients to reach agreement, for example by 
‘using’ Cafcass reports to persuade clients of the ‘inevitable’ outcome.146 
 
Domestic violence continued to be minimised or ‘equalised’ by courts and 
professionals which meant that it continued to be disregarded, screened out of 
Cafcass reports, and considered irrelevant to contact.
147
 There was a “systemic 
failure” to appreciate the impact of persistent post-separation abuse on women.148 As 
a consequence, fact-finding hearings continued to be inconsistently and rarely 
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held.
149
  Hunt and Macleod found a general ‘coolness’ to fact-finding hearings; 
despite allegations of domestic violence featuring in half of the sample cases, fact-
finding hearings were extremely rare.
150
 The courts’ reluctance to hold such hearings 
appeared to be due to the perception by the judiciary that “there were few cases in 
which findings would be relevant to contact; doubts about the quality of the evidence 
available; a general preference for settlement over adjudication; concerns about the 
inevitable ‘mud-slinging’ exacerbating the conflict; and pressure on court time.”151 
 
“The only group not implicated in this ‘nobody wants finding of fact 
hearings’ scenarios were Cafcass officers, some of whom voiced their 
disquiet at the rarity of these hearings and their frustration at asking for 
hearings which were either not listed or did not happen.”152   
 
Images of ‘safe family men’ and ‘implacably hostile mothers’ continued to 
influence the perceptions of professionals, who often misunderstood the 
behavior of violent men, so that perpetrators of domestic violence could be 
perceived as reasonable, plausible and charming.
153
 As a consequence, “even 
proven histories [of violence] were disregarded by courts, professionals and 
contact centres,”154 fathers’ motivation was rarely questioned, and the parenting 
capacity of violent men was over-estimated.
155
 
 
On the other hand, the post-Re L research commonly found that women who 
raised allegations of domestic violence continued to be viewed with suspicion, 
disbelieved and treated as obstructive.
156
 Harrison found that if the father denied 
the violence, solicitors, Cafcass officers and contact centre staff tended to frame 
it as “one person’s word against another,” usually giving fathers the “benefit of 
the doubt”.157 Alternatively, mothers’ fears could be trivialised and not taken 
seriously,
158
 and if mothers were viewed as ‘implacably hostile’ they could be 
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threatened with enforcement proceedings, even in cases where men had 
breached non-molestation orders or had convictions for violence.
159
   
 
Additionally, very rarely did courts refuse to order direct contact. Research by the 
National Association of Probation Officers “found that in the vast majority of cases, 
fathers were granted contact with their children regardless of their violent and 
abusive behaviour.”160 This continued to lead to unsafe contact arrangements that put 
women and children at risk of harm from violent fathers.
161
 HMICA found that 
Cafcass did not assess risk sufficiently and that some of the routine approaches used 
by Cafcass officers were “dangerous”.162 Practitioners’ practices were no different, 
whether or not domestic violence was alleged. Hunt and Macleod also found that it 
was unusual to find a risk assessment in Cafcass reports.
163
 As a consequence, a 
number of research studies found that, despite very high levels of domestic violence, 
orders for supervised contact were rare; the most common final outcomes were for 
direct, unsupervised contact.
164
 
 
9. Genesis of the Practice Direction 
Following the publication by Women’s Aid of a report about 29 children in thirteen 
families who were killed between 1994 and 2004 as a result of contact arrangements 
in England and Wales,
165
 Wall LJ presented a report to the President of the Family 
Division in February 2006 on the five cases where contact was ordered by the court 
with the agreement of the parties.
166
  Wall LJ recommended that the guidelines in Re 
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L should be reinforced, and requested the Family Justice Council to advise on the 
approach the courts should adopt to proposed consent orders, and to consider 
whether parties were being pressurised by their lawyers into reaching agreements 
which they did not believe to be safe. 
 
Following these recommendations, Resolution undertook a postal survey of its 
membership, at the request of the Family Justice Council, which found that: orders 
for no contact were only made in two per cent of cases; fact-finding hearings were 
extremely rare and courts were very reluctant to hold them; there was a wide 
divergence in practice in seeking disclosure of domestic violence from clients; courts 
very rarely refused consent orders and in some cases consent orders were made 
which participants thought put children at risk of harm; a third of participants 
thought that there was too much pressure on parties to agree contact arrangements; 
courts did not enquire into the safety and suitability of arrangements for children 
when making consent orders.
167
  
 
The subsequent report produced by the Family Justice Council found that, in general, 
the guidelines in Re L were more honoured in the breach than in the observance.
168
 
Fact-finding hearings were rare, and in applications for consent orders the Re L 
guidelines were virtually ignored. The assumption that contact is in a child’s best 
interests and that it will inevitably be ordered by the court “sometimes results in 
pressure being put on victims of domestic violence by lawyers, or by perpetrators of 
that domestic violence, to agree to an order.”169 As a result, unsafe contact 
agreements were often made because of the advice given to parents. The report 
concluded that: “Seeking agreement should never take priority over safety in cases 
involving domestic violence or any other form of child abuse.”170 The main 
recommendation of the FJC was that:  
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“A cultural change is required, with a move away from ‘contact is 
always the appropriate way forward’ to ‘contact that is safe and positive 
for the child is always the appropriate way forward’.”171  
 
It was also recommended that the message of Drs Sturge and Glaser, that domestic 
violence constitutes a significant failure in parenting, “needs to be repeated again 
and again, loud and clear, until it gains widespread acceptance.”172 Solicitors and 
barristers should be cautious when advising clients to agree arrangements for contact 
in cases where there are allegations of domestic violence, and the safety of any 
proposed arrangements should be paramount. Risk assessments should be 
undertaken in every case in which domestic violence has been alleged or admitted, 
before a consent order is made. 
 
The Family Justice Council recommended that a Practice Direction should be issued 
embodying the CASC and Re L guidelines and the recommendations of the FJC. 
Accordingly, Practice Direction 12 J, which forms the subject of this study, was 
issued by the President of the Family Division in May 2008.
173
 
 
10. Conclusions 
The relations of power that underpin and are played out in family law led to the 
position whereby “fatherhood…replaced marriage as the social institution 
maintaining men’s control of women”,174 and the ‘welfare of the child’ became 
constructed almost entirely in terms of the importance for children of maintaining 
contact with non-resident fathers after parental separation. This constructed and 
reinforced an ideological divide between domestic violence and post-separation 
parenting, which rendered fatherhood ‘safe’ by relegating ‘dangerous masculinity’ to 
territory “outside the realm of fathering”.175 So men as perpetrators of domestic 
violence were constituted separately from men as fathers. In the arena of post-
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separation parenting, it was images of ‘safe family men’ that dominated political and 
popular discourses and family policy, because of the strong political imperative to 
reconstitute ‘the family’ across households and maintain a place for the father after 
parental separation. Underpinning parental responsibility is the image of safe, 
familial masculinity, which makes it so difficult for mothers to raise ‘other’ images 
of ‘dangerous’ masculinity.  
 
The gendered relations of power that gave rise to, and reinforced, the perceived 
importance for children of maintaining a relationship with non-resident fathers, 
worked to erase men’s violence against women in legal discourse, so that “in spite of 
the growing recognition of the gendered features of violence in adult close 
relationships,…fatherhood [was] still to an overwhelmingly large extent constructed 
as essentially nonviolent.”176 At the same time, images of ‘implacably hostile 
mothers’ focused attention on mothers’ opposition to contact. 
 
The pre-Re L case law and research demonstrate that law’s selective construction of 
children’s welfare, with its minimal expectations of fathers, “masked the gendered 
separation of men into good fathers and violent men”,177 and reinforced the 
invisibility of male violence in the private law arena.
178
 This erasure of domestic 
violence meant that ‘father-absence’ and the denial of contact were perceived as a 
more serious and damaging ‘social harm’ than fathers’ violence towards mothers.179 
As a consequence, the moral and ethical dimension of men’s violence to women was 
masked, thereby condoning the violence. Risks to women’s and children’s safety 
were also marginalised or rendered invisible.
180
 So the selective construction of 
children’s welfare did not “necessarily mean privileging their safety and well-being 
but, instead, [was] used to legitimate the scrutinising and disciplining of women who 
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[were] trying to protect their children.”181 The perceptions and practices of courts 
and professionals were both shaped by, and reinforced, the ideological separation of 
contact and domestic violence, so that domestic violence barely impinged on the 
‘presumption of contact’. The result was that the mother’s voice was disqualified by 
professionals in contact cases, since she could not express a legitimate interest in her 
own protection without risking being constructed as selfish and hostile. In this way, 
both the courts and professionals worked to silence women’s attempts at seeking 
autonomy from violent men. This led to enormous pressure to agree to contact and to 
harsh consequences for mothers if they resisted contact between violent fathers and 
children.  The increasingly hegemonic status of the equal, democratic family, 
underpinned by discourses of individual responsibility, masked and reinforced not 
only the gendered division of labour, but also the risks for women of sustaining 
contact with abusive fathers. 
 
In the context of the strength of the dominant familial discourses and the gendered 
subjectivities to which they gave rise, feminist campaigners and academic 
researchers in the late 1990s achieved remarkable success in putting domestic 
violence on the agenda in private law Children Act proceedings, and compelling 
policy makers and the judiciary to take domestic violence more seriously. The CASC 
recommendations and the decision in Re L attest to the possibilities for shifting the 
discursive terrain in which contact between violent men and children is considered 
and decided. However, these developments were simultaneously undercut by the 
endorsement of the presumption of contact, as well as the powerful familial 
discourses already in circulation, which continued to resonate with large sectors of 
the judiciary and family law professionals. This meant that even after Re L, and 
despite strong encouragement by some members of the senior judiciary for the lower 
courts to take domestic violence seriously, the Re L and CASC guidelines failed to 
have a significant impact, and many judges and professionals disregarded them 
because they continued to perceive contact as more important than domestic 
violence. Even severe physical violence continued to be minimised and neutralised 
by many courts and professionals, and women continued to be pressurised into 
agreeing to unsafe contact arrangements.  
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The downgrading of domestic violence meant that risk was rarely and inconsistently 
assessed, and little thought was given by courts and professionals to the safety of 
children and resident parents. The demonised figure of the ‘implacably hostile 
mother’, together with discourses of maternal ‘irrationality’, continued to lead to 
women’s fears of domestic violence being portrayed as unreasonable and illogical, 
and therefore harmful to children.
182
 The hallmark of the ‘good mother’ remained 
her willingness to promote and encourage contact with non-resident fathers, 
irrespective of his violence towards her, because “virtually any involvement by 
fathers with their children constitutes good-enough fathering.”183 Mothers who 
opposed contact with violent fathers were likely to be perceived and treated as 
implacably hostile and denied a legitimate voice to express concern for their own, 
and their children’s safety and well-being.184 The burden on mothers of facilitating 
contact between children and violent fathers, and the risks to their own safety and 
well being, continued to remain invisible to many courts and professionals. As 
Harrison observed: 
 
“When a history of domestic violence remained unknown or became 
obscured, and women appeared reluctant to move on, a perception of 
them as hostile and obstructive was reinforced, and their real fears were 
left unacknowledged.”185   
 
Furthermore, one of the principal recommendations of the Court of Appeal in Re L 
and of the CASC – for courts to hold fact-finding hearings on disputed allegations of 
domestic violence – was frequently ignored because domestic violence was 
considered irrelevant to contact and fact-finding hearings were seen as an 
unwelcome intrusion into the conciliatory, forward-looking ethos of family 
proceedings. Even if domestic violence was found to have occurred, simple 
expressions of the desire for contact were constructed as sufficient ‘motivation’ to 
justify ignoring the guideline factors, thereby failing to acknowledge that the pursuit 
of contact by fathers may itself be part of a process of abuse. As Lady Hale 
observed: “The most troubling aspect of my perception is that some women are 
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being pursued and oppressed by controlling or vengeful men with the full support of 
the system.”186  
 
The issue that will be considered in the following chapters is the extent to which the 
Practice Direction has led to courts and professionals seeing beyond images of ‘safe 
family men’ and ‘implacably hostile mothers’ and acknowledging properly that ‘the 
family’ is not always a safe haven but a place where abuse can occur.  
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CHAPTER 4  
PERCEPTIONS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
CHILDREN’S WELFARE AND PARENTS 
INVOLVED IN CONTACT PROCEEDINGS 
 
 
1. Understanding domestic violence 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The way in which the term, ‘domestic violence’, is defined and understood has 
varied over time and in different contexts. According to contemporary 
understandings and definitions, ‘domestic violence’ is a pattern of coercive, 
controlling behaviour, of which physical violence may form a part. So, for example, 
Women’s Aid define domestic violence as:  
 
“physical, psychological, sexual or financial violence that takes place 
within an intimate or family-type relationship and forms a pattern of 
coercive and controlling behaviour. This can include forced marriage and 
so-called ‘honour’ crimes. Domestic violence often includes a range of 
abusive behaviours not all of which are, in themselves, inherently 
‘violent’ – hence some people prefer to use the term ‘domestic abuse’ 
rather than ‘domestic violence’.”1 
 
The encompassing, insidious nature of domestic violence was experienced by the 
women interviewed by Coy et al, who provided accounts of the broad range of abuse 
they had sustained from the fathers of their children.
2
 Their findings demonstrated 
the way in which the violence and abuse constituted a pattern of coercive control 
embedded in the fabric of the women’s everyday lives and parenting practices “by 
micro-managing the household and inculcating a constant state of anxiety and fear,” 
and systematically alienating children from their mothers.
3
 These abusive behaviours 
were experienced by many of the women as more frightening and debilitating than 
the physical violence. 
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1.2 Professionals’ perceptions of domestic violence 
In order to determine professionals’ understandings of domestic violence, 
respondents’ views were sought on the description of domestic violence in the 
Practice Direction; this question also provided helpful information on the adequacy 
of that description. The Practice Direction describes ‘domestic violence’ as including:  
 
“[P]hysical violence, threatening or intimidating behaviour and any other 
form of abuse which, directly or indirectly, may have caused harm to the 
other party or to the child or which may give rise to the risk of harm.”4  
 
The vast majority of professionals recognised that domestic violence is not limited to 
incidents of physical violence.
5
 Many respondents described it as encompassing 
emotional abuse,
6
 and a few respondents considered that financial control, 
denigration of the mother and alienation from their children were forms of domestic 
violence. None of the participants described domestic violence as arising out of 
anger, and only two referred to it as constituting a lack of control. 
 
“You know, it isn’t always physical, it’s the emotional abuse and the 
erosion of self-esteem.” [Ms G, Barrister, SE] 
 
“You know, the sort of alienation from family, they don’t realise that it’s 
happening until they start to talk to you and you go: right, I’ve come 
across this before, tell me exactly what happened.” [Ms P, Barrister, SW] 
 
In light of the findings of earlier research discussed in Chapter 3, and the incident-
based approach to domestic violence applied by many family lawyers in Hunter and 
Barnett’s research,7 it was encouraging to find that half of all respondents (although 
only two barristers), articulated a theoretical understanding of the power and control 
dynamics that characterise domestic violence, although it was less surprising to find 
that more Cafcass officers
8
 than legal professionals understood those dynamics. 
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These respondents were able to see that what could have been constructed as one-off 
or ‘historic incidents’ formed part of a pattern of coercive control.  
 
“I dealt with a case recently where there had been, sort of, I asked mother: 
would you say the relationship was characterised by violence, how often 
did the violence take place, probably three times a year…but actually it 
was because he only needed to raise his eyebrow to make it clear that if 
she went any further then she would be beaten…and we need to be aware 
that that control doesn’t need to be the physical; the emotional, the 
mental control can be just as effective, but just as corrosive to the 
victim.” [Mr J, FCA, NE] 
 
“His control, well his control is different, if you’re constantly pregnant, 
short of money, he’s doing a criminology degree, putting you down, look 
at me I’m a brainbox,…The thing is domestic violence, the most 
worrying ones, are the controlling partners.” [Ms V, FCA, NW] 
 
Ms P described a barrister in the case she had undertaken on the day of the interview 
saying:  
 
“Oh well, the last incident of violence was in 2008, and I sort of said: yes, 
but he was abusive, he was quite violent then and she learnt not to 
challenge him because she obviously challenged him in 2008 and got 
what for, so he’s not gonna have to do it since.” [Ms P, Barrister, SW]  
 
Two Cafcass officers commented on the manipulative way in which perpetrators can 
use charm to portray themselves as ‘reasonable’ and ‘safe’, and mothers as lying or 
irrational. 
   
In contrast, Ms U [FCA, NW] distinguished between ‘genuine’ cases of domestic 
violence, characterised by the coercive use of control, in which victims may be 
“dreadfully disempowered”, and cases of ‘false’ allegations, where women “cry 
wolf”, which were, in her view, characterised by the failure of women to report the 
violence, thereby suggesting a lack of understanding of the difficulties for many 
women in disclosing abuse.  
 
Although most professionals perceive domestic violence in wider terms than 
physical violence, and many understand its power and control dynamics, this does 
not mean that this necessarily translates into practice, as half of all participants still 
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consider that anything ‘less than physical’ is not serious or important. These 
professionals tend to see domestic violence on a scale of severity, minimising or 
considering less ‘relevant’ behaviours that do not constitute incidents of ‘severe’ 
physical violence.
9
  
 
“They were allegations of pushes or shouting, um, and some low level 
threats if I can put it that way and, you know, we’re not wishing to 
minimise it in any way, you know, if it was true then it’s, you know, it’s 
not very pleasant, but it, you know, there was no allegation of injuries or, 
you know, a punch or a slap or anything of that sort.” [Ms T, Barrister, 
NW] 
 
Ms E referred to a case in which the violence was “mid-level”, comprising 
“punching, kicking, pushing her over, slashing the flat, that sort of thing, nothing 
where she really needed much help from the hospital other than painkillers. No 
stabbings, or anything nasty, again I hate to minimise it.” [Ms E, Barrister, London] 
 
The extent to which participants perceive domestic violence on a ‘scale of severity’ 
was highlighted by their responses to a scenario of a typical case, in which findings 
were made of threats, pushing and shoving, and one ‘historic’ incident of punching. 
Most respondents did not consider that to be at the ‘severe’ end of the spectrum.  
 
Even Ms P, who understood the varied forms that domestic violence can take and the 
underlying power and control dynamics, nevertheless reverted to narrower 
assumptions when talking about a recent case which was, she said, a “typical case 
where you’ve got domestic abuse, not domestic violence because he wasn’t violent 
to her, he was, although, having said that, he wasn’t violent to her although he did 
rape her, um, but after they’d separated.” [Ms P, Barrister, SW] 
 
It may be the case that the very ‘serious’ cases of domestic violence in which 
professionals are involved may inure them to what they perceive as the less ‘severe’ 
or ‘minor’ cases. This was articulated by Ms A1:  
 
“And I think we come across some really severe stuff that when we get 
people come in that, it’s not really, it’s nowhere near as high as others, 
                                                 
9
 N = 14 comprising:  Barristers = 5;  Solicitors = 4;  FCAs = 5 
146 
 
because I think I do this a little bit, you’ve got to remember that to them 
this is very significant.” [Ms A1, Solicitor, NW] 
 
Only three respondents, all barristers, viewed domestic violence as capable of being 
construed as mutual conflict, thereby failing to apportion responsibility for it to the 
perpetrator. 
 
“Because a lot of people will actually accept that there’s been rows and 
it’s been a relationship with lots of arguments and she’s given as good as 
she’s got or whatever, both will accept there’s been verbal rows, and 
quite often people accept that, or worse when one or both of them has 
been drinking.” [Ms S, Barrister, NW]10 
 
However, two Cafcass officers considered that domestic violence could occur 
because of the ‘toxic nature’ of the relationship, thereby constructing it as arising 
from the mismatched personalities of the individual participants in the relationship.  
 
“It’s the toxic nature of the relationship, there are some people who, 
when they get into a relationship, it becomes toxic. They can go and 
meet somebody else…and it’s not toxic…they’re the harder ones, where 
you’ve got a toxic relationship.” [Ms U, FCA, NW]11  
 
On the other hand, three respondents recognised that perpetrators’ violence can often 
be replicated in other relationships.  
 
“I mean today, for example, the father had got previous, he’d got 
warnings for harassment and he’d got an assault from an ex-partner and 
that kind of, just think: Well, if he’s behaved like that in those 
relationships then that sort of, you know, peaks your interest for this 
one.” [Ms P, Barrister, SW]  
 
A sizeable minority of respondents thought that domestic violence that ‘only’ occurs 
on relationship breakdown is less serious or important, and even understandable or 
                                                 
10
 In Re J (Costs of Fact-Finding Hearing) [2009] EWCA Civ 1350, [2010] 1 FLR 1893, Wilson LJ 
was critical of leading counsel for the father referring to the case as “an example of what she calls the 
‘run of the mill’ fact-finding inquiry in which the mother will exaggerate, the father will minimise 
almost, so she implies, in equal measure.” [19] (Wilson LJ) 
11
 These sentiments were echoed by Ms Y [FCA, London] 
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excusable,
12
 despite the substantial body of research which indicates that domestic 
violence can increase in severity on or after relationship breakdown.
13
  
 
“And you do kind of apply some common sense, and you do say, well, 
actually there might have been one or two slightly nasty incidents when 
Mr and Mrs So-and-So split up but that’s in the context of the split, 
they’re both a bit angry and hurt with one another and this will calm 
down and that’s probably fair enough, that probably isn’t that unsafe, but 
I don’t know that you can really take the chance on that.” [Ms O, FCA, 
SW] 
 
It was not surprising to find that more Cafcass officers, with their background and 
training in child welfare, than family lawyers, understood the effects of domestic 
violence on children, including the effects of emotional abuse. However, three 
solicitors expressed an awareness of the harm that can be caused to children even if 
they do not witness domestic violence directly: “Even if it’s not seeing the, what 
happened, it’s seeing the upset that was caused by what happened, um, those kind of 
things…and not just witnessing, also seeing the, the sort of projected unhappiness in 
their parent.” [Ms B, Solicitor, London]   On the other hand, Ms E thought that 
children who do not actually witness domestic violence are not harmed by it: “so it is 
actually harm deflecting on the children, um, which obviously is very different to 
children who luckily have never seen any of that and it all happened when they were 
in bed and, you know, they don’t know about it.” [Ms E, Barrister, London] Ms A 
even considered that it was the mother’s responsibility to shield the children from 
awareness of domestic violence, and that the harm caused to children arose from the 
mother making the children aware of it: “So if they see domestic violence, then 
children don’t necessarily have to be totally affected by it as much as it would be if it 
was put in their face every five seconds by the resident parent, which I think happens 
quite a lot.” [Ms A, Solicitor, London]14 
 
1.3 Participants’ views on the description of domestic violence in 
the Practice Direction 
 
Half of all respondents did not consider that the description of domestic violence in 
the Practice Direction was adequate. The primary reason given was that it does not 
                                                 
12
 N = 6 comprising: Barristers = 1;  Solicitors = 3;  FCAs = 2 
13
 This research is discussed in Chapter 3 
14
 Ms A demonstrated a condemnatory approach to mothers involved in contact cases generally. 
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make sufficiently clear that forms of abuse other than physical violence are included; 
nor does it make any reference to the power and control dynamics of domestic abuse, 
which a small number of respondents considered should be explicitly included. 
 
“My issue with this has always been the emphasis on physical abuse, 
because it’s the first words that appear. And actually, I think that there’s 
a lacuna, you know, it isn’t always physical, it’s emotional abuse and the 
erosion of self-esteem, issues of control, manipulation.” [Ms G, Barrister, 
SE] 
 
“ ‘And any other form of abuse’. But it’s almost as though it’s an 
afterthought by the way it’s phrased, isn’t it?” [Ms H, FCA, SE] 
 
On the other hand, eleven respondents considered that the description in the Practice 
Direction is adequate, mainly because they thought it could be understood to include 
behaviours other than physical violence, and Ms B [Solicitor, London] observed that 
the problem is not the definition, but how it is understood and applied by the courts. 
 
1.4 Judicial perceptions of domestic violence 
Since it was not possible to interview judicial officers, their perceptions of domestic 
violence were gleaned from the review of the reported cases and respondents’ views 
on how judges and magistrates understand domestic violence. It is recognised that 
this method has its limitations, in particular because participants’ perceptions of 
judicial attitudes would invariably be filtered through their own views on domestic 
violence.  
 
In A v A (Appeal: Fact-finding)
15
 Mostyn J stated that domestic violence is “rightly” 
now regarded as the “great taboo”. This view is not apparent from the attitudes 
towards it shown by many judges (including Mostyn J), as the cases reported after 
the implementation of the Practice Direction demonstrate that many judges continue 
to minimise and neutralise domestic violence, and some judges continue to view it 
on a scale of severity. There is also a tendency for the father’s violence to be 
‘normalised’ and portrayed as a ‘natural’ part of marriage break-down, or even as the 
understandable anger and frustration of the ‘ordinary man’. In Re P (Children) Ward 
LJ stated that domestic violence is “a term that covers a multitude of sins. Some of it 
                                                 
15
 A v A (Appeal: Fact-finding) [2010] EWHC 1282 (Fam) [54] (Mostyn J) 
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is hideous, some of it is less serious, and it is probably into the latter category that 
this case fits.”16 He stated of the father that:  
 
“I can understand that this proud, intelligent father is humiliated by the 
findings of domestic violence against him, is humiliated by the prospect 
of having to attend a domestic violence course of anger management…It 
is enough to make any ordinary man just a little bit angry.”17     
  
This downgrading of domestic violence can lead to the judgments of the lower and 
higher courts failing to describe the violence itself, which reinforces the erasure of 
domestic violence from judicial and professional discourses informing the issue of 
child contact, as the violence becomes, quite literally, invisible in the judgments. In 
Re P (Children)Ward LJ referred to an “unseemly dispute” on handover, and the 
children being deeply upset by “the altercation” between the parents.18 Similarly in 
Re H (Contact Order) the parents’ marriage was described as “running into 
difficulties” and Sir Scott Baker referred to an “unfortunate incident” which occurred 
at the mother’s house to which the police were called and the father was arrested.19 
No account was given in either of the judgments of the mother’s allegations or of 
what happened on those occasions.
20
 
 
The case law indicates that the senior judiciary have on occasions urged the lower 
courts to take domestic violence more seriously. In Re R (Family Proceedings)
21
 
Thorpe LJ took the opportunity to reinforce the reason for the decision in Re L: 
“Underlying the guidance given by this court and the President is a general social 
policy, given the prevalence of domestic violence in our society and the extent to 
which in the past it has been a submerged evil.”22 Wall P (as he then was), in an 
address to Resolution, expressed concern that:  
 
“domestic abuse…remains one of the hidden scourges of our society. We 
all know that it can take a myriad of forms from the physical assault 
                                                 
16
 Re P (Children) [2008] EWCA Civ 1431 [5] (Ward LJ) 
17
 ibid [36] (Ward LJ). See also A v A (Appeal: Fact-finding) (n 15) [19] (Mostyn J) 
18
 Re P (Children) (n 16) [8] (Ward LJ) 
19
 Re H (Contact Order) [2010] EWCA Civ 448, [2010] 2 FLR 866. 
20
 See also Re A (Residence Order) [2009] EWCA Civ 1141, [2010] 1 FLR 1083; Re M (Children) 
[2009] EWCA Civ 1216, [2010] 1 FLR 1089; Re B (Transfer of Residence to Grandmother) [2012] 
EWCA Civ 858, [2013] 1 FLR 275; Re W (Children) [2012] EWCA Civ 1788  
21
 Re R (Family Proceedings) [2009] EWCA Civ 1619, [2009] 2 FLR 82 
22
 ibid [12] (Thorpe LJ). See also Re J (A Child) [2012] EWCA Civ 720 [4] (Thorpe LJ) 4 
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which results in murder or serious bodily injury to the psychological 
damage which can wreck lives. It remains an area cloaked by shame and 
secrecy.”23 
 
The more recent reported cases suggest that more judges are starting to recognise the 
coercively controlling nature of domestic violence, as well as the many ways in 
which that control can be exercised. In Re W (Children) [2012]
24
 findings were made 
by the trial judge against the father not only of physical violence towards the mother, 
but also of controlling her by not allowing her to return to work outside the home or 
go to university, and harassing her with constant telephone calls and messages. The 
trial judge, however, described these findings “as serious but not so serious that there 
should not be any contact at all.”25 Black LJ, on the mother’s appeal, contextualised 
the father’s conduct, observing that an ‘incident’ in April 2011 “could not 
necessarily be isolated and treated as just an isolated event at the end of a course of 
conduct.”26     
 
A case that merits close scrutiny for the way in which the trial judge demonstrated 
and applied her awareness of the power and control dynamics of domestic violence 
is Re S (A Child) [2012].
27
 The father appealed against an order made by Judge 
Knowles granting residence of a young child to the mother; the father had sought 
sole or shared residence. The interesting feature of the case is that, whereas the father 
had not been physically violent to the mother, the mother admitted to having hit the 
father on a number of occasions. If the judge had applied an incident-based approach 
to this case, she might have concluded that the mother was the abusive parent. 
However, Judge Knowles opened up to scrutiny the father’s conduct towards the 
mother to reveal a pattern of domineering and controlling behaviour, and arrived at 
the conclusion that the father was the abusive parent.
28
  “All in all, I find a constant 
wearing down of the Mother by the Father and a desire to undermine her at every 
twist and turn. He has shown himself throughout these proceedings as wanting to 
                                                 
23
 Wall P, ‘The President’s Resolution Address 2012’ (2012) 42 Family Law 817-825, 821 
24
 Re W (Children) [2012] EWCA Civ 528 
25
 ibid [17] (Black LJ) 
26
 ibid [19] (Black LJ). See also Re W (Children) (n 20) [25] (McFarlane LJ) 
27
 Re S (A Child) [2012] EWCA Civ 1031 
28
 The father’s abusive, controlling behaviour was found to include following the mother in his car, 
sending her numerous bullying and derogatory text messages, refusing to give the mother details of 
what occurred during contact, insisting that the child be enrolled in a nursery of his choice, constantly 
attempting to prove that he was the better parent and restricting the mother from living and working 
where she chose. 
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dominate.”29 The judge in this case recognised the father’s abuse of the mother as a 
course of conduct, woven into the fabric of the parties’ everyday lives, and made 
visible the way in which the father’s abuse of the mother was an inseparable aspect 
of his own parenting of the child. 
 
The majority of respondents to this project
30
 thought that their local judges have a 
good understanding of what constitutes domestic violence and ‘take it seriously’. 
Since most respondents considered that domestic violence constitutes wider 
behaviours than only physical violence, it follows that these respondents felt that 
judges, too, applied this wider perspective. 
 
“In xxx County Court, generally I’m pretty happy with the way in which 
domestic violence is dealt with. It’s dealt with by and large seriously by 
the district judges who we see pretty much day in, day out and they 
understand it can take different forms and they understand the control 
element.” [Mr J, FCA, NE] 
 
Ms P said that all the circuit and district judges in the large area of the South West in 
which she practices are “pretty clued up”.  
 
“I think we are quite lucky here…the judges there do seem to be…very 
good with domestic violence…[one particular judge] is really good on 
this kind of power and control, and he will challenge…And also we used 
to have a local judge who would position the chairs in his room so that 
they were facing him, desk in the middle, chairs facing diagonally 
towards him, and would watch the parties come in and if the father turns 
the chairs towards the mother so that he could stare at her, you know, 
he’d lost his case basically.” [Ms P, Barrister, SW] 
 
Three respondents observed that judges’ awareness of domestic violence had 
improved over the past few years. “It’s a lot better now. I can remember when I 
started there was no understanding. You got the odd judge who had been on some 
training and that was it. But now there is a much better understanding.” [Ms X, FCA, 
London] 
 
                                                 
29
 Re S (A Child) (n 27) [46] (Sir Mark Potter), quoting the trial judge 
30
 N = 17 comprising:  Barristers = 5;  Solicitors = 6;  FCAs = 6 
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A cautionary note should be sounded, however, with respect to two family lawyers’ 
positive views about their local courts’ approach to domestic violence, since they 
themselves appeared to minimise or downplay it.  
 
“I think if it’s definitely at the lower end then they perhaps, you know, 
they will treat it for what it is really. You know, if they’ve had a spat 
because of, you know, he walked in on her with another man or 
something, they will probably say, well actually, they wouldn’t say it but 
they’d be thinking: I would have done the same thing, so we’ll overlook 
it if it was a one-off. You know, so they’ll treat it for what it is, I think.” 
[Ms D, Solicitor, SE]   
 
Professional approval of judicial understanding of domestic violence was, however, 
far from unanimous. Mr J expressed great concern about the attitude of the judiciary 
in the county court of a North East town in which he had recently started working, 
which he described as “like stepping back five years” and “the wild west.” [Mr J, 
FCA, NE]  
 
Ms N felt that although judges generally do have some understanding of domestic 
violence, they “see so much of it” and, driven by the desire to “resolve matters,” they 
“lose patience” with the complexity of families. She gave a recent example of a 
mother who was “petrified” of the father:   
 
“She said: the courts, it was so impatient with me, the judge was horrible 
to me…And she said, you know, [the judge] directed a question at dad 
and said: this must be very difficult for you. And she said: I sat there 
thinking: you know, how difficult it is for me and my children who have 
to continuously come back to court with my children.” [Ms N, FCA, SW] 
 
Eight respondents
31
 expressed concern that courts tend to focus on incidents of 
physical violence, and are not alive to, or take seriously, other forms of domestic 
abuse; indeed Ms O [FCA, SW] said that, not so many years ago, most practitioners 
would have had the same approach, herself included. “Most only really consider 
physical abuse most seriously, quite a lot of emotional abuse is brushed aside. I think 
this is mainly because it is harder to prove.” [Ms E, Barrister, London] 
                                                 
31
 N = 8 comprising:  Barristers = 4;  Solicitors = 1;  FCAs = 3. It should be noted that these did not 
include any of the respondents based in the North West city, who were all very positive about the 
attitudes of their local judiciary towards domestic violence.  
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“I’d say that the majority look at physical violence or strongly 
threatening behaviour as domestic violence, rather than the smaller forms 
of abuse or intimidation…I’d say more the physical violence is the thing 
that’s focused on more.” [Ms A3, Barrister, London] 
 
Although Ms P [Barrister, SW] spoke favourably about her local county court judges, 
she expressed concern that they do not always have insight into the way in which 
‘historic’ incidents of violence can have a continuing terrifying and controlling effect.  
 
Three solicitors and three Cafcass officers considered that judicial understandings of 
domestic violence vary considerably between different courts and between different 
judges in the same courts.  “Some are very switched on, some are less so.” [Ms Y, 
FCA, London] Three respondents considered that appropriate and regular training 
had a significant impact on judicial approaches to, and understandings of, domestic 
violence, while others thought that the broader life experiences of judges and 
magistrates had a greater impact than training.  
 
2. When is domestic violence ‘relevant’ to contact? 
Professional and judicial perceptions of domestic violence have a significant impact 
on the way in which they consider it to be ‘relevant’ to contact. The Practice 
Direction provides that, as a general principle, the court must: 
 
“at all stages of the proceedings, consider whether domestic violence is 
raised as an issue, either by the parties or otherwise, and if so must:… 
consider the nature of any allegation or admission of domestic violence 
and the extent to which any domestic violence which is admitted, or 
which may be proved, would be relevant in deciding whether to make an 
order about residence or contact and, if so, in what terms.”32 
 
Although very few reported cases offer specific guidance as to when domestic 
violence may be relevant to contact, they suggest that many courts and professionals 
consider domestic violence to be ‘relevant’ to contact when it involves very ‘serious’ 
or ‘severe’ physical violence. In Re E (Contact) [2009], the trial judge made findings 
on all the mother’s allegations of physical and sexual violence against the father, 
                                                 
32
 Potter P, Practice Direction: Residence and Contact Orders: Domestic Violence and Harm [2008] 
2 FLR 103, reissued on 14
th
 January 2009 at [2009] 2 FLR 1400 [3] (emphasis added) 
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stating in his judgment that the findings were “of such a serious nature as to impact 
very substantially on the question of contact between the Father and…the child.”33 
Those reported cases where the appellate courts have been critical of trial judges for 
failing to hold fact-finding hearings all involved allegations of serious physical 
violence.
34
  
 
Conversely, in Re C (Domestic Violence: Fact-Finding Hearing) [2009]
35
 the father 
had been convicted in the criminal courts for serious assaults on the mother, and 
Judge Copley did not consider that a fact-finding hearing was necessary because, 
during the following three years, the mother had not made any ‘substantial’ 
allegations of further violence, contact was already established at a contact centre, 
there was no alleged violence towards the child, and the father had completed an 
anger management course. This case suggests, therefore, that allegations will not be 
considered relevant if they are ‘old’ and/or not sufficiently ‘serious’, if contact is 
already happening at the time of the proceedings, if no violence towards the child is 
alleged, or if the father has been successfully ‘treated’.  
 
Participants’ responses confirm these indications gleaned from the case law, namely, 
that the main circumstances in which courts appear to consider domestic violence not 
to be relevant is where it is ‘old’ or ‘historic’, where it is ‘minor’ or not sufficiently 
serious, where it occurs during the ‘heat’ of the relationship breakdown, and where 
the mother raises allegations of domestic violence after having allowed contact for 
some time. These circumstances mirror those in which participants considered that 
mothers who feared domestic violence would not be justified in opposing contact. 
These were encapsulated by Ms S:  
 
“That it may be very historic allegations, um, or very minor incidents, or 
scenarios where there are references to domestic violence but 
subsequently there has been ongoing contact and there’s been no issues 
about that in terms of the quality of the contact between parent and child, 
so it’s not, absolutely in terms of relevance to contact orders, but relevant 
to contact arrangements, safeguarding it would be relevant to, but not to 
actually whether or not there should be contact.” [Ms S, Barrister, NW]  
 
                                                 
33
 Re E (Contact) [2009] EWCA Civ 1238, [2010] 1 FLR 1738 [5] (Ward LJ) 
34
 These cases are discussed in Chapter 5. 
35
 Re C (Domestic Violence: Fact-Finding Hearing) [2009] EWCA Civ 994, [2010] 1 FLR 1728 
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Circumstances in which the fear of domestic violence  
may justify opposition to contact36 
 
 Barristers Solicitors FCAs Total 
Fear of DV almost always justifies 
opposition to contact 
2 5 6 13 
‘Seriousness’/extent of DV/‘severe’ 
physical only 
5 7 2 14 
Child witnessed/aware of DV 3 4 1 8 
Effect on mother so severe that it affects 
her parenting 
3 1 0 4 
Not justified if safeguarding checks 
clear/no other independent evidence 
0 1 3 4 
Not justified if mother already allowed 
contact 
2 0 0 2 
Father does not acknowledge the DV 0 1 1 2 
Not justified if allegations 
‘old’/’historical’37 
0 1 0 1 
 
 
A significant majority of respondents
38
 cited the ‘seriousness’ of the violence as one 
of the primary factors on which the courts would base ‘relevance’ and it was 
apparent that most professionals themselves considered that only ‘serious’ or 
‘severe’ violence would be ‘relevant’ to outcomes. This mirrors the views of most 
family lawyers that ‘minor’ or ‘petty’ abuse, or ‘incidents’ arising from the heat and 
bitterness of the relationship ending would not justify the mother in opposing 
contact.
39
  
 
“I have in the county court on occasion, but you know, the judge saying, 
you know: this really isn’t the sort of thing that the court will be 
concerned with, whether your client, you know, snatched a cup of tea out 
of the other person’s hand. Um, so yeah, that has happened, and I 
normally felt that those were sensible decisions.” [Ms E, Barrister, 
London] 
 
                                                 
36
 It should be noted that many respondents cited a combination of these factors. 
37
 This low number may not be an accurate reflection of professionals’ views since many respondents 
agreed with their reported views of the courts’ perception that ‘old’ or ‘historic’ allegations of 
domestic violence are not ‘relevant’ to contact 
38
 N = 22, comprising almost equal numbers of barristers, solicitors and FCAs 
39
 Only two Cafcass officers qualified their views in this respect 
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“And you know, it’s in a spectrum, isn’t it? It’s that broad, but then you 
look at the spectrum as to how serious the violence is as to how it would 
affect the contact.” [Ms D, Sol, SE]  
 
“Yeah, I mean obviously you’ve got to look at the, you know, violence is 
quite a wide term and it can mean all sorts of things…and you’re not 
wishing to minimise, you know, things that are at the end of the scale, 
you know, sometimes they’re not a good reason to obstruct contact. But 
equally if there’s very serious violence that can be a reason in itself.” 
[Ms T, Barrister, NW] 
 
A number of respondents observed that courts rate non-physical forms of abuse as 
less relevant than physical violence.   
 
“Someone taking someone’s phone and not allowing them to have it and 
being very controlling over money and being verbally abusive which the 
child may not have been aware of which doesn’t necessarily mean that 
their contact shouldn’t happen.” [Ms M, Barrister, SW] 
 
The extent to which even Cafcass officers may minimise domestic violence was 
demonstrated by Ms O, who also confirmed that courts do not consider it to be 
relevant where it is ‘minimal’ or it occurred when the parties were “a bit heated” 
during the course of the relationship break-up, but clearly agreed with this approach:  
 
“I think the court will [decide that domestic violence is not relevant] 
where it is generally very minimal, you know, where it’s, say for 
example, [the father] has a few convictions that might be a bit old, then 
nothing particularly serious, you know, the man’s perhaps grown up … 
and at the time of separation that bit of temper has come up again and, 
you know, he may have said and done a few things he now regrets. The 
court will perhaps accept that it happened in the context of, and both 
parties were possibly, you know, a bit heated and whatever…I mean, it’s 
unusual for any of us to have gone through our whole lives without ever 
having got very cross with somebody and take a bit of a kick at someone, 
you know, and in those sorts of cases the court will say: well, come on, 
you’ve got to be, come on, that’s not, you know. It’s really when there is 
an indication that somebody could seriously lose it, or has got some very 
nasty habits and nasty friends.” [Ms O, FCA, SW]  
 
In this way Ms O was neutralising and normalising domestic violence by portraying 
it as the ‘normal’ and understandable behaviour of the slightly irate parent, 
something that ‘any of us’ might do. 
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A number of other respondents also considered arguments or ‘squabbling’ on 
relationship breakdown not to be ‘real’ domestic violence and therefore not relevant, 
or less relevant to contact, and unlikely to justify the mother in opposing contact. “I 
mean, um, it’s the age old issue of what point does normal family squabbling and 
what one would expect at a family relationship breakdown need to be considered any 
more seriously.” [Mr R, Solicitor, NE]  
 
“I often look at domestic violence, I look at the context of the violence 
within the relationship. Sometimes it’s very severe and the child could 
have witnessed it and I think in those cases where the child has witnessed 
domestic violence in whatever form, I can’t see how it can’t be 
relevant…I think though sometimes when relationships come to their 
conclusion and emotions are running very high, people act out of 
character sometimes. And you have one or two incidents of things which 
father, if it is the father, it normally is the father, can be very remorseful 
about…So I’m not minimising the violence I talk about at the end of 
relationships but I think the court needs to be mindful, and I think the 
court is mindful on that occasions [sic], because as I say, people can act 
out of character.” [Mr J, FCA, NE] 
 
For these respondents, the perpetrator can continue to be constructed as the ‘safe 
family man’ by positioning his behaviour as ‘out of character’, rather than that of the 
‘dangerous abuser’.  
 
Eighteen respondents
40
 suggested that courts would not consider domestic violence 
to be relevant if it was “old” or “historic”, happened “some years ago” or “long ago”, 
or  was “in the past”, a view shared by a number of these respondents. Ms E 
provided an example of a case where the magistrates listed a fact-finding hearing on 
‘historic’ allegations:  
 
“Because they split up eight years ago…and he had had contact in the 
interim period, it had just broken down…and now she was saying, well 
amongst other things, he’s been violent…And so I couldn’t see why we 
needed a fact-finding at all, I mean, unless they’re the most serious, I 
couldn’t see how nine years old was helping us today, when he’s had 
contact in the interim.” [Ms E, Barrister, London]  
 
                                                 
40
 Comprising equal numbers of barristers, solicitors and FCAs 
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Respondents’ views were confirmed by their responses to the final case scenario;41 
many family lawyers indicated that the mother would not be able to successfully 
oppose contact because the ‘real’ violence happened some years ago. 
 
However, a minority of family lawyers and Cafcass officers expressed concern about 
the tendency of courts to consider ‘historical’ allegations of domestic violence as 
irrelevant to contact. Ms O [FCA, SW] was critical of many judges who only “react” 
if they perceive “an immediate threat”, and Mr V [FCA, NW] observed that 
domestic violence, in his view, is always relevant, whenever it happened.  
 
Ms L gave an example of a case that caused her concern, in which the father 
attempted to strangle the mother two years prior to the relationship breakdown, and 
the mother provided an account of a history of “sort of intimidating and controlling 
behaviour” which Ms L found “quite worrying in terms of, you know, what it said 
about his state of mind.” 
 
“He was doing things like filming her at handovers…stuff that rings 
alarm bells…and the judge said that he felt that the violence that the 
mother had alleged was historical and even if found as proven would not 
affect the progression of contact.” [Ms L, Solicitor, SW]  
 
Because this judge perceived domestic violence in a legalistic way as comprising 
discrete ‘incidents’, the father’s controlling behaviours were discounted by him, so 
that the ‘real’ violence was, for the judge, indeed historical.  
 
Seven family lawyers (primarily barristers) but only one Cafcass officer
42
 expressed 
the view that domestic violence would not be considered relevant by the courts if the 
mother had allowed contact to take place for some time before raising allegations of 
domestic violence, particularly if contact was “progressing well.” Ms M considered 
that this was a common scenario:  
 
“Or where mum has been supervising the contact, at her property, you 
know, between dad and child or, and then says: oh, but I’m really scared 
                                                 
41
 See Appendix F 
42
 N = 8 comprising:  Barristers = 5;  Solicitors = 2;  FCAs = 1 
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of him and I don’t think there should be any change to contact, or it 
should go to a centre, and the court says: no.” [Ms M, Barrister, SW]  
 
Ms M recalled a case where there were ‘historic’ allegations of domestic violence, 
following which the child had had staying contact with the father.   
 
“They had fallen out over a whole variety of issues but not violence as 
such, she then of course was going back to that as an issue of his 
previous controlling behaviour and what she perceived to be that 
continuing…there had been such a pattern of staying contact in the 
interim it was hard to see how, there was no concern that had arisen from 
that, how then the violence was then going to suggest that this child 
should not be having contact with her father, the real question was how it 
could restart again.” [Ms M, Barrister, SW] 
 
Similarly, in the case referred to above by Ms L [Solicitor, SW], the mother’s 
concerns were also filtered out because she had permitted the father unsupervised 
contact up to the issue of proceedings, “and I think that probably gave a lot of weight 
to what the other side were saying: if you’re that worried then why did you allow us 
all that time?” Ms L was not happy with the decision and considered appealing it. 
 
Ms T provided an example of a recent case in which the mother raised allegations of 
domestic violence midway through a two-year contact dispute, where contact was 
already taking place, “and I think nobody really took them seriously because she had 
already agreed to contact beforehand.” [Ms T, Barrister, NW] 
 
Six respondents
43
 were of the view that domestic violence would be relevant if it was 
witnessed by the children and/or they were affected by it, and seven family lawyers 
and a Cafcass officer thought that domestic violence could justify a parent in 
opposing contact for this reason.   
 
“You might have a ten-year-old child who’s saying: I saw, you know, 
my dad being aggressive to my mum and violent to her and I never want 
to see him again. And in that case, even if it’s what we term as low level 
violence, it’s still hugely relevant to the issue of contact.” [Ms T, 
Barrister, NW]  
 
                                                 
43
 Comprising equal numbers of barristers, solicitors and FCAs 
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However, Ms X, [FCA, London] considered that if the child had not actually 
witnessed the violence they would not be affected by it and courts would not, 
therefore, consider it to be relevant. 
 
Three barristers and a solicitor thought that domestic violence could justify the 
mother in opposing contact if the effect of it on her was extremely ‘serious’ or so 
severe as to affect her parenting capacity, although Ms K [Solicitor, NE] observed 
that such arguments no longer find any sympathy with courts. Indeed, this was not a 
factor mentioned by any respondents when considering the relevance of domestic 
violence. 
 
Three Cafcass officers and a solicitor thought that courts would consider domestic 
violence to be relevant if there was ‘objective evidence’ of it, such as police and 
hospital reports, FWINs,
44
 social services records and injunctions, but would take it 
less seriously and downgrade its relevance if the safeguarding checks were clear and 
there was no ‘concrete’ evidence.45 These respondents were themselves of the view 
that in these circumstances, the mother must be unjustified in her opposition to 
contact.   
 
“So I mean if after we’ve done these safeguarding or police checks and 
nothing comes back, I would say that a lot of the problems arise because 
one of the parents is just bitter, you know, somebody cheated on 
somebody with somebody and they found out…they’re using the 
children by not allowing them to have access to the children as a means 
of punishing the other person.” [Mr W, FCA, SW] 
 
Only Ms N [FCA, SW] expressed the firm, unqualified view that domestic violence 
is always relevant to contact, and Ms M [Barrister, SW] observed that while in her 
view domestic violence is always relevant to contact, it may be less relevant, 
depending on the circumstances.  
 
The majority of respondents considered that the FPCs are more ‘cautious’ or 
‘mechanical’ in their approach than district or circuit judges, and therefore list fact-
finding hearings without actively considering whether the allegations, if proved, 
                                                 
44
 Force Wide Information Network  
45
 See further Chapter 6   
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would be relevant to contact, whereas county court judges tend to be more ‘robust’ 
or ‘firm’ in considering relevance; in other words, county court judges are more 
likely to filter domestic violence out of cases. “I feel that I end up doing many fact-
findings which perhaps could have been avoided in FPCs if a robust tribunal had 
seized itself of the matter.” [Ms E, Barrister, London] On the other hand, Ms A 
thought that family magistrates are less alert to domestic violence as a serious issue 
than district judges. She provided an example of a case where the magistrates 
ignored the allegations made by the mother, who was a litigant in person.  
 
“I don’t think she hyped [the domestic violence] up enough…So they 
didn’t venture backwards as to the reasons why and whether that should 
be a factor in itself. So, I mean, in a different court I think that would 
have been dealt with a lot differently.” [Ms A, Solicitor, London] 
 
The majority of family lawyers but only two Cafcass officers said that they had had 
experience of cases where allegations of domestic violence were made but the court 
determined at an early stage that they were not likely to affect the outcome of the 
case.
46
  Only Ms N [FCA, SW] said that she had never encountered this situation, 
and Ms Q [Solicitor, SW] said that she had not encountered this recently. While two 
respondents commented that this was fairly uncommon, two Cafcass officers 
indicated that it happened very regularly. Mr V [FCA, NW] commented that the way 
in which domestic violence is filtered out as ‘irrelevant’ is by ignoring it and 
ignoring Cafcass reports that highlight its relevance. 
 
While five respondents thought that The President’s Guidance in Relation to Split 
Hearings (‘the Guidance on Split Hearings’)47 had had no effect on the way in which 
courts consider the issue of relevance, the majority were of the view that it has had a 
major effect, primarily by judges being more robust or proactive in ‘weeding out’ 
cases where domestic violence is considered to be irrelevant, being firmer in what 
they perceive to be ‘relevant’ domestic violence, and as a consequence being much 
less willing to order fact-finding hearings.
48
 “I think there’s certainly, um, more 
                                                 
46
 N = 16 comprising:  Barristers = 7;  Solicitors = 7;  FCAs = 2 
47
 Wall P, The President’s Guidance in Relation to Split Hearings [2010] 2 FLR 1897 
48
 The effect of the Guidance on Split Hearings on fact-finding hearings is discussed further in 
Chapter 6. 
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examination of the issues, there’s more sort of consideration as to how far it’s 
actually going to take the case.” [Mr Z, Solicitor, NW] 
 
3. The ‘presumption of contact’ 
It is not only professional and judicial perceptions of domestic violence that inform 
their views on the ‘relevance’ of domestic violence. The ‘presumption of contact’ 
also has an important role to play in the way in which courts and professionals 
respond to domestic violence in contact cases.  
 
All respondents were asked how important they think it is for non-resident parents to 
have some contact with their children. All but one participant considered that such 
contact is ‘important’, ‘very important’, or ‘extremely important’. Thirteen of these 
respondents were unqualified in their support for post-separation contact, including 
five Cafcass officers; there were no overt differences in views, therefore, between 
family lawyers and Cafcass officers on the presumption of contact.  
 
“On a scale of 1 to 10, I would say 10. With 10 being the exceptionally 
important, yes.” [Ms H, FCA, SE] 
 
“Oh, I think unless there is really really good reasons that they shouldn’t, 
then I think it should be taken as read that they should.” [Ms O, FCA, SW] 
 
Only one respondent hesitantly disagreed with this proposition, appearing to be 
aware that her view was ‘against the mainstream’:  
 
“I think it depends on the children. I think it’s on a case-by-case basis. I 
think it’s difficult to say that contact is always in a child’s best interests 
and I think generally, just from my personal point of view, that’s not 
necessarily what I believe. But I think it’s, you know, it’s very difficult.” 
[Ms B, Solicitor, London] 
 
Three respondents, all family lawyers, considered that, although theoretically contact 
is important, whether or not it would benefit specific children depends on the 
circumstances of the case.  
 
“I think it’s fact-specific to the case I think, it would very much depend 
on, if there were reasons why that would not be appropriate for that 
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particular child. … But the presumption would certainly be that it would 
be important.” [Ms S, Barrister, NW] 
 
Nine respondents indicated that post-separation contact is important, but only if it is 
‘safe’, including emotionally safe. It was surprising to find that most of the 
respondents expressing this view were solicitors, who outnumbered Cafcass officers 
in this respect. “I think it’s essential so long as it’s safe and that means physically 
and emotionally safe.” [Ms L, Solicitor, SW] 
 
On the other hand, Ms C [Solicitor, SE] expressed the view that even in 
circumstances where one parent has been abusive to the other parent, and the child 
may be afraid of the abusive parent and affected by witnessing the violence, that 
child still ‘needs’ to have a relationship with the abusive parent.  
 
Two Cafcass officers were of the view that contact is beneficial as long as it is of 
good quality: 
 
“It’s certainly hugely desirable from the child’s point of view on the 
basis that that contact is of a high, a good quality. So quality of contact is 
always a relevant issue for the court…The court starts with the 
presumption, Cafcass and we start from the presumption that contact is 
desirable. A million things can come in the way of that of course but we 
start from that presumption.” [Mr. J, FCA, NE] 
 
Family lawyers (and presumably the remaining Cafcass officers) did not appear to 
consider the quality of contact important in determining its benefit to the child. 
 
The reason articulated by most respondents as to why they considered contact to be 
important was the presumed benefits for children’s psychological welfare and 
‘needs’ including, for four respondents, ‘identity’ issues: “But in terms of heritage, 
in terms of child’s identity, in terms of loving parents, in terms of having support 
network, for all those reasons contact is [important].” [Ms H, FCA, SE] 
 
Four family lawyers and one Cafcass officer considered that the research and 
‘experts’ on children’s welfare after parental separation support children’s ‘need’ to 
maintain contact with non-residential parents: 
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“I think there’s, you know, a huge body of psychological research, case 
law that, you know, establishes that children who don’t have that 
relationship with an absent parent really feel that they have some sort of 
emotional sense of loss.” [Ms T, Barrister, NW] 
 
“Especially the more experts’ reports that I read, the more important I 
think I’ve realised it is as well as the years have gone on about the, um, 
the emotional attachment that children have a right to know where 
they’re from and both sides of their family, um, so yeah, important.” [Ms 
E, Barrister, London] 
 
4. Attitudes towards mothers and fathers 
As discussed in Chapter 3, dominant parental subjectivities of ‘implacably hostile 
mothers’ and ‘safe family men’ had a profound impact on professional and judicial 
perceptions and practices in child contact proceedings prior to May 2008. It was 
considered important, therefore, to ascertain the extent to which such images of 
parents may continue to underpin, impact on, and be reinforced by the practices and 
perceptions of professionals and judicial officers. 
 
4.1 ‘Implacably hostile mothers’? 
In order to glean an understanding of participants’ attitudes towards women who are 
involved in contact proceedings, and in particular of their perceptions of why 
mothers may oppose, or wish to limit contact, respondents were asked whether they 
had encountered parents who they believed were unjustifiably denying the other 
parent contact with the child/ren. Additionally, participants’ views of mothers could 
be discerned from their responses to other questions. 
 
All respondents said that they had encountered resident parents who they believed 
had unjustifiably denied the non-resident parent contact.
49
  Although all respondents 
viewed mothers as capable of obstructing contact for the ‘wrong’ reasons, and many 
demonstrated a suspicious or wary attitude towards mothers, Cafcass officers were 
less likely to express overtly hostile attitudes towards mothers than solicitors or 
barristers. 
 
                                                 
49
 It was apparent from the responses that, even when not specifically stated, the ‘obstructive’ parent 
referred to was the mother as the resident parent. 
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Eight respondents, five of whom were Cafcass officers, indicated that such 
unjustified opposition was a “common” or “regular” occurrence, while four thought 
it “rare”, “exceptional” or “unusual”.50 Ms G even thought that: “It’s very rare 
actually you get someone saying: because of – and then there is a cogent, worthwhile 
reason.” [Ms G, Barrister, SE] On the other hand, Ms Y considered that mothers are 
usually justified in opposing contact: “No, I wouldn’t say it was quite common, I 
would say it was the exception, you know, rather than the rule…On the whole I think 
that the resident parent is generally right to voice the concerns that they have.” [Ms 
Y, FCA London] 
 
Most respondents thought that mothers’ emotional reactions to the breakdown of the 
parental relationship and/or their consequent negative feelings towards the fathers 
were the underlying reasons for their unjustified opposition to contact, causing them 
to lose sight of their children’s interests. 
 
“It’s generally where their own negative experiences of the relationship 
and their strongly held negative views about the parent interfere with 
their own, er, decision-making and they lose focus from what’s in the 
best interests of the child and they’re thinking, you know, about 
themselves and sometimes imposing their own experiences on the 
children and being over-anxious and over-concerned that the children are 
going to…come to some harm.” [Ms L, Solicitor, SW] 
 
“Anger, hurt, can’t accept that the relationship is over, uses the child in 
the hope that they are going to get back together. [Interviewer: Is that 
quite common?] Yes.” [Ms X, FCA, London] 
 
For these respondents, because the value of contact was unquestioned, mothers were 
acting irrationally and selfishly by putting their own emotional needs and reactions 
before those of their children.  
 
Two respondents were generally critical of parents involved in contact or residence 
proceedings for being over-emotional and irrational: 
 
“The people who can be reasonable about contact aren’t the people that 
we see…when they’re in the public forum, they hate each other. They 
                                                 
50
 2 Cafcass officers and 2 family lawyers 
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both think that the other one is doing whatever they’re doing deliberately 
to spite the other person, and neither of them are focused on the child, 
and there’s no way that they would ever agree.” [Ms G, Barrister, SE] 
 
However, two Cafcass officers expressed an awareness and understanding of the 
complexity of the emotional context within which parents come to private law 
Children Act proceedings, and concern at the inability of courts to recognise this: 
 
“I suppose in these situations you’ve got to, you know, you’ve got to 
take into account of the fact that these people’s emotions are very, very 
heightened and churned and, you know, and they need some time to 
settle down, they need to feel that they’re being listened to, they need to 
feel that they’ve got an opportunity to sort some of that out themselves 
and see where they want things to be.” [Ms O, FCA, SW] 
 
“A few judges that are rolled up who, in my view, don’t have a world 
view, so wouldn’t understand the complexity of the families that we 
understand and that we work with really.” [Ms N, FCA, SW] 
 
However, it is principally mothers who are singled out as particularly ‘irrational’:  
 
“Although it seems perfectly rational to the parent themselves, actually 
from the court’s point of view, and from Cafcass’s point of view, and 
from the non-resident parent’s point of view and from the child’s point 
of view also at least, it’s completely irrational what’s being done.” [Mr J, 
FCA, NE] 
 
“Well, mainly because of the things that they bring up as to reasons why 
they don’t think contact should go ahead…It’s when you get things 
which just aren’t logical.” [Ms A3, Barrister, London] 
 
These perceptions of over-emotional mothers acting irrationally and selfishly against 
their children’s interests, together with their own beliefs in the benefits of contact, 
led many respondents to perceive the reasons given by mothers for their opposition 
to contact to be petty, trivial, irrelevant and/or illogical. Yet Coy et al found that the 
primary reasons why women attempted to stop or limit contact were “fear for their 
own safety; concern for children’s welfare; perpetrators’ failure to comply with 
agreements/arrangements.”51 The reasons given by clients to the family lawyers 
participating in this study appeared to be serious. Yet many respondents considered 
                                                 
51
 Coy et al (n 2) 31; see also at 62 
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these trivial, or thought that they had discerned the underlying ‘real reasons’ for the 
mother’s opposition to contact, such as jealousy about the father acquiring a new 
partner, the mother hating the father, the mother wishing to punish the father. Unless 
there were ‘obvious’ serious welfare concerns, many family lawyers did not consider 
that any opposition to contact was justified.  
 
“I suppose it’s those cases where there’s no alcohol, drug or violence 
problems. So none of the obvious risk factors but they still say, well, he 
doesn’t give me any money for the children is quite a usual one, you 
know, if they’ve had CSA problems they think that they can deny 
contact…or a lack of support in their relationship, um, or he was, he was 
a poor husband or a bad boyfriend. Quite often as well: he left me-type 
arguments, he left the family home, um, he’ll only see the children on 
my terms, those sorts of reasons as well, I suppose quite often when the 
split is quite raw, quite new, that that happens.” [Ms E, Barrister, London] 
 
Two family lawyers considered that indications of obstructiveness were where 
mothers, in their view, provided inconsistent or constantly changing ‘excuses’ for 
opposing contact, so that what may at first appear to be ‘rational’ behaviour is 
gradually revealed as irrational:  
 
“It’s usually, I mean, I say mothers, it’s usually mothers,…and it’s 
normally in circumstances where they clearly have a huge degree of 
hostility towards that other person. Sometimes you can understand where 
they’re coming from, from their own perspective, sometimes it’s just 
completely irrational but you realise sort of later on in the case, because 
initially they’ll put up objections to contact which might seem that they, 
you know, are fair.” [Ms T, Barrister, NW] 
 
Since the ‘unjustified’ reasons for opposing contact given by respondents did not 
include domestic violence, it is reasonable to assume that professionals would 
consider the mother justified in such opposition if she feared domestic violence from 
the father. This was not necessarily the case.  
 
Fewer than half of all respondents thought that the fear of domestic violence would 
almost always justify a parent in opposing contact. There was a marked difference in 
views between Cafcass officers and solicitors on the one hand, and barristers on the 
other on this issue. Just over half of the Cafcass officers, and half of the solicitors 
interviewed, thought that the fear of domestic violence would almost always justify a 
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parent in opposing contact, as opposed to only two barristers.
52
 Ms B [Sol, London] 
and Mr J said that in their view, mothers should never be seen as implacably hostile 
to contact if they had sustained domestic violence; in those circumstances 
“implacable hostility doesn’t come into play.” [Mr J, FCA, NE] Mr J and Ms O 
indicated that such opposition was a positive factor because “at least it gives you the 
opportunity to look into it and assess it properly rather than just making an 
assumption that the child is going to be safe.” [Ms O, FCA, SW] Ms Y said that she 
would be worried if the mother did not express concern about contact in these 
circumstances:   
 
“Certainly I would be concerned if a parent didn’t worry about domestic 
violence being a factor in how they thought that the contact should be, if 
there was domestic violence, clearly. It’s a factor about their parenting 
capacity, isn’t it?” [Ms Y, FCA, London] 
 
Eleven respondents, of whom only two were FCAs, said that the fear of domestic 
violence could justify the victim in opposing contact “depending on the 
circumstances” or “to an extent”.53  None of the participants indicated that the fear of 
domestic violence could never justify a refusal of contact, although Ms E 
demonstrated a reluctance to articulate this position to the court because “I don’t find 
that it’s often very attractive to argue for no contact on the basis of domestic 
violence.” [Ms E, Barrister, London]  
 
As discussed above, the circumstances in which courts and professionals consider 
domestic violence to be relevant to contact are broadly the same as those in which 
the fear of domestic violence may justify opposition to contact, namely, in cases of 
recent, very severe primarily physical violence which was witnessed by the child, 
and preferably where the child has not had contact with the father for some time. 
Additionally, two solicitors and two Cafcass officers indicated that domestic 
violence could only justify opposition to contact if the fear was ‘genuine’, ‘rational’ 
or ‘objectively’ justified: 
 
                                                 
52
 N = 13, comprising:   Solicitors = 5;  FCAs = 6;  Barristers = 2 
53
 Barristers = 4; Solicitors = 5;  FCAs = 2 
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“Again, being objective about it, the issue of the fear of domestic 
violence, the perception of fear of domestic violence in one person 
doesn’t necessarily translate into evidentially made-out findings and 
something tangential for the court. But as a factor, of course, it’s part of 
the harm criteria, Section 31(9).” [Mr R, Solicitor, NE]54  
 
It was concerning to find that three Cafcass officers and a solicitor thought that if 
mothers alleged domestic violence, but safeguarding checks on the father were clear, 
and/or if there was no other independent supporting evidence, the mother must be 
unjustified in her opposition to contact.  
 
Although most professionals considered, to varying degrees, that mothers’ fears of 
domestic violence may justify them in opposing contact, a substantial minority 
(predominantly family lawyers)
55
 appeared to view such allegations with suspicion 
or disbelief, or overtly expressed the view that mothers fabricate allegations of 
domestic violence for their own purposes.  
 
“And all of a sudden, you know, these allegations, you know, revived 
and: but we must have a fact-finding! And it’s normally a delay tactic on 
the mother’s part because she didn’t want the court to be making a 
residence order.” [Ms T, Barrister, NW] 
 
Three of these family lawyers thought that mothers may make allegations of 
domestic violence because they have learnt ‘through the grapevine’ that that is a 
good way to stop contact. 
 
“Certainly at one stage, it could be years ago, I had, it would be a 
worrying trend of women raising the issue, um, and it going nowhere, 
but managing to go nowhere for quite a long time. And I got the feeling 
there were quite a lot of quite determined and relatively on the ball 
women who were getting advice, I don’t think from official sources but 
from friends of friends and blah blah blah, saying: listen, you want to just 
say he’s done this, and then it can take six months to get it sorted.” [Ms S, 
Barrister, NW] 
 
                                                 
54
 Similarly Mr W [FCA, SW] thought that the mother would be justified in opposing contact if her 
allegations were corroborated by ‘objective’ evidence such as police records, convictions or other 
documented ‘real’ proof. 
55
 Barristers = 4;  Solicitors = 4;  FCAs = 3 
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Only Ms B [Solicitor, London] and Ms M [Barrister, SW] recognised the way in 
which victims of domestic violence may be constructed as implacably hostile by 
courts if they do not conform with victim stereotypes. Ms M spoke of a client who 
was “very, very angry when she talks about him, because sometimes fear and anger 
go hand in hand and I think from her that’s probably not served her too well because 
then people see the anger and don’t always appreciate the fear that’s underlying.” 
[Ms M, Barrister, SW] 
 
“I mean, it’s really, really difficult for those women to come into contact 
with the perpetrator. And I think sometimes victims can look like they’re 
being hostile when they’re not, they just really don’t want to see that 
person, and it’s fair enough really.” [Ms B, Solicitor, London] 
 
The starkest example of the difference in judicial attitudes towards fathers and 
mothers was provided by Ms O [FCA, SW] who spoke about the only case of an 
‘implacably hostile’ resident father, which revealed how differently from mothers 
courts and professionals may treat fathers who oppose contact and ‘flout’ orders. The 
four children resided with the father, who had “strongly influenced” them. He 
refused to allow the children to have contact with the mother on the basis that they 
did not want to see her.  
 
“And nobody challenged him on it. I mean, you know, okay, I’m 
probably as bad as anyone else, I didn’t actually say: well actually, you 
should sling them in the car, you know…but you know, really it’s down 
to you, you really need to use your powers as a parent, you know. 
Beyond that you couldn’t do any more, there really wasn’t anything, you 
could not order him to do it and expect it to be done, it just didn’t 
happen.” [Ms O, FCA, SW]  
 
Despite the pervasive views on the prevalence of unjustified opposition to contact by 
mothers, it was interesting to note that eight participants,
56
 including a number who 
held highly critical views of mothers, indicated that mothers are, in fact, generally 
supportive of contact, including those who had sustained domestic violence:  
 
                                                 
56
 Barristers = 5;  Solicitors = 2;  FCAs = 1. Only one respondent, Ms A3 [Barrister, London] thought 
that most mothers involved in proceedings are opposed to contact. 
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“I often ask them: Are you against the principle of contact? And by and 
large they say ‘no’. It’s quite unusual to say they’re against totally 
anything.” [Ms F, Barrister, SE] 
 
“Even where domestic violence is an issue, increasingly women say: I’m 
not opposed to the kids seeing him, I just don’t want to have to come into 
contact with him.” [Ms S, Barrister, NW] 
 
Ms P pointed out that mothers who have been subjected to domestic abuse can be 
more likely to agree to contact to appease the father. Ms P and Ms M [Barristers, SW] 
emphasised the lengths to which mothers will go to ‘make contact work’, including 
those who have sustained domestic violence:   
 
“What I think generally, because the resident parent wants desperately 
for the kids to have a relationship with their father, so makes the contact 
work…and because they want that to happen and they do sort of bend 
over backwards to make it work, it does work.” [Ms P, Barrister, SW]  
 
Two family lawyers even described cases where mothers wanted the children to have 
contact with violent fathers and they counselled the mothers against this. 
 
“Quite often they will say: oh, he’s never hurt the child, you know, it’s a 
classic: the child’s fine, it’s not the child, it’s me, oh he’s a wonderful 
father. And so you spend some time explaining actually that is really 
harmful.” [Ms L, Solicitor, SW]  
 
“I was for mum who, dad had been convicted of common assault, and 
she relied on a few other bits and bobs, saying he was a bit of a bully 
when they separated. And, um, she was a rare specimen of mother who 
said:…but he’s a good father. I said: well, you know, that’s a failure in 
parenting to do that to you.” [Ms E, Barrister, London]57  
 
The reported cases reveal a harsher, more condemnatory attitude towards mothers 
who oppose contact by some members of the judiciary than by most of the 
professionals who participated in this study.  This has even led to courts transferring 
the residence of children to fathers or paternal family members if they perceive that 
mothers are obstructing contact. In Re A (Residence Order)
58
 the court transferred 
the residence of the children to the father, despite findings of domestic violence 
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 Ms E was the only participant to refer to domestic violence as a “failure in parenting”. 
58
 Re A (Residence Order) (n 20). See in particular judgment of Coleridge J who was particularly 
condemnatory of women generally who oppose contact. 
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having been made against him. Although the Court of Appeal allowed the mother’s 
appeal, the father’s conduct was minimised and even ignored, and the mother was 
strongly condemned for her “obdurate” opposition to contact.  In Re B (Transfer of 
Residence to Grandmother),
59
 the Court of Appeal allowed the mother’s appeal 
against an order transferring residence of the child to the paternal grandmother and 
agreed with her counsel who had criticised the trial judge “for treating the mother as 
implacably hostile when that lacked the ordinary, necessary foundation of clear 
findings following investigation of the relevant history, not only during the 
relationship but in its aftermath.”60 
  
The mother may also be constructed as hostile if she does not undertake the task of 
reducing the father’s hostility. In Re P (Children),61 although the trial judge found 
that the mother did not have any mental health problems, Ward LJ suggested that she 
should undergo therapy or counselling as this “might go some little way to assuaging 
the father’s implacable conviction that she is a woman with severe mental problems 
such as spill over to the detriment of his children.”62 The task of the ‘good mother’ to 
engage in therapy to enable her to support contact or reduce the father’s hostility is 
also seen in Re W (Direct Contact).
63
 The trial judge did not consider the mother to 
be implacably hostile because she recognised that the mother’s opposition to contact 
had a valid basis in the father’s behaviour towards her. However, on the father’s 
appeal, McFarlane LJ constructed the father as the ‘good parent’ because he 
accepted the need for therapeutic intervention and engaged in it, whereas the mother, 
he found, did not, thus earning her the title of ‘bad mother’. Her inability to engage 
in therapy was constructed as more culpable than the father’s abusive behaviour.  
 
4.2 ‘Safe family men’ 
In order to explore professionals’ attitudes towards fathers involved in contact 
disputes, respondents were asked whether they had encountered cases where non-
resident parents were pursuing contact as a means of harassing or continuing to 
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 Re B (Transfer of Residence to Grandmother) (n 20) [11] (Thorpe LJ). See also Re W (Residence: 
Leave to Appeal) [2010] EWCA Civ 1280, [2011] 1 FLR 1143; M v M (Residence) [2010] EWHC 
3579 (Fam), [2011] 1 FLR 1951 
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control the resident parent.
64
 General perceptions of fathers were also gleaned from 
participants’ responses to other questions. 
 
All respondents reported that they had acted in cases where fathers had pursued 
contact through the courts in order to harass or continue to control the mother. 
Similarly, solicitors and barristers who responded to Coy et al’s survey “supported 
women’s perception that child contact proceedings were used by perpetrators to 
continue to exert power and control.”65 However, only three respondents in this 
study (all FCAs) considered that it is not uncommon for fathers to pursue contact for 
this reason. Most participants were less decisive on this issue, and saw it as less 
prevalent than mothers unjustifiably opposing contact.  
 
“That is actually less common…than the first instance where parents 
unreasonably don’t allow contact. But it does happen, and it is a means 
of keeping control of, and monitoring who the other parent is with and 
seeing and trying to manipulate the situation.” [Mr V, FCA, NW] 
 
Respondents also thought that it was more complex and less clearcut than ‘simply’ a 
question of improper motivation, indicating a general reluctance to see fathers in a 
negative light.
66
  
 
“Because I think certainly there is cases [sic] of harassment where there 
is domestic violence but equally the father does genuinely want a 
relationship…It’s not always clearcut or straightforward at all, no.” [Ms 
H, FCA, SE]  
 
Indeed Ms Y seemed keen to ‘make excuses’ for violent fathers. While she thought 
that:  
 
“there have been instances where parents have achieved contact when 
they don’t really give a toss about the kids, only want to hurt the other 
partner…[my] optimistic head is that parents are pursuing contact when 
there’s domestic violence because they love their children but they can’t 
control themselves, that’s my optimistic head.” [Ms Y, FCA, London] 
                                                 
64
 Respondents’ views on this issue also emerged from their responses to the question asking whether 
courts consider the factors set out in Paragraph 27 of the Practice Direction. 
65
 Coy et al (n 2)78; see also at 33, 70 & 77 
66
 Coy et al (n 2) 56, found that many legal professionals considered that perpetrators’ primary 
motivation was seeking a ‘meaningful relationship’ with their children, but an almost equal number 
“reported that regaining power and control lay behind applications.”  
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While Ms E [Barrister, London] was reluctant to impute improper motives to fathers 
because  “it’s very difficult to allege something about the state of somebody’s mind”, 
the vast majority of respondents, including Ms E, had no difficulty theorising 
(negatively) on the mothers’ ‘state of mind’ in opposing contact. 
 
Despite the general perception of most respondents that it was not common for 
fathers to pursue contact for dubious motives, respondents provided numerous 
examples of cases in which they considered that the father’s motivation was 
questionable.  
 
Ms I spoke about a case where numerous findings were made against the father, who 
showed Ms I a diary he had written which he intended showing to the child when he 
was older, which was “damning” of the mother.  
 
“I have no, no doubt, that his only reason and motivation for contact with 
his child is to be able to go on and control the child’s mother…I am 
really worried then for the child’s emotional wellbeing. And I can 
honestly say, hand on my heart, I know where my recommendations will 
be.”  [Ms I, FCA, NE] 
 
Ms N described a case in which she had just completed a risk assessment of a father 
who had told her that the mother “needs controlling.”  
 
“So yeah, I recommended no contact in my risk assessment. I think the 
motivation was about power and control rather than what the real focus 
of the needs for his child. And that isn’t to say that he didn’t talk about 
the needs of his child because he was bright enough to be able to 
articulate it, but his motivation for me was about: I’m gonna get him, 
because it hurts her.” [Ms N, FCA, SW]  
 
Ms N did not accept the father’s assertions of concern for his child at face value, 
because she understood the power and control dynamics of domestic violence and 
perpetrators’ manipulative behaviours. Nevertheless, she considered that fathers are 
not “always motivated on continuing the power and control” and that “generally 
people have a genuine desire to want to see their children.” 
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Ms X considered that: 
 
“sometimes it’s quite clear that the parent seeking contact isn’t the least 
bit interested in the kids. What he wants to do is undermine the mother, 
you know, really harm her in another way, he can’t hit her so he tries to 
harm her in another way. So that’s always been in our thinking.” [Ms X, 
FCA, London]  
 
It is hard to reconcile this with her view that “the resident parent will often say that’s 
the reason for the application but it soon becomes clear that it isn’t.” Implicit in these 
apparently contradictory views is the perception that it is the professionals, not the 
mother, who have the ‘rationality’ to determine whether the father’s motivation is 
genuine. 
 
Three lawyers and a Cafcass officer pointed out that fathers sometimes apply for 
contact as a means of tracing the mother and/or to find out information about, or 
undermine, her: “Contact could be used as a way of getting to the parent, for 
example, when, I’ve had clients who, he’s basically sort of stalked them and found 
them.” [Ms B, Solicitor, London] 
 
“Sometimes you get very manipulative fathers as well, you know, what’s 
mum doing, what’s mum been doing this week, who’s she seeing, who’s 
been round, and I think that makes the children feel very uncomfortable.” 
[Ms D, Solicitor, SE]  
 
Ms D provided an example of a violent and controlling father “who does interrogate 
them, always asks them about what they’ve been eating.” 
 
Since almost all respondents to this study endorsed the presumption of contact, and 
most considered that fathers with dubious motivations were the exception rather than 
the rule, it was not surprising to encounter views generally more sympathetic to 
fathers than to mothers, particularly from barristers. 
 
“And when, you know, the father’s jumped through every hoop that he 
can and then there’s still new objections coming up and new things that 
have never been mentioned before, and you sort of realise, actually, 
you’re just coming up with anything to stop this guy seeing the child.” 
[Ms T, Barrister, NW] 
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“So I suppose I’m slightly more wary of the mums when I make 
agreements actually. So suppose normally the non-resident parent, dad 
normally, um, is so keen to get any time he can that, you know, he’s 
likely I suppose to turn up and be good but it’s quite often fine for the 
other side that something goes wrong.” [Ms E, Barrister, London] 
 
Nevertheless, respondents revealed fairly low expectations of what constitutes a 
‘good’ father, and even dismissive views of the fathers they had encountered. Two 
solicitors considered that applying for contact is itself evidence of positive 
motivation: “I think by the fact they’ve made the application and followed it through, 
they would see that as motivation in itself, I would have thought.” [Ms A, Solicitor, 
London]
67
 Ms P expressed the view that if contact is “not going well, it’s normally 
because dad’s not stepping up to the plate, you know, he’s not turning up or he’s 
messing about.” [Ms P, Barrister, SW] Ms E went so far as to suggest that, with 
respect to risk assessments, “if the court had to offer certainty, then, um, probably 
very few fathers would have contact, I suppose, in these situations.” [Ms E, Barrister, 
London] However, these views did not seem to affect their general beliefs in the 
benefits of contact. 
 
The women interviewed by Coy et al reported that social workers and Cafcass 
officers could be “taken in” by “abusive men’s presentation as charming and on 
“their best behaviour’,” without realising that they, too, were being manipulated.68 
However, three Cafcass officers interviewed for this study articulated an awareness 
of perpetrators’ behaviours and/or were willing to challenge fathers:  “And we know 
about men who are perpetrators of domestic violence is that they can come across as 
charming, you know, so part and parcel of the definition of being a domestic 
abuser.” [Mr W, FCA, SW] 
 
Judicial attitudes towards fathers could be discerned from participants’ reports of 
judges readily accepting expressions of contrition at face value, expressing sympathy 
for violent fathers, refusing to accept that the father had improper motives in seeking 
contact, being reluctant to accept that fathers could be abusive towards children (as 
                                                 
67
 Similar views were expressed by Ms C [Solicitor, SE] 
68
 Coy et al (n 2) 58 
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opposed to abusive towards mothers, which is considered by courts to be more 
‘acceptable’), and being allowed back repeatedly on Domestic Violence Perpetrator 
Programmes (‘DVPPs’).   
 
“And equally if they are admitting it then, you know, even if it’s just on 
the morning of the fact-finding hearing, you know, then sometimes 
judges will be much more gung ho and sort of say: well, you know, fine, 
he’s admitted it, let’s look at a way of resolving this without an expert 
assessment.” [Ms T, Barrister, NW] 
 
Three family lawyers commented on how difficult it is to persuade courts that the 
father’s motivation may be questionable or improper: “I think the sort of motivation 
point is quite difficult to establish…it’s quite difficult to persuade a court that a 
contact application is motivated by anything other than a desire to see the children.” 
[Ms T, Barrister, NW] 
 
“I don’t always come across judges, say, looking at the motivation 
because you often have a client saying: this is another element of control, 
wouldn’t you, and that’s not an argument that I’ve ever really been able 
to advance successfully with a judge.” [Ms K, Solicitor, NE] 
 
Ms B recognised that judges generally tend to have a positive view of fathers’ 
motivation because of their belief in the benefits of contact:  
 
“Obviously they’re coming from the stance that it’s best for the child to 
see the parent. So if someone’s expressing genuine concern to see their 
child, um, then they might err on the side of believing that.” [Ms B, 
Solicitor, London] 
 
These views are supported by the case law, which shows that even where findings of 
domestic violence have been made, the simple desire for, and pursuit of contact is 
constructed as sufficient to constitute evidence of the ‘commitment’ of the good 
father, rather than as a means of exercising power and control. In Re W (Contact: 
Permission to Appeal) McFarlane LJ stated that he “admired” the father “for 
pursuing the matter in the way that he has, giving priority to his desire to re-establish 
his relationship with his young son”.69 Even fathers with proven histories of abuse 
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 Re W (Contact: Permission to Appeal) [2012] EWCA Civ 1214, [2013] 1 FLR 609 [31] (McFarlane 
LJ) 
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are frequently seen as important for their children’s welfare. In Re W (Children)70 a 
father against whom findings of serious violence and coercively controlling 
behaviour were made, and who was found to have made the mother’s life intolerable, 
was considered by the trial judge to be a ‘good enough’ father to permit 
unsupervised contact, a view with which Black LJ, on the mother’s appeal, 
disagreed.
71
 
 
The higher courts also demonstrate a degree of latitude towards fathers which 
contrasts with the impatience that is shown to ‘obstructive’ mothers. In Re M 
(Section 91(14) Order)
72
 the father “lost control” during a hearing, applied to 
withdraw his application and, when the judge refused his application, left court. The 
judge dismissed the father’s applications for contact and parental responsibility and 
made a Section 91(14) order.
73
 The Court of Appeal set aside the Section 91(14) 
order, Thorpe LJ stating: “Surely this was not the time to prohibit or inhibit the 
father. The proper course was to, as it were, draw him back into the proceedings and 
not to put a barrier on his further engagement with the system.”74  
 
Occasionally the senior judiciary acknowledge that the court process can be used by 
perpetrators as part of a course of abusive conduct. In Re W (Family Proceedings: 
Applications) Wall P (as he then was) said that “it should have been recognised that 
the children are living with their mother, who should have been supported in their 
care rather than faced with regular and potentially destabilising applications that they 
should live elsewhere.”75 Additionally, where the focus is maintained on the father’s 
conduct, he is less likely to be viewed as a ‘safe family man’. In Re W (Children)76 
the father was found to have behaved in an abusive, controlling and threatening 
manner towards the mother. McFarlane LJ stated that the trial judge was correct to 
indicate to the father that she wanted to see “movement on his part in his 
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 Re W (Children) (n 24) 
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 See also Re P (Children) (n 16) [6] (Ward LJ); Re W (Residence: Leave to Appeal) (n 59) 
72
 Re M (Section 91(14) Order) [2012] EWCA Civ 446, [2012] 2 FLR 758 
73
 Section 91(14) Children Act 1989 enables courts to order that a party may not make any further 
applications without permission of the court. 
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 Re W (Family Proceedings: Applications) [2011] EWHC 76 (Fam), [2011] 1 FLR 2163 [11] (Wall 
P). See also Re J (Costs of Fact-Finding Hearing) (n 10) [4] (Wilson LJ); Re G (A Child) [2011] 
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understanding and ability to just see that he may be part of the problem here rather 
than an innocent bystander to whom all these things have miraculously happened.”77    
 
5. Discussion 
The responses of professionals confirm the view of Ms Y [FCA, London] that courts 
and professionals have come a long way from the days when she started practice in 
the early 1980s, when the victim had to suffer “injuries or blood” before it was 
recognised that she had sustained domestic violence. Many family lawyers and 
Cafcass officers have a broad and insightful theoretical understanding of domestic 
violence and some understand its coercive, controlling nature, although fewer 
barristers understand these dynamics. The more recent reported cases demonstrate 
that the gendered pattern of coercive control underlying domestic violence is no 
longer ‘noise’ to law, and some judges are starting to recognise and give effect to 
this approach when deciding contact cases, giving true meaning to the view of Sturge 
and Glaser that domestic violence constitutes a significant failure in parenting. 
 
However, there are still many family lawyers, particularly barristers, and a minority 
of Cafcass officers who continue to apply a narrow, legalistic approach to domestic 
violence,
78
 which has also continued to dominate much of the post-Practice Direction 
case law, leading to domestic violence frequently being minimised and neutralised. 
At the same time, messages have emanated from the senior judiciary emphasising 
the importance of taking domestic violence seriously in contact cases. This has led to 
a bifurcated approach in many cases, with domestic violence being perceived on a 
scale of severity whereby severe physical violence is rightly condemned, but ‘lesser’ 
forms of abuse are considered insufficiently important or not ‘real’ violence. 
Although professionals felt that judicial awareness of the nature and extent of 
domestic violence has improved over the last few years,
79
 a significant minority 
expressed concern about courts only taking severe physical violence seriously.
80
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 ibid [21] (McFarlane LJ). See also Re S (A Child) (n 27) 
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 See Hunter and Barnett (n 7) who found a broad, though not consistent, demarcation in perceptions 
of domestic violence between legal professionals and judicial officers who tend to apply a legalistic, 
incident-based approach to domestic violence, and Cafcass officers who demonstrate a broader 
understanding of its power and control dynamics. 
79
 These views were supported by research undertaken by Hunter and Barnett (n 7), who found that 
some judges do take domestic violence extremely seriously; see, eg, CJ474, NE at 70 
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 Similar findings were made by Coy et al (n 2) 60 
180 
 
 
Respondents’ perceptions of domestic violence can have a marked impact on their 
practices. For example, regarding domestic violence as comprising discrete incidents 
of physical violence can lead to ‘old’ or ‘historic’ allegations of violence being seen 
as irrelevant to current issues of contact and therefore disregarded, because patterns 
of controlling behaviour, and their continuing effects on victims and children, are 
obscured.  
 
The way in which professionals perceive and respond to domestic violence may be 
strongly affected by their views on the merits of post-separation contact. We have 
seen that nearly all professionals fully endorse the ‘presumption of contact’. This can 
mean that the broad theoretical insights of professionals into the nature and effects of 
domestic violence do not necessarily translate into practice, and may narrow the 
range of circumstances in which domestic violence is considered ‘relevant’ to 
contact.  
 
Because most courts, like many professionals, perceive domestic violence on a scale 
of severity, only recent ‘severe’, usually physical, violence, particularly if it is 
witnessed by the children, is seen as ‘relevant’ to contact, while less serious or 
‘minor’ abuse may be relevant to how contact should be managed, and ‘historic 
incidents’ of abuse are seen as completely irrelevant. The predominant focus on 
severe physical violence may mean that mothers have to ‘hype up’ their allegations 
to persuade courts to recognise the seriousness of the father’s conduct, which could 
invariably lead to accusations of exaggeration or lying.  
 
The perception of many respondents that ‘family squabbles’ arising from the ‘heat’ 
and bitterness of the relationship breakdown are not ‘real’ domestic violence is 
underpinned by images of safe family men who are acting ‘out of character’. It 
therefore appears inevitable to these professionals that ‘minor’ ‘isolated’ incidents of 
abuse, particularly at the end of the relationship, cannot have a bearing on contact 
because they fail to contextualise them within the gendered power and control 
dynamics of domestic abuse. 
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Many professionals think that courts only consider domestic violence to be relevant 
if it would affect the principle of contact, not the form or ‘mechanics’. However, 
neither the Practice Direction nor the Guidance on Split Hearings place this gloss on 
the meaning of ‘relevance’. Additionally, nowhere does the Practice Direction, the 
Guidance on Split Hearings, or the case law stipulate that only extremely ‘severe’ 
physical violence should be considered ‘relevant’ to contact.81 Yet the Guidance on 
Split Hearings appears to have had the effect of domestic violence being more 
frequently ‘weeded out’ by raising the threshold of what is seen to be relevant, with 
increasingly abusive behaviours being construed as irrelevant to contact.  
 
Underlying these views on the ‘relevance’ of domestic violence is the pervasive 
assumption of the benefits of contact, which has had the effect of narrowing the 
range of behaviours that may be construed as providing ‘cogent’ reasons to deny 
children these benefits and overriding the broad theoretical perceptions of most 
professionals of the nature of domestic violence, including its gendered power and 
control dynamics.  
 
The effects of the strong presumption of the benefits of contact are also revealed by 
professional and judicial attitudes towards mothers and fathers and by the reluctance 
of professionals to countenance any opposition to contact including, for some, in 
circumstances of domestic violence. Because the benefits of contact are unarguable, 
and there is no valid means for expressing the moral value of the mother’s wellbeing 
and autonomy, almost any opposition to contact is filtered through images of 
implacably hostile mothers and safe family men, and seen as ‘irrational’, ‘petty’ and 
‘unreasonble’.  
 
Several Cafcass officers, some solicitors and a minority of barristers do recognise the 
fear of domestic violence as a justifiable reason for the mother to oppose contact. 
However, for many, women’s fears of domestic violence in all but the most extreme 
circumstances may be viewed as another obstacle to overcome in the pursuit of 
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 See also Hunter and Barnett (n 7) who found that there were a range of views on the question of 
‘relevance’, from those who considered that domestic violence is always relevant to contact, to those 
who placed such importance on the merits of post-separation contact that domestic violence was 
considered to be peripheral to the ‘main’ issues of contact and should have little effect on the court’s 
orders. 
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contact. Mothers’ fears about their children having contact with the father may be 
met with suspicion, and their concerns for their own safety, well-being and 
autonomy may be seen as expressions of self-interest, particularly by barristers but 
also by some solicitors and Cafcass officers. While a significant minority of family 
lawyers acknowledge how supportive mothers generally are about contact,
82
 this 
does not appear to affect the suspicion and distrust with which many family lawyers 
view women involved in contact proceedings.
83
 Although most respondents to this 
study did not see mothers as deliberately malicious and hostile to contact, a 
significant minority perceived mothers as capable of manipulation, deceit and 
deliberate obstruction with the consequence that their allegations of domestic 
violence may be disbelieved.
84
   
 
Women can find themselves in a ‘no-win’ situation whether or not they agree to 
contact – if the mother opposes contact, she may be seen as irrational, difficult or 
even implacably hostile; however, if she allows it but subsequently raises allegations 
of domestic violence, the abuse is likely to be seen as irrelevant and/or the mother as 
obstructive of contact. 
 
Mothers may receive more understanding and support, however, from the minority 
of professionals who have a keen perception of the broad nature and gendered power 
and control dynamics of domestic violence.  However, while a significant minority 
of professionals expressed concern about the pressure placed on women by contact 
proceedings brought by perpetrators, and some Cafcass officers understood the 
manipulative nature of abusive men, for many these problems remained invisible.
85
  
 
Professional and judicial attitudes towards mothers contrast sharply with their 
attitudes towards fathers. There was a general reluctance, particularly by family 
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 Most of the women interviewed by Coy et al (n 2) were keen for their children to see the fathers 
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lawyers and, according to some participants, by judges, to impute improper motives 
to fathers seeking contact and a willingness to accept expressions of ‘genuine’ 
motivation at face value, including in circumstances of domestic violence, despite 
numerous examples being given of cases where fathers were clearly pursuing contact 
as a means to harass and control the mother. The influence of, and desire to keep 
intact, the image of the ‘safe family man’ means that many courts and professionals 
are very unwilling to perceive fathers in a negative light. Coy et al point out that the 
fact that perpetrators are rarely, if ever, identified as vexatious litigants suggests that 
the family courts fail to recognise the way in which men may pursue contact as part 
of a strategy of harassment and control.
86
    
 
The reported cases and the interviews demonstrate how the presumption of contact 
and an acontextual approach to domestic violence reinforce each other, resulting in 
the conceptual separation of the father’s conduct from his parenting practices. As a 
consequence, the father’s violence becomes increasingly invisible and the 
responsibility for the ‘problem’ with contact is laid solely at the door of the mother, 
who therefore deserves a ‘robust’ response.  
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CHAPTER 5  
SEEKING AGREEMENT FOR CONTACT 
AND CONSENT ORDERS 
 
1. Introduction 
It is clear that the way in which family lawyers understand domestic violence and 
its ‘relevance’ to contact, and perceive the benefits of contact, may have a 
profound impact on how they represent parents in contact proceedings. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, a major concern of the Family Justice Council, which led 
to the Practice Direction being issued, was the extent to which unsafe consent 
orders were being negotiated by professionals and sanctioned by the courts, often 
as a consequence of pressure being put on mothers to compromise and/or agree 
to contact. This practice arises out of the assumption not only that children ‘need’ 
to maintain a relationship with non-resident fathers, but also that ‘conflict’ and 
litigation is bad for children and therefore that it is better for children for their 
parents to cooperate and agree contact than to ‘battle it out’ in court proceedings.  
 
2. Seeking agreement for contact – advice or coercion? 
The majority of family lawyers interviewed firmly signed up to the notion that 
agreements between parents for contact benefit children, rather than decisions by 
courts.
1
  According to Ms F [Barrister, SE]: “If they can consent early it takes the 
heat and anguish out of litigation which is very stressful indeed.” [Ms F, 
Barrister, SE]   
 
“I do believe that it’s much better if mum and dad can agree because 
then it’s a case of united front. And it also does stop problems in the 
future, I know children often do it as they get older, play one parent 
off against the mother, but if mum and dad are working together as a 
united front… it stops them from then saying one thing to mum, and 
one thing to dad and, you know, it can stop a lot of problems in the 
future I think.” [Ms C, Solicitor, SE]2 
 
                                                 
1
 N = 12 
2
 Similar views were expressed by many family lawyers. 
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However, a number of respondents qualified their responses by saying that 
agreements can be beneficial as long as there are no risks involved, or the 
agreements are not ‘forced’ or the result of a power differential.  
 
“I would caveat what I’ve just said unless one parent is at a 
disadvantage in terms of their vulnerability and being manipulated 
because if there’s a power imbalance, yes, then actually, what they 
agree between themselves can sometimes, is not in the children’s best 
interests.” [Ms L, Solicitor, SW]   
 
Two family lawyers thought that the notion of seeking ‘agreement’ in the context 
of contact proceedings is unrealistic, but approached this issue from different 
perspectives.  
 
“The people who can be reasonable about contact aren’t the people 
that we see…So this idea of the judges saying: it’s far better that the 
parents can agree, and you think: no, actually what we’ve done is 
we’ve got them to court, legally represented, with Cafcass or a 
mediator playing umpire, effectively refereeing an argument that lets 
them vent their spleen and both walk away thinking that they’ve got 
what they wanted.” [Ms F, Barrister, SE]  
 
For Ms F, parents involved in contact proceedings are so ‘irrational’ and 
‘vengeful’ that they could not display the ‘civility’ and ‘reason’ necessary to 
reach agreement.  
 
On the other hand, Ms B thought that the idealised notion of the civilised 
agreement is often unrealistic in light of parents’ understandable emotional 
distress or real and serious problems.  
 
“You can’t really say yes or no, because obviously, yes, it’s better if 
they agree, but it’s better if they get on, and the parents we see don’t 
get on…so I think that the Legal Services Commission’s whole: oh, 
you have to agree it, doesn’t really fit with life. Because you can’t 
agree it if you’re all at each other’s throats, and you don’t agree on 
anything. And that’s why you’ve gone to see a solicitor. Or because 
there’s really serious problems between you, like violence, in which 
case, no, I don’t think you should be forced to agree, certainly not.” 
[Ms B, Solicitor, London] 
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Ms P [Barrister, SW] expressed grave concern about mothers agreeing to contact 
to appease fathers, thereby perpetuating patterns of domination and control, and 
about the ‘silencing’ effect that seeking agreement and avoiding hearings can 
have: “I worry that sometimes parents agree contact that’s not in the interests of 
the children just to appease the other or to make it, you know, for an easy life.” 
[Ms P, Barrister, SW]  
 
Only one participant articulated the view that agreements may ‘break down’ 
because of the ‘hostile mother’ deliberately reneging on them:  
 
“I have had a few mothers, um, agree to contact but not actually do it. 
So they’ve agreed it at court, it’s a consent order, um, and then they 
haven’t implemented it…So I suppose it’s more mums…So I 
suppose I’m slightly more wary of the mums when I make 
agreements actually.” [Ms E, Barrister, London] 
 
In order to explore the extent to which participants encourage agreements, 
solicitors and barristers were asked what general initial advice they give clients 
about contact and how the courts view it.  The views of a few Cafcass officers on 
this issue were also gleaned from their responses to other questions.  
 
The majority of lawyers
3
 advised their clients on the ‘presumption of contact’, 
that contact is ‘the norm’ and that the courts generally expect and want children 
to have contact with non-resident parents, unless there are “exceptional”, 
“compelling” or “good” reasons against it. In the process, ‘irrelevant’ reasons 
raised by mothers have to be eliminated.  
 
“I think that our local courts are very much of the view that contact 
should take place if at all possible, um…there will be an expectation 
that it should happen in some way or shape or form, be it direct, 
indirect, supervised, supported, and so on and so forth. And that there 
has to be exceptionally compelling reasons for the court to not order 
any contact.” [Ms G, Barrister, SE]4   
 
Ms S said that although the client may not initially want to reach agreement:  
                                                 
3
 N = 13 
4
 The advice given to mothers by Ms G is typical of that expressed by most family lawyers. 
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“with the appropriate assistance and explanation they can understand 
why that is the appropriate outcome, um, in those 
circumstances…and having somebody give them very sensible 
advice and explaining why some things that they think may be 
extremely pertinent, or relevant, aren’t.” [Ms S, Barrister, NW] 
 
Three solicitors indicated that they emphasise to parents the courts’ preference 
for a conciliatory approach, and two solicitors said that, as Resolution members, 
they saw court as a last resort and would encourage clients to avoid court and 
participate in mediation or collaborative law, as long as there was no risk 
involved.  
 
Ms Y [FCA, London] perceived a “real tension” between the “legal” approach 
(of lawyers and judges) and that of Cafcass in terms of “moving things along” 
and between the focus on agreement and consensus (lawyers and the judiciary) 
and protection (Cafcass). However, this perceived difference in approach and 
focus was not apparent in the responses to the issue of seeking agreement; if 
anything, lawyers focused more on ‘safe contact’ than did Cafcass officers. Six 
lawyers indicated that they would advise clients on the courts’ preference for 
contact ‘as long as it is safe’.   
 
“Putting violence to one side, that the courts, they want children to 
have contact with the non-resident parent and that it would be very 
unusual for them not to order any contact to take place…Um, but 
that’s really where there hasn’t been any violence, because that does 
change things quite considerably.” [Ms D, Solicitor, SE]5   
 
Four solicitors and a barrister indicated that their advice to clients about the 
presumption of contact would be tailored to the circumstances of the case: 
 
“Well, generally I think it depends on how long ago the, if I’m for a 
mother, how long ago the father saw the child, the relationship the 
father has with the child, whether it needs to start off as supervised, if 
                                                 
5
 Similar views were expressed by Ms E [Barrister, London], Ms K [Solicitor, NE] and Ms B 
[Solicitor, London] 
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there are concerns about drugs or alcohol or domestic violence.” [Ms 
A3, Barrister, London]
6
  
 
While it may be considered understandable and even necessary for family 
lawyers to advise their clients about the presumption of contact, some lawyers 
went further and were more openly coercive, using various strategies to push 
mothers into agreeing to contact. Two solicitors and a barrister indicated that 
they would impress on resident parents the child’s right to contact in order to 
progress them towards agreement. Four barristers and two solicitors indicated 
that they would employ the courts’ approach to contact in order to persuade and 
encourage mothers to ‘compromise’ and agree to some contact.   
 
“Usually I ask them directly because normally we have instructions 
and then you go through what the court expects and often you can 
turn them round in ten or fifteen minutes. That they will lose, on the 
facts.” [Ms F, Barrister, SE]   
 
“And I always say that in 99 per cent of cases the court would be 
allowing some form of contact. And it’s in the minority that they’ll 
say no. So I always start off on that basis so that they’re working 
towards that, rather than the other way around.” [Ms A, Solicitor, 
London]   
 
Ms D explained how she would persuade both mothers and fathers to agree to 
contact, based on her understanding of children’s emotional needs:  
 
“Certainly with resident parents…it’s very difficult and you have to 
try and get them to work past the bitterness from the breakup, etc. So 
it’s about trying to push on them that it’s in the child’s best interests 
to have contact with dad or mum…And if they’re younger children, 
they’re saying: oh, they saying they don’t want to go. Well, you’d 
make them go to school, wouldn’t you? You know, it is important to 
maintain the relationship with the parent…because I always say to 
parents: neither of you are going to get what you want, you’re going 
to have to compromise or the court will enforce something upon you 
that neither of you are going to like, nine times out of ten.” [Ms D, 
Solicitor, SE]  
 
                                                 
6
 Similar views were expressed by Ms A1 and Ms A2 [Solicitors, NW], Ms A [Solicitor, London] 
and Mr R [Solicitor, NE]. Ms C [Solicitor, SE] was the only family lawyer who did not refer to 
the presumption of contact when describing her advice to parents. 
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Pressure to agree to contact does not only come from the parties’ representatives; 
the courts and Cafcass also have a role to play in this respect. This can range 
from indirect, subtle steering towards agreement, to more overt pressure. Ms H 
articulated the ‘subtle’ approach:  
 
“And actually it would be helpful and reassuring for the mother to 
have the case come back in three months’ time to look at how we can 
progress from there. And it’s too frightening for her at the moment to 
envisage overnight stays, she wants to test the waters, and…you say: 
why don’t we just try for three months, see if any issues arise, and 
then we’ll come back and we’ll look at [it]…Solicitors really like 
working like that as well, and it’s a really helpful approach.” [Ms H, 
FCA, SE]
7
   
 
A more coercive approach was described by Ms U, who gave an example of a 
case where she made concerted efforts to get the mother to agree to contact and 
mediation:   
 
“The child is now nine and she has categorically refused point blank 
for him to have contact. And despite lots of mediation it just isn’t 
working. But I’ve not given up…The complication is that mum now 
has got really, doesn’t trust anybody…And I’m thinking: we’re 
gonna be at odds because I actually want the child to have contact 
with the dad, you clearly don’t. So I’ve left it as: right, these are 
completely different people now, trying to reinvent themselves. I 
think you need to go to mediation.” [Ms U, FCA, NW]  
 
In those reported cases where mothers have agreed to direct contact with violent 
fathers, it is not usually possible, from the judgments, to determine what led to 
such agreements. However, in Re S (A Child)
8
 there are strong indications that 
the mother was pressurised to accede to contact by a Cafcass officer and the 
judge. Although findings were made against the father of “gratuitous” violence 
towards the mother and an older child, and the mother opposed all direct contact, 
a Cafcass officer recommended that the father should be reintroduced to the child 
by way of professionally supervised contact. As a consequence, she “did not 
pursue her objection in the light of an indication from the judge, no doubt 
                                                 
7
 A similar approach was described by Ms O [FCA, SW] 
8
 Re S (A Child) [2012] EWCA Civ 617 
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recognising the force of the then Cafcass recommendation.”9 The mother 
subsequently changed her stance on contact when a second Cafcass officer 
strongly opposed any interim direct contact because of the father’s violence. This 
case demonstrates the powerful influence on mothers when courts and 
professionals together downgrade domestic violence in favour of the presumed 
importance of contact. 
 
A minority of family lawyers and Cafcass officers articulated an awareness of, 
and concern about the pressure that can be put on resident mothers to 
compromise, often at the cost of their own and the children’s safety.10  “I mean, I 
think they sometimes feel to a degree that they have been coerced into agreeing 
because there’s been a fair degree of pressure from either the court or Cafcass or 
even their own legal advisers.” [Ms T, Barrister, NW]   
 
Ms Y expressed grave concern about this coercive approach towards mothers.  
 
“The equal worry is that quite often resident parents will allow 
contact and agree contact arrangements because the pressure is very 
much on them to do that when it isn’t safe…I mean it feels to me like 
the impetus is very much from the judges that if there is a sniff of an 
agreement between parents that they will want to go for that, um, and 
it’s generally the Cafcass officer sort of saying: oh hold on a 
minute…I know you have to be so careful not to put pressure on 
people to reach agreement.” [Ms Y, FCA, London] 
 
Ms X explained how she would alert the judge to the possibility that a mother 
may be under pressure to agree contact:  
 
“When I was doing [first hearings] you would, you know, you might 
say to the judge…especially if there is two very pushy barristers and 
a very weak woman and a determined dad, I would say: can we just 
hold off on that one while I just have a word with mum and make 
sure she’s absolutely ok with this?” [Ms X, FCA, London]  
 
                                                 
9
 ibid [30] (Black LJ) 
10
 Lawyers = 4; FCAs = 3 
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Two barristers and a Cafcass officer expressed particular concern at the pressures 
that can be put on mothers who may be victims of domestic abuse and subject to 
coercive control.  
 
“You have to be very careful when they agree things at court, 
especially, say, if you’ve acted for the victim of domestic abuse, that 
they’re not just agreeing things because that’s part of their trait, their 
character trait now, or a victim trait. Because they’re so used to 
trying to pacify or appease, that they will agree to things that aren’t in 
their best, well, in the child’s best interests, to be quite honest.” [Ms 
C, Solicitor, SE]   
 
Ms P’s understanding of the power and control dynamics appeared to impact 
positively on her practice, as she recognised that victims of domestic abuse are 
more likely to agree to contact as part of a pattern of attempting to appease 
controlling perpetrators, and expressed an awareness of the need to avoid 
replicating the perpetrator’s behaviour.  
 
“In one case I had a mini-pupil with me and I said: I have a view 
about where this case should go, have a view about this father and 
how controlling he is, but I also have to be careful as her professional 
adviser not to take the father’s place in that relationship because I 
didn’t want her to feel that I was putting pressure on her not, you 
know, to appease me…I think it can be quite abusive, the relationship 
that we sort of have with our clients if we, some part of our job is to 
sort of say: right, this is as far, this is where I think the threshold 
is…If my client’s not ready to come up to there then it’s my job to 
protect her and make sure that she is not pushed into anything and 
shoving her about.  ” [Ms P, Barrister, SW]  
 
Ms P was aware, however, that most other family lawyers do not share her 
insight in this respect. “And they’re quite bombastic and actually all they’re 
doing is taking the place of the perpetrator and they put pressure on them.” [Ms P, 
Barrister, SW]
11
  
 
Cafcass officers expressed mixed views on the way in which solicitors and 
barristers represent their clients and protect their interests. Three Cafcass officers 
                                                 
11
 However, as discussed in Chapter 7, when describing how she would advise mothers after 
findings have been made, Ms P indicated that she would persuade the mother to agree to some 
form of contact. 
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thought that family lawyers representing victims/mothers do attempt to protect 
their clients’ interests and focus on their safety. “I can’t think of anyone that I’ve 
actually had to say: now look, do you realise what danger that might put your 
client in, and I would if I thought that there was.” [Ms O, FCA, SW] Ms N even 
felt that some family lawyers, particularly barristers, can be “pushy” and over-
bearing in pursuing their clients’ cases. 
 
On the other hand, two Cafcass officers felt that family lawyers do not focus 
sufficiently on the mother’s safety or protect her interests, and can push her, or 
allow her to enter into, unsafe agreements for contact. Ms I [FCA, NE] gave an 
example of a case where the mother’s solicitor told her to agree to contact 
because she would “lose anyway” and was dismissive of the mother’s concerns. 
Ms I felt that barristers are more likely to support mothers as clients than 
solicitors are. She gave an example of a case where the mother’s barrister had 
stood up for her in the face of fierce opposition from the father, whereas 
solicitors, she felt, are more likely to ‘encourage’ their clients to agree to contact. 
 
Ms Y also reported problems with lawyers trying to get agreements for contact 
instead of pressing for fact-finding hearings. In two cases she considered that the 
mother’s representatives were behaving like the mother in failing to stand up to 
the father and were bullied by the father’s representatives.  
 
“And I don’t know what the lawyers were doing but they kept getting 
to court and trying to set up agreements, and mum’s lawyers were 
just not standing up to dad’s lawyers and, you know,…they behaved 
as she did, and…it was just an absolute bloody nightmare.” [Ms Y, 
FCA, London]  
 
In another case, where the extremely abusive father was on probation for 
domestic violence, the mother’s solicitor said: “oh, we’re being really bullied and 
made out to feel that we’re being an awkward mother…And then I went and 
spoke to dad…and they were running a real pushy, pushy, pushy case, and I 
could see how she felt bullied by it.” [Ms Y, FCA, London]  
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Ms Y thought it was ‘wonderful’ when lawyers do stand up for the mother. “And 
I think there’s still a pressure on them, always a pressure on them to give contact 
even with domestic violence. It’s kind of, again, refreshing when a representative 
kind of puts forward no direct contact.” [Ms Y, FCA, London] 
 
Even Cafcass officers may be bullied by the father’s representatives in their 
efforts to achieve contact for their clients. Ms O gave an example of a “keen 
young barrister” who badgered and bullied her to let the father have contact:  
 
“But there was no way it was getting past me on the day and I think 
that is an example of an adviser who was overstepping the mark 
really…That was bullying me, that was, you know, it was dangerous, 
because if I’d been bullied into saying: well yeah, okay. And you’ve 
got a mother who might wobble and say ‘yes’, and I’m the one who’s 
saying ‘no’. But you’ve got to because you’re there for the child and 
you have to stand up for the child.” [Ms O, FCA, SW] 
 
3. Consent orders 
If it is the case that victims of domestic violence may continue to be pressurised 
into agreeing to contact, it is important that courts carefully scrutinise proposed 
consent orders. The Practice Direction requires any proposed residence or 
contact order to be scrutinised by the court to ensure that it accords with Section 
1(1) of the Children Act 1989 (the ‘welfare principle’).12 The views of 
participants were sought on the manner and extent to which information about 
domestic violence is provided to, and sought by, the courts when agreements for 
contact are made, and the extent to which judicial officers scrutinise proposed 
consent orders. 
 
3.1 Informing the court about domestic violence 
Family lawyers were asked how courts would become aware of domestic 
violence if they were presented with a proposed consent order and there was no 
mention of it in the papers, and how much information about domestic violence, 
if any, they would provide to the court.  
                                                 
12
 Potter P, Practice Direction: Residence and Contact Orders: Domestic Violence and Harm 
[2008] 2 FLR 103, reissued on 14
th
 January 2009 at [2009] 2 FLR 1400 [4]. Paragraph 5 states 
that the court must not make a consent order if the parties are not present in court unless it is 
satisfied that there is no risk of harm to the child. 
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Ten respondents said that the court would already be aware of domestic violence 
from the paperwork, including the safeguarding checks. However, this is not 
necessarily the case. Respondents confirmed that the father is unlikely to disclose 
in his application form that he has perpetrated domestic violence. Although most 
solicitors reported that they do complete the C1A forms when acting for victim 
parents, Ms T [Barrister, NW] commented that this was not always her 
experience.  Additionally, respondents’ views varied considerably about the 
degree of detail that is usually included in the C1A forms. Ms B [Solicitor, 
London] said she found it “really problematic that the court would use that as a 
guide,” because of the way in which domestic violence gradually emerges. So the 
C1A form is only a starting point and cannot be relied on to ensure that a 
proposed consent order is safe.
13
 
 
The initial safeguarding inquiries undertaken by Cafcass are an extremely 
important part of the disclosure process as they can provide vital information 
about the existence of serious domestic violence at the outset of proceedings 
which fathers, as applicants, are unlikely to disclose. However, respondents 
reported that the speed and reliability of the safeguarding information varies 
considerably nationwide. Additionally, most Cafcass officers and a few solicitors 
emphasised that the checks cannot be relied on because domestic violence is so 
frequently unreported, most perpetrators do not have criminal convictions, and 
the checks do not usually reveal the existence of Family Law Act injunctions. Ms 
X [FCA, London] pointed out that parents can be unknown to the police and 
local authority and yet Cafcass will discover “horrendous” domestic violence. 
 
The parties’ representatives therefore have an important role to play in making 
judges aware of domestic violence. Coy et al found that the extent to which legal 
representatives were willing to disclose the histories of violence to the court was 
                                                 
13
 These views echo those found by Rosalind Aris and Christine Harrison, Domestic violence and 
the supplemental information form (Ministry of Justice 2007), which indicated that the C1A 
forms assist in alerting the judge to allegations of domestic violence at the earlier stages of 
proceedings, but should not be relied on as the only screening tool. See also Maddy Coy, 
Katherine Perks, Emma Scott and Ruth Tweedale, Picking up the pieces: domestic violence and 
child contact (Rights of Women 2012) 
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critical; if such histories were discounted by professionals, this contributed in 
large part to rendering the violence invisible.
14
  
 
Mr R thought that all practitioners would make the court aware of domestic 
violence when submitting a proposed consent order, particularly in the context of 
a power imbalance:  
 
“I think any advocate would need to put to the court the 
circumstances surrounding this and particularly if you’ve got a 
domestically abused woman with the whole issue of the power 
imbalance between the perpetrator and the victim. For your own sake, 
let alone for your client’s sake, you’d be wanting to make sure the 
court was made aware of the context in which the agreement was 
being made.” [Mr R, Solicitor, NE]15  
 
These perceptions were not necessarily borne out by other responses. While half 
of the family lawyers interviewed said that the court would become aware of 
domestic violence by the parties’ advocates raising it, the extent to which they 
would do so seemed to vary. Two barristers and a solicitor considered that not 
only would they inform the court about domestic violence, but that they had a 
duty to do so. “But I think the responsible thing to do really is to raise it…the 
court ought to be aware because I think you have a duty in children cases to, you 
know, furnish the court with that sort of information.” [Ms T, Barrister, NW] On 
the other hand, Ms D [Solicitor, SE] said that while she would inform the judge 
about domestic violence when submitting a consent order, other solicitors may 
not do so, principally due to heavy court lists. Ms S [Barrister, NW] indicated 
that she would tell the court about domestic violence only if she thought it was 
‘relevant’ but would not do so if it was raised by a ‘hostile mother’ to delay the 
case. Ms A [Solicitor, London] went further and indicated that she would not 
inform the court about domestic violence when presenting it with a consent order, 
unless the client specifically instructed her to do so. 
 
Seven participants pointed out that, in practice, the opportunities to inform the 
court about domestic violence when presenting a proposed consent order are 
                                                 
14
 Coy et al (n 13) 
15
 This view was confirmed by Ms X [FCA, London] who thought that lawyers always tell the 
court and Cafcass about domestic violence. 
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limited, and that courts may be unreceptive to such disclosure in case the consent 
order ‘unravels’.  
 
“I mean most of the time when you go in with a consent order, judges 
don’t want to hear very much from you anyway. You’ve got it, that’s 
fine, you’re agreed, if there’s a problem come back at the next 
hearing.” [Ms A3, Barrister, London] 
 
There was a wide variation in participants’ views on how much information 
about domestic violence they would provide to the court when submitting a 
consent order, ranging from those who would provide minimal information in 
order not to “open up a can of worms” or “raise the temperature”, to a sizeable 
minority who would provide enough information to explain the rationale and 
terms of the order, to those who considered it very important to make full 
disclosure to the court about domestic violence so that the client could not be 
accused at a later stage of fabricating allegations of domestic violence if the 
consent order broke down.  
 
“You have to advise a client very carefully that if they don’t raise 
their allegations early on and it all breaks down and they later say: 
well, he was always violent to me, and you hadn’t said it from the 
outset, then … often courts are not going to view those allegations as 
credible.” [Ms L, Solicitor, SW]  
 
Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 6, many courts and professionals are suspicious 
of mothers who allow contact to take place and then raise allegations of domestic 
violence after it has broken down.  
 
3.2 Scrutiny of consent orders by judicial officers 
Hunter and Barnett found that while most judicial officers thought that courts 
adequately scrutinise proposed consent orders always or very often, family 
lawyers and Cafcass officers were more likely to say that courts never or only 
occasionally scrutinise such orders adequately. Pressure of work and inadequate 
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information were identified by judges and barristers as reasons why proposed 
consent orders might not be scrutinised carefully enough.
16
 
 
According to just over half of the respondents in this study, the extent to which 
judges and magistrates ‘scrutinise’ proposed consent orders depends entirely on 
the particular judge and/or the size of the court lists.  Whereas some judges do 
enquire about domestic violence or ask for more information about it, others are 
happy simply to ‘sign off’ the order. Ms S [Barrister, NW] thought that there was 
more scrutiny and less ‘rubber-stamping’ over the last couple of years but that 
judicial practice still varies. Similarly Ms P said that while some judges will 
challenge aspects of the order, others would rather avoid it ‘unravelling’:  
 
“There are some judges who would want to know, but there are other 
judges who take the view that the least they know the better when it’s 
a consent order because…it then starts to, once they start asking 
questions, it all starts to unravel and it’s very finely balanced.” [Ms P, 
Barrister, SW] 
 
A sizeable minority of respondents across the professional groups considered that 
a great deal of “rubber-stamping” of consent orders still happens.17  
 
“No, I think they’re quite happy to sit back and let us do all of that 
and the negotiations and reach the agreements and there’s a lot of 
rubber-stamping goes on, yeah…I can’t say that I’ve had a case 
where a judge has raised a concern about a consent order if the 
parties have agreed it, even where the court is aware that there’s a 
history of violence.” [Ms L, Solicitor, SW]  
 
“Well, a lot of the time you don’t even go in anymore. I mean, I’ve 
found lately that if you’ve reached a consent order, the judges will 
just say: oh, we might not need to see you, and just tick it off, or ask: 
are you all agreed? I’ll sign that off, it seems fine.” [Ms A3, Barrister, 
London] 
 
All but three of the respondents (all family lawyers) said that they had never 
experienced judges or magistrates enquiring whether domestic violence was an 
                                                 
16
 Rosemary Hunter and Adrienne Barnett, Fact-Finding Hearings and the Implementation of the 
President’s Practice Direction: Residence and Contact Orders: Domestic Violence and Harm 
(Family Justice Council 2013) www.familyjusticecouncil.org.uk, last accessed 12.11.13, 58 
17
 N = 8 
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issue in a case if this was not raised by the parties, as it was unlikely that the 
court would go on a “fishing expedition.” [Ms A2, Solicitor, NW] Four family 
lawyers thought that judges would positively avoid asking about domestic 
violence if the parties had not mentioned it, two of whom agreed with this 
approach: “It’s usually bad enough without anybody putting the boot in, to raise 
the temperature.” [Ms F, Barrister, SE] “I think that they would take the view 
that that was giving someone a get out clause in an intractable dispute, when they 
haven’t raised it themselves.” [Ms M, Barrister, SW] 
 
Despite the variability in practice reported by the majority of respondents, and 
the continued concerns about rubber-stamping expressed by a sizeable minority, 
twice as many respondents considered that there had been a positive change in 
judicial practice in terms of scrutinising proposed consent orders as a result of 
the Practice Direction than those who did not.
18
 “Yes, yes definitely. They’ve 
questioned it and perhaps asked in more detail in terms of how it’s going to work 
and how the parties have considered to make the contact safe.” [Ms K, Solicitor, 
NE] However, Ms C [Solicitor, SE] thought that while courts were more willing 
to scrutinise proposed consent orders when the Practice Direction was first 
implemented, she had perceived a backward slide. 
 
The majority of respondents
19
 had never encountered a situation where a court 
had refused to make a proposed consent order, and most of them had never 
experienced the court adjourning the case to obtain further information because 
of concerns about domestic violence. Those respondents who had experienced 
this situation emphasised that this was rare or did not happen regularly.
20
 
 
Five respondents said they had never encountered a consent order being 
approved by the court where a Cafcass officer raised concerns about domestic 
violence. However, five others said that they had, but indicated that this was 
uncommon, and nine participants responded with an unqualified ‘yes’. Five 
                                                 
18
 Two FCAs thought that the Revised Private Law Programme, with the greater involvement of 
FCAs at first hearings had also had a positive impact. 
19
 N = 16 
20
 N = 13 
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Cafcass officers expressed concern that this may occur when the FCA is not 
present in court, has become distracted by other cases, or is too busy.  
 
“I mean I go absolutely loopy if I see, if I’ve been distracted by 
somebody or had to see another case, and the parties and solicitors 
have sneaked into the court…without me being present and orders 
being made…and the judge shouldn’t really, the judge should wait 
for me to come into the room…But I’ve turned up at court and the 
solicitors for both parties have been chatting. And I often get: Don’t 
worry about it, I’ve already got the order agreed. And they’re really 
naughty.” [Ms H, FCA, SE]  
 
A minority
21
 of family lawyers even perceived the intervention of Cafcass in 
raising concerns about domestic violence when consent orders have been 
negotiated as obstructive or unnecessary ‘nitpicking’. 
 
The difficulties that may arise when proposed consent orders are approved in the 
absence of the Cafcass officer were highlighted by Ms Y who gave an example 
of a recent case in which she was preparing an addendum Section 7 report and 
became very concerned when she spoke to the mother.  
 
“We took it back to court and we had a consent order and I was 
horrified, I was absolutely horrified, and I wrote to the court 
immediately. She was saying: but I didn’t agree, I didn’t agree with 
what, you know, the consent order was, I wasn’t there…And the 
judge apparently had also voiced concerns at the time because it was 
clearly in my previous report that I thought this mother would agree 
to things under pressure from dad. And then I spoke to her 
again…and she said ‘no’, she felt confident saying ‘no’ to dad.” [Ms 
Y, FCA, London] 
 
Mr V said that in situations where consent orders were approved about which he 
had concerns, he would write to the court, although when he did so in one case 
“it didn’t make any difference.” [Mr V, FCA, NW] Similarly Mr J reported that 
in one of the courts in which he practises, the judges either fail to seek his views 
or ignore them: “Oh, we don’t need to know that, Mr J, no, no, we’re not having 
that. These are two perfectly good people, this is all bureaucracy.” [Mr J, FCA, 
NE] 
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On the other hand, two Cafcass officers provided examples of cases where they 
had voiced strong concerns about agreements for contact being made, which did 
have an effect on the outcomes, although Ms Y [FCA, London] commented that 
“it is an uncomfortable position to be in because then you have to start, you know, 
unpicking it.” Ms Y gave an example of an extremely worrying case:  
 
“The worst one was with…this poor woman…you could see she was 
crying, and she had a full burka on and, you know, two lawyers, both 
men, both Asian, saying: we’ve got a consent order for residence to 
father.”  [Ms Y, FCA, London] 
 
Ms Y was concerned that the mother’s lawyer, who was interpreting for her, was 
not giving a true account of what the mother was saying, so she got one of the 
Cafcass staff, who spoke Sylheti, to interpret.  
 
“Of course, then I got the full story and, you know, Dad sounded 
really scary and he’d thrown her out, he’d kept the child…So, you 
know, we unpicked the consent order and I had a go at the lawyer, 
actually. And then I referred it on to the local authority as well, so 
that she left the court with an order saying that the child should be 
with her and her family.” [Ms Y, FCA, London] 
 
Ms N gave an example of a recent case:  
 
“I’ve run into court in the end because they were just about, they said: 
it’s been agreed. I said: there’s issues of horrendous domestic 
violence here that haven’t been looked at and I’m recommending full 
welfare reports…I said: I’m here for the child’s voice, so if I’m 
saying in my experience that there were safeguarding issues, we 
don’t know why this agreement has been reached.” [Ms N, FCA, SW]  
 
In that case, the mother had not voluntarily agreed to contact. “Her view was that 
she, um, wanted a quiet life, she didn’t want to make it difficult because if she 
makes things difficult he then becomes abusive…It drives me mad really. They 
must have known I wouldn’t agree to it…[but] they did listen.” 
 
It is clear from these accounts that Cafcass officers may need to be particularly 
‘robust’ and strong if they have concerns about agreements that have, or are 
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about to be made. Ms Y and Ms N, who are extremely experienced Cafcass 
officers, were able to intervene effectively in the cases they described, but there 
must be concern that less experienced or more timid Cafcass officers may not be 
able to withstand the pressure from all sides for agreements to be reached and 
approved. 
 
4. Discussion 
By its very nature, the work of lawyers for clients is partisan; the lawyer serves 
and promotes her client’s best interests.22 The partisan nature of legal 
representation is confirmed as a core principle by the Code of Conduct of the Bar 
of England and Wales: 
 
“A barrister (a) must promote and protect fearlessly and by all proper 
and lawful means the lay client’s best interests and do so without regard 
to his own interests or to any consequences to himself or to any other 
person (including any colleague, professional client or other 
intermediary or another barrister…); (b) owes his primary duty as 
between the lay client and any other person to the lay client and must 
not permit any other person to limit his discretion as to how the 
interests of the lay client can best be served.”23  
 
However, as a result of the strong influence of the dominant welfare discourse on 
courts and professionals, solicitors and barristers specialising in family law 
increasingly appear to have absorbed welfare and ‘psy’ concepts into their 
thinking, so that we can see what Roche describes as a ‘welfare professionalism’ 
creeping into the roles of the legal profession,
24
 resulting in “the gradual 
assimilation of welfare ideology into family law” and the emergence of a 
developing ‘hybrid’ professional discourse.25 Particularly since the introduction 
                                                 
22
 See Katherine Wright, ‘The evolving role of the family lawyer: the impact of collaborative law 
on family law practice’ (2011) 23(3) CFLQ 370-392. See also John Eekelaar, Mavis Maclean and 
Sarah Beinart, Family Lawyers: The Divorce Work of Solicitors (Hart 2000) 187 
23
 The Bar Council, Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales (The Bar Council 2012) 
[303], www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/regulatory-requirements/the-code-of-conduct/, last 
accessed 28.06.13 
24
 Jeremy Roche, ‘The Children Act 1989: Once a Parent Always a Parent?’(1991) 13(5) Journal 
of Social Welfare and Family Law 345-361. See also Helen Rhoades, ‘The “No Contact Mother”: 
Reconstructions of Motherhood in the Era of the “New Father”’ (2002) 16 International Journal 
of Law, Policy and the Family 71-94, 80 
25
 Bren Neale and Carol Smart, ‘ “Good” and “bad” lawyers? Struggling in the shadow of the 
new law’(1997) 19(4) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 377-402, 396 
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of the Children Act 1989, parents “will find their solicitors and barristers 
sounding increasingly like mediators rather than partisans.”26  
 
Indeed, family law solicitors’ professional codes have incorporated this hybrid 
welfarism, thereby formalising and solidifying this discourse. The Resolution 
Code of Practice provides that Resolution members are required to: “Conduct 
matters in a constructive and non-confrontational way…Encourage clients to put 
the best interests of the children first…Make clients aware of the benefits of 
behaving in a civilised way.”27  
 
We have seen that many professionals have indeed adopted the ‘hybrid’ role of 
the ‘good’ family lawyer/child welfare professional and have absorbed the 
positive perception of consensus and agreement-seeking. This can have a 
profound impact on the way in which family lawyers use their authority to 
encourage parents to behave ‘sensibly’ in order to reach agreement for contact.28 
A number of studies support the findings of this project, which has demonstrated 
how family lawyers use the dominant welfare discourse to attempt to “divert 
clients away from pursuing their self-interest and towards compromise”, and 
‘steer’ clients towards what they perceive to be the ‘reasonable’ outcome.29    
 
Most family lawyers do not need to apply overt pressure on mothers to agree to 
contact; however, their general initial advice can inevitably steer clients towards 
agreement simply by spelling out the approach that courts undeniably take 
towards contact, thereby reinforcing that approach in a circular process. This 
means that advice can very easily become pressure, even if this is not intended 
by the lawyer. Many lawyers do, however, ‘use’ the presumption of contact, their 
                                                 
26
 Carol Smart, ‘Losing the Struggle for Another Voice: The Case of Family Law’(1995) 18 
Dalhousie Law Journal 13-195, 190. This trend has been compounded since many family 
lawyers have trained as mediators – see Michael King, ‘ “Being sensible”: Images and Practices 
of the new Family Lawyers’ (1999) 28 Journal of Social Policy 249; Wright (n 22) 370 
27
 Resolution, ‘Codes of Practice’ in Guides to Good Practice (Resolution 2012) 2, 
www.resolution.org.uk, last accessed 13.10.12; see also at 6 & 71. These sentiments are echoed 
by the Law Society’s Family Law Protocol – see The Law Society, Family Law Protocol (The 
Law Society 2006) [1.1.20]; see also [1.1.22]. 
28
 For similar views, see Eekelaar et al (n 22) 52-53 
29
 ibid 308; see also 124. See also King (n 26) 261; Christine Piper and Shelley Day Sclater, 
‘Changing Divorce’ in Shelley Day Sclater and Christine Piper (eds), Undercurrents of Divorce 
(Ashgate 1999) 237-238 
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own interpretations of children’s emotional and psychological needs, and other 
strategies to steer clients towards agreement. What lawyers perceive as 
‘irrelevant’ to contact, including, for some, concerns about domestic violence, 
are erased by ‘sensible’ advice; it follows, therefore, that clients who persistent in 
raising such issues cannot be ‘sensible’ or ‘rational’.  
 
Overt pressure may be exerted on mothers by a sizeable minority of family 
lawyers, particularly by those who are more likely to perceive mothers generally 
as ‘hostile’ to contact. Further pressure can be exerted by the father’s 
representatives, not only on the mother but also on her representatives and on 
Cafcass officers, compounding the abuse already experienced by the mother. If 
this pressure does not ‘work’, the mother may also experience further 
‘encouragement’ towards agreement from the Cafcass officer and the court. The 
strong presumption in favour of contact has led to the higher courts encouraging 
mothers to ‘shift their positions’ and allow contact with violent fathers, even in 
cases where it is recognised that direct contact is not appropriate at the time.
30
  
 
The impact that ‘good’ legal advice can have on parents was articulated by Mr V:  
 
“Good child care solicitors can make a big difference to a case, 
because not only are they talking reason to their clients, they’re 
talking reason on behalf of the child and trying to get them to see that 
there’s reasonable contact that can be had, that’s safe and that’s in the 
child’s interests, but their client has to move their position. So they 
can make a difference.” [Mr V, FCA, NW]  
 
Similarly Ms H said that “more often than not solicitors have got the child’s 
welfare at heart.” [Ms H, FCA, SE] Although lawyers are, of course, advocating, 
in theory at least, on behalf of their own client, these Cafcass officers identified 
the ‘hidden’ client of many family lawyers – law’s construction of the ‘contact 
child’ at the heart of family proceedings. On this view, the ‘good’ family lawyer 
is one who puts the child’s interests before those of their client by promoting 
contact. 
 
                                                 
30
 See, eg, Re M (Children) [2009] EWCA Civ 1216, [2010] 1 FLR 1089, per Thorpe LJ at Para 
12; Re A (Residence Order) [2009] EWCA Civ 1141, [2010] 1 FLR 1083 
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The internalisation and operationalisation of the dominant construction of 
children’s welfare is therefore the hallmark of the ‘good’ family lawyer. “Indeed, 
solicitors must ensure they do cause parents to act sensibly if they themselves are 
to be deemed sensible by judges … and ‘good’ lawyers by their colleagues.”31 
Family lawyers, therefore, need to be ‘civilised’ in the same way as parents do. 
The role of ‘good’ family lawyers means that most lawyers tend to reinforce, 
rather than oppose, current familial ideologies and thus further marginalise other 
ways of talking about familial relations that challenge the hegemonic status of 
the father within the modern family. It is the ‘good’ family lawyer on whom the 
court system relies in “ ‘producing the rational client’, inculcating realistic 
expectations and guiding their clients to particular outcomes.”32 
 
It would therefore appear that the Practice Direction has not achieved the 
‘cultural shift’ hoped for by its architects. Nevertheless, a strong minority of 
family lawyers and more Cafcass officers have a much greater appreciation of, 
and concern about the pressures that can be put on mothers to agree to unsafe 
contact. These family lawyers try to avoid replicating the role of the abuser in 
their practices, and make concerted efforts to ‘stand up for’ the mother and 
children.  
 
The belief of most professionals and judges in the benefits of agreed outcomes, 
the pressures on judicial officers of lengthy court lists, and the time and effort 
that family lawyers put in to brokering agreements for contact, may inhibit 
consent orders being properly scrutinised by courts. Most family lawyers report 
that they would inform the court about domestic violence if they are representing 
the victim and a few consider that it is their duty to do so. This suggests some 
improvement from the days when many family lawyers were reluctant to disclose 
domestic violence to the court. However, a minority would actively avoid raising 
the issue and a larger number would be reluctant to provide much detail, to avoid 
derailing the proposed consent order. Additionally, in practice, there may not be 
                                                 
31
 Christine Piper, ‘Assumptions about children’s best interests’ (2000) 22(3) JSWFL 261-276, 
263. See also Alison Diduck, Laws Families (LexisNexis UK 2003) 
32
 John Dewar and Stephen Parker, ‘The Impact of the New Part VII Family Law Act 1975’ 
(1999) 13 Australian Journal of Family Law 96 at Pg. 111 
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much opportunity to disclose domestic violence to the court, particularly if this is 
discouraged by the judge, or the parties do not even go into court.  
 
There appears to be a wide variation in the extent to which judges and 
magistrates scrutinise proposed consent orders, with some judicial officers being 
reluctant to enquire about domestic violence so that consent orders do not 
‘unravel’, and many still ‘rubber-stamping’ them without any enquiry or even 
seeing the parties. It was extremely concerning to find that lawyers and judicial 
officers may not only ignore the concerns and advice of Cafcass officers, but 
actively avoid their involvement in cases in order to drive through agreements for 
contact. Despite the general perception that the Practice Direction has improved 
the extent to which proposed consent orders are scrutinised by courts, it seems 
that judges very rarely refuse to make consent orders on the basis of concerns 
about domestic violence. The extent to which they will approve consent orders if 
Cafcass officers express concerns seems to vary and may depend on how robust 
the Cafcass officer is in withstanding pressure from the courts and legal 
representatives. 
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CHAPTER 6   
FACT-FINDING HEARINGS 
 
The Practice Direction provides that:  
 
“The court should determine as soon as possible whether it is 
necessary to conduct a fact-finding hearing in relation to any disputed 
allegation of domestic violence before it can proceed to consider any 
final order(s) for residence or contact.”1 
 
Research undertaken prior to the implementation of the Practice Direction 
revealed the very low numbers of fact-finding hearings held in private law 
Children Act proceedings, despite the high prevalence of domestic violence in 
such cases.
2
 A significant aspect of this project was to determine whether this is 
currently the case and if so why, by examining how often fact-finding hearings 
are held, the willingness of family lawyers and Cafcass officers to request them 
and the courts to hold them, whether they are held where appropriate, and the 
factors that may militate against holding them. In addition, this project explores 
participants’ perceptions of the nature of ‘evidence’ and ‘findings of fact’, the 
effect of these perceptions on their practices, and the consequences for children 
and parents. 
 
1. Frequency of fact-finding hearings 
 
Participants were asked whether they had noticed any increase in the numbers of 
fact-finding hearings held following the implementation of the Practice Direction. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Potter P, Practice Direction: Residence and Contact Orders: Domestic Violence and Harm 
[2008] 2 FLR 103, reissued on 14
th
 January 2009 at [2009] 2 FLR 1400 [13] 
2
 See Alison Perry and Bernadette Rainey, ‘Supervised, Supported and Indirect Contact Orders: 
Research Findings’ (2007) 21 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 21-47;  Joan 
Hunt and Alison Macleod, Outcomes of applications to court for contact orders after parental 
separation or divorce  (Ministry of Justice 2008) 
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Whether any increase in numbers of fact-finding hearings following the 
Practice Direction – by region 
 
 
 
London SE SW NE NW Total 
Increase 4 4 3 4 5 20 
No 
increase 
1 1 2 0 2 6 
Not 
know 
  1   1 
Total      27 
 
Whether any increase in numbers of fact-finding hearings following the 
Practice Direction – by professional groups 
 
 Barristers Solicitors FCAs Total 
Increase 5 11 4 20 
No increase 2
3
 0 4 6 
Not know   1 1 
Total    27 
 
 
The majority of solicitors and barristers interviewed,
4
 including all the five 
family lawyers interviewed in 2010, across all regions said that they had noticed 
an increase in the numbers of fact-finding hearings since the Practice Direction 
was implemented in May 2008. “I think that since the Practice Direction there’s 
just been more fact-finding hearings, so they deal with that really early on, which 
is the difference.” [Ms A, Solicitor, London, interviewed in 2010]    
 
Ms S clearly saw this increase in negative terms:  
 
“I think it had a significant impact after it initially came out, um, not 
least because it seemed that it was being an issue raised in every 
single private law application, and everything’s going off. Cafcass 
wouldn’t do section 7 reports, everything was going off, finding of 
fact hearings, and so there was this very significant backlog…if there 
were any allegations of violence at all, everything was being listed 
and the backlog and the delays in proceedings were immense.” [Ms S, 
Barrister, NW]  
 
                                                 
3
 These barristers included Ms T [NW] who responded ‘no’ to this question but then appeared to 
be talking about the more recent period following the Guidance on Split Hearings 
4
 N = 16 
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She said that she was constantly doing fact-finding hearings “back-to-back” but 
had a “horrible sinking feeling” that much of this was caused by devious women 
requesting them to “put the brakes on contact progressing” because of advice 
they had received from “associates”. 
 
Despite these views on the increase in fact-finding hearings following the 
Practice Direction, Ms B, who was interviewed in 2010, felt that they would soon 
be on the decline:  
 
“I think it might have a reverse effect soon because I think that courts 
are starting to think: oh God, we can’t actually cope with the amount 
of fact-finding hearings, and they’re all really long and so I 
think…there might be an effect now where it’s just starting to go 
back the other way and they can try and avoid them because they 
can’t cope with the demand of them. For the moment you get six-
month waits for a fact-finding hearing.” [Ms B, Solicitor, London]  
 
As Ms B had predicted, five respondents who were interviewed in 2011 observed 
that despite the initial increase, the numbers of fact-finding hearings appeared to 
have slowed down over the past year:   “I suppose because I came to the Bar in 
2007 and so just before the Practice Direction came in…they were coming in left, 
right and centre. Um, but it’s definitely slowed since last year…across the board, 
yeah.” [Ms P, Barrister, SW] Ms P thought that this was a ‘sensible’ 
development. 
 
Although four Cafcass officers thought that there had been some increase in fact-
finding hearings following the implementation of the Practice Direction 
(including both Cafcass officers in the North East), four others from all other 
regions did not perceive any increase at all, and Ms H [FCA, SE] thought that the 
reverse was the case.
5
   
 
So we can see that a higher proportion of family lawyers than Cafcass officers 
observed an increase in the numbers of fact-finding hearings following the 
Practice Direction. Additionally, different Cafcass officers from the same region
6
 
                                                 
5
 Mr W [FCA, SW] said that he did not know whether or not there had been an increase.  
6
 For example, Ms X and Ms Y [FCAs, London] 
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held opposing views on this issue. A number of factors may have influenced 
participants’ perceptions such as the extent to which fact-finding hearings 
impinged on their own practices, and their ability to recall what was happening 
three years prior to the interviews.  For these reasons, it is suggested that the five 
family lawyers interviewed in 2010
7
 may have had more accurate recollections 
of the situation during the two years following the implementation of the Practice 
Direction, although these respondents were all based in London and the South 
East, which is where Hunter and Barnett found the biggest impact of the Practice 
Direction.
8
  
 
Hunter and Barnett found that a small majority of respondents thought that there 
had been an increase in fact-finding hearings following the implementation of the 
Practice Direction and over a quarter thought that there had been no change. 
Circuit Judges, District Judges and barristers were more likely to say that there 
had been a substantial increase, while magistrates and Cafcass officers were less 
likely to observe such an increase.
9
 These findings are broadly similar to those of 
this study, although the larger proportion of those respondents interviewed for 
this project reporting an increase in the incidence of fact-finding hearings 
following the Practice Direction may be attributable to most of the interviews 
being conducted earlier than Hunter and Barnett’s survey. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that, because considerably higher numbers responded to the survey than 
were interviewed, the survey data may well be more representative of 
professional and judicial views on this issue. 
 
Despite these views on the increase in the numbers of fact-finding hearings, the 
case law reveals that in a number of cases that went to appeal after the Practice 
Direction came into effect, the Court of Appeal was highly critical of trial judges 
for failing to conduct fact-finding hearings, for abandoning them when they had 
been listed, or for accepting compromises when the full history of domestic 
violence should have been investigated. In Re Z (Unsupervised Contact: 
                                                 
7
 All five family lawyers interviewed in 2010 perceived an increase in the frequency of fact-
finding hearings following the Practice Direction. 
8
 Rosemary Hunter and Adrienne Barnett, Fact-Finding Hearings and the Implementation of the 
President’s Practice Direction: Residence and Contact Orders: Domestic Violence and Harm 
(Family Justice Council 2013) www.familyjusticecouncil.org.uk, last accessed 12.11.13, 58 
9
 ibid 
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Allegations of Domestic Violence)
10
 fact-finding hearings were listed on three 
separate occasions but were never held. On the third occasion the judge of his 
own initiative abandoned the fact-finding hearing after the first day and ordered 
unsupervised contact, despite the duty Cafcass officer reminding him of the 
Practice Direction. Wall LJ (as he then was), on the mother’s appeal, castigated 
the trial judge in the strongest terms.  
 
“I make it as clear as I can that the practice direction is there to be 
obeyed…Above all, it seems to me that the Practice Direction places 
proper and firm emphasis on the importance of the fact-finding 
exercise, and in my judgment that process cannot be short-
circuited.”11  
 
In Re R (Family Proceedings)
12
 the trial judge terminated a fact-finding hearing 
before the father gave evidence, having made an adverse assessment of the 
mother’s credibility. Allowing the mother’s appeal, Thorpe LJ emphasised that:  
 
“The importance of preliminary fact finding hearings in domestic 
violence cases was emphasised by this Court in the conjoined cases 
of Re L, V, M, H…some years ago now, and the importance of this 
judicial task has been subsequently emphasised by direction from the 
President.”13 
 
Despite these strong criticisms of trial judges for failing to hold fact-finding 
hearings, the message emerged from the higher courts that the numbers of fact-
finding hearings had increased to such a point that the court system was unable to 
cope and, by implication, that fact-finding hearings were being held 
unnecessarily. In SS v KS
14
 Hedley J referred to increased delays in the court 
system occasioned by the rise in public law cases since the ‘Baby P’ case, and to 
the increase in fact-finding hearings because of Re L and the Practice Direction. 
“The combination of these factors is testing the family justice system in London 
                                                 
10
 Re Z (Unsupervised Contact: Allegations of Domestic Violence) [2009] EWCA Civ 430, [2009] 
2 FLR 877. The mother alleged that the father had been very violent towards her and had 
threatened to abduct the children. He had also breached non-molestation and occupation orders. 
11
 ibid [27] (Wall LJ) 
12
 Re R (Family Proceedings: No Case to Answer) [2009] EWCA Civ 1619, [2009] 2 FLR 82. 
See also Re B (Transfer of Residence to Grandmother) [2012] EWCA Civ 858, [2013] 1 FLR 275; 
Re K (A Child) [2012] EWCA Civ 1306 
13
 Re R (Family Proceedings) (n 12) [12] (Thorpe LJ) 
14
 SS v KS [2009] EWHC 1575 (Fam), S v S (Interim Contact) [2009] 2 FLR 1586 
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to the limit and one inevitable consequence is greater delay.”15 He also intimated 
that fact-finding hearings may be being held where they are not necessary, by the 
courts “playing for safety.”16 In Re C (Domestic Violence: Fact-finding 
Hearing)
17
 Thorpe LJ gave a confused account of the genesis of the Practice 
Direction and its amended version which led him to arrive at the extraordinary 
view that the evil being addressed by the Practice Direction was the increasing 
number of unnecessary fact-finding hearings. As a consequence, he exhorted the 
courts to be more circumspect in holding fact-finding hearings which, he 
suggested, were “wasteful both of judicial resources and of public funding in 
publicly funded cases”.18     
 
The case law discussed above does not, however, suggest that unnecessary fact-
finding hearings are being held, rather, the opposite appears to be the case. 
Furthermore, in a number of instances the Court of Appeal has explicitly 
approved the holding of fact-finding hearings, or has implicitly done so by not 
criticising the decision to hold such hearings.
19
     
 
Only one reported case, A v A (Appeal: Fact-finding),
20
 has been identified where 
the appellate court was critical of the trial judge for holding a fact-finding 
hearing, on the basis that it would serve no purpose because the parties had 
already agreed interim shared residence, despite the trial judge having found all 
the mother’s very serious allegations against the father proved.21     
 
2. Effect of the Guidance on Split Hearings 
The President’s Guidance in Relation to Split Hearings [‘the Guidance on Split 
Hearings’] was issued as a direct consequence of the perception that, following 
the Practice Direction, fact-finding hearings were “taking place when they need 
                                                 
15
 ibid [3] (Hedley J) 
16
 ibid [5] (Hedley J) 
17
 Re C (Domestic Violence: Fact-finding Hearing) [2009] EWCA Civ 994, [2010] 1 FLR 1728 
18
 ibid [18] (Thorpe LJ) 
19
 See Re A (Fact-Finding: Disputed Facts) [2011] EWCA Civ 12, [2011] 1 FLR 1817; Re J 
(Costs of Fact-Finding Hearing) [2009] EWCA Civ 1350, [2010] 1 FLR 1893; Re W (Children) 
[2012] EWCA Civ 528; Re S (A Child) [2012] EWCA Civ 617 
20
 A v A (Appeal: Fact-finding) [2010] EWHC 1282 (Fam) 
21
 Mostyn J demonstrated an extremely hostile attitude towards the mother and overturned all the 
findings made by the trial judge. 
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not do so; and…[were] taking up a disproportionate amount of the court’s time 
and resources.”22 The Guidance on Split Hearings stipulates that the decision to 
direct and/or conduct a separate fact-finding hearing “is a judicial decision. It is 
not a decision for Cafcass or for the parties. It is a decision to be taken by the 
court.”23 The Guidance further provides that: “a fact finding hearing should only 
be ordered if the court takes the view that the case cannot properly be decided 
without such a hearing.”24  Nor should a separate hearing necessarily be directed 
if the fact-finding exercise is considered necessary. “In my judgment it will be a 
rare case in which a separate fact finding hearing is necessary.”25 So the clear 
intention of the Guidance on Split Hearings was to limit the number of separate 
fact-finding hearings held. 
 
Participants in this study were asked whether they had observed any change in 
the numbers of fact-finding hearings following the Guidance on Split Hearings 
being issued in May 2010. A total of 22 useable responses were obtained. 
 
Whether any change in numbers of fact-finding hearings following the 
Guidance on Split Hearings – by region 
 
 London SE SW NE NW Total 
No 
change 
0 3 2 1 1 7 
Not know    1 2 3 
Decrease 3 0 4 2 3 12 
 
 
Whether any change in numbers of fact-finding hearings following the 
Guidance on Split Hearings – by professional groups 
 
 Barristers Solicitors FCAs Total 
No change 3 0 4 7 
Not know  2 1 3 
Decrease 4 4 4 12 
 
 
                                                 
22
 Wall P, The President’s Guidance in Relation to Split Hearings [2010] 2 FLR 1897 [1] 
23
 ibid [5], emphasis in original 
24
 ibid [6] 
25
 ibid [7], emphasis in original 
213 
 
While twelve respondents said that, since the Guidance on Split Hearings was 
issued in May 2010, they had observed a decrease in fact-finding hearings, seven 
respondents
26
  reported no change, and three indicated that they did not know.
27
 
Those who indicated no change were relatively evenly distributed geographically, 
apart from London, where the three participants who responded to this question 
noticed a decrease in the numbers of fact-finding hearings. These London 
respondents were all interviewed more than a year after the GOSH had been 
implemented and therefore may have had the best opportunity to assess its 
longer-term impact. 
 
The twelve respondents who reported a decrease in the incidence of fact-finding 
hearings following the Guidance on Split Hearings were evenly divided amongst 
solicitors, barristers and Cafcass officers.
28
 However, more Cafcass officers than 
other groups reported no change or did not know,
29
 which may be because more 
Cafcass officers than family lawyers thought there was no increase in the 
numbers of fact-finding hearings following the Practice Direction in the first 
place.  
 
Ms C [Solicitor, SE], who was interviewed in May 2010, observed a recent 
change in practice by the courts, which suggests that judges were already trying 
to limit the numbers of fact-finding hearings even before the Guidance on Split 
Hearings was implemented:  
 
“And so I’ve noticed an extreme change from first of all there being 
absolute, complete to the letter compliance with the Practice 
Direction, to now them saying: is it actually necessary? Do we 
actually need to deal with things by way of fact-finding hearings and 
referring off to the FPC, can we not just agree something here?”  
 
                                                 
26
 These respondents include Ms E [Barrister, London] who was interviewed in May 2010 and 
therefore would not yet have experienced the effect of the Guidance on Split Hearings. 
27
 Similar findings were made by Maddy Coy, Katherine Perks, Emma Scott and Ruth Tweedale, 
Picking up the pieces: domestic violence and child contact (Rights of Women 2012) and by 
Hunter and Barnett (n 8); the latter found that respondents were almost evenly divided on 
whether there had been a decrease, or no change, in the incidence of fact-finding hearings 
following the Guidance on Split Hearings. 
28
 N = 4 from each group 
29
 Barristers = 3; solicitors = 2; FCAs = 5 
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Ms L reported that courts are now more ‘robust’ and far less willing to order 
fact-finding hearings as a direct consequence of the Guidance on Split Hearings. 
“I think I can remember having a case where…the judge specifically said:…I’m 
not obliged to list it simply on the basis of this opinion, it is a matter for me to 
consider that, you know, on the guidance.’” [Ms L, Solicitor, SW]  
 
Not only has the numbers of fact-finding hearings reduced following the 
Guidance on Split Hearings; a few respondents such as Ms Q [Solicitor, SW] 
reported that the length of the hearings has also decreased because of the courts 
limiting the number of allegations to be tried: “Or the trial judge takes a view and 
gets you in and says: out of your 482 allegations, I’m interested in six, pick your 
best, and then he says: is that it? I’m not interested. OK then.’” [Ms G, Barrister, 
SE] Mr V gave an example of a case where the fact-finding hearing was listed 
for five days but the barristers “whittled it down” to one day by limiting the 
number of allegations.  
 
Ms P expressed concern about this tendency to limit the number of allegations to 
be tried because this can result in a partial picture of the abuse:  
 
“My experience from today is that the judge was obviously trying to 
restrict the evidence to something that was manageable for the court 
system rather than something that was actually going to get to the 
bottom of the case. You know, um, I mean, when you read judgments 
about people having schedules of facts, you know, 40 odd facts, and 
I’ve got the judge today saying six each, like well, it doesn’t really do 
the job, does it, when there’s more than six.” [Ms P, Barrister, SW]  
 
This problem was expressly recognised by the trial judge in SS v KS.
30
 The 
parties’ representatives attempted to ‘carve up’ the fact-finding hearing, which 
involved numerous allegations of very serious physical and psychological 
violence by the father towards the mother and children, on the basis of limited 
admissions by the father, “but the judge was of the view that a fair picture could 
only be obtained by considering all [the allegations]”.31 This case suggests that 
                                                 
30
 SS v KS (n 14)  
31
 ibid [5] (Hedley J), who concurred with the approach of the trial judge. It should be noted that 
the researcher, in her professional capacity, represented the father in this case. 
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fact-finding hearings may not be held as a result of professionals’ eagerness to 
avoid them even in circumstances when courts would consider them ‘necessary’. 
 
Some family lawyers, particularly barristers, considered that the decrease in the 
numbers of fact-finding hearings held was a positive development. Ms K 
commented that the judges have “sensibly curtailed the number of fact-findings”:  
 
“I think at one time the courts were prepared to list a fact-finding on 
a very limited basis and now you find that the judges are saying: is 
this going to make any difference to the final decision? Does there 
need to be two separate hearings?” [Ms K, Solicitor, NE]32 
 
“In my own practice I’m actually finding less of them…I think there 
was once a statement, somebody raised domestic violence and people 
just assumed that that meant you were on the road to a fact-finding 
whereas now I think there is this early stage analysis when you look 
at it and say: do we need fact-finding? Is that going to be helpful? Is 
that actually going to change the ultimate-.” [Ms T, Barrister, NW]33 
 
Other participants, particularly Cafcass officers, expressed concern about the 
reduction in the incidence of fact-finding hearings, and Ms N [FCA, SW] was 
worried that fact-finding hearings would become even rarer.
34
 
 
3. Are fact-finding hearings held when listed? 
Respondents were asked whether they had encountered cases where fact-finding 
hearings were listed, but on the day of the hearing they did not take place or were 
cut short. All but one of the solicitors and barristers interviewed, but only five 
Cafcass officers
35
 reported that they had experienced this situation, although a 
few participants commented that this was not a frequent occurrence. There were 
no significant regional differences to these responses. Six respondents said that 
they had never encountered this situation, of whom five were Cafcass officers.
36
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 For similar views expressed by judicial officers, see Hunter and Barnett (n 8) 23 
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The most common reason cited for fact-finding hearings not going ahead on the 
day they were listed was that the perpetrator made ‘sufficient’ admissions of 
domestic violence so that, as Ms E [Barrister, London] observed, the matter is 
“carved up.”37 “Well, one party for whatever reason withdraws their allegations, 
or partially withdraws their allegations or where the other party makes 
admissions, quite often usually a combination.” [Ms M, Barrister, SW] Ms L 
[Solicitor, SW] said that the father may make “concessions” in order to avoid a 
“raft of findings” against him. Many respondents said that the outcome in these 
circumstances was frequently an ‘agreed’ schedule of findings, although Ms T 
[Barrister, NW] considered that this is “always a bit of a fudge” and Ms Y [FCA, 
London] described them as “watered down compromises.”  
 
The second most common reason for fact-finding hearings not going ahead was 
lack of resources, namely, insufficient court time, heavy court lists, other cases 
over-running, double listing, or evidence not yet being available.
38
   
 
Four respondents said that fact-findings may not proceed on the day of hearing 
because the parties had agreed contact and/or settled their differences in the 
interim: “They’ve moved on, they’ve become friends, um, and they can deal with 
their problems and they don’t want any more trouble.” [Ms F, Barrister, SE] 
 
“I have had a couple of cases where we’ve lined everything up for a 
fact-finding hearing and by the time we got to the fact-finding 
contact has already sort of started off on a supervised basis, you 
know, grown better and better…And we’ve actually got to the fact-
finding hearing and said: we don’t need this now, you know, because 
we are in a position where contact is moving, it’s progressing 
smoothly, everyone’s happy with it, child’s content, it’s safe, Cafcass 
officers are aware of the issues, but it’s not impacting on contact. So 
we don’t need the fact-finding, you know, so, yeah.” [Ms P, Barrister, 
SW]
39
 
 
Other, less frequent, reasons given why fact-finding hearings may collapse were: 
a party withdrawing their allegations;
40
 lack of evidence;
41
 and counsel advising 
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 N = 13, comprising:  Barristers = 4;  Solicitors = 7;  FCAs = 2 
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 Ms T [Barrister, NW] gave an example of a similar case and outcome 
40
 Reported by Ms M [Barrister, SW] 
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on the day that the allegations will not be proved.
42
 Ms P [Barrister, SW] 
provided an example of a case where a psychologist had assessed the father as a 
serious risk to the mother and child and recommended no direct contact. The 
father accepted this assessment and recommendation and therefore the fact-
finding hearing was unnecessary.  
 
It would seem that the situation revealed by previous research, where a fact-
finding hearing listed by one judge was terminated by another judge on the day 
of the trial, is no longer a common concern. Seven respondents said that they had 
not experienced this happening, one respondent said it may happen but is very 
unusual, and five family lawyers
43
 said they had experienced this situation, 
although at least two of them observed that this is now much less common. 
Where this does happen, the judge may put pressure on the parties to reach 
agreement: 
 
“I think courts, once they list it, are more anxious to have it dealt 
with but it does, the judge changing their mind or whatever, trying to 
persuade the two parties that do we really need one…So where they 
list it for a day fact-finding and both parties turn up on the day and 
the judge just says: ‘is this really necessary?’…and the judge puts 
pressure on both sides…and we’ll agree supervised contact to take 
place.” [Ms A, Solicitor, London, interviewed in 2010].  
 
Mr. J reported wryly that if a fact-finding hearing ended up being listed on a 
Friday afternoon, “you’ve got no chance of that being heard.”  
 
“They’ve always got something better to do. I’m being slightly, 
maybe a bit unfair but you know, the number of times, finding of 
facts on a Friday morning is always a floating case which means no 
one is allocated to it and it doesn’t go ahead or: I’m sure you can sort 
something out, says the judge.” [Mr. J, FCA, NE]44  
 
These examples demonstrate how allegations of domestic violence can 
‘disappear’ during the course of proceedings. However, those participants 
interviewed in 2010 were more likely to have encountered this situation than 
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 Reported by Ms L [Solicitor, SW] 
43
 These five family lawyers were interviewed in 2010. 
44
 Mr J did point out that that scenario is less common now than in the past. 
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those interviewed after the Guidance on Split Hearings was implemented, which 
suggests that the listing of fact-finding hearings was considerably narrowed 
thereafter to those rare cases where they are ‘obviously’ necessary, so that they 
are far less likely to be aborted on the day. 
 
4. What happens to disputed allegations of domestic 
violence if separate fact-finding hearings are not 
held? 
 
As the picture emerged of the decrease in the numbers of separate fact-finding 
hearings, some respondents were probed as to what happens to disputed 
allegations if they are not tried separately, and in particular, whether are they 
litigated at final hearings or simply disappear. Half of the respondents to Hunter 
and Barnett’s survey considered that the allegations would more appropriately be 
determined as part of the substantive hearing.
45
 However, no clear picture 
emerged from the participants to this study.   
 
Ms I [FCA, NE] and Ms E [Barrister, London] thought that there were more 
composite hearings in recent months, and Mr J [FCA, NE] reported one recent 
composite hearing in  a county court in which he had recently started working.  
 
Ms T [Barrister NW] indicated that courts ‘sometimes’ hold composite hearings 
although this was not necessarily a deliberate listing decision, and expressed 
concern about the effect of such hearings:  
 
“Sometimes we have a fact-finding hearing and it ends up effectively 
being [pause] [Interviewer: a final hearing?] Well, not a final hearing, 
but the contested hearing and then you sort of come back for a 
review afterwards and you never recover.” [Ms T, Barrister, NW] 
 
On the other hand, Ms S [Barrister, NW] and Ms Q [Solicitor, SW] considered 
that, if courts decide not to hold separate fact-finding hearings, the disputed 
allegations are effectively ‘weeded out’ and disappear. Ms S thought that this 
was a positive step: 
 
                                                 
45
 Hunter and Barnett (n 8) 
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“I think they’re being weeded out so there isn’t a determination…I 
think in some circumstances they are being dealt with very promptly 
so the court has considered them resolved, or they are weeded 
out…and not dealt with and the court then makes recommendations 
about contact.” [Ms S, Barrister, NW]46   
 
Mr R [Solicitor, NE] and Ms P [Barrister, SW] reported that courts employ a mix 
of strategies if discrete fact-finding hearings are not held, with composite 
hearings being held where the allegations are considered ‘serious enough’, or the 
allegations are ‘weeded out’ and ignored:  “It’s a mixture of both, I have to say. 
Yeah, and sometimes that’s down to the judge…I think there’s pressure on the 
courts, there’s pressures of time-scales, to try to have it all concertina-ed into 
one.” [Mr R, Solicitor, NE] 
 
Ms P observed that, while in the past six months she had noticed fewer split 
hearings and more composite ones, this was still fairly uncommon and in some 
cases domestic violence tends to “fizzle out” as contact gains momentum:  
 
“It’s all being dealt with in one final hearing and I don’t think it’s 
because the court’s saying: ‘we’re not having any trial on the 
issues’…I think people really have taken on board what the, what 
effect will it have on contact and looked at it more of a welfare and 
capacity to parent issue than a, you know, a fact-finding per se. So 
the issues will still be litigated but not in every case because, you 
know, you do have cases where you get to, contact has momentum 
and they find a happy medium and, you know, things settle down, 
partners then move on and get new partners and so the heat goes out 
of it. And it’s a bit easier for everybody.” [Ms P, Barrister, SW]  
 
Ms P thought that where the fact-finding exercise is listed to take place at the 
final hearing, “it all feels a bit artificial” if contact has progressed in the interim, 
particularly if the allegations are “historic” and the parties have “moved on” or 
become “litigation weary.”  
 
Ms P was the only respondent to identify an important positive aspect of 
composite hearings – that they enable allegations of domestic violence to be 
contextualised within, and seen as part of, the ‘welfare’ issues of parenting. This 
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was one of the reasons why some judges and barristers who responded to Hunter 
and Barnett’s survey expressed a preference for dealing with allegations of 
domestic violence in one composite hearing: “Fewer fact-findings and earlier 
final hearings. The allegations are almost always part of a more complex 
situation and to deal with them in isolation is not realistic and not in children’s 
interests.” (DJ 568)47 
 
Another way in which disputed allegations may be dealt with if fact-finding 
hearings are not held is by courts expecting Cafcass officers to ‘investigate’ the 
allegations in their Section 7 reports:  
 
“It’s just very difficult to answer the question because there’s hardly 
ever a fact-finding hearing agreed. I think judges are more inclined to 
recommend a Section 7, and my kind of conspiracy theory on that is 
that it then saves them the time…effectively we’re becoming like 
investigators, and that’s not our job, to have to determine the 
likelihood or not of domestic violence really, it shouldn’t be our job.” 
[Ms H, FCA, SE]  
 
Mr J [FCA, NE] was adamantly opposed to composite hearings. [Interviewer: 
how does it work?] “Well, it doesn’t.” He pointed out that if courts rely on 
Cafcass reports to circumvent fact-finding hearings this can simply waste further 
time because he will inevitably end up saying in his report:  
 
“Very serious allegations have been raised in this matter, although 
the court was minded to say they were not relevant, no findings were 
ordered and I’m unable to offer a way forward whilst these issues 
have not been resolved. You’ve just wasted three months.” [Mr J, 
FCA, NE]  
 
Mr J gave an example of a recent case where he was asked to report on 
alternative bases:  
 
“Where the judge…said: what I want you to do Mr J is to consider 
what will be the impact if I do this, what will be the impact if I do 
that, what will be the impact if I do this, blah blah blah. How can you 
write a welfare checklist advising on what you don’t know?…it’s just 
not right to put a full hearing down the same time as a finding, to 
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build findings in. There needs to be a findings [sic] and then you 
have the full hearing.”48 
 
There is no indication from the case law that courts are holding ‘composite’ 
hearings. Rather, it appears from the reported cases that the approach of the 
lower courts is to ignore allegations of domestic violence altogether if they 
consider that they are not serious enough to warrant a separate fact-finding 
hearing. The only reported case in which it appears that a ‘composite’ hearing 
was held (although this is not stated in the judgment of Sir Mark Potter) is Re S 
(A Child)
49
 in which findings of abusive and coercively controlling behaviour 
were made against the father at a final hearing. 
 
5. How do fact-finding hearings get listed? 
The responses discussed above provide a clear picture of courts actively 
restricting the numbers of fact-finding hearings listed and held. It was therefore 
considered important to explore the extent to which fact-finding hearings are 
requested by professionals, and how courts decide whether or not to list them. 
 
Most of the family lawyers interviewed
50
 expressed the view that courts list such 
hearings on their own motion or make the ultimate decision on whether a fact-
finding hearing should be listed if a request is made by a party or the Cafcass 
officer. Seven family lawyers explained that the current practice is for courts to 
direct statements, Scott schedules
51
 and sometimes police disclosure and other 
‘independent’ evidence to be filed, and then list the matter for a directions 
hearing at which the court will decide whether a fact-finding hearing is 
‘necessary’. This focus on itemised schedules and  ‘concrete evidence’ means 
that, from the outset of the proceedings, women are compelled to construct and 
articulate the abuse they have sustained within the discursive framework of the 
legalistic, incident-based approach to domestic violence, which means that other, 
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 Similar views were expressed by Mr V [FCA, NW], who gave an example of a case where he 
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 Scott schedules are tables setting out the dates and brief descriptions of the allegations that the 
victim seeks to prove. The alleged perpetrator files a schedule in response and a composite 
schedule is then prepared for the trial. 
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subtle forms of abuse and coercive, controlling behaviours become increasingly 
invisible. 
 
Although it appears that courts are far more proactive in taking the ultimate 
decision on whether a fact-finding hearing should be listed, it was made clear 
that the issue often has to be raised in the first place by the parties or by the 
Cafcass officer. The willingness of family lawyers to request such hearings is 
therefore extremely important.  
 
6. Do family lawyers request fact-finding hearings? 
The majority of family lawyers
52
 said that if their client opposed contact on the 
basis of domestic violence, which the other parent disputed, they would request a 
fact-finding hearing. Ms T indicated that she was particularly proactive in this 
respect: “There are a whole lot of cases where I’ve been to where it hasn’t been 
listed and then I’ve gone along and said: well, I’m instructed, and I’ve had to sort 
of then raise it and say: let’s list this.” [Ms T, Barrister, NW] 
 
Whether family lawyers do request fact-finding hearings to this extent is another 
matter. While Ms E [Barrister, London] said that she would certainly request a 
fact-finding hearing if her client relied on the allegations, she conceded that she 
had never, in fact, actually asked for one. Additionally, at another stage in the 
interview she indicated that she would ‘raise it’ but not ‘insist on it’ and would 
ultimately leave it to the court. Ms H [FCA, SE] commented that in her 
experience family lawyers rarely request fact-finding hearings. As discussed 
below, it is likely that the self-reported willingness of family lawyers to request 
fact-finding hearings on behalf of the victim/mother may only apply to those 
cases where they think that the allegations are ‘relevant’ to contact; there may 
also be an element of response-bias in their self-reports. 
 
Both solicitors from the North East and Ms E [Barrister, London] indicated that 
they would be reluctant to request fact-finding hearings on behalf of the victim if 
there was a lack of ‘evidence’ as the allegations would be difficult to prove and 
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would have a potentially negative impact on the mother’s case if findings were 
not made. “It would depend on the level of domestic violence and I suppose also 
on how likely, how that person would be able to prove because it’s so difficult 
for people, isn’t it?” [Ms K, Solicitor, NE]53  
 
Whether or not most family lawyers do, in fact, request fact-finding hearings 
when representing the alleged victim/mother, their responses suggest that they 
think they should do so. This contrasts with their marked reluctance to request or 
agree to fact-finding hearings if representing the father/perpetrator. Ms E 
[Barrister, London] said that she would never, or only very rarely, request a fact-
finding hearing if representing the father, and if there was copious evidence 
against him she would actively try to avoid one:  
 
“I don’t think I’ve ever pushed for a fact-finding without knowing 
what disclosure’s going to come because knowing my luck, it’ll 
come with ten CRIS reports of damning evidence, witnessed by a 
neighbour, and the children, and a police officer, and, um, almost 
negligent I think, so I would never really push for it, no.” [Ms E, 
Barrister, London]  
 
When representing the alleged perpetrator, the majority of family lawyers 
indicated that they would assess his credibility and the strength of the evidence 
against him in deciding whether to request, or agree to a fact-finding hearing. 
They would also be influenced by whether the allegations, if proved, were likely 
to affect his contact. 
 
“It would depend what the allegations were and the extent to which 
they were going to impact on contact. If there was a situation where 
they were working towards supervised contact anyway and there was 
a fairly reasonable timetable it might not be necessary to have a fact-
finding hearing and also not necessarily in their best interests…You 
have to assess what the evidence is.” [Ms M, Barrister, SW] 
 
Indeed, Ms E gave an example of a case where she represented the father and 
was “relieved” that the judge decided not to hold a fact-finding hearing on the 
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mother’s allegations “because I think they would have been proved.” [Ms E, 
Barrister, London] 
 
Conversely, family lawyers might agree to a fact-finding hearing when 
representing the father if they thought that he could successfully defend them.  
 
“I mean, I have had the odd occasion where I’ve thought: these 
allegations aren’t going anywhere, um, they’re spurious, and 
undermined, and my client would make a good witness, let’s knock 
these on the head now and be done with it.” [Ms E, Barrister, 
London]
54
  
 
Ms M said that if the allegations are very serious, she would agree to a fact-
finding hearing, “because otherwise they are constantly raised against them, um, 
without it being proven and then the courts are always cautious and say: 
obviously there’s a potential risk if you haven’t given the other side opportunity 
to disprove it.” [Ms M, Barrister, SW] 
 
Three family lawyers observed that fathers are often keen for a fact-finding 
hearing to be held in order to ‘clear their name’, particularly if they have been 
acquitted of assault in the criminal courts. Ms E said that she usually tries to talk 
them out of it in those circumstances:  
 
“I mean, I have had the odd client who’s said: well, I’m not scared of 
a fact-finding, I’ll prove my name, I’ve got nothing to fear, that sort 
of thing. And I’m normally try [sic] to talk them down and said, you 
know: okay, that’s very bravado and all that but this is balance of 
probabilities.” [Ms E, Barrister, London] 
 
So we can see an implicit perception by these family lawyers that fathers against 
whom allegations of domestic violence are made are usually ‘guilty’ of them and 
fact-finding hearings are therefore best avoided if they are representing the father. 
The expressed willingness to request fact-finding hearings when representing the 
victim suggests that most family lawyers do not hold the same reservations about 
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mothers, although a minority are understandably concerned about the 
consequences for victims if the allegations are not proven. 
 
7. Willingness of judicial officers to list fact-finding 
hearings 
 
Research by Coy et al revealed a reluctance by courts to hold fact-finding 
hearings. Only one respondent reported that judges “always” investigate 
allegations of domestic violence at the earliest opportunity, a third suggested that 
this happens “mostly”, half that it happens “sometimes” and twelve per cent that 
it happens “rarely”.55 Similarly Hunter and Barnett found that fact-finding 
hearings are still the exception rather than the rule.
56
 Most respondents to their 
survey reported that fact-finding hearings are held in 0 to 25 per cent of cases in 
which domestic violence is raised as an issue, with the largest group
57
 saying that 
such hearings are held in less than ten per cent of cases.  
 
It was therefore surprising to find that just over half of the respondents 
interviewed for this project,
58
 comprising equal numbers of barristers, solicitors 
and Cafcass officers from all regions, indicated that judicial officers are usually 
willing to hold fact-finding hearings if asked to do so. However eleven 
respondents indicated that this “depends” and “varies”, is not “always” or 
“automatically” the case, and that there are wide differences amongst judicial 
officers in respect of their willingness to hold fact-finding hearings.
59
 Ms S 
[Barrister, NW] had observed completely different approaches even by judges in 
the same county court. 
  
Ms P said that courts are willing to hold such hearings as long as one can justify 
the request,
60
 and that circuit judges are far more willing to do so than district 
judges, probably because they have more freedom to manage their own lists:   
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“I’ve had a judge do a fact-finding there and then, you know, say: 
well, the rest of today has gone and my case for tomorrow, so I’ll 
have you now, are you ready, alright, come on then…I think also 
because they can see that sometimes, you know, we kind of fanny 
around a lot, don’t we, around the issues and actually judges think: 
do you know what? I’ll just hear the evidence, yeah, just get it out in 
the open, I’ll make a fact-finding and then everybody’s gonna have to 
deal with it.” [Ms P, Barrister, SW] 
 
Only six respondents said that courts were not usually willing to hold fact-
finding hearings.
61
 Mr J [FCA, NE] said that in one of the county courts in which 
he had recently started practising it was almost impossible to persuade judges to 
list fact-finding hearings, and Ms H commented that most judges are reluctant to 
hold such hearings, particularly since the implementation of the Revised Private 
Law Programme: “I can’t remember when a fact-finding hearing was listed 
recently…I’ve seen situations where parents are just sort of shouted at and told to 
get out and sort something out…there’s hardly ever a fact-finding hearing 
agreed.” [Ms H, FCA, SE] Similarly, Ms N [FCA, SW] commented that fact-
finding hearings “are like gold dust these days.”  
 
In order to increase the reliability of the responses, family lawyers were asked 
whether they had ever been refused a fact-finding hearing when a request had 
been made. Of those participants who responded to this question,
62
 five said that 
they had, five said that they had not, and two barristers said “occasionally”. 
There was no geographical pattern to this response, but slightly more barristers 
than solicitors indicated that they had not or had only occasionally been refused a 
request for a fact-finding hearing. These responses therefore support the general 
views expressed by professionals about the willingness of courts to hold fact-
finding hearings. The wide variation in judicial practice was confirmed by the 
responses of Ms F and Ms G [Barristers, SE]who practise in the same courts. Ms 
F said she had only occasionally been refused a fact-finding hearing, while Ms G 
said that this happened “all the time”.   
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There are a number of possible reasons for the apparently greater willingness of 
family lawyers to request fact-finding hearings, and of courts to hold them, 
revealed by the findings of this study than was found by Coy et al and Hunter 
and Barnett. The slightly higher proportion of barristers compared with other 
professional groups to report that their requests for fact-finding hearings are 
rarely refused may be because barristers are more persuasive in their requests 
and/or tend to act in more ‘serious’ cases than solicitors. However, it is suggested 
that the primary reason for these findings lies in the narrow construction of 
‘relevant’ domestic violence by judges and barristers. This means that barristers 
are only likely to request fact-finding hearings in the most ‘serious’ cases of 
recent physical violence, and it is not surprising, therefore, that courts would 
agree to hold such hearings in those circumstances. 
 
Indeed, Ms S indicated that refusals to hold fact-finding hearings are quite 
common where the requests are made on the spurious instructions of the client 
who ‘misguidedly’ thinks that the abuse she has sustained is relevant to contact:  
 
“I mean, for a court to refuse to list it, it would, in my experience, 
most likely be because it’s an unfounded request to list a finding of 
fact, and somebody may be acting on their client’s instructions, um, 
because the client feels it’s appropriate and it’s relevant and it’s 
necessary or whatever…But the court wouldn’t necessarily conclude 
that there needed to be a finding of fact.” [Ms S, Barrister, NW]  
 
So it is ‘unjustified’ requests for fact-finding hearings that are refused by courts, 
which lends support to the suggestion that family lawyers only request such 
hearings, and courts are only willing to list them, in those rare ‘justified’ cases 
where domestic violence is considered ‘relevant’ to contact. 
 
This was further borne out by professionals’ views on the extent to which fact-
finding hearings are listed at the request of the Cafcass officer. Respondents were 
asked whether courts usually accede to requests by Cafcass officers to hold fact-
finding hearings. This question produced the starkest divergence in views 
between family lawyers and Cafcass officers. Seven family lawyers but only 
three Cafcass officers indicated that courts would usually, although not always, 
and not automatically, follow a recommendation by an FCA for a fact-finding 
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hearing. Ms P [Barrister, SW] could not think of a case where the court had 
refused such a recommendation. 
 
The remaining seven Cafcass officers said that courts would not, or “not always” 
accede to such a recommendation, or would only do so after a great deal of 
persuasion. “I would say probably 80 per cent of the time, if you insist on a 
finding of fact hearing, then they will do it, but you do have to fight your 
corner.” [Mr V, FCA, NW]   
 
The majority of Cafcass officers
63
 and a minority of family lawyers
64
 indicated 
that courts are no longer as willing to accede to requests by Cafcass for fact-
finding hearings as they may have been in the past. Ms K thought that courts and 
parties are deliberately trying to bypass Cafcass requests for such hearings 
altogether:  
 
“I think everyone is aware of the guidance and shouldn’t be, in fact a 
hearing shouldn’t be listed because Cafcass say they can’t report 
without it or if one of the parties decide that they want it. So I think 
the judges are quite keen to get in before there is a Cafcass report and 
make that decision and then record that on the file so Cafcass is 
aware that the judge does not think a fact-finding hearing is 
necessary.” [Ms K, Solicitor, NE]  
 
Four Cafcass officers were emphatic in their views that courts do not generally 
accede to their requests for fact-finding hearings. Ms H [FCA, SE] said that she 
regularly recommends fact-finding hearings in her Schedule 2 letters, but since 
they are so rare, those recommendations are obviously not being followed. 
Similarly Ms N [FCA, SW] expressed grave concern about the fact that the 
courts no longer follow her recommendations for fact-finding hearings. Ms N 
and Ms Y thought that this situation was getting worse and that there was a 
‘backlash’ to the Practice Direction. These views give a strong indication of the 
antipathy of courts to fact-finding hearings, because Ms H and Ms N were clear 
that in other respects, the courts invariably follow their recommendations.  
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It was very worrying to hear from Mr J that in one county court in which he 
works FCAs are extremely reluctant even to recommend fact-finding hearings 
because the judges usually refuse them and castigate the FCA:  
 
“The difficulty, the dilemma is, in XXX, practitioners become 
deterred from making recommendations if they are going to get 
trashed. They shouldn’t do. They should still make the 
recommendation. The court has got to be told, told it like it is even if 
the court isn’t going to do it. But there is a certain wary reluctance.” 
[Mr J, FCA, NE] 
 
Some of the respondents who indicated that courts would usually follow Cafcass 
recommendations for fact-finding hearings or that it ‘depended’, saw this in 
negative terms as they did not think such recommendations were ‘helpful’, 
leading to “more delay anyway, because it’s taken them 16 weeks or more to say 
that, so it’s rather infuriating in that sense.” [Ms A, Solicitor, London, 
interviewed in 2010] 
 
Similarly Hunter and Barnett found that some judges and family lawyers 
considered that Cafcass officers insisted unnecessarily on fact-finding hearings, 
and even imputed selfish motives to Cafcass, suggesting that they request fact-
finding hearings to avoid preparing reports or making recommendations and are 
therefore ‘passing the buck’.65 It is notable, however, that survey respondents did 
not report most fact-finding hearings being initiated at the instigation of Cafcass 
officers, but by the alleged victim. 
 
8. Reasons why fact-finding hearings may not be held 
The terms of the Practice Direction and the Guidance on Split Hearings together 
provide the rationale for decisions by courts not to hold preliminary fact-finding 
hearings. The Practice Direction provides that it should be ‘necessary’ to hold a 
fact-finding hearing if the nature and effect of the disputed allegations of 
domestic violence mean that they would be ‘relevant’ to contact, and would be 
likely to affect the court’s decision on contact.66  The Guidance on Split Hearings 
encourages courts to construe these provisions as narrowly as possible by stating 
                                                 
65
 Hunter and Barnett (n 8) 
66
 The Practice Direction (n 1) [3], [11] & [13] 
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that “a fact finding hearing should only be ordered if the court takes the view that 
the case cannot properly be decided without such a hearing”67 and that “it will be 
a rare case in which a separate fact finding hearing is necessary.”68  
 
The narrow circumstances in which fact-finding hearings are considered 
appropriate also lie in their origins in care proceedings in relation to the local 
authority’s obligation to prove that the ‘threshold criteria’ are met.69 Courts were 
encouraged to consider “whether or not there were questions of fact within a case 
which needed to be determined at an early stage.”70 Bracewell J in Re S (Care 
Proceedings: Split Hearing) [1996] explained that cases suitable for such ‘split 
hearings’ “would be likely to be cases in which there is a clear and stark issue, 
such as sexual abuse or physical abuse.”71 From its inception, therefore, the 
practice of the ‘split hearing’ has been based on the notion that such hearings are 
appropriate to determine specific allegations of physical or sexual abuse. This 
approach was expressly approved by Wall P (as he then was) in the Guidance on 
Split Hearings, so that the focus of fact-finding hearings on physical violence 
rather than on the many other forms that domestic abuse may take is further 
entrenched in legal discourse.
72
 
 
The advantages of holding separate fact-finding hearings were explained by 
Bracewell J in Re S (Care Proceedings: Split Hearing): resolution of the facts 
“would enable the substantive hearing to proceed more speedily” and the court to 
“focus on the child’s welfare with greater clarity.”73 However, as discussed 
above, courts, professionals and policy-makers formed the view that such 
hearings were in fact having the opposite effect. The Guidance on Split Hearings 
was explicitly issued to curtail the number of preliminary fact-finding hearings 
                                                 
67
 The Guidance on Split Hearings (n 22) [6] 
68
 ibid [7], emphasis in original 
69
 Section 31(2) of the Children Act 1989 provides that unless the court is satisfied that the 
subject child is suffering, or is likely to suffer significant harm attributable to the care given to 
the child by the parent, it cannot go on to consider whether the child’s welfare requires a care or 
supervision order to be made. 
70
 The Guidance on Split Hearings (n 22) [11] 
71
 Re S (Care Proceedings: Split Hearing) [1996] 2 FLR 773, 775 
72
 The Guidance on Split Hearings (n 22) [11] 
73
 Re S (Care Proceedings: Split Hearing) (n 71)773 (Bracewell J)  
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because of perceived concerns about the delay these have caused, exacerbated by 
lack of court time and resources.  
 
These concerns were suggested by seven respondents as reasons why courts may 
decline to hold fact-finding hearings.
74
 Indeed, Mr R intimated that courts may 
refuse to hold fact-finding hearings on the ostensible basis that they are not 
necessary, even where they are, because in reality they are trying to reduce 
delays:  
 
“I think the courts currently need to be persuaded far more to hold a 
fact-finding. Now, you can be cynical and say that’s because, 
particularly here in the North-East, the lists are absolutely 
chockablock, um, you can be cynical and say that, or you can say 
perhaps that the judges are being more adept at picking up the more, 
the difficult cases. It really depends on your perspective. You could 
say in a lot of cases you could substantiate enough to hold a separate 
fact-find.” [Mr R, Solicitor, NE] 
 
The vast majority of participants confirmed that judges would not consider it 
‘necessary’ to hold a fact-finding hearing if they thought that the allegations were 
not ‘relevant’ to contact so that, even if proved, they would not affect the 
outcome. 
 
“Initially I think the judges were quite keen on asking the parties if 
they thought there needed to be a fact-finding here and it’s been a 
more gradual change where the judges have gone back to think: well, 
it’s up to us to look at, you know, is it possible to make a decision on 
the basis of what’s in front of me and if so, is it going to impact on 
the contact and how is it going to impact on the contact?” [Ms K, 
Solicitor, NE] 
 
The most common reason why courts may consider that domestic violence is not 
‘relevant’ to contact and therefore decline to hold fact-finding hearings is if they 
do not consider the allegations to be sufficiently ‘serious’. Sixteen of the twenty 
respondents who had indicated that courts would consider serious physical 
violence to be ‘relevant’ to contact expressed their views by reference to the 
decision on whether or not a fact-finding hearing should be held, indicating that 
                                                 
74
 N = 7, evenly spread among professionals and regions 
232 
 
‘minor’ or non-physical abuse would not justify a hearing as it would not affect 
the court’s orders, and only very serious allegations of domestic violence would 
be likely to lead to a fact-finding hearing.  
 
“I think if there’s any aspect of physical violence, um, if there’s been 
injunctions, if there’s been police call-outs or involvements, or social 
services involvement. I think that’s more likely to tip the balance.” 
[Mr R, Solicitor, NE] 
 
“In cases of serious and sustained physical violence, a fact-finding 
hearing is normally ordered – to allow any experts to consider risk 
appropriately. But in less serious cases, it is less likely to be 
ordered.” [Ms E, Barrister, London]  
 
Ms T confirmed that her local county court judges would not direct fact-finding 
hearings to determine “fairly minor” allegations such as “pushes or shouting” 
which do not result in injuries:  
 
“I mean like the one I was referring to earlier about where there had 
been allegations of domestic abuse and the other side are saying, you 
know, this is terribly serious and we can’t do anything about contact 
in the absence of determination and I’ve said: look, this is, I don’t 
want to use the word, ‘ridiculous’ because that minimises it, it’s not 
ridiculous, but, you know, in the context, in the wider context of 
serious allegations at one end and less serious, these are less serious, 
let’s get on with something even if it’s a contact centre. And, you 
know, that was a case in which the judge agreed, you know, there’s 
no need.” [Ms T, Barrister, NW] 
 
Similarly, some of the 18 respondents who indicated that courts would not 
consider ‘old’ or ‘historical’ allegations of domestic violence to be ‘relevant’ to 
contact explained this by reference to decisions to hold fact-finding hearings. If 
the mother had allowed the child to have contact with the father for some time 
after the violence occurred, her allegations would be considered particularly 
‘irrelevant’. “Unless, you know, there are very serious allegations”, judges 
would prefer to get contact established “rather than dwelling on what’s 
happened in the past.” [Ms L, Solicitor, SW] 
 
“There was a situation where I think the parents had been split up for 
quite a long time, there were allegations of domestic violence, it was 
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disputed, but there had been a pattern of contact for quite some time 
afterwards…so where there were historic allegations the court had 
said: sorry, this is not going on now…there was no need to have a 
fact-finding hearing on it because there had been such a pattern of 
staying contact in the interim…the real question was of how it could 
restart again.” [Ms M, Barrister, SW] 
 
Similarly Hunter and Barnett found that the most commonly cited reasons as to 
why a fact-finding hearing might not be held are that the allegations are not 
considered ‘relevant’ to the court’s decision about residence and/or contact,75 
and/or that the allegations are ‘old’,76 and some respondents felt that fact-finding 
hearings should only be held where the allegations are of very ‘serious’ or ‘real’ 
recent violence.
77
 For these respondents, allegations of domestic violence are a 
diversion from the ‘real’ business of promoting contact. 
 
A few respondents in this project thought that courts may decide to hold fact-
finding hearings if the child had, or was likely to have been, severely affected by 
the violence. Ms T [Barrister, NW], for example, said that even if there is a ‘low 
level of violence’, if the child saw the abuse and was so affected by it that they 
did not want to see the father, a judge may decide that a fact-finding hearing is 
necessary. 
 
Three barristers and a solicitor considered that where the father already had 
convictions or cautions for domestic violence towards the mother and/or made 
admissions, it was unlikely that the court would consider a fact-finding hearing 
necessary. Ms E provided an example of a case in which the mother, who was in 
person, had made twenty allegations against the father, who made “partial” 
admissions not only of domestic violence but of “other slightly odd behaviour”, 
although he denied trying to strangle the mother:  
 
“The point being we then went into court before a recorder in xxx 
[county court] who said: ‘look,…I don’t think the court needs to 
make findings on the rest, I think there’s enough damaging 
information here to cause the court concern.” [Ms E, Barrister, 
London]  
                                                 
75
 67 per cent 
76
 61 per cent 
77
 Hunter and Barnett (n 8) 27. See also Coy et al (n 27) for similar findings 
234 
 
 
The issue of evidence also played a part in respondents’ views on why courts 
may decline to hold fact-finding hearings.
78
  On the one hand, three barristers 
and a Cafcass officer considered that if there was no ‘independent’ evidence of 
domestic violence so that the court was faced with “one person’s word against 
the other”, then the court would be less inclined to hold a fact-finding hearing.   
 
“I think because the courts are so busy as well, they don’t want to 
block out two or three days in the court diary, when actually when 
you get back there’s no independent supporting evidence, you’ve got 
one person’s word against the other…the court can then case manage 
appropriately and say: even if I find at its highest, it’s not going to 
change my view about the way this should progress in terms of 
contact. That’s the usual approach, isn’t it?” [Ms G, Barrister, SE] 
 
Conversely, three respondents
79
 thought that if there was enough ‘external’ 
evidence, such as police reports, the court would not consider a fact-finding 
hearing to be necessary.   
 
Ms C attributed the drive to promote contact as underlying the courts’ reluctance 
to hold fact-finding hearings:  
 
“I think that’s something that does happen here in xxx actually, I 
think there’s such a reluctance to actually bottom the issues from day 
one and say instead: look, let’s just set up some supervised contact, 
get Cafcass involved and see if we can move matters on. There’s a 
real kind of push for, yeah, rather than dwelling on what’s happened 
in the past let’s, unless, you know, there are very serious allegations 
and I think, I think actually in my experience that that’s the sort of 
kind of pressure you feel.” [Ms C, Solicitor, SE]  
 
9. Are fact-finding hearings held where appropriate? 
The majority of family lawyers across all regions considered that fact-finding 
hearings are held where appropriate.
80
  Only three Cafcass officers indicated, in 
response to other questions, that they shared this view. However, as discussed 
                                                 
78
 Participants’ understanding of the nature and effect of ‘evidence’ is discussed further below. 
79
 A barrister, a solicitor and an FCA 
80
 N = 13, comprising:  Barristers = 5;  Solicitors = 8. The figures by region are: London, South 
West and North East = 3;  South East = 1;  North West = 6 
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below, many Cafcass officers gave examples of cases where they thought fact-
finding hearings should have been held, which suggests that most Cafcass 
officers, but not family lawyers or courts, are concerned about the over-limitation 
on such hearings.  
 
Are fact-finding hearings held where appropriate – by professional groups 
 Held where 
appropriate 
Held too 
often 
Not held often 
enough 
Total 
Barristers
81
 5 5 0 10 
Solicitors 8 1
82
 2 11 
FCAs
83
 3 0 1 4 
Total 16 6 3 25 
 
The 16 respondents who said that fact-finding hearings are held where 
appropriate generally considered that ‘the balance is right’ and a number of them 
commented that they could not think of any that were ‘unnecessary’.  These 
views suggest that most family lawyers approve of the very restrictive 
circumstances in which fact-finding hearings are held. 
 
However, five barristers and one solicitor (who was interviewed in 2010) still 
thought that fact-finding hearings are held too often. Ms F and Ms G [Barristers, 
South East] were of the view that many fact-finding hearings are “a total waste of 
time” and “useless”, and Ms D [Solicitor, SE] thought that fact-finding hearings 
were “definitely” held where they are not necessary, for example, where the 
allegations are “minor” or “historical”. Similarly, Ms E considered that there 
were too many unnecessary fact-finding hearings, particularly in the FPCs. “I 
feel that I end up doing many fact-findings which perhaps could have been 
avoided in the FPCs if a robust tribunal had seized itself of the matter.” [Ms E, 
Barrister, London]  
 
                                                 
81
 Two barristers gave ambivalent responses, indicating that generally fact-finding hearings are 
held where appropriate but they gave examples of cases where they thought fact-finding hearings 
were held where not necessary. 
82
 Ms D [Solicitor, SE] who was interviewed in 2010 before the Guidance was fully effective 
83
 A minority of Cafcass officers expressed a view on this issue 
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Ms E provided an example of an ‘unnecessary’ fact-finding hearing in a London 
court involving “mid-level” violence including “punching, kicking, pushing her 
over, smashing the flat, that sort of thing, nothing where she really needed much 
help from the hospital other than painkillers. No stabbings, or anything nasty, 
again I hate to minimise.” [Ms E, Barrister, London] Ms E described the trial as 
“going through the motions” because the mother was not opposed to contact in 
principle:  
 
“So we went through the motions of this two-day fact-find, 
everything was proved because, you know, we had medical evidence, 
police evidence, we had, you know, everything, and so…everything 
was proved bar one or two things, about 18 things…But then the 
order the Justices made was to the contact centre anyway. It crossed 
my mind that if that’s what mum was agreeable to at the first 
appointment, why we really needed that.” [Ms E, Barrister, London]  
 
However, Ms E then later recognised that there was, after all, a purpose to the 
fact-finding hearing, namely, that the father would not be “satisfied with that 
arrangement forever” and the court was therefore “thinking long-term” about the 
need to assess the risk. “I can understand, I suppose, why the court wanted to 
knock that on the head and just have those reasons in a document and the 
findings and, um, draw upon them in six or nine months’ time.” [Ms E, Barrister, 
London] 
 
Only three respondents - both solicitors practising in the South West and a 
Cafcass officer - thought that fact-finding hearings are not held often enough.  
 
Thirteen respondents, including eight Cafcass officers, were probed on whether 
they had encountered any cases where a fact-finding hearing was not held where 
they considered that it should have been. Seven Cafcass officers,
84
 two barristers 
and two solicitors
85
 reported that they had encountered such cases, while only 
one solicitor and one Cafcass officer said they had not.  
 
                                                 
84
 Mr J [FCA, NE] said he had encountered this situation in the past but not recently 
85
 By region, these eleven respondents comprised:  South West = 4;  North West = 3;  North East 
= 1 [Mr J];  South East = 1;  London = 2 
237 
 
Ms M spoke about a fact-finding hearing that was compromised but the 
allegations kept resurfacing a year later:  
 
“Yeah, I had a case where the case had been for some time and they 
had had different lawyers representing them at a fact-finding hearing 
and they’d both come away with a very wishy-washy statement and 
the allegations were still being raised as an issue a year later and they 
should actually have gone through with a fact-finding hearing…and 
you just think if they’d held it earlier. For both parents, yeah, 
irrespective of what the findings are going to be it’s better to have it 
and then deal with it.” [Ms M, Barrister, SW] 
 
Ms L provided two examples of such cases. In one, the judge declined to hold a 
fact-finding hearing and the mother still kept raising the allegations up to the 
time of the interview:  
 
“But another six months on, because the court has never bottomed 
these allegations and really kind of, you know, thrashed them out 
once and for all she still, you know, she’s still anxious and she’s still 
raising them and still, to how they’re still relevant and actually, I 
think, you know, for both parents it would have been really helpful 
for there to have been that fact-finding.” [Ms L, Solicitor, SW]  
 
In the other, the father subsequently disputed the concessions he had earlier 
agreed:  
 
“We could never get past that. So actually what should have 
happened in that case is that the parties have their day in court, let the 
judge make the findings and then you’ve got something to work with 
the client and move on from, move on with it.” [Ms L, Solicitor, SW] 
 
Ms T indicated that there were numerous cases in which she had been instructed 
late in the day, in which she considered that fact-finding hearings should have 
been held:  
 
“I mean I’ve had cases in which I’ve, you know, I’ve met mum for 
the first time and had instructions and I’ve said, you know: we really 
need to determine all of this, and I know nobody else has thought at 
any stage in the past six months that all this was relevant but, you 
know, that’s my view.” [Ms T, Barrister, NW]  
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Ms X provided an example of a case where “it would have made everything 
much easier because mum still claims that dad was violent towards her, you 
know…at the school and everything, she tells the teachers that he was violent 
towards her, because it’s never been disproved.” [Ms X, FCA, London]86 
 
10. Participants’ views on fact-finding hearings 
Respondents’ views on fact-finding hearings revealed a wide divergence between 
the perceptions of barristers on the one hand and Cafcass officers and solicitors 
on the other. The majority of respondents,
87
  including all ten of the Cafcass 
officers interviewed, as well as eight solicitors but only two barristers, 
considered that fact-finding hearings were generally “helpful” or “useful”, 
although a further four barristers and two solicitors held mixed views.  
 
Several respondents felt that fact-finding hearings were helpful to “narrow the 
issues” or “resolve” matters by providing a factual basis for assessing risk and 
determining outcomes.
88
 “But it’s, you know, you kind of think: well, what’s the 
value of a risk assessment when you don’t have a factual basis with something as 
serious as that?”  [Ms T, Barrister, NW] 
 
A number of respondents felt that if allegations remain unresolved, they can 
linger and impede ‘progress’, or resurface months and even years later. “I think 
pretty much, we sort of take the view that we don’t want it hanging around like a 
bad smell, so it’s better to get it out in the open.” [Ms P, Barrister, SW]89 
 
“I think people are more aware of the situation you can get into 
where if there hasn’t been a fact-finding hearing, you can end up 
years down the line arguing over something that really should have 
been ruled in or out from the start, I think people are very aware of 
that.” [Ms O, FCA, SW] 
 
                                                 
86
 Ms O [FCA, SW] said that colleagues of hers had worked on cases where courts refused to 
hold fact-finding hearings where the FCAs thought they should have done. 
87
 N = 20 
88
 N = 7 
89
 Similar findings were made by Hunter and Barnett (n 8) 30. Respondents reported the benefits 
of fact-finding hearings as including: providing a factual basis on which the case can proceed; 
helping to move the parties and the case on; resolving issues which may continue to resurface if 
not addressed. 
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With respect to the case where the father denied having made concessions at 
what should have been the fact-finding hearing and totally disputed all the 
allegations, including those he had earlier admitted, Ms L observed: “I think it 
would have really helped both parties move on if findings had been made…But 
because the court had never actually made any findings against him he was still: 
I’ve never done anything wrong, you know.” [Ms L, Solicitor, SW] 
 
Although Ms B had slight concerns about fact-finding hearings, she queried how 
disputed allegations could be resolved without one:  
 
“If domestic violence did occur, and the child could be at risk, you 
need to work out one way or the other whether that’s the 
case…Because I think that there are cases where domestic violence 
should mean that there isn’t contact, and how you going to resolve 
that without a fact-finding, I suppose.” [Ms B, Solicitor, London] 
 
Five respondents
90
 understood the benefits of fact-finding hearings from the 
victim’s perspective.  
 
“I think they can be useful, I think that, because although often in 
family we strive to avoid contested hearings because we think that, 
you know, they’ll just introduce some hostility between parents, I 
think sometimes actually, particularly for the victims, they feel that 
they have had their day in court and then it’s almost quite a cathartic 
experience for them although it’s obviously nerve-racking. And I 
think it really depends on the individual. For others, you know, the 
thought of giving evidence is horribly nerve-racking.” [Ms T, 
Barrister, NW] 
 
Ms L spoke about a case where the mother was a “classic example of a victim of 
years and years and years of abuse” which was “normalised” in her mind, the 
father was highly dangerous with “psychopathic tendencies” and the fact-finding 
hearing enabled the mother to emerge as a “changed person”. “I was listened to, I 
was believed, you know, because the judge made findings on all of her 
allegations.” [Ms L, Solicitor, SW] 
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 Barristers = 2;  Solicitors = 2;  FCAs = 1 
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Ms B recognised the benefits for the mother in being afforded the time prior to 
the fact-finding hearing to recognise the abuse she has sustained for what it is, 
instead of being rushed into conceding contact:  
 
“I think sometimes it’s important to have the issue looked at and for 
the client to have the time to think about what they’ve been through 
because, as I said previously, when they first present and say there’s 
been violence, sometimes they do actually really minimise it and they 
can’t really address it. And so normally there’s kind of quite a gap for 
the evidence in the fact-finding hearing for them to actually think 
through everything that’s happened and rationalise it.” [Ms B, 
Solicitor, London] 
 
On the other hand, Ms C considered fact-finding hearings helpful from the 
father’s perspective, seeing them as useful to eliminate ‘false’ allegations which 
can be misused by hostile mothers to delay the proceedings and prevent contact:   
 
“So say, I act for a dad who the mother is saying has been abusive 
towards her, and she’s willing to…kind of put that to one side and 
agree to him having contact. But each and every time when she’s 
disgruntled she then raises allegations of domestic violence against 
him, um, because it might point-score, or whatever, you know, and it 
might help her case. I think the fact-finding, if findings are not made 
against him or her, we can draw a line under it, and we can turn 
round and say: well, stop raising that, the court have determined that 
this did not happen, leave that be. Or, conversely: the court 
determined that this did happen. And then you have to work forward 
from that, rather than there being this ambiguity and things not being 
sure.” [Ms C, Solicitor, SE] 
 
Ms E also appeared to assess the merits of fact-finding hearings almost entirely 
from the father’s perspective, by seeing them as helpful to resolve the father’s 
contact and “move things on.” With respect to a recent case in which she thought 
that the allegations were spurious and untrue, she thought that a fact-finding 
hearing could help to “clear the air”. 
 
The six family lawyers who held mixed views on fact-finding hearings 
highlighted the positive aspects in similar terms to the views of the respondents 
discussed above, namely, to ‘clarify the facts’ and provide a basis for risk 
assessment and decision-making, although these respondents tended to 
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emphasise that this was important in cases of ‘severe’ or ‘serious’ violence, and 
some of them saw the factual resolution as important in helping to ‘move contact 
on’.  
 
Ms S [Barrister, NW] thought that fact-finding hearings could be “extremely 
useful” in providing a factual basis where the allegations are “relevant”, either to 
determine whether or not there should be contact, or because, “if you don’t 
knock them on the head”, they will impede contact from “progressing”.  
 
However, these six family lawyers also saw fact-finding hearings in negative 
terms by increasing “acrimony” between the parents, being stressful experiences 
for the parties who can end up in a worse position if they are disbelieved, and 
because contact is likely to end up being ordered in any event.  
 
“I think it can really increase the acrimony and possibly not make a 
difference to the outcome. But in cases where there are serious 
domestic violence [sic] and serious risk to the victim and the children, 
there is no other way of proving it.” [Ms K, Solicitor, NE] 
 
For Ms M, unless domestic violence is bad enough to stop contact, a fact-finding 
hearing is unnecessary and unhelpful:  
 
“Especially if contact has taken place some time prior to the issue 
coming before the court, because it doesn’t always help the issue 
because of some situations where domestic violence has been raised, 
contact is going to happen anyway…why then antagonise the 
relationship between both parents if they have to work 
together?…And then why put either parent through the, what is the 
stressful situation of being accused of lying on both sides and of 
exaggerating when actually both of them have to live with what they 
think happened and move on for the sake of their child.” [Ms M, 
Barrister, SW] 
 
Similarly Ms E thought that although fact-finding hearings can help to “clear the 
air” so that “all parties can move forward with sensible proposals once the abuse 
has been ruled out”, the fact-finding exercise can be a “waste of resources” 
because contact usually happens and progresses in any event: “More often than 
not, even when findings have been made, contact will eventually be ordered, 
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either as supported/supervised, and then eventually unsupported. Thus, in some 
senses they do waste resources.” [Ms E, Barrister, London]  
 
Images of implacably hostile mothers fed into Ms S’s perceptions of fact-finding 
hearings [Barrister, NW]. She felt that women may request fact-finding hearings 
deliberately to delay the proceedings, and thought they can be “incredibly 
unhelpful” by requiring the parties to “rehash history” and be accused of lying, 
particularly where contact is already taking place.  
 
Only two barristers and a solicitor held entirely negative views of fact-finding 
hearings.
91
 They were also among the respondents who thought that fact-finding 
hearings are held too often.  
 
“A lot of them are useless, a complete waste of time…and the case 
deteriorates, the relationship could take months to recover, there 
would always be bitterness. My view is they need to be dealt with 
very carefully indeed as to whether they happen or not.” [Ms F, 
Barrister, SE]  
 
Ms G agreed with these comments,
92
 and added that she had only experienced 
one “really worthwhile” fact-finding hearing – an extreme case of very serious 
domestic violence by a father who was a “nutter” and was “kicked out of 
Fathers4Justice”, and the mother and children had to relocate under new names 
with wide-ranging orders to prevent the father locating them:  
 
“And in that context it was really helpful, because the judge got a 
flavour of him from the outset, heard him in evidence, heard what 
he’d done to these children, which was just horrific and that quite 
rightly coloured the judge’s view…And it was fantastic for my client 
because it completely vindicated her, she dealt with things, the 
children were completely protected, it meant that we got the right 
result in the end.” [Ms G, Barrister, SE]  
 
However, that case was very much the exception.  
 
                                                 
91
 These respondents, particularly the barristers, were extremely pro-contact and held very 
negative views of mothers involved in contact proceedings generally. 
92
 Ms F and Ms G were interviewed together. 
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“Nine times out of ten, even more than that, they are a complete and 
utter waste of time and energy for the parties, the court, for everyone, 
they just raise the temperature unnecessarily, because you have a 
winner and a loser, and that’s not what we’re meant to be doing in 
family law.” [Ms G, Barrister, SE]93  
 
Despite these views, both these respondents had indicated earlier in the interview 
that they would request a fact-finding hearing if they represented the resident 
parent where allegations of domestic violence were disputed. 
 
Ms D was also vehemently opposed to fact-finding hearings, because of the way 
she perceived they could be “manipulated” by devious mothers to delay 
proceedings:  
 
“I don’t find them very helpful. Um, I think that they’re open to 
abuse and that it’s clogging up the court system that’s already 
overrun, it’s clogging up Cafcass that’s already overrun, it’s 
increasing the legal aid budget to the extent that it’s now,…it drags it 
out longer for mum and dad where he should be having some contact, 
he’s not having contact for a significant period of time.” [Ms D, 
Solicitor, SE]
94
 
 
Similarly Hunter and Barnett found that some of the main negative aspects put 
forward by respondents to the survey was that fact-finding hearings cause delay, 
they polarise the parties and increase acrimony between them, they use up scarce 
resources, and they do not or will not affect the outcome of the case, since the 
courts’ strong pro-contact stance means that it is likely to be ordered in any 
event.
95
 “The assumption seems to be contact will take place and so a fact find 
will not help – let’s just get on with it.” (S427, NE)96 As with this study, Hunter 
and Barnett also found that respondents who thought that fact-finding hearings 
were held too often tended to have negative perceptions of such hearings, while 
those who thought they were not held often enough were more likely to 
emphasise their positive aspects. 
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 Ms F agreed with these sentiments 
94
 Ms T [Barrister, NW] also gave an example of a case where the mother “revived” allegations 
of domestic violence at the final hearing and requested a fact-finding hearing, which Ms T saw as 
a “delay tactic” on the part of the mother to avoid a residence order being made in favour of the 
father. 
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11. The nature, effect and consequences of 
‘findings of fact’ and ‘evidence’ 
 
The way in which ‘findings of fact’ may be constructed and understood caused 
great difficulties for many of the professionals who participated in this study, and 
may constitute a further reason for the antipathy of some professionals and 
judges towards fact-finding hearings. It is suggested that autopoietic, or 
‘systems’ theory, can be very helpful in explaining the problems that 
professionals and judicial officers have in attempting to rationalise how facts are 
‘proved’, what those facts mean, and how their effects and consequences may be 
perceived and understood. 
 
Two of law’s principal internal procedures for determining whether something 
has ‘happened’ are the burden and standard of proof. The general rule in both 
criminal and civil proceedings is that the prosecution, applicant or claimant has 
the ‘burden of proof’, that is, they have to prove their case. In fact-finding 
hearings, the burden is on the party who asserts that domestic violence occurred 
to prove ‘the truth’ of her allegations on the balance of probabilities. The fact-
finding exercise is not, therefore, an inquisitorial exercise with applicant and 
respondent presenting their cases on equal terms (although law would not 
‘observe’ it in those terms). If judges cannot decide which parent is telling the 
truth and there is no ‘hard’ evidence to assist, they can ‘fall back’ on the burden 
of proof and find that the mother has not ‘proved her case’. 
 
An event, occurrence or process is treated by law as either having happened or 
not having happened; there are no ‘grey areas’ or room for possibilities. The 
systemic and self-referential nature and the consequences of this decision-
making process were eloquently explained by Lord Hoffman in Re B (Care 
Proceedings: Standard of Proof):  
 
“If a legal rule requires a fact to be proved (a ‘fact in issue’), a judge 
or jury must decide whether or not it happened. There is no room for 
a finding that it might have happened. The law operates a binary 
system in which the only values are 0 and 1. The fact either happened 
or it did not. If the tribunal is left in doubt, the doubt is resolved by a 
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rule that one party or the other carries the burden of proof. If the 
party who bears the burden of proof fails to discharge it, a value of 0 
is returned and the fact is treated as not having happened. If he does 
discharge it, a value of 1 is returned and the fact is treated as having 
happened.”97 
 
If, therefore, the mother satisfies the burden of proof that the father was violent 
towards her then he is treated as having been violent towards her, and his 
continued assertions that he was not violent do not affect law’s decision. 
Conversely, if the mother fails to prove that the father was violent, he is treated 
as not having been violent, and the mother’s assertions that he was, but that she 
was simply unable to prove it, are meaningless for law. As long as the judge 
follows the correct legal procedures, his decision is correct in law and therefore 
‘just’ if that decision is observed from law’s gaze. 
 
11.1 Evidence 
In order to determine whether a ‘fact’ is proved, law selects communications 
from its environment and reconstructs them as ‘evidence’. Those 
communications that enter law’s environment but are not selected as evidence 
remain ‘noise’ to law. Since the subject of law is the acontextual, atomistic 
individual, what amounts to ‘evidence’ is that which can provide corroboration 
that an incident, event or process in relation to the particular individuals who are 
the subject of the proceedings did or did not occur. ‘Other’ information, such as 
sociological studies on the gendered nature and prevalence of domestic violence, 
the manner in which perpetrators in general may behave, or which demonstrate 
that women very rarely fabricate allegations of domestic violence, is currently 
noise to law or has not even entered law’s environment. This means that a 
mother cannot rely on such information as evidence that the particular father 
against whom she has made allegations was violent to her.  
 
What may constitute ‘evidence’ was explained by Lady Hale in Re B (Care 
Proceedings: Standard of Proof):  
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 Re B (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2008] UKHL 35, [2008] 3 WLR 1 [2] (Lord 
Hoffman). See also [31] (Lady Hale) 
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“We rely heavily on oral evidence, especially from those who were 
present when the alleged events took place. Day after day, up and 
down the country, on issues large and small, judges are making up 
their minds whom to believe. They are guided by many things, 
including the inherent probabilities, any contemporaneous 
documentation or records, any circumstantial evidence tending to 
support one account rather than the other, and their overall 
impression of the characters and motivations of the witnesses. The 
task is a difficult one. It must be performed without prejudice and 
preconceived ideas. But it is the task which we are paid to perform to 
the best of our ability.”98 
 
Despite the various ‘rules of evidence’ and ‘proof’ devised by law, its codes and 
procedures provide no way, at the end of the day, to assist judges in the task of 
evaluating the evidence (particularly oral evidence). So despite Lady Hale’s call 
to judges not to draw on ‘preconceived ideas’, judges do bring a complex 
combination of personal, discursive and ideological perceptions to the judicial 
task, which may be highly visible to the outside observer but are invisible to law. 
As the case law reveals, many judges do express views and opinions about 
‘implacably hostile mothers’ and ‘victimised fathers’, and a few judges may 
draw on their knowledge about, for example, the difficulties for women in 
leaving violent relationships and adducing ‘independent’ evidence of the abuse 
they have sustained.
99
 While they may articulate those views as influencing the 
way they assess the evidence, those views are not expressed as the evidence upon 
which facts are or are not found.  
 
We can see how discourses of atomistic, decontextualised individualism and the 
narrow, incident-based approach to domestic violence, can exert a powerful 
influence on the perceptions of professionals and courts in determining the way 
in which ‘evidence’ is constructed and understood. This was demonstrated by the 
concern expressed by a number of respondents
100
 about the ability of courts to 
determine whether domestic violence has occurred where the only evidence is 
the testimony of the parties, and there is no ‘real’ or ‘independent’ evidence, 
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although law makes no such distinction about what constitutes ‘evidence’. This 
means that the contest is seen as a ‘he says, she says’ situation. In these 
circumstances, by excluding ‘other’ information from the remit of what 
constitutes evidence, the courts are indeed left with ‘one person’s word against 
another’, with both parents equally capable of lying or telling the truth.  
 
“If [the courts] decline [to list a fact-finding hearing], you know, if 
it’s one of these that is so woolly that you can’t really do a fact-
finding, you know, especially if it’s back in the mist of time or 
whatever, he says, she says sort of situation,…because it is incredibly, 
how can I put it, is nebulous, it’s quite sticky and difficult to wade 
your way through.” [Ms O, FCA, SW] 
 
“You will always get judges saying: well, come on, how am I 
supposed to deal with his word against her word, but then on the 
other hand how are you supposed to deal with a contact dispute 
where one parent is saying: I’m too afraid to let my child go to him.” 
[Ms M, Barrister, SW]  
 
Ms M provided an example of a fact-finding hearing that collapsed because there 
was no ‘real’ supporting evidence:  
 
“Historically, you see, there was a fact-finding hearing that was set 
up, but it collapsed because possibly, because she was very angry, 
and because there was no real supporting evidence, because there 
were police logs that alleged that there were arguments, not there was 
violence by one parent on the other, um, there was I think very small 
admissions that were made because there was some medical evidence, 
but very minor, and again, supporting them both being 
argumentative…because of lack of evidence. I think partial evidence 
was given and then it collapsed. [Ms M, Barrister, SW] 
 
While Mr J understood the difficulties for courts dealing with a ‘he says, she 
says’ trial, he did not see this as a reason to avoid a contested hearing, because 
the risk cannot then be assessed. “The court has to hear even where there is no 
medical, no police, no children’s services evidence of what mother says.” [Mr J, 
FCA, NE]
101
 
 
Ms H recognised how Cafcass may collude in this process:  
                                                 
101
 The ‘excruciating difficulty’ of the task of making findings was highlighted by Munby J in Re 
A (Fact-Finding: Disputed Facts) (n 19) 
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“I mean I can, I think the difficult cases are those ones where it’s not 
concrete, there’s no concrete, you know, you’ve got a mother who 
hadn’t reported it to the police, hadn’t necessarily been at A and E 
with any injuries and I imagine that that’s frustrating for solicitors 
who’ve got clients where it’s very difficult to prove. And certainly 
I’ve seen some mothers leaving court very dissatisfied that their 
issues have not been taken seriously. I suspect Cafcass, we possibly 
collude to an extent, with the judge in that, you know, it doesn’t fit 
into any category. And I think those are the toughest cases.” [Ms H, 
FCA, SE] 
 
Mr R saw a particular difficulty in ‘quantifying’ or ‘evidencing’ cases of 
emotional abuse, recognising that the incident-based approach to domestic 
violence does not lend itself easily to findings being made on a process rather 
than on ‘facts’:  
 
“I think it’s the issue as well of evidence that it’s far easier to go to 
court to try and obtain a finding on an issue of physical abuse, it’s a 
bit like a care case where there is one sole precipitative incident. If 
it’s neglect, it’s that horrible drip, drip, drip effect. Emotional harm 
can be like that as well. It’s not quite as substantial a concept…So 
actually, the evidence base is very often just isn’t there. It’s from 
what a judge makes of what he sees and hears.” [Mr R, Solicitor, NE]  
 
It was also concerning to find that, for some respondents, the lack of 
‘independent’ evidence was itself ‘proof’ that domestic violence had not 
happened, on the basis that if it had ‘really’ taken place, there would be ‘external’ 
evidence of it:   
 
“But you would hope where there are cases of serious violence you 
would be able to obtain some sort of police disclosure. That there 
would be some kind of referral, or referral to social services, and that 
might obviate the need for a hearing as well if there was sufficient 
external evidence, I suppose.” [Ms K, Solicitor, NE]  
 
Nevertheless, Ms K did recognise that women may not be in a position to 
report the abuse: “I think that happens a lot doesn’t it, and not just in certain 
communities, just across the board, I think.” [Ms K, Solicitor, NE]  
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Even more worrying was Ms X’s expressed suspicion of mothers who do not 
report the violence. With respect to the first case scenario she observed:  
 
“I would want to know why, the fact it’s got to be a fact-finding 
hearing, is mum obviously hasn’t reported the abuse to anybody. I 
would want to know why that was, why she never reported it to 
anybody.” [Ms X, FCA, London] 
 
The views of these professionals are of great concern as they suggest that 
professionals and courts may avoid fact-finding hearings, or courts will not find 
the mother’s case ‘proved’ when they perceive that there is no ‘real’ evidence 
despite the fact that oral testimony and the judge’s perceptions of the parties 
when giving evidence are, of course, proper evidence for law. Indeed, the case 
law makes it clear that appellate courts should be slow to allow appeals against 
issues of fact because the trial judge has had the benefit of seeing and hearing 
from witnesses.
102
  
 
Nevertheless, the ability of courts to make findings on the basis of the parents’ 
evidence alone, and the importance that courts may attach to parents’ oral 
evidence was highlighted by Lady Hale in Re B (Care Proceedings: Standard of 
Proof)
103
 and was recognised by a number of participants.  
 
“I think the majority of cases there are, you might have one or two 
calls to the police, but there are generally a lot of incidents where 
they’re not reported. There are cases where there’ve been a long 
histories [sic] of domestic violence I’ve had, and there is no 
documentation to support it whatsoever, but at finding of fact hearing 
the judge has found that mum was telling the truth.” [Ms A2, 
Solicitor, NW]  
 
Ms P [Barrister, SW] observed that “it is very telling when your client gives 
evidence.”  
 
For three family lawyers, their client’s ‘credibility’ was an important factor in 
determining whether to press for fact-finding hearings for this very reason:   
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“You have to assess what the evidence is…and how your client’s 
going to come across…it’s often an issue when it’s been listed, sort 
of what evidence do [sic] your client rely on in court, well, it’s going 
to have to be her word and you’re going to have to listen and decide 
whether you think there’s a real credibility to it.” [Ms M, Barrister, 
SW]   
 
A number of respondents even saw a theatrical aspect to fact-finding hearings 
which they perceived as making it even more difficult for courts to find the ‘real 
truth’. Ms P indicated that parents can learn how to “play the game” so that “very 
often, you know, what we see isn’t what’s real”. [Ms P, Barrister, SW]  
 
We can also see how those discourses that underpin current family proceedings 
which construct parents involved in contact proceedings, and particularly 
mothers, as irrational, unreliable or hostile feed in to the way in which the 
evidence is assessed. Ms A3 [Barrister, London] gave an example of a case 
where the judge found that the mother had been fabricating the allegations 
because, in Ms A3’s view, she was “a solicitor and very well dressed and came 
across very well.” Conversely, Ms L provided an example of a case where the 
mother was “a classic example of a victim of years and years and years of 
abuse:” “And she gave her evidence, she was fantastic…And this guy came 
across as, you know, the really dangerous violent man that he was.” [Ms L, 
Solicitor, SW] For Ms S, mothers who are ‘credible’ in their testimony should be 
able to provide a coherent narrative: “But there are some allegations that it’s self-
evidently, well, someone’s description of the incidents is relatively poor or weak 
or confused, the court is unlikely to make those findings.” [Ms S, Barrister, NW] 
 
We can therefore see how images of ‘real’ victims and perpetrators may underpin 
the way in which courts and professionals respond to parents’ evidence. 
Additionally, the failure of many courts and professionals to understand why 
many women may not be able to adduce ‘independent evidence’, and the lack of 
awareness of the effect of domestic violence on the ability of women to attest to 
their experiences can undermine their credibility. In A v A (Appeal: Fact-
finding)
104
 Mostyn J overturned all the findings against the father made by the 
trial judge, who had found the mother to be an open, honest and truthful witness, 
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by finding ‘inconsistencies’ and ‘discrepancies’ between the mother’s oral 
evidence, her schedule of allegations and her account to the Cafcass officer, 
assuming that domestic violence emerges and is accounted for in a ‘rational’, 
chronological and coherent way. Similarly in Re R (Family Proceedings: No 
Case to Answer)
105
 the trial judge, on the third day of a fact-finding hearing, 
accepted a submission by the father that the mother was blatantly lying, because 
of discrepancies between her written and oral evidence. He also impugned the 
mother’s credibility on the basis that there was an absence of contemporaneous 
reports, and criticised her demeanour in the witness box. So a fact-finding 
hearing may not be held if there is no evidence other than the mother’s testimony, 
and if she does testify, she can be disbelieved if she does not conform to 
expectations. 
 
Two Cafcass officers expressed concern about how children’s testimony could or 
should be factored in to the forensic exercise in fact-finding hearings. It is clear 
from the substantial body of research discussed in Chapter 3 that children are 
frequently witnesses to, or aware of the violence, and could, therefore, provide 
‘corroborative’ evidence. Yet it seems that images of children as vulnerable and 
fragile, who may be damaged if they become part of the ‘conflict’, or as 
immature and therefore unreliable or open to manipulation, mean that their 
experiences may be filtered out of the evidence. However, there is no legal 
reason why the children’s views set out, for example, in a Cafcass report, should 
not form part of the evidence. 
 
“And I’ve often, you know, like that case we had, where the fact-
finding was actively around what I got from the kids…[but] quite 
often there isn’t a Cafcass report until after the fact-finding, so where 
do you get the independent information about what the children are 
saying or, you know, what the parents are saying unless you’ve got 
something before the fact-finding on which the judge can hang, or 
counsel can hang, other questions…So I don’t, I mean I don’t think 
children can be witnesses and that’s not right.” [Ms Y, FCA, London]  
 
Ms O gave an example of a case where the father disputed the mother’s 
allegations of domestic violence and she interviewed the children.  
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“And I have indications from the interviews with the children that in 
my opinion I think there has been. But do I, the court hasn’t asked 
me to report, so you know what I mean? Should the judge know that 
before he rules or should he be able to rule on the evidence that he’s 
looking at and then-?” [Ms O, FCA, SW]   
 
11.2 The consequences of ‘findings of fact’ 
Many respondents, particularly Cafcass officers but also some family lawyers, 
struggled with the binary nature of law’s construction of ‘the truth’ of the 
mother’s allegations and perceived a potential disjuncture between what judges 
have determined to be ‘the facts’ and what ‘really happened’, implicitly 
recognising the selectively constructed nature of law’s ‘reality’:  
 
“I suppose you have to rely on the judge getting it right and there’s 
going to be times when you think: yeah, he was spot on, and there’s 
going to be other times you’re going to think: he missed half of that, 
and now all of that’s out the window and can never be brought back, 
you know. I’m generally in favour of fact-finding, but I do think it 
does risk that it is only the court’s opinion.” [Ms O, FCA, SW]  
 
Ms O succinctly expressed the problem: “The truth is another, there is a 
difference between a finding of fact and the truth. Sometimes one sits on top of 
the other and sometimes it doesn’t, and you can never be [sure].” [Ms O FCA, 
SW] 
 
Some participants expressed concern about the consequences of ‘unjust’ 
decisions, and the difficulties that can be caused for families between law’s 
world and the ‘real world’:  
 
“And then of course there’s the directive that if a finding of fact is 
proven not to have taken place, then we are to behave as though it 
never happened, which is extremely difficult when you’ve got 
children who are saying: well, he kicked me, he did this, he did that, 
he hurt my mum, you know, those sorts of things.” [Mr V, FCA, NW] 
 
Ms M gave an example of an unusual case where the mother feared that the 
father was responsible for an arson attack on her home, but because this had 
never been ‘proved’, “there is nothing that points that way other than her fear 
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that he did.” [Ms M, Barrister, SW] Because of this lack of ‘proof’, the court had 
to treat the case as if the father had not committed the arson. This meant that the 
court was blind to a very serious risk to the mother and children because it had to 
treat the case as if there was no such risk. 
 
While a number of respondents recognised the enormous benefits for mothers of 
‘justice’ having been delivered where findings are made, a number of 
professionals expressed great concern about the consequences for those who had 
failed to establish findings on their allegations.  
 
“And it’s that kind of perverse: can you evidence it, is the judge 
going to find it? And, you know, there is a danger and I do advise 
clients about the danger of not having the fact found, you know, and 
on the day it can be devastating, can’t it? You know, clients for 12 
months have said: this is what’s happened, then the judge says: 
actually, I don’t believe you. Devastating for them, you know.” [Ms 
P, Barrister, SW]  
 
“Because I would see very little point in taking the mother’s case to 
court for it to be shot down at an early stage through effectively lack 
of evidence which only then colours her somehow as a, as a difficult 
woman, a difficult mother and a difficult witness…why on earth 
would you want to put somebody in the witness box to have chunks 
knocked out of them by an able advocate and to undermine their case 
through effectively lack of evidence?” [Mr R, Solicitor, NE] 
 
Mr V pointed out that a court’s decision that domestic violence had not occurred 
could have very negative consequences for children as well as for mothers, and 
struggled with his professional role on those occasions when he perceived law’s 
decisions as unjust, expressing frustration at what he saw as his own forced 
complicity in this process:  
 
“I say, usually to the mother: well, you know, I hear what you say, I 
can’t ignore [it]. Once you’ve heard that information…you can’t just 
dismiss it from your thought processes when you’re working, but you 
have to distance yourself from it and you have to tell them that 
you’re going to distance yourself from it, and sadly occasionally you 
have to tell children that you have to,…you have to say, you know, in 
terms of saying to a child: well, you know, the court doesn’t believe 
you, the court doesn’t believe what you said about your daddy or 
mummy, then, you know, occasionally that has happened and where 
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does that leave that poor child then…and you, you know, do your 
best to fight the corner for that, for that unheard voice, but you do 
feel like you’ve got your hands tied behind your back sometimes.” 
[Mr V, FCA, NW]  
 
For these respondents, the ‘truth’ that law delivers may not necessarily be ‘fair’ if 
it does not ‘sit on top’ of ‘what really happened. Ms P saw no way out of this 
problem other than to accept law’s construction of ‘the truth’, recognising that if 
we observe the ‘justice’ that law delivers as ‘unjust’, law’s operations could 
potentially be blocked:  
 
“And because we had all kind of been working on the fact that the 
findings would be fair and I think you just have to work on the basis 
that that’s the basis of the case. Um, because you can’t work on the 
basis that they’re not going to be fair.” [Ms P, Barrister, SW]  
 
The harsh consequences for mothers if their allegations are not found proved is 
borne out by the case law, which shows how mothers risk being treated as 
particularly hostile and irrational by courts if they do not accept the court’s 
decision. In M v M (Residence)
106
 the mother’s allegations of domestic violence 
against the father were not made out. At the final hearing the mother was clear 
that she did not accept those findings and continued to assert that the father was a 
violent man. As a consequence, she was treated as so hostile that residence of the 
child was transferred to the father in India. It is not suggested that the mother’s 
allegations were necessarily ‘true’; rather, this case illustrates the consequences 
for mothers of not accepting ‘the truth’ as constructed by law.107  
 
Many professionals queried the purpose and effect of fact-finding hearings when 
parents failed to accept courts’ decisions. Ms M [Barrister, SW] pointed out that 
parents usually retain their own views on ‘what happened’, whatever the court’s 
findings may be. For Ms A3, this meant that findings of fact may serve no useful 
purpose:  
 
“I personally don’t always see that they actually make, help in any 
way, because parents, even if the finding’s been made, aren’t likely 
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to accept it, it doesn’t often change the view of the person who’s 
gone through the fact-finding. If a woman is adamant that she’s been 
beaten up and the court says that she hasn’t, she’s not going to turn 
around and say: oh okay, it probably didn’t happen then, because in 
her mind, it did.” [Ms A3, Barrister, London]  
 
Some family lawyers (mostly barristers) observed fact-finding hearings entirely 
from a ‘legal’ perspective and the findings as conclusive of ‘the truth’, so it is the 
parents who must be ‘irrational’, difficult or awkward if they do not accept the 
findings. “The reality is though, that it provides a factual basis upon which 
everybody else is working on, it doesn’t mean that either party has any 
acceptance of it.” [Ms S, Barrister, NW]   
 
Mr R recognised that whether or not the findings are ‘true’ or the parties accept 
them, law has provided a stabilising means for future decision-making, and in 
this sense he saw fact-finding hearings as useful.  
 
“You know, to that extent it’s a great assistance to the court and it’s a 
very convenient peg to hang a decision on and give some rationale as 
to why there should or shouldn’t be any contact but for the parties I 
think it just passes them by…[mothers who fail to prove their 
allegations] will continue to scream and say: it did, it did, it did! So I 
think it very much helps the lawyers and professionals working in the 
system but, you know, there’s probably a point to make as to how 
much assistance it is to the parties is a moot point, I guess.” [Mr R, 
Solicitor, NE]  
 
Mr R has accurately identified that whether or not parents accept the findings is 
irrelevant for law because the purpose of the findings is to provide ‘facts’ for law 
on which further self-referential decisions can be made. 
 
It is implicit in the views of those professionals who expressed concern about the 
consequences for mothers of failing to prove their allegations, that they believed 
the mother’s allegations to be true, despite a contrary decision by the court. On 
the other hand, a number of family lawyers and Cafcass officers
108
 reported that 
fathers frequently refuse to accept findings of fact against them, and in those 
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cases professionals appear to accept that law has indeed produced a ‘just’ 
decision which the father would do well to accept.  
 
“What you find that if domestic violence [has] been a feature, a 
significant feature and is being denied by, we would say the 
perpetrator, even if findings have been [made] against him,…I have 
found from my own experience in working in situations like this that 
the perpetrator actually denies any involvement or his role, blaming it 
always on, um, you know, the other person, the mother 
usually…What I’ve found as well really is that the perpetrator of 
domestic violence because they deny, and I’ve not come into a 
situation where anyone has accepted that they have been in some way 
responsible for it.” [Ms I, FCA, NE]  
 
12. Discussion 
Despite the small sample sizes and therefore the limitations on the ability to 
generalise from them, the findings of this study are strongly indicative of an 
increase in the numbers of fact-finding hearings held following the 
implementation of the Practice Direction in May 2008 across all regions but 
particularly in London and the South East, although fewer Cafcass officers 
perceived such an increase.
109
 However, even before the Guidance on Split 
Hearings, some respondents observed an increasing reluctance by courts to hold 
fact-finding hearings, possibly influenced by judicial pronouncements in the 
reported cases about too many fact-finding hearings being held which are 
‘clogging up’ the court system,110 a view shared by many judges and family 
lawyers. According to the professionals interviewed, the Guidance on Split 
Hearings appears to have had the effect of further reducing the incidence of fact-
finding hearings. Additionally, there is a wide variation in the extent to which 
different judges and courts are likely to direct fact-finding hearings, giving the 
appearance, according to some respondents, of a “post code lottery”.111 
 
Underlying the origins of preliminary fact-finding hearings, the terms of the 
Practice Direction and of the Guidance on Split Hearings, as well as the 
perceptions of many family lawyers and judges, but fewer Cafcass officers, is the 
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narrow, incident-based approach to domestic violence, which fails to see it as the 
physical manifestation of the power and control dynamics that permeate parents’ 
relationships. This approach, together with professional and judicial perceptions 
of the ‘relevance’ of domestic violence, mean that fact-finding hearings are 
usually restricted to cases involving ‘incidents’ of recent, severe physical 
violence, which are seen by most courts and professionals as the only type of 
abuse that would affect contact.  
 
The expressed willingness of family lawyers to request fact-finding hearings if 
they represent the victim and of courts to hold them needs to be seen in the 
context of the extremely narrow circumstances in which those professionals and 
courts consider that domestic violence would be ‘relevant’ to contact in the first 
place; it is only ‘unjustified’ requests made at the instigation of misguided or 
obstructive mothers or Cafcass officers that may be refused. The antipathy of 
courts towards fact-finding hearings is demonstrated by the increasing reluctance 
of courts to accede to requests by Cafcass officers for such hearings and their 
willingness to do so only if the Cafcass officer ‘fights their corner’.  
 
So unless the father has perpetrated recent, very serious physical violence against 
the mother and/or the child has been severely affected by the violence, judicial 
officers will not consider a fact-finding hearing to be ‘necessary’, which suggests 
that many disputed allegations may be disregarded. Since the majority of family 
lawyers consider that fact-finding hearings are held where appropriate, and that 
the reduction in the number of fact-finding hearings is a positive development, it 
seems that they agree with the courts’ restrictive approach to fact-finding 
hearings.
112
 Only a very small minority of family lawyers, but most Cafcass 
officers, did not appear to agree with this approach, as they were far less satisfied 
that the courts have ‘got the balance right’ and expressed concern about cases 
where domestic violence is ignored and/or issues remain unresolved.
113
 
                                                 
112
 Similar findings were made by Hunter and Barnett (n 8). Circuit judges and barristers were 
most likely to say that fact-finding hearings were held too often, while nearly three quarters (72 
per cent) of Cafcass officers, as well as solicitors and Others thought that they were not held 
often enough. 
113
 Just over a third of lawyers completing Coy et al’s survey said that they had had experience of 
cases where fact-finding hearings were not held when, in their view, they should have been – see 
Coy et al (n 27) 
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Even if allegations of domestic violence are considered recent and ‘serious’ 
enough to warrant a fact-finding hearing, the trial may still not end up taking 
place, or may be severely curtailed.  The desire to encourage contact ‘at all costs’ 
may mean that, by the date of the hearing, it is seen as redundant as the mother 
may have been pushed into allowing contact to ‘move on’ by then, and 
occasionally the judge may put pressure on the parties to agree to contact instead 
of conducting the hearing. This may happen, in particular, where a ‘composite’ 
hearing is held, although the findings of this study suggest that composite 
hearings are not very common. In this way we can see how domestic violence 
can progressively ‘fizzle out’ and ‘disappear’ during the course of the 
proceedings.
114
 
 
The antipathy of some family lawyers to fact-finding hearings, particularly those 
who see them as inimical to establishing harmonious agreements for contact, 
means that they may attempt to avoid a fact-finding hearing by ‘carving up’ the 
dispute on the basis of limited admissions by the father which ends up with a 
‘watered down’ compromise, and many courts appear to encourage this approach. 
Additionally, even if a hearing is held, the number of allegations to be tried may 
be restricted to a few ‘sample incidents’. Both these practices mean that the full 
extent of the risk posed to the mother and child is minimised or even invisible, 
and further decontextualises the abuse from the gendered power dynamics 
informing the parental relationship. 
 
Respondents’ views on fact-finding hearings provide an insight into the extent to 
which the presumption of contact and dominant parental subjectivities resonate 
with professionals. For those family lawyers who hold negative views of fact-
finding hearings, such hearings are an unnecessary and harmful impediment to 
the ultimate goal of achieving contact and the harmonious post-separation family, 
and even a further tool in the armoury of the vengeful, obstructive mother. The 
view of many professionals and courts that fact-finding hearings cause delay 
arises out of, and reinforces the perception that domestic violence is an 
                                                 
114
 Coy et al (n 27) 50, found that women experienced the failure to hold fact-finding hearings “as 
a further silencing.”  
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unimportant obstacle to the progression of the really important business of 
promoting contact. The repeated judicial attempts to get contact established and 
progressing, often involving numerous hearings over months and years could be, 
but are not, constructed as ‘wasteful’ of resources because the presumption of 
contact constitutes them as ‘necessary’. Similarly, the need to hold fact-finding 
hearings could have been ‘blamed’ on the refusal of perpetrators to admit the 
violence, yet no participants suggested that such hearings could be avoided if the 
father admitted the abuse from the outset; rather, it is the mother who is at fault 
for bringing the ‘acrimony’ into the ‘rational’, conciliatory ethos of family 
proceedings. 
 
Although law constructs parties to proceedings as atomistic, equal individuals, 
each theoretically capable of equal credibility, parents do not participate in fact-
finding hearings on an equal footing because the burden of proof is on the 
complainant/ mother, so that if she fails to prove that domestic violence has 
occurred, in law it has not occurred. This burden is compounded by the 
presumption of contact and by dominant discourses and their ideological effects 
which construct women involved in contact proceedings as irrational, 
untrustworthy or even malicious. These processes, together with the inability of 
many courts and professionals to understand the power and control dynamics of 
domestic violence, mean that the mother’s uncorroborated oral testimony may be 
viewed with suspicion and discounted as not being ‘real’ evidence. Some 
participants indicated that courts and professionals may attempt to overcome this 
problem by avoiding fact-finding hearings altogether if there is no ‘independent’ 
evidence. This is reinforced by discourses of ‘rationality’ which construct 
credible witnesses as those who can offer a coherent, unambiguous account, 
images of ‘real’ victims and perpetrators which underpin how professionals and 
courts respond to parents’ evidence, and the inability by many to understand the 
effects of domestic violence on women. 
 
Many respondents, particularly Cafcass officers but also some family lawyers, 
struggled with law’s selective construction of ‘reality’ because of the potential 
for a judge’s decision to be ‘unjust’ where there is a discrepancy between what 
they believe ‘really’ happened and what law has decided has happened. This is 
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not a problem for law, since the only alternatives from a ‘legal’ perspective are to 
accept the decision, appeal against it (but then risk another ‘unjust’ decision) or 
avoid a decision being made altogether.  Professionals like Mr R recognised that 
the purpose of the fact-finding exercise, for law, is to provide the mechanism for 
further self-referential decisions to be made, thereby maintaining law’s 
normative function. Yet this can lead to arrangements that may or may not be 
‘safe’, ‘risk-free’ or benefit the child. Many participants observed not only the 
potential ‘injustice’ of law’s decision-making but also the harsh consequences for 
parents and children of law ‘getting it wrong’. These observations of legal 
decision-making may themselves inhibit lawyers from requesting fact-finding 
hearings. 
 
For those professionals who observe decisions in fact-finding hearings from a 
‘legal’ perspective and therefore cannot ‘see’ that ‘justice’ may produce 
‘injustice’, parents must be irrational, difficult or, in the case of fathers, ‘in 
denial’ if they do not ‘accept’ the decision. Yet despite the view of many 
participants that fathers do not usually accept findings made against them, this 
does not seem to affect their firm beliefs in the benefits of contact. 
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CHAPTER 7 
INTERIM AND FINAL ORDERS 
 
1. Interim orders 
The Practice Direction provides that, pending a fact-finding hearing, the court 
should consider whether an interim order for residence or contact is in the child’s 
interests “and in particular whether the safety of the child and the residential 
parent can be secured before, during and after any contact.”1 In deciding on 
interim residence or contact, the court has to take into account the matters set out 
in the ‘welfare checklist’ and consider, in particular, “the likely effect on the 
child of any contact and any risk of harm, whether physical, emotional or 
psychological, which the child is likely to suffer as a consequence of making or 
declining to make an order.”2 In addition, the court needs to consider the 
arrangements required to minimise any risk of harm to the child and ensure the 
safety of the parties.
3
 In determining this latter issue the court has to consider not 
only whether, where and by whom contact should be supervised or supported, 
but also “the availability of appropriate facilities for that purpose.”4 
 
Whether any interim contact is ordered to take place before a fact-finding hearing 
has important implications not only for the safety and well-being of the child and 
resident parent, but also for the final disposal of the case. Additionally, as we 
have seen in Chapter 6, if contact takes place prior to the fact-finding hearing it 
can even affect whether there is a hearing. 
 
In order to increase the reliability of the responses of family lawyers, 
interviewees were presented with a case scenario [‘the interim case scenario’] in 
which the mother alleged that the father was violent towards her when they lived 
together and had threatened her since they separated. She opposed all contact 
between the father and the child, who was aged seven. A fact-finding hearing 
was listed to take place in two months’ time. 
                                                 
1
 Potter P, Practice Direction: Residence and Contact Orders: Domestic Violence and Harm 
[2008] 2 FLR 103, reissued on 14
th
 January 2009 at [2009] 2 FLR 1400 [18] 
2
 Ibid [19] 
3
 Ibid [20] 
4
 Ibid [20(a)(ii)] 
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1.1 What orders do courts make for contact pending fact-
finding hearings? 
 
Women participating in Coy et al’s research reported that orders for contact were 
made in 81 per cent of cases, just over half of which were interim orders.
5
 Hunter 
and Barnett
6
 found that, pending fact-finding hearings, courts most frequently 
order supervised contact,
7
 followed by indirect contact
8
 or, slightly less 
commonly, supported contact.
9
  
 
The views of the interviewees in this study were mixed on whether courts tend to 
order direct contact pending fact-finding hearings if the mother opposes such 
contact. Most participants, including all but one of the barristers interviewed, 
indicated that this would depend on the circumstances or would be judge-
dependent.
10
 Ms T observed that while some judges are very risk alert and will 
not order any direct contact until the fact-finding hearing is finished, others may 
be far more ‘bullish’ and say: “Well, you’re going to have to give me a pretty 
good reason to deny some form of contact.” [Ms T, Barrister, NW]  
 
The majority of solicitors, but a minority of Cafcass officers and only one 
barrister, were clear and emphatic that courts do not tend to order any direct 
interim contact pending fact-finding hearings, and confirmed this in addressing 
the interim case scenario.
11
 Ms A [Solicitor, London] thought that this happens 
“maybe too much so.” Even if the father pressed for interim direct contact, Ms K 
has never encountered a judge ordering it because that would amount to the court 
pre-judging the issue, “because once contact starts, that’s it, isn’t it?…I mean, if 
contact was opposed on principle and a judge then orders it before a fact-finding 
hearing, what’s the point of then having a fact-finding hearing?” [Ms K, Solicitor, 
                                                 
5
 Maddy Coy, Katherine Perks, Emma Scott and Ruth Tweedale, Picking up the pieces: domestic 
violence and child contact (Rights of Women 2012) 
6
 Rosemary Hunter and Adrienne Barnett, Fact-Finding Hearings and the Implementation of the 
President’s Practice Direction: Residence and Contact Orders: Domestic Violence and Harm 
(Family Justice Council 2013) www.familyjusticecouncil.org.uk, last accessed 12.11.13 
7
 ibid, 64 per cent quite or very often 
8
 ibid, 58 per cent quite or very often 
9
 ibid, 47 per cent quite or very often 
10
 N = 16, comprising:  Barristers = 7;  Solicitors = 4;  FCAs = 5 
11
 N = 9, comprising:  Barristers = 1 ; Solicitors = 6; FCAs = 2 
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NE]
12
  Similarly, Ms A [Solicitor, London] and Ms B [Solicitor, London] 
reported that they had never come across a court ordering interim direct contact 
if this was opposed by the mother.  
 
Conversely, a minority of each professional group considered that courts usually 
do order some form of interim direct contact,
13
 but were more uncertain about 
this and tended to qualify their responses. All respondents who considered that 
courts would be likely to order interim direct contact reported that this would 
invariably take place in a supervised or supported contact centre.
14
 It was thought 
very unlikely that the father would be awarded completely unsupervised contact.  
 
“I’d say it depends on the circumstances of the case, but a lot of the 
time the courts do try to promote direct contact if it is going to be 
supervised, with provisos such as that mother is not to meet up with 
him, there’s somebody else doing the handover. As long as it’s 
carefully thought out. And if the mother is adamant that she really, 
really doesn’t want it, then they’ll probably say: let’s list a fact-
finding as a matter of urgency.” [Ms A3, Barrister, London]  
 
The perceived preference of courts for interim contact to be supervised is not 
necessarily borne out by the reported case law. In Re Z (Unsupervised Contact: 
Allegations of Domestic Violence), the trial judge, on the third occasion that the 
mother’s allegations of extremely serious violence against the father were listed 
for a fact-finding hearing, prior to which the child had been having supervised 
contact, abandoned the fact-finding hearing on the second day and ordered 
unsupervised contact.
15
 Wall LJ held on appeal that a full fact-finding hearing 
should have been held and that the order for unsupervised contact was, in the 
circumstances, premature. 
 
All three Cafcass officers who thought that courts tend to order interim direct 
contact saw this as a risk to the child’s physical and emotional safety, possibly 
damaging to the mother’s relationship with the child and potentially confusing 
                                                 
12
 Ms E [Barrister, London] expressed very similar views about courts not ordering interim direct 
contact because that would pre-judge the issue. 
13
 N = 7, comprising:   Barristers = 2; Solicitors = 2; FCAs = 3 
14
 The problems caused by the availability and funding of contact centres are discussed below. 
15
 Re Z (Unsupervised Contact: Allegations of Domestic Violence) [2009] EWCA Civ 430, [2009] 
2 FLR 877 
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for the child if contact is stopped after findings are made. Ms X reported that 
courts “almost always” order interim direct contact:  
 
“Well, that’s the problem really because, um, they will almost always 
order contact, um, possibly in a contact centre, safe contact, but you 
know, sometimes the case is so serious that, you know, at the end of 
the day dad isn’t going to see the children…so I wonder, the fairness 
on the children in having the contact and then having the contact 
stopped.” [Ms X, FCA, London] 
 
The most commonly cited factors that courts take into account in deciding 
whether interim direct contact should be ordered against the wishes of the 
resident parent were whether contact was or was not taking place at the time of 
the proceedings and/or the state of the father’s relationship with the child.16 If 
contact was taking place regularly at the time when the issue came before the 
court, these participants all reported that the court would invariably require 
contact to continue, usually supervised or supported, if that was not already the 
position. Conversely, if the father had not seen the child for some time and/or 
had no pre-existing relationship with the child, it was considered very unlikely 
that the court would instigate contact prior to the fact-finding hearing.
17
   
 
“I think you’ll usually find if there is one parent that’s abruptly 
brought the contact to an end, and if there’s been a history of contact 
or ongoing contact, they are far more likely to order the interim 
hearing in order to get back on track, but if there’s been a long break 
in contact then no one will set it up.” [Mr R, Solicitor, NE]   
 
The next most common factor cited by respondents as likely to affect the court’s 
determination on interim contact, sometimes in combination with the ‘status quo’ 
and other factors, was the ‘seriousness’ or ‘severity’ of the alleged violence.18 If 
the allegations are of very ‘severe’ physical violence, then it is less likely that 
interim direct contact will be ordered if the mother opposes this, particularly if 
the child has not seen the father for a lengthy period. “Oh, if it’s very severe 
                                                 
16
 N = 12, comprising:  Barristers = 4;  Solicitors = 3;  FCAs = 5 
17
 These views were confirmed by the participants’ responses to the interim case scenario. 
18
 N = 10, comprising roughly equal numbers of each professional group. Again, these views 
were confirmed by family lawyers’ responses to the interim case scenario. 
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domestic violence. Like mum’s been hospitalised or something like that, or dad’s 
been charged.” [Ms X, FCA, London] 
 
“I think it depends on the judge you get and the level of violence in 
the allegations, what contact’s been happening previously. Because if 
he hasn’t seen them for a long time, well, that’s a consideration in 
itself, isn’t it, without any violence being present. So, um, it depends 
on the circumstances really, I think.” [Ms D, Solicitor, SE]19  
 
Ms D gave an example of a case which illustrates her views on this issue. There 
was a twelve-year history of very serious violence by the father towards the 
mother, including possession of firearms and threats to kill. The child had not 
seen the father for two years. The judge did not order any interim contact, the 
father having refused the mother’s offer of indirect contact.  
 
However, as we have already seen, fact-finding hearings only tend to be listed in 
‘extreme’ cases of domestic violence. Indeed, for this reason, Ms Y [FCA, 
London] was of the view that indirect interim contact only is becoming the norm. 
 
Other, less commonly cited factors were: 
 whether the father could find out the mother’s location from the children 
during contact [Ms M, Barrister, SW] 
 whether the father has ‘suitable’ proposals for contact [Ms Q, Solicitor, 
SW and Ms D] If, for example, the father requested overnight contact, 
“then obviously that’s ridiculous if he hasn’t seen them for a long time.” 
[Ms D, Solicitor, SE] 
 the children’s wishes and feelings [Ms N, FCA, SW] 
 whether the father is likely to denigrate the mother to the children during 
contact [Ms C, Solicitor, SE, who said that she had successfully argued 
against interim direct contact on several occasions for this reason] 
 if ‘incidents’ had occurred during contact [Ms D, Solicitor, SE] 
 if the victim was too traumatised to cope with interim contact [Ms Q, 
Solicitor, SW] 
 
                                                 
19
 These views were replicated in Ms D’s response to the interim case scenario 
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Even though a significant minority of participants considered that courts are very 
unlikely to order interim direct contact if the mother opposes this, at least eight 
participants indicated that the mother will have to be particularly tenacious, 
“adamant” and steadfast in her opposition to contact to achieve this outcome 
because of pressure by the courts to agree to some contact. Ms T [Barrister, NW] 
observed that some judges, particularly District Judges, put a lot of pressure on 
parties to agree interim contact, but if there is no agreement, they will not “force 
the issue”.20  
 
The case law indicates, however, that if the mother is perceived as ‘implacably 
hostile’ to contact it is more likely that interim contact may be ordered against 
her wishes.
21
 Additionally, we can see how the perceived importance of contact 
can override all other considerations and compromise women’s and children’s 
safety and welfare pending fact-finding hearings.  In SS v KS
22
 the trial judge 
ordered interim supervised contact when a fact-finding hearing was adjourned for 
four months part way through the hearing in circumstances where, according to 
the views of the participants to this study, no interim contact of any description 
should or would be ordered – the allegations against the father were extremely 
serious, the mother opposed all direct contact, and the father had no ongoing 
relationship with the children. Indeed, the trial judge recognised that “to make an 
order now for other than indirect contact would be to fly in the face of the 
purpose of the hearing”,23 and Hedley J, on the mother’s appeal, accepted her 
argument that supervised contact would not address issues of emotional harm to 
the children and mother.  
 
“It is the essential reason why an order for interim contact should not 
be made in cases involving domestic violence where such allegations 
(if true) would be relevant to the issue of whether, and if so what, 
contact order should be made.”24  
 
                                                 
20
 Similar views were expressed by Mr R [Solicitor, NE], Ms P [Barrister, SW], Ms L [Solicitor, 
SW]  and Ms A3 [Barrister, London] 
21
 See Re W (Residence order: Leave to Appeal) [2010] EWCA Civ 1280, [2011] 1 FLR 1143 
22
 SS v KS [2009] EWHC 1575 (Fam), S v S (Interim Contact) [2009] 2 FLR 1586. See also Re H 
(Contact Order) [2010] EWCA Civ 448, [2010] 2 FLR 866 
23
 SS v KS (n 22) [6] (Hedley J), quoting the trial judge 
24
 ibid [10] (Hedley J) 
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Nevertheless Hedley J dismissed the mother’s appeal because of the length of 
time before the fact-finding hearing could resume, despite the fact that nowhere 
does the Practice Direction state that the factors for the court to consider when 
determining interim contact should be compromised if there is a substantial delay 
in the proceedings.  
 
The majority of participants considered that courts do focus sufficiently on 
minimising risk and securing the safety of the child when ordering or considering 
interim contact, although proportionately fewer Cafcass officers than family 
lawyers thought that this was the case.
25
  For some respondents, this was because 
courts do not, in their view, tend to order interim direct contact. For others, this 
was because courts would only order such contact if it was supervised and 
therefore the children “would not come to any harm”. [Ms A3, Barrister, London]  
Some family lawyers, like Ms A3, Ms E and Ms D, did not question the safety of 
contact centre provision. “They’re relatively, they’re physically safe, um, and 
that’s the important thing, I suppose.” [Ms E, Barrister, London]  
 
“I mean, contact centres are only supported, anyway. But it gives 
mum and dad a chance to get in and out without seeing each other. 
Um, and if there is anything obviously that comes to the attention of 
the contact workers and it’s brought to their attention…It would be 
done in a way that is protective for both of them really.” [Ms D, 
Solicitor, SE]  
 
These views are very concerning in light of Harrison’s research, which found 
that women frequently ended up coming into contact with their abusers at 
supported contact centres.
26
 Additionally, low levels of vigilance meant that 
children’s and mother’s safety and welfare could be imperilled, by fathers 
making threats to, or denigrating mothers, asking children to pass notes on to 
mothers or to reveal women’s addresses.27 These problems were recognised by a 
number of respondents including Ms C [Solicitor, SE], who thought that the 
father’s ability to denigrate the mother or pass subtle messages about her to the 
                                                 
25
 N = 21, comprising:  Barristers = all (8);  Solicitors = 8;  FCAs = 5 
26
 Christine Harrison, ‘Implacably Hostile or Appropriately Protective? Women Managing Child 
Contact in the Context of Domestic Violence’ (2008) 14(4) Violence Against Women 381-405 
27
 ibid 392-393. See also Lynn Harne, ‘Violent fathers – “good enough” parents?’ (2004) The 
Domestic Abuse Quarterly 19  
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children was an unsafe, risky aspect of supported contact. Ms P pointed out that 
even when contact appears to be “going well” it can be problematic:  
 
“But you also want everybody who’s involved in the process to be 
aware of how contact that is going quite well can still be quite 
difficult, sort of insidiously giving a message to the children that 
fathers wants to get across about mum or, you know, it can still be 
quite dangerous.” [Ms P, Barrister, SW]  
 
Three Cafcass officers did not think that courts focused sufficiently on risk and 
safety when considering interim contact. Ms I [FCA, NE] considered that 
supported contact centres do not meet adequate safety requirements as they 
essentially provide unsupervised contact, and felt that if judges were better 
informed about domestic violence and its effects on children, they would be in a 
better position to assess risk and manage safety in the interim.  
 
At least four Cafcass officers gave examples of cases in which they thought that 
interim orders made by courts, usually without their own input, had put children 
at risk. Ms Y [FCA, London] reported on a case where she advised the mother to 
stop contact because the father, who had convictions for domestic violence, was 
having regular contact but kept shouting at the mother at handovers in front of 
the child.
28
  
 
1.2  Recommendations by Cafcass officers for interim contact 
All the Cafcass officers who expressed a view on their likely recommendations 
indicated that they would not usually recommend any direct contact pending 
fact-finding hearings if the mother opposed this, and may not do so even in some 
circumstances where the mother had agreed to some limited contact. However, 
for some Cafcass officers, the circumstances in which they would recommend no 
direct interim contact mirrored those in which the courts would be unlikely to 
order it in any event. Mr. J said that his “default position” would be to 
recommend no direct contact pending the fact-finding hearing if there was 
“severe” domestic violence or there had been no contact “for a while”: “Cautious 
is the word, and the courts are cautious as well, rightly so.” [Mr J, FCA, NE] 
                                                 
28
 See also the example provided by Ms N [FCA, SW] discussed below. 
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It is not only mothers who may be subjected to pressure to concede contact; 
similar pressure may be put on Cafcass officers, who may need to fight hard to 
stand their ground. Ms O gave an example of a case where she recommended no 
interim direct contact because the father of a very young child had behaved so 
aggressively at the child’s nursery that he frightened the staff, but Ms O was 
subjected to huge pressure and “badgering” from the father’s barrister to alter her 
recommendation:   
 
“And I actually had to sit down and say to him: now look, you 
know,…I have worries that your client would be out of control, 
wouldn’t know what he was doing and this is the sort of case that you 
hear of in the media where somebody’s gone off and done something 
and, you know, the children don’t come back. And I mean they don’t 
come back alive…But there was no way it was getting past me on the 
day and I think that is an example of an adviser who was 
overstepping the mark really.” [Ms O, FCA, SW]   
 
Ms N spoke about a case where she stopped contact between the child and a 
violent father. His solicitors “dragged” Ms N to court to complain about Ms N 
“overriding” a court order.  
 
“And I said: in my view safeguarding is paramount and I’ve got 
evidence here to suggest that this little boy’s welfare was a concern, 
and actually I think we need to sometimes think about that instead of 
just saying: there is a court order in place, this has to happen. Um, so 
the judge, you know, put me up on the stand and said: explain your 
position. I did, and he said: okay, yeah, I take that. And I came out of 
court thinking: did that just happen? The judge listened to me!” [Ms 
N, FCA, SW]  
 
All these Cafcass officers confirmed that if they recommended no interim direct 
contact, the court would “go along” with that. The difficulty, as Ms I pointed out, 
is that in these early stages pending the fact-finding hearing, Cafcass are not 
usually fully involved:  
 
“They don’t go into the actual impact on the children or actually what 
it’s doing by the contact and agreeing the contact albeit supervised 
that could still go on. They should, they make these orders in the 
interim, as they say, to have this contact but they don’t see it until we 
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get on to do the work with the child or children in question that 
allowing this contact to take place at that stage could be so 
detrimental and again, if they [are] seeing [the child] in a contact 
centre or they might have a family member agree, you don’t know 
how that, you know, how that contact is being managed.” [Ms I, FCA, 
NE]   
 
Ms I gave an example of a case where 32 serious findings were made against the 
father who constantly ‘blamed’ the mother, and the court had ordered contact in a 
supported contact centre:  
 
“So my concern is…the emotional harm that this can have on the 
child in turn…but they still gave him interim contact, this was before 
my involvement, interim contact, so it would have gone from 
working to first hearing, all of that in between when no FCA was 
involved…yes, it happens a lot.” [Ms I, FCA, NE]29  
 
Ms O [FCA, SW] and Mr V [FCA, NW] gave examples of cases where interim 
orders were made for direct contact, without their knowledge, which they 
attempted to overturn by requesting their managers to write to the court. Mr V 
spoke about a case where the father had many convictions for violence, including 
stabbing the mother with a knife, but the court ordered unsupervised contact, so 
he wrote to the court about his concerns. However, Mr V was taken off the case 
because the father took a dislike to him; he subsequently learnt that the case was 
back in court because the father’s “drinking, aggressive, hostile behaviour re-
emerged.” [Mr V, FCA, NW] Two other Cafcass officers referred to violent 
fathers making complaints against them, which may be another controlling 
strategy of abusive men. 
 
These examples highlight the fact that Cafcass officers can have a crucial role in 
safeguarding children when interim contact is under consideration. It was 
therefore of concern to hear Ms O say that courts should not react too seriously 
to isolated domestic violence “in the heat of the moment”, and suggest that “a 
few words of advice” from the judge would stop the father from being dangerous:  
 
                                                 
29
 Ms I gave another example of a case where interim direct contact was ordered before her 
involvement and she succeeded in getting it suspended. 
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“And often it’s a matter of having a few words of advice to 
somebody, you know, and it’s very effective if it comes from a judge, 
or you know: Mr So-and-So, you need to do so and so, you know, 
leave your car the other side of the road, let So-and-So walk to the 
pavement, don’t go to the front door, you know,…don’t put yourself 
in a position where you’re going to upset somebody, and generally 
when it’s kind of put that way a lot of them will resolve it, a lot of it 
does die down.” [Ms O, FCA, SW]  
 
1.3 Lawyers’ advice to parents on interim contact  
 
Table 1: Family lawyers’ advice to clients about interim contact –  
general advice compared with courts’ likely order 
 Courts tend 
to order 
interim 
direct 
contact 
Courts not 
usually 
order 
interim 
direct 
contact 
What courts 
order depends 
on the 
circumstances 
Total 
Advise client 
to agree 
contact 
Ms A1, Ms E Ms A2 Ms A3, Mr R,  
Ms P 
6 
Would not 
persuade M to 
agree contact 
 Ms M, Ms A, 
Ms L, Ms B 
 4 
Advice 
depends on 
circumstances 
Ms C Ms K Ms F,Ms G, 
Ms S, Ms T, 
Ms Q, Ms D 
8 
 
 
Table 2: Family Lawyers’ advice to clients about interim contact – general 
advice compared with advice to mother in interim case scenario [‘ICS’] 
 Advise M to 
agree 
contact 
Not persuade 
M to agree 
contact 
Advice 
depends on 
circumstances 
Total 
ICS: Advise 
M to agree 
contact 
Ms A3, Ms 
A1, Ms A2 
 Ms C, Ms D, 
Ms G, Ms F 
7 
ICS: Not 
advise M to 
agree contact 
Ms E Ms M, Ms A, 
Ms L, Ms B 
 5 
ICS: Advice 
depends on 
circumstances 
Ms P, Mr R  Ms K, Ms Q, 
Ms T, Ms S 
6 
 
Table 1 shows that although six family lawyers thought that courts do not tend to 
order interim direct contact, only four would not persuade the mother to agree to 
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contact. Ms M [Barrister, SW] was the only barrister who held the firm view that 
courts do not generally order interim direct contact against the wishes of the 
resident parent and was also the only barrister who would not encourage the 
mother to agree to such contact. All the other barristers interviewed
30
 indicated 
that they would encourage the mother to agree to some interim direct contact 
even if she was concerned for her own safety,
31
 or their advice would depend on 
the circumstances.
32
 Despite the majority of solicitors holding the view that 
courts do not usually order interim direct contact, or that the court’s decision 
would depend on the circumstances, only three solicitors said that they would not 
try to persuade the mother to agree to such contact. These findings suggest that 
direct contact pending fact-finding hearings may take place because family 
lawyers persuade mothers to agree to it, rather than because it is ordered by 
courts against the case argued on behalf of the mother. 
 
The four family lawyers who would not try to persuade the mother to agree to 
some interim contact if she feared for her own safety confirmed this in their 
responses to the interim case scenario. Ms M [Barrister, SW] indicated that she 
would strongly advise the mother not to agree to any interim contact, and Ms B 
said that she would not let herself  “be pressured to advise her to agree to contact 
by the court or the other party.” Ms L [Solicitor, SW] pointed out that if the 
mother agreed to anything other than supported contact, this may undermine the 
credibility of her allegations and be potentially harmful to the child.  
 
Five of the family lawyers who indicated that they would generally advise 
mothers to agree to interim direct contact confirmed this in their responses to the 
interim case scenario, and two solicitors whose general advice would depend on 
the circumstances indicated that they would persuade the mother in the interim 
case scenario to agree to some contact. These respondents indicated that they 
would use various means of persuasion ranging from ‘advice’ on the approach 
the courts would take, to ‘encouragement’, to more explicit coercion, and would 
only support the mother in opposing contact if she is “resolute” or “adamant.” 
                                                 
30
 N = 6 
31
 N = 3 
32
 N = 4 
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“Well, you’ve got to take their concerns seriously. I think you’ve got 
to make it clear to them that some level of contact should take place 
and, you know, we have to meet their concerns but also the needs of 
the child and the rights of the other parent to see the child. We 
certainly wouldn’t be here saying: no, no, no, no, there should be no 
contact at all. That would go against Resolution guidance and 
everything else that we have. You’ve got to be constructive about it, 
and realistic.” [Mr R, Solicitor, NE]33  
 
Ms A3 [Barrister, London] indicated that she would only be prepared to advise 
the mother in the interim case scenario to oppose direct contact if there was a 
threat to the child, not the mother: “Then I’d advise her that after the fact-finding, 
supervised contact will be the way that the court would be looking for the case to 
go, so she couldn’t stop contact forever.”  
 
It was surprising to hear from Ms P, who had explained forcefully how careful 
representatives must be not to put pressure on mothers or replicate the 
perpetrator’s behaviour, that although she felt that in the interim situation, the 
“ball is in the mother’s court,” she would not tell her this but would advise her to 
agree to some contact to appear ‘reasonable’, although contact needs to be safe:  
 
“As I said to my lady this morning, that at the final hearing you want 
them to be the sort of picture of reasonableness so, you know, you, 
it’s a fine balance for your client, about making sure if they want 
contact to take place…then knowing that the court will want contact 
to take place and it will take a dim view of contact not taking place.” 
[Ms P, Barrister, SW]  
 
On the other hand, Ms E [Barrister, London], who would give general ‘advice’ to 
mothers pending fact-finding hearings about the way that contact could be 
‘safely’ managed, was clear that she would not put any pressure on the mother in 
the interim case scenario to agree to any direct contact: “But if her instructions 
are: I’m not agreeing to anything, then I normally don’t, I’m not putting any 
pressure on, that’s for sure.”  
 
                                                 
33
 When asked how he would advise the mother in the interim case scenario, he said that he 
would need more information. 
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Three solicitors whose general advice to mothers would depend on the 
circumstances indicated that they would encourage the mother in the interim case 
scenario to agree to some direct contact (although this may depend on the full 
circumstances).  Ms K [Solicitor, NE] indicated that she would explain that, if 
there was ongoing contact at the time of the hearing, the court will want contact 
to happen if it can be made safe. This advice is surprising, since Ms K was firm 
in her view that courts do not order interim direct contact against the wishes of 
the resident parent. However, she did qualify her hypothetical advice to the 
mother by saying that if the court had decided that a fact-finding hearing was 
necessary it must mean that the violence was ‘serious’ and therefore direct 
contact should be opposed. 
 
Ms T’s advice to the mother in the interim case scenario would depend on factors 
such as the “level of violence” and the effect on the child. “Sometimes you’ll 
have mums alleging that the child’s traumatised by what they’ve seen and just 
the fact of them coming into contact with that person will, of itself, be harmful 
for the child.” However, Ms T then queried whether mothers are ‘genuine’ when 
they assert that the child is traumatised: 
 
“I’m finding more often actually, I’m getting mothers saying: this 
child’s been traumatised by this. And I don’t know whether that’s 
because the word has spread that, you know, this is the way of 
avoiding it or whether, it’s just that people are more aware of those 
issues and they’ve discussed it with Cafcass and they’ve discussed it 
with their solicitors and so they’re more on top of that.” [Ms T, 
Barrister, NW]  
 
The preference of judicial officers for children to have the least ‘invasive’ type of 
contact with fathers pending fact-finding hearings, together with the reluctance 
of some family lawyers to ‘stand up for’ their clients was demonstrated by the 
case of Re G (A Child) [2011],
34
 where the mother made allegations against the 
father of extremely serious physical violence and threats. Against the advice of a 
Cafcass officer, the judge concluded that interim contact should be supervised by 
the paternal grandmother, rather than take place in a contact centre. The mother’s 
solicitor accepted, on appeal, that she was not sufficiently ‘robust’ in presenting 
                                                 
34
 Re G (A Child) [2011] EWCA Civ 1147 
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the mother’s case to the judge. Wilson LJ was highly critical of the trial judge 
and allowed the mother’s appeal. He suggested that the solicitor should have 
highlighted the seriousness of the allegations against the father and of bullying 
and collusion by the grandmother, and that “where there is a history of 
substantial domestic violence, the question of whether contact arrangements will 
generate anxiety and distress for the mother, indirectly damaging for the child, is 
itself an important feature.”35  
 
2. Assessing risk after the fact-finding hearing 
The Practice Direction provides that, where domestic violence is found to have 
occurred, the court should apply the factors in the ‘welfare checklist’ and 
consider, in particular:  
 
“any harm which the child has suffered as a consequence of that 
violence and any harm which the child is at risk of suffering if an 
order for residence or contact is made and should only make an order 
for contact if it can be satisfied that the physical and emotional safety 
of the child and the parent with whom the child is living can, as far as 
possible, be secured before, during and after contact.”36  
 
What Paragraph 26 requires is an assessment of the ‘risk’ to the child and 
resident parent posed by future contact with the perpetrator.  In order to assist in 
exploring participants’ perceptions of the assessment of risk and the way in 
which they advise clients on final orders, they were presented with a case 
scenario [‘the final case scenario’] as follows: the mother alleged that the father 
had been violent towards her over a period of years, with allegations ranging 
from verbal abuse and threats through to kicking and punching. A fact-finding 
hearing was held and the judge made some findings against the father but not to 
the extent alleged by the mother: the father had been verbally abusive, had 
pushed and shoved the mother during arguments, and hit her once many years 
ago, and that all of this usually happened when he was drunk. The mother 
                                                 
35
 ibid [21] (Wilson LJ) 
36
 The Practice Direction  (n 1) [26] 
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opposed all contact on the basis that she was frightened of the father and believed 
that he would never change. The father did not accept the findings.
37
 
 
We have already seen that there is an ideological division between the ‘safe 
family man’ of child welfare discourses and the ‘dangerous perpetrator’ of 
domestic violence discourse. The ‘risk assessment’ provides the means for 
family law to resolve this ideological divide, for law and the psy discourses to 
attempt to make ‘knowable’ the ‘noise’ of the dangerous unknown by 
constructing the domestic violence perpetrator as ‘risky’ and therefore 
controllable rather than ‘dangerous’ and uncontrollable. This enables law to 
present the future as quantifiable and therefore predictable in order for law to 
fulfil its normative function. By keeping the violence separate and distinct from 
‘the benefits’ of contact, the image of the ‘safe family man’ can remain intact 
because the child can continue to ‘benefit’ from contact as long as the ‘risk’ is 
controlled. This was articulated by Ms Q [Solicitor, SW] who considered that 
contact is very important for children if there are no risk factors; if there are, the 
risk has to be ‘reduced’ so that contact can be ‘safe’ and therefore beneficial. 
 
Just over half of the respondents
38
 reported that courts do tend to direct risk 
assessments if findings or admissions of domestic violence are made, and four 
respondents observed that this is more likely to happen now than before the 
implementation of the Practice Direction.
39
 Their responses were validated by a 
number of participants’ comments on the final case scenario.  
 
Respondents expressed a range of views as to which agencies courts would turn 
to for risk assessments. These included adult psychologists or psychiatrists, 
Cafcass officers, or domestic violence perpetrator programmes/assessors 
                                                 
37
 This hypothetical case is fairly typical of outcomes following fact-finding hearings. At the 
stage when the interview schedule was prepared, no research findings were available on the 
typical outcomes of fact-finding hearings; the researcher therefore drew on her own professional 
experience of such hearings. Respondents to the pilot interviews confirmed that this was a 
‘typical’ outcome, and this was subsequently confirmed by Hunter and Barnett’s research (n 6) 
and by some of the respondents to this study. 
38
 N = 15, comprising:  Barristers = 5;  Solicitors = 6;  FCAs = 4 
39
 Similar findings were made by Hunter and Barnett (n 6). Respondents reported that 
perpetrators are referred for expert risk assessments quite or very often in 46.7 per cent of cases, 
and are never or only occasionally referred for such assessments in just over half of cases. 
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[‘DVPPs’], with a slight preference expressed for ‘experts’ (psychiatrists/ 
psychologists).
40
 However, a number of respondents considered that the costs 
and delay involved in expert risk assessments militated against courts ordering 
them.
41
  Respondents’ views were mixed on whether DVPPs are or should be 
directed to undertake risk assessments, and the likelihood of this happening 
seemed to depend to some extent on whether such agencies were available 
locally.
42
 
 
The most marked divergence of views centred on whether Cafcass has the 
necessary expertise to assess risk, or whether this is a task best left to ‘the 
experts’.43 Not surprisingly, Cafcass officers considered not only that they were 
more likely to be requested to assess risk, but that they had the necessary tools to 
do so, while some family lawyers expressed scepticism about the ability of 
Cafcass officers to undertake this task.
44
 Both Ms Y [FCA, London] and Ms N 
[FCA, SW] observed that Cafcass are being increasingly encouraged to assess 
risk, although both commented that it is ‘early days’ for Cafcass.   
 
The preference by many courts and professionals for ‘experts’ to assess risk 
instead of DVPPs or Cafcass officers is concerning, since generic adult 
psychiatrists and psychologists may not have particular expertise in the dynamics 
of domestic violence. Coy et al found that such reports tend to blame the women 
for the violence, for example by ‘provoking’ the perpetrator.45  It is suggested 
that the preference for ‘experts’ can be attributed to the generally increased 
reliance, by law, on expert ‘knowledge’ and to the pathologisation of domestic 
violence, which obscures the gendered power relations underlying it.  
 
                                                 
40
 Coy et al (n 5) 54, refer to studies which found that psychologists and psychiatrists are the most 
commonly appointed ‘experts’ to undertake risk assessments . 
41
 Psychiatrists/psychologists = 10; Cafcass officers = 9; specialist domestic violence agencies = 
8 
42
 Most respondents in the South West considered that Ahimsa, a local DVPP, would generally be 
considered the most appropriate agency to assess risk, and those in London reported a preference 
by courts for risk assessments by the Domestic Violence Intervention Project (‘DVIP’). 
43
 Section 16A of the Children Act 1989 provides that if a Cafcass officer suspects that the 
subject child is at risk of harm they must undertake a risk assessment and provide it to the court. 
44
 Ms U [FCA, NW] recognised that courts and family lawyers tend to query the expertise of 
Cafcass officers to assess risk. 
45
 Coy et al (n 5) 54 
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Cafcass officers had available to them, when the interviews were undertaken, the 
Cafcass Domestic Violence Toolkit,
46
 as well as the CAADA Risk Identification 
Checklist, which together provide detailed tools for undertaking a comprehensive 
risk assessment and which highlight the gendered dynamics of domestic 
violence.
47
 It is of concern that in 2012 the Domestic Violence Toolkit was 
replaced with a Child Protection Policy which does not provide detailed tools for 
assessing risk.
48
  Nevertheless, Cafcass officers, as well as specialist domestic 
violence agencies, should be better placed to assess ‘risk’ than the ‘experts’. 
However Coy et al found that women’s experiences of Cafcass interventions 
were mixed: while some Cafcass officers understood women’s concerns and the 
impact on children of having contact with abusive fathers, “[f]or many, however, 
reports failed to reflect women’s concerns and their accounts of violence,” and 
focused more on promoting contact than assessing risk.
49
  Coy et al found that 
the risks associated with contact between children and perpetrators were more 
accurately and consistently identified by DVPPs than by Cafcass officers, social 
workers, or generic psychologists and psychiatrists.  
 
2.1 How is risk ‘measured’? 
A key ‘indicator’ of risk for the majority of participants50 was the extent to which 
the father was able to admit the violence and accept the findings made against 
him. Fathers who remain ‘in denial’ after findings are made are generally seen by 
courts and professionals as not only ‘high risk’ but also incapable of 
reconstruction into ‘safe family men’, in particular because DVPPs will not 
accept perpetrators who do not admit their violent behaviour. 
 
“I think if there is no acknowledgement judges tend to then form 
quite a strong view that: we’re not going to get anywhere with this 
person in terms of being able to promote safe contact…I think what 
the judge would tend to be saying is: the concern is the potential for 
continued future violence, isn’t there, and if there is no 
                                                 
46
 The Domestic Violence Toolkit was first issued in 2005 and revised in 2007.  
47
 See, eg, Cafcass, Domestic Violence Toolkit, Version 2.1 (Cafcass 2007) 62, referring to 
Johnson and Hotton, ‘Losing control: Homicide risk in estranged and intact intimate relationships 
(2003) Homicide Studies 58-84 
48
 See Coy et al (n 5) 57 
49
 Coy et al (n 5) 55 
50
 N = 17 
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acknowledgement we can’t help someone address that behaviour so 
the risk remains.” [Ms K, Solicitor, NE]  
 
This view was validated by Ms K’s response to the final case scenario. Although 
she felt that “the findings aren’t especially at the serious end of the scale, as the 
capacity for that continues, the risk to the child [sic] because there is no 
acknowledgement of what has happened.”  
 
Acceptance of the findings was an important issue for Ms N, because she 
recognised the perpetration of domestic violence as a ‘choice’ by the perpetrator 
and therefore the denial of that violence as a deliberate decision to abdicate 
responsibility. In relation to the final case scenario, she observed that:   
 
“there has to be some responsibility for that pushing and shoving 
because it’s a choice, you choose to physically abuse, it doesn’t 
matter whether you’ve lost control or you’re in control…we are 
responsible for our own actions.” [Ms N, FCA, SW]   
 
For Ms E [Barrister, London], if the father denies the findings, it is so ‘obvious’ 
that he remains a high risk that “I don’t need a psychologist to tell me that 
necessarily.” For this reason, Ms E felt that some judges often assess risk, and 
are competent to do so. Indeed, she felt that if the father denies the violence, 
anyone with ‘common sense’ could assess risk:  
 
“I don’t think in my experience of working in XXX that I’ve ever 
had a DVIP direction, I’ve never had Judge XXX say: I need a risk 
assessment. Because I think Judge XXX or Judge YYY would do 
that risk assessment themselves. I think they would be competent 
enough to assess the risk themselves without needing somebody to 
assess it for them…and I don’t need a psychologist to tell me that 
necessarily that, the thinking being that if somebody admits their 
wrongdoing they can learn from their mistakes and therefore guard 
against it.” [Ms E, Barrister, London]  
 
These views were supported by the Court of Appeal in Re J (A Child)
51
 where it 
was held that the trial judge was “perfectly capable of making a fair and impartial 
assessment of the merits of the father’s application”.52  
                                                 
51
 Re J (A Child) [2012] EWCA Civ 720 
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In light of the importance attached to the admission of domestic violence and the 
acceptance of the court’s findings, it was not surprising to find that all family 
lawyers reported that they would advise the father in the final case scenario to 
accept the findings made against him so that contact could progress.  
 
“Stop drinking, keep your hands by your sides, be contrite, say that 
you’re willing to accept you’ve got problems and you’re trying to 
address them…And actually facing up to your problems and being 
contrite is likely to get you a lot further than just going to court and 
behaving like a rampaging bull. That would all be put across in the 
usual legalise speak, of course.” [Mr R, Solicitor, NE] 
 
Ms B reported, more generally, that she normally advises perpetrators to admit 
the violence:  
 
“The court will look at whether you admit to things…If our clients 
come in and there’s a sort of raft of accusations against them, and 
they’re saying: no, I never even shouted at her, we say: no, that 
doesn’t sound very realistic in terms of what’s being explained, that 
the court will take into account your ability to accept what you’ve 
done and take steps to change.” [Ms B, Solicitor, London] 
   
Implicit in these family lawyers’ advice to fathers is their acceptance that it is 
law’s construction of ‘the facts’ that will determine future decision-making, 
whether or not the father accepts ‘the truth’:  
 
“That everybody treats, now treats those findings as truth and he has 
to, if he wants to move matters on, he’s gonna have to accept the 
findings, acknowledge his behaviour and the harm it’s caused and the 
expectation is likely to be that he will need to, you know, address and 
change his behaviour through some sort of input of some kind, if you 
can find it.” [Ms L, Solicitor, SW] 
 
Despite the importance attached to the acceptance of the court’s findings, seven 
respondents indicated that such acceptance is very rare, which suggests that the 
advice of family lawyers frequently falls on deaf ears.
53
 It would also seem that 
                                                                                                                                    
52
 ibid [7] (Thorpe LJ) 
53
 The rarity of admissions by perpetrators was confirmed by Hunter and Barnett’s research (n 6) 
which found that most commonly, perpetrators would admit some or none of the allegations and 
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perpetrators tend to deny allegations in the first place: “it’s more likely than not 
the father will be saying: well, there wasn’t any.” [Ms A3, Barrister, London] Ms 
T [Barrister, NW] observed that if perpetrators are going to accept their violence, 
they will do so before any fact-finding hearing. Ms B indicated that fathers 
generally deny the violence and refuse to accept findings made. She would say to 
fathers:  
 
“The court are going to focus on your capacity to change and your 
appreciation of the past violence, whereas they’ve made these 
findings, these are facts and your denying them is only going to make 
things worse for you, not better. But they still wouldn’t probably 
accept that.” [Ms B, Solicitor, London]  
 
It was noticeable that of the many and varied examples of cases provided by 
participants in response to all questions, hardly any were given of fathers who 
had actually accepted findings made against them.
54
  
 
Even where fathers appear to admit some violence, this may not be a true 
reflection of their attitude, and they may be quick to resile from any 
‘concessions’ made. Ms L [Solicitor, SW] provided an example of a case where, 
at the fact-finding hearing, the parties had “cobbled together” concessions but 
when she later represented the father, he said that he had never perpetrated any 
violence and had never even agreed that he had done so.  
 
The refusal of many fathers to admit the violence or accept findings was revealed 
by the extent to which fathers are considered suitable for DVPPs. Mr V [FCA, 
NW] commented that attendance on such programmes is “not very common” for 
this reason. Ms E observed: “Because DVIP said: well, this man denies it still. 
Well, of course he denies it, he had a fact-find, what do you expect? You know, 
if you get to a fact-find they normally still deny it.” [Ms E, Barrister, London] 
 
                                                                                                                                    
that it was rare for all of the allegations to be admitted. Yet it was also found that some or all of 
the allegations would be found proved. 
54
 A couple of respondents referred to fathers who had accepted findings made against them and 
attended DVPPs but these were in public law cases. 
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The case law confirms that in most cases, fathers tend to challenge all or most of 
the allegations of domestic violence, and do not accept the findings made against 
them, or in some cases only partially accept the findings, usually those of less 
‘severe’ violence.55 Despite this, as discussed above, there is an increasing 
perception among the higher courts that ‘unnecessary’ fact-finding hearings, 
instigated by mothers, are clogging up the court system but in none of the 
reported cases where fact-finding hearings were held and the mother’s 
allegations found proved, have courts constructed the ‘problem’ as one of 
perpetrators challenging allegations against them. 
 
For a minority of respondents, risk can also be ‘measured’ by the extent of the 
domestic violence:  
 
“I think if there are findings of domestic violence, and serious, not 
that any domestic violence isn’t serious, but serious domestic 
violence which has involved, um, the children either seeing or being 
in earshot and there being serious physical injury, then that 
introduces a risk element and I think if there’s any lack of acceptance 
by the party of the finding made by the court, it does weigh in the 
balance.” [Mr R, Solicitor, NE]  
 
Similarly Ms H, while acknowledging that acceptance of the findings is a “big 
issue”, struggled with the possibility of that factor alone militating against any 
direct contact:  
 
“And I really struggle with that, it’s tough. It depends on the degree 
of domestic violence, of course. I mean if it’s slightly historical and 
there’s been a change of circumstances and there’s some sense of 
understanding by the perpetrator,” she would ‘test out’ the father at a 
supported contact centre. [Ms H, FCA, SE]  
 
The difficulty of reconstructing ‘danger’ as ‘risk’ was articulated by a number of 
respondents:   
 
                                                 
55
 See Re A-T (Children) [2008] EWCA Civ 652; Re P (Children) [2008] EWCA Civ 1431, 
[2009] 1 FLR 1056; Re J (Costs of Fact-Finding Hearing) [2009] EWCA Civ 1350, [2010] 1 
FLR 1893; Re M (Children) [2009] EWCA Civ 1216, [2010] 1 FLR 1089; Re S (A Child) [2012] 
EWCA Civ 617; Re J (A Child) (n 51); Re W (Children) [2012] EWCA Civ 1788; Re S (A Child) 
[2012] EWCA Civ 1031 
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“So there’s a range of circumstances and I think we haven’t got 
enough assessment into, in place for those ranges of circumstances to 
feel confident about safety. And, you know, added to which are the 
ones where I felt children would be most at risk or where the worst 
has happened and mothers have been killed, have often been where 
there’s been no violence prior.” [Ms Y, FCA, London]  
 
Ms N [FCA, SW] gave an example of a case where the risk posed by the father 
was incorrectly assessed as low by magistrates after they made findings against 
him. Ms N was unsure at the time but told the researcher that her “gut instinct” 
was proved right when the father subsequently assaulted his new partner. 
 
Ms E thought that risk can never be ‘eliminated’, that is, it is impossible to 
guarantee a future free of ‘danger’:  
 
“But I don’t think the court can ever be completely reassured and I 
think, I often say that to mums, you know…we can’t offer you 
certainty, the court can’t offer you certainty, the risk assessor can’t 
offer you certainty, it’s a leap of faith…that’s not what we’re here to 
do. You know, if the court had to offer certainty then, um, probably 
very few fathers would have contact, I suppose, in these situations.” 
[Ms E, Barrister, London]  
 
Implicit in Ms E’s comment is the view that most violent fathers in contact 
proceedings are dangerous but are nevertheless beneficial to children’s welfare. 
For this reason, her solution to this uncertain, dangerous future is to make the 
risk ‘acceptable’ by keeping the parents apart physically. 
 
3. Application of the Paragraph 27 factors 
In determining what, if any, orders to make if domestic violence is proved or 
admitted, the Practice Direction requires a wider enquiry than assessing the risk 
of further abuse. The way in which that wider enquiry should be undertaken is 
set out in Paragraph 27 of the Practice Direction which provides that: 
 
“In every case where a finding of domestic violence is made, the 
court should consider the conduct of both parents towards each other 
and towards the child; in particular, the court should consider: 
(a) the effect of the domestic violence which has been established on the 
child and on the parent with whom the child is living; 
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(b) the extent to which the parent seeking residence or contact is 
motivated by a desire to promote the best interests of the child or 
may be doing so as a means of continuing a process of violence, 
intimidation or harassment against the other parent; 
(c) the likely behaviour during contact of the parent seeking contact and 
its effect on the child; 
(d) the capacity of the parent seeking residence or contact to appreciate 
the effect of past violence and the potential for future violence on the 
other parent and the child; 
(e) the attitude of the parent seeking residence or contact to past violent 
conduct by that parent; and in particular whether that parent has the 
capacity to change and to behave appropriately.” 
 
These factors give effect to Sturge and Glaser’s approach to assessing the overall 
effects and merits of contact between children and violent parents, by providing 
the means for determining not only whether contact can be ‘made safe’ but also 
whether it can be ‘beneficial’. This may mean that in some cases contact will not 
be considered beneficial, regardless of whether or not it can be made ‘safe’.56  
 
The majority of family lawyers,
57
 but only four Cafcass officers, reported that 
courts do consider the factors set out in Paragraph 27 of the Practice Direction 
when deciding on contact when domestic violence has been found, although most 
of these respondents observed that they would not usually be specifically referred 
to as a checklist but “in some shape or form”. [Mr R, Solicitor, NE] Ms P 
[Barrister, SW] observed that it was apparent from the questions that judges ask 
the parties that they have these issues in mind, and that some judges demonstrate 
an awareness of these factors even if the representatives do not raise them.  
 
Two solicitors and five Cafcass officers (but no barristers) reported that courts do 
not consider the Paragraph 27 factors: “No, they just make the findings, that’s it, 
and then they leave Cafcass to decide on everything else.” [Ms A, Solicitor, 
London] Ms A was adamant that she had never seen these factors addressed by 
courts and that all the court considers is whether the father accepts the findings. 
Indeed, Ms H [FCA, SE] said that she did not find judgments particularly helpful, 
for this reason.  
                                                 
56
 Claire Sturge and Danya Glaser, ‘Contact and Domestic Violence – The Experts’ Court 
Report’ (2000) 30 Family Law 615. Many of the opinions of Sturge and Glaser were adopted and 
approved by the Court of Appeal in Re L . 
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 Barristers = 6; Solicitors = 8 
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Three respondents
58
 were unsure whether courts do consider the Paragraph 27 
factors, or felt that they considered some of them but not others.  
 
“It’s a bit like the welfare checklist, isn’t it, you don’t necessarily 
pull it out and say: I have considered the likely effect of, do you 
know what I mean? Perhaps you should. I think magistrates often do, 
maybe magistrates would do this. I haven’t, I don’t think I’ve 
actually seen a judge pull it out and go through it bit by bit but that 
doesn’t mean to say that they haven’t got it firmly fixed in the back 
of their minds.” [Ms O, FCA, SW]59 
 
The factor that respondents most frequently mentioned courts taking into account 
was whether the father accepts the findings, followed by the impact and effect on 
the child and the resident parent of the father’s violence. Respondents’ views 
were far more ambivalent and mixed on the question of the father’s motivation. 
Of those who commented on this issue, four thought that courts do consider 
whether or not the father was motivated by a genuine concern for the child, but 
an equal number felt that courts either fail to question the father’s motivation, or 
are reluctant to believe that the father has ‘improper’ motives. Ms P reported 
having seen judges question the father about his motivation when giving 
evidence and Cafcass officers raising the issue in their reports:  
 
“Yeah again, you know, during questions, when you’re cross-
examining, if you haven’t covered that with them I’ve known judges 
say: what’s all this about then, you know, what are you really, do you 
really want this contact? Aren’t you just trying to see mum? So 
they’re aware of those issues, even if we’ve not raised them and, you 
know, generally we would.” [Ms P, Barrister, SW]  
 
On the other hand, Ms K [Solicitor, NE] was of the view that neither the courts 
nor Cafcass consider the father’s motivation or the impact of his conduct on the 
resident parent, and observed that it is difficult to persuade courts that the father 
has suspect motives for seeking contact. Ms T [Barrister, NW] also indicated that 
                                                 
58
 A barrister, a solicitor and a Cafcass officer 
59
 These views were supported by Coy et al’s research (n 5). Three quarters of the lawyers 
reported that judges “partially” consider the factors set out in Paragraphs 26 and 27 when 
domestic violence is found to have occurred but only ten per cent reported full compliance with 
the Practice Direction in this respect. 
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it is very difficult to persuade courts that the father is “motivated by anything 
other than a desire to see the children.”60   
 
Ms B [Solicitor, London] explained that while courts do consider the father’s 
motivation in seeking contact, they tend to approach it from the presumption of 
contact:   
 
“I think they do [pause] but obviously they’re coming from the 
stance that it’s best for the child to see the parent. So if someone’s 
expressing genuine concern to see their child, um, then they might err 
on the side of believing that. [Interviewer: How do courts decide that 
somebody has a genuine desire to see their child?] They say they do 
in their statement [laughs].”   
 
All respondents reported more than one source of information for courts to assess 
the Paragraph 27 factors, but the most common source cited by all groups of 
respondents was Cafcass reports.
61
 This was followed by the parents’ statements 
and oral evidence given at the trial, and the findings:  
 
“I’ve seen Cafcass officers’ reports with that theme, you know, 
giving a nod to those questions. But I’ve also, um, you know, when 
you’ve got people in the stand, judges ask the person a question as 
well, so you know, I think they’ve got it. And sometimes it’s not 
necessarily clear from the papers, but when they get in the witness 
box and start talking, then there’s a flavour of how they’re saying 
things and, you know, the demeanour and whatever.” [Ms P, 
Barrister, SW]  
 
However, Ms B alluded to the danger of courts relying on the perpetrator’s 
demeanour in the witness box:  
 
“I think judges often get a sense of how someone is as well from their 
oral evidence. Because you get some perpetrators who are very 
aggressive in their evidence. But some who don’t, and then I think 
that they might seem more reasonable…I think judges do tend to get 
a sense of people during their evidence, whether they’re right or 
wrong.” [Ms B, Solicitor, London]  
 
                                                 
60
 Similar views were expressed by Ms E [Barrister, London] 
61
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Ms B’s concerns were borne out by two decisions of McFarlane LJ. In Re W 
(Children)
62
 McFarlane LJ approved of the trial judge’s approach in deciding, on 
the basis of the mother’s oral evidence, that there should be no direct contact 
between the father and the children:  
 
“It does not require medical evidence before a judge can make the 
sort of finding that Judge Murfitt made on this occasion. She was 
particularly well placed to make the finding. She had sat through the 
fact finding hearing and had heard both of the parties give evidence 
to her and formed her own view as to the impact of the father’s 
presentation upon the mother’s ability to withstand it and the effect 
of it upon the mother’s emotional and physical health.”63 
 
However, in Re W (Direct Contact)
64
 McFarlane LJ formed the view that the 
mother was implacably hostile to contact and this seems to have influenced his 
approach to the way in which the trial judge negatively assessed the father, 
holding that judges: 
 
“must be cautious in undertaking a more profound assessment of a 
parent’s psychological or emotional wellbeing on the basis of their 
presentation in court. Judges are not psychologists and the courtroom 
is a wholly artificial environment in which to carry out any form of 
sophisticated evaluation of personality or predictive behaviour.”65   
 
It is suggested that McFarlane LJ’s contradictory views on this issue demonstrate 
how images of dominant parental subjectivities may underpin judicial 
assessments of parents. 
 
Although Cafcass reports were considered to be the most common source of 
information from which the Paragraph 27 factors are assessed, respondents were 
sharply divided by professional groups on the issue of whether Cafcass officers 
actually do consider the Paragraph 27 factors in their reports. Not surprisingly, 
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 Re W (Children) (n 55) 
63
 Ibid [26] (McFarlane LJ) 
64
 Re W (Direct Contact) [2012] EWCA Civ 999, [2013] 1 FLR 494 
65
 ibid [65] (McFarlane LJ). The trial judge in this case formed the view, on the mother’s 
evidence and presentation in the witness box, and in particular on the way in which she “broke 
down” and confirmed that she would not be able to cope with contact, that the mother was 
“entirely genuine” and her evidence could be relied upon in this respect. 
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most Cafcass officers reported that they did so,
66
 while the majority of family 
lawyers who responded to this question were clear that they had never seen these 
factors addressed in a Cafcass report.
67
 The remainder of participants who 
responded to this question were not sure, or indicated that FCAs sometimes or 
partly addressed the Paragraph 27 factors.
68
 Of this group, three family lawyers 
indicated that the quality of reports varies considerably, with some being 
“useless” while “good” reports would reflect the Paragraph 27 issues. Only three 
family lawyers (solicitors from the North West who were interviewed together) 
responded unreservedly that Cafcass officers do address these factors.  It is 
possible that the self-reports of some Cafcass officers may be attributed to 
response bias, since it was clear during the interviews that a number of Cafcass 
officers had never even seen Paragraph 27 before and two FCAs requested copies 
of it, both of whom had initially said that they did consider these factors.  
 
It would therefore seem that, if courts and professionals are relying on Cafcass to 
provide the information to enable courts to determine the factors set out in 
Paragraph 27, these issues may frequently be unaddressed, since it is highly 
questionable whether Cafcass officers regularly do so. The rarity of expert and 
DVPP reports as sources of information suggests that in most cases, if courts do 
indeed consider these issues, they are reliant on their own impressions of the 
parties from their statements and oral evidence, impressions which may well be 
underpinned by dominant images of ‘implacably hostile mothers’ and ‘safe 
family men’.  
 
The case law demonstrates an inconsistent application of Paragraph 27 by the 
lower courts and by Cafcass officers. In some cases those factors appear to have 
been ignored because of the perceived importance of contact and the 
downgrading of domestic violence. The appellate courts on occasions have been 
highly critical of judges who failed to consider those factors, and have 
emphasised the importance of applying them. In Re W (Children) Black LJ held: 
“One is left in no doubt by those paragraphs [26 and 27] as to the matters that 
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should be considered in every case.”69  On the other hand, the reported cases 
suggest that some trial judges do have these factors in mind even if they are not 
expressly stated, and in those circumstances they are less likely to order direct 
contact where fathers have been unwilling to acknowledge their violent conduct 
and its impact on the mother and children and have been highly critical of fathers 
for failing to do so. In Re E (Contact)
70
 the trial judge found that the physical and 
sexual violence perpetrated by the father against the mother was so serious that 
contact would impact on the mother’s capacity to care for the child, and could 
lead to the father discovering the mother’s whereabouts.  
 
4. Advice by family lawyers about outcomes where 
domestic violence is proved or admitted 
 
Most family lawyers indicated that even if domestic violence is proved, they 
would advise the mother to agree to contact, although many of them did focus on 
the safety and risk aspects of direct contact:   
 
“I’ve had lots of cases which involve domestic violence and often the 
resident parent, or the victim, will deny contact because they’re 
concerned about that person’s behaviour. And it can be quite difficult 
to explain to them, the court always take a view that it’s in the child’s 
best interests to have a relationship with the other parent, but it has to 
be safe. I’ve not come across many cases where they have not 
ordered any contact, to be quite frank, save for a couple.” [Ms C, 
Solicitor, SE] 
 
A number of respondents indicated that they would advise the mother on the 
presumption of contact and that if the judge gives an indication that contact 
should happen:  
 
“it’s usually better for mum to take on board what the judge has said 
and come to the agreement herself, um, rather than have it imposed 
upon her, because you can usually put in place safeguarding, um, or 
                                                 
69
 Re W (Children) [2012] EWCA Civ 528 [15] (Black LJ). See also Black LJ in Re S (A Child) 
(n 55) 
70
 Re E (Contact) [2009] EWCA Civ 1238, [2010] 1 FLR 1738. Although the judge adjourned the 
final determination of the matter, he expressed the view that the father’s application for contact 
was almost bound to fail.  See also Re W (Children) (n 55) [21] (McFarlane LJ), discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
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maintain the risk, manage the risk to mum. And it’s just explaining to 
her that we can manage the risk to you, then it is in the best interests 
of the child to have a relationship with dad.” [Ms A2, Solicitor, NW] 
 
Some family lawyers indicated that they would persuade the mother to agree to 
contact by emphasising the advantages to them of maintaining some control over 
the outcome since the court will inevitably order contact:  
 
“Just discussing with her what options she would be agreeable to 
really, and saying to her: look, if you don’t agree something, in all 
likelihood the court will order something if they feel the children and 
you are safe, so it’s better to try and agree something perhaps rather 
than have something imposed upon you.” [Ms D, Solicitor, SE]71 
 
Although most family lawyers did not ignore the risk and safety aspects of 
contact, they indicated that they would focus on ‘reassuring’ the mother that 
contact could be managed safely for her and the child, as a further means to 
persuade her to agree to it. For these lawyers, the mother’s fear of the father is 
seen as an obstacle to overcome to enable contact to happen, rather than a 
consequence of the coercive control that the father may exercise over her, which 
illustrates how the theoretical understanding of many family lawyers of the 
controlling aspects of domestic violence may not translate into practice. 
 
Most of these lawyers were not openly coercive in their advice. However, a few 
indicated that they would use more forceful strategies such as alluding to the 
court changing residence, or enforcement proceedings:  
 
“I suppose you’d have to advise her, you know, that the courts with a 
view [sic] that contact should take place and obviously if she doesn’t 
cooperate with contact orders you’re looking at potentially 
enforcement proceedings, aren’t you?” [Mr Z, Solicitor, NW] 
 
It is only in very extreme circumstances that family lawyers would support the 
mother in opposing direct contact: “I suppose if the domestic violence was so 
severe it’s been witnessed by the child, that child has been harmed emotionally 
and is at potential risk of serious harm in the future.” [Ms C, Solicitor, SE] 
                                                 
71
 Ms Q [Solicitor, SW] indicated that she would give similar advice. 
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Family lawyers’ reports of the advice they would give to mothers if domestic 
violence is proven were confirmed by their responses to the final case scenario. 
The majority of family lawyers
72
 said that they would advise the mother to agree 
to contact, primarily because they did not consider the findings made ‘serious 
enough’ to warrant the mother’s opposition to contact.  Ms F indicated that she 
would give forceful, almost coercive, advice:  
 
“I would tell her to get real, and start thinking positively, not for her 
sake but for the child’s sake because, from experience, this can 
backfire in later life and the child could turn on her and it has 
happened…and it is always a problem, that if this continues, this 
situation continues, then residence may be in question.” [Ms F, 
Barrister, SE] 
 
The remaining family lawyers from this group indicated various strategies that 
they would use to persuade mothers to agree to contact. Most would point to the 
likelihood or inevitability of the court ordering some direct contact, emphasising 
to the mother that her most ‘serious’ allegations were not proved, and 
downplaying or minimising the findings that were made. Clearly, they perceived 
the father’s behaviour in the final case scenario to be too low down the scale to 
warrant the mother’s opposition to contact. Ms E, for example, said that as the 
findings made were “less than” those alleged, less weight would be placed on 
them and “so I’d probably say to her that contact is probably likely to be ordered, 
if it’s verbal, pushing and shoving during arguments while under drink, and hit 
her once a long time ago.” [Ms E, Barrister, London] Although some family 
lawyers did point out that the court would be likely to take “a dim view” of the 
father not accepting the findings, they would explain to the mother that this 
would be unlikely to prevent the court ordering contact, despite nearly all these 
family lawyers considering that fathers who do not accept findings made against 
them pose a high risk.  
 
Family lawyers may also bolster their advice with their own understandings of 
children’s psychological welfare:  
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“The mother’s got to be aware that even with findings having been 
made, there is still a rationale for the children to grow up with a 
knowledge of their paternal family…so yes, I mean, the findings, as 
we know, are not necessarily the  be all and the end all in terms of the 
relationship if the children have enjoyed contact with him.” [Mr R, 
Solicitor, NE]
73
 
 
A minority of family lawyers focused on the father’s conduct and on the steps 
that he should take, seeing the findings that had been made as serious and the 
mother’s fear of the father as ‘justified’.74 These respondents indicated that they 
would advise the mother that the father should either have a risk assessment 
and/or attend a perpetrator programme, including “an assessment of the impact 
upon mum if she is saying that she continues to be frightened and how that 
would affect her parenting.” [Ms K, Solicitor, NE] However, Ms K remarked 
rather despondently that “that has never really been an argument here…I mean, 
we’ve won cases before where we’ve said mum remains so scared that it’s going 
to impact on her parenting and her ability but I don’t think the judges have had a 
lot of sympathy for that argument.”   
 
Two family lawyers, Ms D [Solicitor, SE] and Ms P [Barrister, SW], when 
speaking in general terms, had made it very clear that they would never advise or 
coerce a client to agree to contact where there is a history of domestic violence.  
Yet in relation to the final case scenario, both Ms D and Ms P indicated that they 
would advise the mother that the court would expect contact to take place and 
that she would therefore be better off agreeing to it. 
 
Only three family lawyers, all solicitors, indicated that they would not try to 
persuade the mother to agree to contact.
75
 Ms L’s view was that the father has “a 
mountain to climb” because he is not accepting the findings: “Certainly that’s the 
approach the court should take, so that’s the advice you’d give her.” [Ms L, 
Solicitor, SW] Ms B said that she would advise the mother that although it was 
                                                 
73
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75
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not a completely positive outcome, she would not push the mother to agree to 
contact: 
 
“But I wouldn’t say: well now, there’ve been only half the findings 
been made, you’ve got to allow contact, I would never push someone 
into agreeing contact when it didn’t seem, when they thought they 
were at risk or the children were at risk.” [Ms B, Solicitor, London] 
 
5. Orders when findings of domestic violence are made 
Current court statistics reveal that, despite the prevalence of domestic violence in 
contact proceedings,
76
 orders for no contact, or refusals of contact applications, 
are extremely rare.
77
 In none of the cases in which the women interviewed by 
Coy et al were involved were orders for ‘no contact’ made.78 Similarly most 
respondents to Hunter and Barnett’s survey agreed that orders for no contact are 
rarely made; the most common orders following findings of fact were supervised 
contact,
79
 indirect contact,
80
 or supported contact.
81
 The reported cases 
demonstrate that even where findings of domestic violence are made, the lower 
courts may order direct contact against the wishes of the mother, or a less 
restrictive form of contact than that proposed or agreed to by the mother.
82
 
 
It was not surprising, therefore, that many interview respondents indicated that, 
even where domestic violence is proved, this ‘hardly ever’ or ‘very rarely’ results 
in no direct contact. The majority of respondents considered that the court in the 
final case scenario would order some direct contact, if not immediately, but at 
some stage thereafter. “More often than not, even when findings have been made, 
contact will eventually be ordered either as supported/supervised, and then 
eventually unsupported.” [Ms E, Barrister, London] Indeed, Ms E had never 
                                                 
76
 As discussed in Chapter 3, domestic violence may be prevalent in at least 70 per cent of contact 
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encountered a case recently where the court ordered indirect contact only after a 
fact-finding hearing. 
 
“Many relationships have domestic violence in them but only a 
fraction of contact cases fail…When you look at how bloody awful 
some of our cases are and the experiences of the children, it’s 
remarkable how few cases no contact is ordered. It is remarkable 
given we deal with the toughest ten per cent of cases where 
relationships break down and there are children.” [Mr J, FCA, NE] 
 
Despite these views and the continuing decline in the numbers of applications for 
contact that are refused, a significant minority of respondents
83
 thought that the 
Practice Direction has had an effect on courts’ decisions on contact where 
domestic violence is found to have occurred.   
 
“I think even with the guidance we haven’t reverted to a position 
where the judge has said: alright, there has been domestic violence 
but I still want contact to be established at this first hearing. They 
have been at least prepared to allow a Section 7 report to look at the 
issues and thereafter for there to be a hearing. Whereas possibly 
previously a judge would be saying: well, alright, there has been 
domestic violence but I still want something to be set up now.” [Ms 
K, Solicitor, NE]  
 
All three solicitors based in the North West said that courts are less likely to 
order contact where findings of domestic violence have been made, and Ms A1 
[Solicitor, NW] said that courts focus more on how contact can be made safe for 
the child. The four Cafcass officers who shared this view indicated that courts are 
now more “wary” or “cautious” and have a greater awareness of the issues 
involved.  
 
“I think in cases where we’ve actually said: this really is too 
dangerous to proceed, I think I don’t feel so nervous I suppose these 
days about saying: no, I think there should be no contact, I think I 
feel more secure in doing that than perhaps I did a few years ago.” 
[Ms O, FCA, SW]  
 
On the other hand, seven family lawyers thought that the Practice Direction has 
had no real effect on outcomes, although they approached this from different 
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perspectives. Ms G [Barrister, SE] and Ms M [Barrister, SW] thought that judges 
have always considered domestic violence to be an important factor, while the 
remaining participants thought that domestic violence continues to be given a 
low priority. Ms B [Solicitor, London] considered that it is debatable whether 
outcomes have been affected by the Practice Direction because “it might well be 
the same outcome but a different way of getting there,” while Ms L thought that 
the courts “pay lip service” to the Practice Direction, and unless a Cafcass report 
makes very clear recommendations, “it’s quite difficult to persuade the court that 
they should limit contact.” [Ms L, Solicitor, SW] 
 
Ms D approached this issue from the father’s perspective. She thought that the 
Practice Direction has had no impact on how courts determine contact, but that it 
has lengthened the process, thereby delaying contact for fathers: “Because it 
drags it out longer for mum and for dad where he should be having some contact, 
he’s not having contact for a significant period.” [Ms D, Solicitor, SE] 
 
The lack of impact of the Practice Direction on the lower courts is demonstrated 
by the case of Re W (Children)
84
 where the father, who was having contact in a 
contact centre, sought unsupervised contact. Findings of violence were made 
against him but the judge permitted the father to take the children out of the 
contact centre during contact visits, describing the findings “as serious but not so 
serious that there should not be any contact at all”.85 Black LJ allowed the 
mother’s appeal and was highly critical of the trial judge for ordering 
unsupervised contact without a Cafcass or expert’s report, and discredited the 
judge’s evaluation of the seriousness of the findings. 
 
The factors most commonly cited by the majority of family lawyers
86
 that would 
militate against the court ordering direct contact are the severity of the violence 
and/or how ‘historic’ it is, so that only ‘recent’, extremely serious physical 
violence would lead to no contact being ordered.
87
 Domestic violence that is 
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considered to be “minor” or even in the “mid bracket” is not considered 
sufficient.
88
 Additionally, the perpetrator’s failure to admit the violence or accept 
the findings was also cited as a factor that may persuade the court not to order 
any direct contact, although if the violence is not considered serious enough, 
such failure may not, in itself, be seen as a good enough reason.  
 
The examples provided by respondents of cases where no direct contact was 
ordered by the court demonstrate the extreme circumstances where this might 
happen.  
 
“I’ve had one recently where there has been a psychological 
assessment which says that he is quite dangerous and if there was to 
be even supervised contact, then if he was to be challenged in any 
way he could become quite violent. Um, so at the moment he’s 
having indirect contact where he’s been, the contents of his letters are 
inappropriate and they’re having to go through Cafcass, so it looks as 
though that’s going to be stopping as well.” [Ms C, Solicitor, SE] 
 
“I had one case in xxx FPC at xxx where the…domestic violence was 
really at the most serious end I’ve ever seen. A broken jaw, two 
convictions for ABH, she was hospitalised whilst pregnant, in front 
of the children, you know, everything under the sun, and it was, um, 
obviously proved…but I completely expect dad not to get any direct 
contact because mother is terrified of him and it was visible in court, 
she couldn’t even barely speak when he’s there. He denies all of 
them so his risk is obviously high…I think that’s the sort of case 
where…it becomes a no direct contact case.” [Ms E, Barrister, 
London] 
 
Ms S [Barrister, NW] gave an example of a case of extremely serious violence, 
including attempted rape and murder. The children were present when the mother 
was very seriously injured, and the judge ordered indirect contact only. However, 
it was concerning to hear Ms S report that she anticipated that “there will be 
direct contact in due course” because the children had a “very positive 
relationship” with the father, albeit “in a very disturbed way”.  
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These responses suggest that professionals perceive an ‘acceptable’ level of 
domestic violence which mothers and children should tolerate in the interests of 
promoting contact with fathers. This was implicitly recognised by Ms O:  
 
“You may get a few solicitors that argue and say: oh, but it was only 
a bit of a slap or something. I think in general I think the courts 
accept that if we’ve said that this indicates there’s a level of violence 
here that is unacceptable then they would ask for further assessment 
and I don’t think they’ll get any further.” [Ms O, FCA, SW]  
 
However, the level of abuse that mothers and children may be expected to 
tolerate because of the importance placed on contact can be seen in those cases 
where trial judges have made findings of severe physical violence and refused to 
order any direct contact but their orders have been overturned or modified on 
appeal.
89
 These cases reveal the unrelenting messages from the appellate courts 
about the importance of persevering with contact, even in cases of proven 
domestic violence. In Re P (Children) Ward LJ concluded that contact should not 
be stopped unless it is the last resort for the judge, and allowed the father’s 
appeal, expressing concern that the trial judge had not “grappled with all the 
alternatives that were open to him” to enable contact to be resumed.90 
 
A similar reluctance to ‘give up on’ contact was also demonstrated by some of 
the participants in this study. Ms M gave an example of a father she was 
representing at the time who was considered so dangerous that all his contact had 
to be fully supervised. He had a “history of significant offending” and was “a 
very, very aggressive man”.  
 
“And he desperately wants to see his child and that is genuine, but 
the issue really is that actually he poses quite a significant risk to, to 
women in general, so the question is: what do we do from here?” [Ms 
M, Barrister, SW]  
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One may query why it was considered beneficial to the child to have contact with 
a father who would require fully supervised contact indefinitely.  
 
Ms I gave an example of a case that had been ongoing for three years before she 
became involved, in which the father had a problem with drugs and had been 
violent towards the mother, had failed to undertake drug testing or engage with 
the DVIP, and had not turned up for supervised contact. Ms I wrote to the court 
and said:  
 
“Basically enough’s enough here, dad’s had ample opportunity in 
three years of his application which is publicly funded…I asked the 
court to withdraw the contact, to leave it indirect…and I go into the 
court and he says: Mrs I, I agree entirely with you.” [Ms I, FCA, NE]  
 
The fact that the case had been ongoing for three years despite the father’s failure 
to engage at all gives an indication of the lengths to which the courts will go to 
promote contact, however reprehensible the father’s conduct, and however 
uncommitted he may be. 
 
The age of the child and his/her wishes and feelings were cited by only three 
respondents
91
 as factors that may affect the court’s decision when findings of 
violence have been made. While Mr R [Solicitor, NE] thought that “if they are 
nine or ten and have very clear recollections of mummy being beaten up then he 
may well have cooked his goose and it may be indirect contact”, Ms F [Barrister, 
SE] thought that a child’s wish to see a violent father could tip the balance the 
other way. 
 
Four family lawyers said that the final order of the court after findings have been 
made would also depend on “what contact was happening” at the time of the 
hearing. If, therefore, some direct contact was established prior to the fact-
finding hearing, it is unlikely that the findings would lead to that being stopped 
or even curtailed.  
 
                                                 
91
 Two family lawyers and an FCA 
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The majority of family lawyers either approved of courts ordering direct contact 
after findings of fact have been made, or did not express a view on this. However, 
most of the Cafcass officers expressed concern about this, as did a minority of 
family lawyers.
92
 Ms B half-jokingly observed that she has encountered some 
cases where the court ordered staying contact following findings of domestic 
violence being made. 
 
What emerged from many of the responses was the incremental way in which 
contact ‘progresses’ and a fatalistic attitude towards the inevitability of contact 
being ordered. Ms E explained that contact would typically start as either 
supported or supervised and then eventually progress to unsupported which led 
her to query the purpose of fact-finding hearings:  
 
“Because you go through all of that three days of evidence and so 
forth, and then the most likely outcome is that they order contact 
anyway, in a contact centre, supervised or supported, depending on 
what facilities are available.” [Ms E, barrister, London]  
 
Ms P gave an example of a case of ‘historic’ domestic violence where contact 
was already taking place in a supported contact centre and after the findings the 
judge directed it to take place unsupervised because the contact had “moved on” 
by then.  
 
“And I think that’s one of the problems in this sort of scenario is that 
by the time you get to the final hearing you’ve generally moved 
beyond the point that you started at, where there was a massive 
dispute…you’ve had quite a lot of professional input from Cafcass so 
the parties’ views then may be softened, there has mainly been a bit 
of insight into the other or they’ve learnt how to play the game, you 
know…you get to the point where it doesn’t make a huge amount of 
difference and it’s sort of inevitable that the contact is going to move 
on.” [Ms P, Barrister, SW] 
 
The majority of Cafcass officers interviewed
93
 reported that courts do generally 
follow their recommendations if findings of domestic violence are made:  
 
                                                 
92
 Ms K [Solicitor, NE], Ms L [Solicitor, SW] and Ms B [Solicitor, London] 
93
 N = 9 
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“I’ve never had a judge in either court turn round and say: oh, the 
Cafcass officer’s going a bit over the top here, isn’t she? You know, 
I’ve never had that. Certainly my personal relationship with the 
judges is very good and they will go along with what I’m 
recommending, what risks I’m identifying.” [Ms H, FCA, SE]  
 
Ms N observed that if she recommends no direct contact, courts would follow 
that recommendation if she is very clear:  “They would normally listen to us, I 
think, if we go very clear. If we go all woolly then they’re not going to listen to 
us, are they?” [Ms N, FCA, SW]94 
 
Only Ms I remarked, rather, gloomily, that many judges do not even read Cafcass 
reports let alone follow their recommendations:  
 
“You’ve got the family court adviser’s report. ‘Have I? Oh, I must 
have mislaid that.’ That happens. That happens so many times. And 
they don’t read them and I find that. Because then I feel they’ve got 
their views on what they’ve heard without looking at what I’ve got.” 
[Ms I, FCA, NE] 
 
Since orders for no contact following findings of domestic violence are so rare, 
these views suggest that it must be unusual for a Cafcass officer to recommend 
no direct contact, and that they, too, are reserving such recommendations for the 
most ‘serious’ cases and/or where the father refuses to accept the findings made. 
Some support for this proposition was provided by Ms I [FCA, NE], a very 
experienced Cafcass officer, who said that she had only twice ever recommended 
no contact at all between the child and non-resident parent. 
 
6. Ensuring safety if final orders for contact are made 
The majority of family lawyers and Cafcass officers thought that the most likely 
type of contact that the court would order following the making of findings 
would be supervised or supported contact, depending on the severity of the 
findings, with a slight preference for supervised contact.  
 
                                                 
94
 Similar sentiments were expressed by Ms X [FCA, London]. Two family lawyers supported 
these views and observed that it is difficult to argue against a recommendation in a Cafcass report. 
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“I think it depends on the severity…If it’s in that mid-bracket, they 
may be looking at supervised contact, they may be looking at some 
sort of therapy, involving the child and the absent parent 
meeting…and then Cafcass becoming involved to do the 
reintroduction, to manage it.” [Ms G, Barrister, SE]  
 
Whether such an order is safe and appropriate depends, of course, on what 
professionals and courts consider to be “mid bracket” domestic violence. Clearly 
Ms G did not think that the father’s conduct in the final case scenario fell within 
this category as she suggested that his contact would eventually move on to 
being unsupervised. Ms M [Barrister, SW] thought that, if the findings were of 
“minor” domestic violence, such as “pushing and shoving”, the court would be 
likely to order contact straight away.  
 
In relation to the final case scenario, most family lawyers suggested that the court 
would be likely to order supervised or supported contact, although two thought it 
would probably progress more “slowly” or infrequently than if no findings of 
domestic violence had been made.
95
  
 
“The court here, sadly, probably still supported contact, 
notwithstanding that the father doesn’t accept the findings because of 
this, you know, the underlying principle that the child has a right to 
have a relationship with the parents and the judge might well think: 
well,…I haven’t been persuaded that the mother’s proven all her 
allegations, um, whether that’s the right approach, you know, that’s 
another matter.” [Ms L, Solicitor, SW]  
 
However, all respondents who commented on the issue of the availability of 
supervised and supported contact centres reported severe resource limitations, 
particularly for fully supervised contact but also, in many areas, for supported 
centres.
96
 Large tracts of the South West, particularly rural areas, appeared to be 
completely bereft of any contact centres:  “We have a dearth of supervised and 
supported contact and at the moment [the agency running the contact centres has] 
gone bust so there’s absolutely none whatsoever.” [Ms Q, Solicitor, SW]  
 
                                                 
95
 Ms A [Solicitor, London] and Ms A3 [Barrister, London] 
96
 Similar findings were made by Hunter and Barnett (n 6) 
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Six respondents commented on the very long waiting lists for supported, as well 
as supervised, contact; waiting lists of up to six months for supported contact 
were not uncommon.  While supported contact may be free of charge, the cost of 
supervised contact, where it is available, appears to be prohibitive for the vast 
majority of families.
97
 Six respondents said that Cafcass may have funding for 
blocks of six contact sessions as part of a contact activity, but this appears to be 
patchy and depend on local resources. Four family lawyers commented that 
judges may order supported contact, even where supervised contact is considered 
necessary, because of the lack of facilities for supervised contact, as “the next 
best thing”,98 and even if supervised contact is directed, in reality it would end up 
at a supported contact centre because of the lack of available facilities and 
funding for supervised contact. 
 
Eight family lawyers
99
 but only one Cafcass officer
100
 thought that supervised or 
supported contact centres do provide ‘safe’ contact in circumstances of domestic 
violence, with a slight preference for supervised contact, particularly if there is a 
risk to the child. However, a small minority of family lawyers but most Cafcass 
officers expressed concern about the safety of contact at a contact centre. Ms H 
[FCA, SE] and Mr V [FCA, NW] said that they would never recommend a 
supported contact centre for domestic violence cases,
101
 and Ms I [FCA, NE] 
expressed great concern about the fact that supported contact centres do not 
monitor what the father may say to the child.  
 
The unsuitability of even supervised contact in some cases of domestic violence 
was highlighted by Black LJ in Re S (A Child),
102
 where the trial judge made 
serious findings against the father of violence towards the mother and an older 
child, and of neglectful behaviour towards the subject child. Against the advice 
of a Cafcass officer, the judge ordered direct supervised contact on the basis that 
                                                 
97
 Ms M [Barrister, SW] reported that one supported contact centre charges £30.00, which may be 
outside many people’s reach. 
98
 Ms E [Barrister, London] 
99
 Barristers = 3;  Solicitors = 5 
100
 Ms U [FCA, NW] 
101
 Ms H qualified this by saying that she would never recommend supported contact centres in 
cases of “serious” domestic violence. Ms A3 [Barrister, London] also queried whether supported 
contact centres are appropriate in cases of “serious” domestic violence. 
102
 Re S (A Child) (n 55) 
303 
 
there would be no risk of physical harm to the child. Black LJ allowed the 
mother’s appeal, noting that the Cafcass officer’s anxiety “was not confined to 
physical violence…but related to emotional damage that she considered could 
occur because of the mother’s reaction to the contact starting and the father’s 
attitude to the mother in the contact that he had with his daughter.”103 
 
A further problem with contact centres expressed by some participants is that 
they only provide temporary assistance:  
 
“But that is very difficult because I think the message that the victim 
is receiving is that it’s only a matter of time before that contact’s 
going to progress into possibly unsupervised contact. And then how 
is it managed? Because by that time, often, it is out of the court arena, 
isn’t it?…Because, you know, how someone behaves in a supervised 
setting where there are rules and how someone is going to behave on 
a doorstep when the case is closed effectively.” [Ms K, Solicitor, 
NE]
104
   
 
Seven respondents reported that courts may require Cafcass officers to supervise 
contact in the absence of any contact centre provision, although Ms N expressed 
concern about the pressure on Cafcass to supervise or observe contact:  
 
“I think there is going to be more pressure on us and in recent times, 
because we’ve not been able to recommend any supervised contact 
because we haven’t had anyone to recommend, and so: will Cafcass 
undertake the supervising? No, we haven’t got time to do that!” [Ms 
N, FCA, SW]
105
   
 
In the absence of formally supported or supervised contact, the most common 
‘safety’ measures that appear to be recommended by Cafcass officers and 
directed by courts are supervision by family members, or contact ‘handovers’ 
being ‘staggered’ or managed by family or friends so that the parents do not need 
to come into contact with each other.
106
  
                                                 
103
 ibid [33] (Black LJ) 
104
 Ms T [Barrister, NW] and Ms D [Solicitor, SE] expressed similar views, and Ms X [FCA, 
London] said she would never recommend a contact centre if domestic violence has occurred for 
this reason. 
105
 These sentiments were echoed by Ms P [Barrister, SW] and Ms C [Solicitor, SE] 
106
 For similar findings see Coy et al (n 5). Nearly three quarters of the women reported that their 
concerns about safety did not lead to any restrictions or conditions placed on contact. Almost all 
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Six family lawyers
107
 and two Cafcass officers thought that ‘third party 
handovers’ are a helpful safeguarding measure. However, Ms B expressed 
concern about the use of family members for contact handovers because “they 
could use that to follow the person and find out where they are.” [Ms B, Solicitor, 
London] 
 
Another popular ‘safety’ measure suggested by Cafcass officers as well as family 
lawyers was contact or handovers taking place in a “public place” or a “neutral 
venue” such as McDonalds, supermarket car parks or outside a police station.108 
The various ‘safety’ measures that courts may consider in order to ensure that 
some contact takes place after findings of domestic violence have been made 
were summed up by Ms D:  
 
“I think if they can order direct contact in a safe environment that 
they would. Um, I think certainly they would prefer some form of 
contact to go ahead than nothing at all. Whether that be through a 
contact centre or, you know, meeting outside the police station, 
outside Tescos, so that, you know, there’s cameras about and people 
about so that they don’t see each other. Or the involvement of a 
friend or family, just to get some form of contact going, really. But 
they would, you know, take into account that there has been violence 
in trying to do it in a safe way.” [Ms D, Solicitor, SE] 
 
Ms D even suggested that the mother may supervise contact in somewhere like a 
children’s adventure playground: “so mum goes and sits by the tea and coffee 
things so that she’s in the building but dad goes off and plays with the child in 
the soft toy area or whatever, so that they’re in the same building in a secure 
environment.” [Ms D, Solicitor, SE] This cosy picture, underpinned by images of 
‘safe family men’, sits uneasily with the violent behaviour that these measures 
are intended to address. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
the women relied on family and friends for handover arrangements and some women felt 
compelled to supervise contact themselves. While supervised contact was considered by women 
as the safest form of direct contact, this was rarely ordered.  
107
 Barristers = 3,  Solicitors = 3 
108
 Mr V [FCA, NW], who thought that supported contact was “too risky”, suggested a 
supermarket car park with CCTV for the mother in the final case scenario, and observed that this 
is fairly common. 
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The problems inherent in using a ‘public place’ for contact or handovers were 
highlighted by Ms N and Ms B. Ms N [FCA, SW] spoke about a case where she 
stopped an arrangement for the parents to meet in a car park: “you know, park 
next to each other, but things still happen.”  
 
“I had a client beaten up at the bus stop down the road so, you know, 
in front of loads of people, and they continuing contact now 
anyway…and they’re just thinking: well, what other option do we 
have? And there are no other options, I suppose.” [Ms B, Solicitor, 
London] 
 
Other suggested safeguarding measures included: keeping the mother and child’s 
address and school confidential; conditions on contact and on communication 
between the parents; prohibited steps orders to prevent the father removing or not 
returning the child; undertakings or injunctions; “keep safe” work with the 
mother and child; and support for the mother from domestic violence agencies. 
Four family lawyers suggested Parenting Information Programmes [‘PIPs’] as a 
safeguarding measure and Ms U [FCA, NW] even suggested mediation as a 
“helpful” intervention following a fact-finding hearing. Ms F [Barrister, SE] 
thought that Family Assistance Orders may be helpful – “they can move 
mountains.”  
 
Six family lawyers
109
 expressed the view that the best way to address risk and 
safety is for the perpetrator to take steps to become safe by “addressing his 
behaviour”, accepting he has “done wrong” and “taking steps to change”. Ms Y 
[FCA, London] and Ms B observed that at the end of the day, contact may never 
be made completely safe:  
 
“And I think that if you get to the end of contact proceedings and 
there has been violence found really the only really safe thing is for 
the perpetrator to have gone through DVIP to the point where they’ve 
completely addressed all of their issues, which, well, you never know 
whether that’s forever anyway, or for there to be no contact…I think 
there are some times where I definitely think that there’s no way that 
anything ordered would ever be safe contact.” [Ms B, Solicitor, 
London]  
 
                                                 
109
 Barristers = 2;  Solicitors = 4 
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Ms P pointed out that a “one size fits all” approach will not necessarily address 
risk and safety:   
 
“Because it can be, you know, it can be quite low level violence but 
high level emotional control and the safeguards are different for each 
different scenario...I think with a lot of clients it’s not about what 
dads are going to necessarily do, it’s about what they’re going to say, 
how they’re going to say it, and just the way that they handle the 
children, whether there’s going to be favouritism, it’s all that kind of 
stuff.” [Ms P, Barrister, SW]  
 
Hunter and Barnett
110
 observe that the literature on contact arrangements where 
domestic violence has occurred suggests that different contact arrangements are 
appropriate depending on the level of risk, ranging from no direct contact with a 
very high risk parent, to supervised handover arrangements where parents should 
not come into contact with each other.
111
 The responses of professionals 
participating in this study, and of the participants in Coy et al’s research suggest, 
however, that unsafe strategies may be used even in ‘medium’ and ‘high risk’ 
cases because of the absence of appropriate resources for safeguarding women 
and children, and/or because the violence is minimised by courts and 
professionals. 
 
7. DVPPs and other interventions for perpetrators 
 
Women and family lawyers participating in Coy et al’s research reported that few 
Cafcass officers or social workers had any awareness of, or recommended 
domestic violence perpetrator programmes for fathers who were found to be 
violent.
112
 In several cases, interventions such as anger management, couples 
counselling and parenting programmes were recommended, which clearly are not 
appropriate in cases of domestic violence. Similarly research by Hunter and 
Barnett
113
 found that the most common form of service/assessment following 
                                                 
110
 Hunter and Barnett (n 6) 
111
 See Chris Newman, Expert Domestic Violence Risk Assessments in the Family Courts 
(Respect 2010), 
www.respect.uk.net/data/files/domestic_violence_risk_assessment_in_family_court.pdf, last 
accessed 03.02.13 
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113
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admissions or findings of domestic violence was referral to anger management 
programmes;
114
 referral to a DVPP was considerably less likely to happen.
115
  
 
It was therefore surprising to find that the majority of family lawyers 
participating in this study reported that judges and family magistrates would 
usually or often require the perpetrator to attend a DVPP if facilities and funding 
are available.
116
 However, both solicitors from the South East reported that they 
had never encountered a court requiring a perpetrator to attend a DVPP,
117
 and 
Ms A [Solicitor, London] said that she had only experienced this once. Four 
respondents indicated that it would depend on the particular judge as to whether 
or not the father was required to attend a DVPP. Ms E [Barrister, London] 
reported that the PRFD and Inner London FPC routinely refer perpetrators to the 
DVIP but that this is not court-wide practice, and she has never experienced a 
referral to a DVPP in two county courts in Essex that she frequently attends.  
 
Similarly the majority of Cafcass officers reported that if domestic violence was 
proved or admitted, they would recommend that the perpetrator attend a 
DVPP.
118
 Ms H reported that in her area of the South East, a DVPP had been 
established for the first time and was very enthusiastic about it:  
 
“The classic one which is fantastic because we’ve now got this 
resource, this Domestic Violence Perpetrator Programme which 
we’ve been, you know, crying out for years. Because it’s always that 
dilemma I had as a Cafcass officer: what do you do with this man? 
So there’s this great programme…and they’re brilliant.” [Ms H, FCA, 
SE]
119
    
 
Provision of DVPP resources and, in particular, funding for perpetrators to attend 
programmes, appeared to be very patchy and problematic, so that in many 
                                                 
114
 ibid 49.1 per cent ‘quite often’ or ‘very often’ 
115
 ibid 35 per cent ‘quite often’ or ‘very often’ 
116
 N = 10. Three family lawyers observed that referral to a DVPP may not be necessary if a 
perpetrator has attended or is attending an IDAP programme, which is a DVPP that convicted 
perpetrators are usually required to attend as part of their sentence. 
117
 As discussed below, this may have been because a DVPP provider had only just been 
established in their area at the time of the interviews. 
118
 N = 7 
119
 The willingness of Cafcass officers to recommend DVPPs for perpetrators was confirmed by 
four family lawyers. 
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instances, referral of a perpetrator to a DVPP may be more of an aspiration than a 
reality.
120
 In some areas, such as the South East and the North East, DVPPs 
appear to be available, while Devon and the North West were reported to be 
‘bereft’ of such services, with no funding for the few resources available. While 
in theory the DVIP offers a programme for perpetrators in London, all 
respondents based in London reported that neither Cafcass nor the Legal Services 
Commission
121
 would fund it. Similarly, even in those areas where providers are 
available, most respondents reported difficulties with funding for perpetrators as 
well as for the programme providers. Many respondents also reported long 
waiting lists.
122
 
 
Lack of availability of resources alone does not explain the low rate of 
attendance by perpetrators; it is likely that when some family lawyers referred to 
fathers attending DVPPs, they were actually referring to anger management. This 
is because a significant minority of family lawyers
123
 and a small minority of 
Cafcass officers interviewed used the terms ‘anger management courses’ and 
‘DVPPs’ interchangeably, not appearing to understand the differences between 
them. Ms F, for example, when asked whether courts are willing to refer 
perpetrators to DVPPs, responded: “Yes, anger management.” [Ms F, Barriser, 
SE] Similarly Ms L [Solicitor, SW] and Ms D [Solicitor, SE] commented that the 
father in the final case scenario should be required to go on an anger 
management course, but used the term interchangeably with a DVPP. This is not 
surprising, since the reported cases suggest that some senior judges are similarly 
confused about the differences between DVPPs and anger management 
courses.
124
   
 
Additionally, the responses of a few participants suggest that they saw domestic 
violence as an anger problem and therefore that anger management was the 
                                                 
120
 Funding for DVPPs should be available because in December 2008 Sections 1 to 5 and 
Section 8 of the Children and Adoption Act 2006 came into force, which amended Section 11 of 
the Children Act 1989 to include contact activity directions and conditions. Attendance at a 
perpetrator programme is included as a contact activity, for which government funding, through 
Cafcass, was made available.  
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 The Legal Services Commission has now been replaced by the Legal Aid Agency. 
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 Very similar findings were made by Hunter and Barnett (n 6) 
123
 N = 6 
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 See Re P (Children) (n 55) [36] (Ward LJ); Re W (Children) (n 55) [5] (McFarlane LJ)  
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appropriate intervention, or that a DVPP delivered anger management. 
According to Ms M:  
 
“I think the real issue in cases of domestic violence…[is] the courts 
not providing the assistance to the perpetrator to change and make 
the changes that are needed…the risk is always that that parent has 
emotional problems that’s led to his anger management or her anger 
management and without addressing that root cause, it’s a problem in 
perpetuity, isn’t it?” [Ms M, Barrister, SW]  
 
Even some senior members of the judiciary appear to consider that anger 
management is an appropriate intervention for domestic violence perpetrators, or 
that DVPPs deliver anger management. In Re C (Domestic Violence: Fact-
Finding Hearing)
125
 Thorpe LJ expressed the view that because the father had 
completed an anger management course, he could not understand why the 
Cafcass officer wanted the father to attend the DVIP.  
 
“The modules in the DVIP programme include stopping physical 
violence, emotional abuse, effects of domestic violence on partners and 
children, responsible parenting, harassment and stalking, sexual abuse, 
jealousy and tactics of isolation. They may indeed be said to be separate 
ingredients but obviously the control of passion is part and parcel of 
each programme.”126  
 
The appropriateness of anger management to ‘cure’ domestic violence is not a 
view shared by all the senior judiciary. In Re Z (Unsupervised Contact: 
Allegations of Domestic Violence) [2009]
127
 Wall LJ criticised the trial judge for 
referring to anger management, which, he said, has been discredited in many 
circles. 
 
Another reason for the low attendance of perpetrators to DVPPs is likely to be 
the requirement that they admit the violence, accept the findings against them, 
and want to change. Half of all respondents
128
 articulated an awareness of this 
requirement and of the reasons for it, and a few Cafcass officers said that they 
                                                 
125
 Re C (Domestic Violence: Fact-Finding Hearing) [2009] EWCA Civ 994, [2010] 1 FLR 1728. 
See also Re A-T (Children) (n 55) where the trial judge wanted the father to attend anger 
management. 
126
 Re C (Domestic Violence: Fact-Finding Hearing) (n 126) [19] (Thorpe LJ), emphasis added 
127
 Re Z (Unsupervised Contact: Allegations of Domestic Violence) (n 15) 
128
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would not recommend a perpetrator to a DVPP if they refuse to admit the 
violence:  
 
“Well, they wouldn’t get onto a programme without there being some 
acknowledgement as to what has happened otherwise it would be a 
very short lived programme, wouldn’t it, because the provider would 
be saying: I can’t get anywhere.” [Ms K, Solicitor, NE]  
 
Only two respondents, both young barristers, did not appear to understand the 
requirement for perpetrators to acknowledge their abusive behaviour: “Well, I’ve 
had that in cases, where they don’t acknowledge it, but surely that’s the purpose 
of the DVIP course, to teach them to acknowledge it, they’re not going to just 
acknowledge.” [Ms A3, Barrister, London] 129 
 
Respondents’ views on the format and ‘success’ of DVPPs were mixed. While 
three participants, all Cafcass officers, thought that the length of the DVPP is 
appropriate, and understood the reasons for this, four other respondents, 
including a Cafcass officer, were of the view that the programmes (usually about 
six to nine months) are “too long.”130 Ms A [Solicitor, London] gave an example 
of a case where findings were made against the father and the Cafcass officer 
recommended that he attend the DVIP, which she thought was “going 
overboard” because of the length of the programme and the risk, in her view, 
being “minimal”. Ms A3 [Barrister, London] also thought that DVPP 
programmes “slow down” the father’s contact unnecessarily.131 This view 
suggests a lack of understanding of the purpose and operation of such 
programmes, which have been carefully developed and validated at their current 
length, and cannot be curtailed if they are to operate effectively.  
 
Six respondents reported, to varying degrees, that programme outcomes can 
occasionally be successful.  The most optimistic was Ms P: “I’ve had cases 
where the father has gone off and done a perpetrator’s programme and done 
                                                 
129
 Similar views were expressed by Ms E [Barrister, London] 
130
 DVPP programmes are typically 32 weeks long. 
131
 For similar views see Hunter and Barnett (n 6) and Re C (Domestic Violence: Fact-Finding 
Hearing) (n 126) in which Thorpe LJ expressed the view that the 32-week programme run by the 
DVIP was an unnecessary drain on the public purse. See also Re P (Children) (n 55) (Ward LJ). 
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really well at it, and so he’s come out the other side.” [Ms P, Barrister, SW] On 
the other hand, four participants indicated that it is not uncommon for fathers to 
refuse to attend a DVPP, or if they do agree to undertake one, they commonly 
‘drop out’ and fail to complete it. Ms B reported that she had never encountered 
any perpetrator completing the whole programme:  
 
“And whether the other party can actually be bothered to stick it out 
that long and engage if they can, and they admit violence, then it’s 
pretty likely that some contact will be ordered. But quite a lot of 
people drop out or they just won’t admit anything…I’ve had people 
drop out at that stage a few times because they just get really angry 
[laughs].”132  
 
Similarly 40 per cent of respondents to Hunter and Barnett’s survey confirmed 
that they had experienced problems with perpetrators not attending or completing 
DVPPs, which most attributed to the long waiting lists to commence the 
programmes and the length of the programme itself, expressing some sympathy 
for the perpetrator in this respect.
133
 
 
Ms C [Solicitor, SE] queried the efficacy of the programmes even if the 
perpetrator does complete it, commenting, in relation to the IDAP programme, 
that the outcomes are very negative as most perpetrators do not tend to change. 
Mr R [Solicitor, NE] went even further and observed that fathers may agree to 
attend a DVPP to be “mischievous” and/or “go through the motions”.  Mr R also 
remarked that frequently fathers “go to one or two sessions but get fed up with 
it”. In those circumstances courts usually allow them the opportunity to go back 
on the programme. This demonstrates a lack of commitment by the perpetrator 
and a degree of latitude towards them by courts and professionals.
134
  
 
As far as other interventions for perpetrators are concerned, three family lawyers 
and two Cafcass officers reported that PIPs may be utilised as interventions for 
perpetrators, and their responses suggest that this is happening because they are 
                                                 
132
 Similarly Ms E [Barrister, London] said that she had never had a client who had completed a 
DVPP and was successfully ‘rehabilitated’. 
133
 Hunter and Barnett (n 6) 
134
 Similar findings were made by Coy et al (n 5). See Hunter and Barnett (n 6) for the various 
consequences of non-attendance at DVPPs reported by respondents to the survey. 
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considered an appropriate safeguarding resource, rather than in the absence of 
anything else: “Yes, it can actually prevent domestic violence I think, post 
separation, because it’s helping parents establish a way of managing contact in a 
constructive way without resorting to abusive phone calls.” [Ms H, FCA, SE] It 
is extremely concerning that PIPs, with their strong pro-contact message, are 
considered an appropriate resource where domestic violence has occurred.  
 
8. Discussion 
Prior to fact-finding hearings, before law has determined ‘the truth’ of the 
mother’s allegations, it is not known whether the father is a ‘dangerous 
perpetrator’ or a ‘safe family man’, or whether, if he turns out to be a ‘dangerous 
perpetrator’, that danger can be reconstructed as a ‘risk’. The mixed approaches 
of courts and professionals to the issue of interim contact reflect their difficulties 
in managing this unresolved ‘unknown’. 
 
Since fact-finding hearings appear to be held only in the most ‘serious’ cases of 
recent, severe physical violence, particularly where there is no ongoing contact 
between the father and child, these findings indicate that in those cases where 
interim direct contact is ordered against the wishes of the mother, the presumed 
benefits of contact are considered to be more important than all other 
considerations, including the factors that courts are obliged to consider under the 
Practice Direction. Additionally, it would seem that courts are most likely to 
resolve the problem posed by the father’s as yet undetermined status by relying 
on the ‘status quo’, rather than the alleged violence. Ironically, therefore, if the 
‘good mother’ permits the father to have contact, despite his violence, she may 
be penalised for this at the point when she wants the court and professionals to 
protect her and the child. 
 
The preference of courts and professionals for contact centres as the solution to 
the ‘problem’ of interim contact suggests that the main perceived threat to the 
child and mother is from the father’s physical violence. Those professionals, 
particularly Cafcass officers and a few family lawyers, who understand the 
broader implications of contact between children and abusive fathers, did not 
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consider contact centres, particularly those offering supported contact, to be a 
safe or appropriate option for interim contact. 
 
While a small minority of family lawyers (primarily solicitors) would strongly 
support mothers who oppose direct contact pending fact-finding hearings, most 
barristers but fewer solicitors appear to start from the premise that some direct 
contact will and should take place, and would not even attempt to argue a case 
for no interim direct contact, unless the mother is particularly ‘adamant’. So 
mothers may have to be very forceful and tenacious to resist the pressure from 
their own representatives. It is likely, however, that most of those family lawyers 
who indicated that they would advise mothers to agree to interim direct contact 
may not have appreciated how coercive their well-intended ‘advice’ could be. 
 
The greatest concern about interim contact was expressed by Cafcass officers, 
who were particularly worried about arrangements being agreed and orders made 
in their absence or without their knowledge. The extreme circumstances of the 
examples of cases given by Cafcass officers where they felt compelled to 
intervene and reverse interim orders made, indicates not only the highly 
dangerous contact that courts may order but also the strength of the presumption 
of contact.  
 
If domestic violence is proved at the fact-finding hearing (which appears to be 
the most likely outcome in the majority of cases), it would seem that the ‘risk’ 
posed by the father is most frequently determined by his ability to accept the 
findings made against him. The responses of participants to this study suggest 
that most fathers refuse to accept the findings and that they consider these fathers 
to be ‘in denial’ and therefore that law has determined ‘the truth’. Yet rarely are 
perpetrators held responsible for the need to hold fact-finding hearings; nor do 
these views seem to affect the firm belief of many of these respondents in the 
theoretical benefits to children of contact with non-resident fathers, including 
those who have perpetrated domestic violence. Additionally, these views suggest 
that most fathers against whom findings are made are ‘high risk’ (because they 
will not accept the findings), yet direct contact is the most likely outcome in such 
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cases. It would therefore seem that the bar for unacceptable risk is set extremely 
high. 
 
However, the Practice Direction requires courts to assess the overall effects and 
merits of contact between children and violent parents, not simply whether the 
‘risk’ can be managed and ‘made safe’. The extent to which courts apply 
Paragraph 27 can have a profound impact on the orders made where domestic 
violence has occurred and in particular, on the extent to which courts are 
prepared to order no contact. Participants’ responses, together with the case law, 
suggest that this enquiry may be underpinned by images of ‘safe family men’ and 
that many judges may lack awareness of the manipulative strategies of abusive 
men, so that they may be reluctant to accept that an abusive father is motivated 
by anything other than a desire to see the child. Furthermore, in the absence of 
Cafcass or ‘expert’ reports addressing the factors set out in Paragraph 27 of the 
Practice Direction, judges and professionals may ignore those factors and focus 
only on the immediate risk of further physical violence. Alternatively, judges 
may draw on their own impressions of parents in the witness box which, the case 
law suggests, may be filtered through images of implacably hostile mothers. On 
the other hand, the interviews and case law suggest that those judges and Cafcass 
officers who understand the coercively controlling nature of domestic violence 
and/or its effects on women and children are more likely to undertake the broader 
assessment required by Paragraph 27, and that their decisions and 
recommendations are more likely to reflect this. 
 
The case law reveals opposing and contradictory tensions in the making of 
contact orders where domestic violence has been proved or admitted. While 
some courts appear willing to order no contact if the findings are considered 
sufficiently ‘serious’ and in particular, if the father refuses to accept the findings, 
other courts seem to find it difficult to envisage cases where domestic violence 
would constitute a ‘bar’ to contact, or do not consider the violence sufficiently 
‘serious’ to warrant the type of restrictions proposed by the mother. Additionally, 
while the orders made by some judges reflect the considerable importance they 
have placed on the effect of the violence on the mother and on her ability to cope 
with contact, other courts ignore the impact of the violence in favour of the 
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perceived importance of contact.
135
 These ambivalent approaches to the making 
of contact orders when domestic violence has occurred reflect the tensions 
between the ‘presumption of contact’ and the increased pressure put on trial 
judges by the Practice Direction and by some Court of Appeal decisions to take 
domestic violence seriously. 
 
The interviews, and current statistics and research, all demonstrate, however, that 
even where domestic violence is found, some form of direct contact is almost 
always ordered, even if this is opposed by the mother. This suggests that most 
judicial officers consider the father’s conduct and its consequences to be less 
important than the presumed benefits of contact, so that women may experience 
enormous difficulty resisting orders for direct contact even where findings of 
domestic violence have been made. As Ms B [Solicitor, London] wryly observed: 
“I think the best chance of not getting any contact is by the non-resident parent 
getting angry and just giving up.”  
 
If the court concludes, after findings have been made, that the child should have 
direct contact with the perpetrator, the Practice Direction requires the safety of 
the child and resident parent to be safeguarded.
136
  It appears, however, that in 
the absence of resources for supervised or supported contact, courts and 
professionals may settle for what they see as the ‘next best thing’ rather than 
accept that no direct contact should take place, which may mean the nebulous 
support of family or friends, or mothers being left to fend for themselves in 
‘public places’. 
 
The very high rate at which contact is ordered with violent fathers may also be 
due to the way in which mothers are advised and represented in contact 
proceedings. Most family lawyers, including those with a good understanding of 
the power and control dynamics of domestic violence, would persuade mothers 
to agree to contact unless extremely ‘severe’ physical violence has been proved, 
some of whom would apply coercive pressure on mothers to agree to contact. 
                                                 
135
 A similar contradictory approach can be discerned in Court of Appeal decisions. 
136
 The importance of this was emphasised by Wall LJ (as he then was) in Re Z (Unsupervised 
Contact: Allegations of Domestic Violence) (n 15) [27]  
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Only a small minority of family lawyers appear to keep the father’s conduct 
visible, acknowledge that the mother’s fear of the father is justified, and support 
the mother in her opposition to contact. So even in circumstances where courts 
could potentially be persuaded to refuse, or impose greater restrictions on direct 
contact, family lawyers may persuade mothers to agree to contact because of 
their own perceptions of the inevitability of contact being ordered, and their 
desire to be seen as ‘good’ family lawyers. If the mother has already been 
persuaded to allow some interim contact, she is likely to find that, once her 
allegations are proved, the father will be permitted even less restricted contact 
than he was having on an interim basis. 
 
It would seem that, despite the apparent willingness of courts to require 
perpetrators to attend DVPPs and Cafcass officers to recommend them, in reality 
this may turn out to be anger management or other inappropriate resources 
instead. This may be attributed to professionals and judicial officers not 
understanding the differences between anger management and domestic violence 
intervention, or considering anger management to be an appropriate intervention, 
based on the perception that domestic violence arises out of anger, ‘passion’ and 
lack of control. This reinforces those discourses that construct domestic violence 
as a mental or emotional problem that can be ‘cured’, thereby obscuring the 
power and control dynamics of domestic violence and its effects. However, as 
Hunter and Barnett point out:  
 
“Anger management is rarely an appropriate intervention to reduce 
the risk of domestic abuse since in many cases, anger does not 
signify ‘loss of control’, but rather is the mechanism (or one 
mechanism) used by an abuser to exercise control by physically 
assaulting, threatening or intimidating the victim.”137  
 
Additionally, seeing a DVPP as another ‘hurdle’ for the perpetrator to cross, and 
seeing that hurdle as too high, risks adopting the perpetrator’s perspective, rather 
than that of the child and the victim.
138
 However, as Hunter and Barnett point out: 
                                                 
137
 Hunter and Barnett (n 6) 49 
138
 ibid 51 
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“It is the perpetrator’s failure to acknowledge and address his violence, not the 
DVPP that impedes contact.”139 
 
The failure of fathers to accept the violence and be willing to change, and/or the 
lack of availability and funding for DVPPs, may mean that courts and 
professionals turn to other resources to ‘mend’ the father on the basis that 
‘something is better than nothing’, rather than accept that safe contact may be an 
unattainable goal.
140
 While it is very positive that so many professionals consider 
that some intervention is necessary for perpetrators of domestic violence, the fact 
that this area of service provision is inadequate, and many fathers may not be 
suitable for attendance at a DVPP does not mean that children and mothers 
should be put at risk and have their safety compromised because there is no 
effective means of dealing with the perpetrator’s abusive behaviour.141 Yet so 
strong is the presumption of contact that courts and professionals have great 
difficulty ‘giving up’ on contact. 
                                                 
139
 ibid 51 
140
 Ms T [Barrister, NW] thought that courts did not mind what intervention the father did as long 
as he “did something.” See also Hunter and Barnett (n 6) 
141
 See also Hunter and Barnett (n 6) 
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CHAPTER 8 
 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Domestic violence has, until very recently, been perceived by courts and 
professionals working in the family justice system almost solely in terms of 
discrete incidents of physical violence. The views of the professionals who 
participated in this study and the recent case law suggest that understandings of 
domestic violence have started to shift as oppositional voices are beginning to be 
heard. Most professionals no longer view domestic violence as comprising 
physical assaults only and recognise the many, varied forms it can take. 
Increasing numbers of Cafcass officers and some family lawyers and judges 
understand its power and control dynamics, and few professionals consider 
violence ‘between’ parents as completely separate from children’s welfare. As 
Ms Y [FCA, London] pointed out: 
 
“And what for me is positive is that it’s a currency, not everybody 
wants to buy into, but everybody knows what we mean by 
safeguarding and domestic violence and it’s there, it is at the 
forefront, and it’s a conscious decision to choose not to look at it, 
rather than ignoring it altogether.” 
 
Despite this apparent ‘progress’, refusals of applications for contact by courts 
have steadily declined since the Practice Direction was issued and, during 2011, 
when most of the interviews were undertaken for this study, were at their lowest 
point recorded. This “suggests that the father’s role continues to be viewed as 
inalienable, even when there is known previous or continuing violence”.1 
Additionally, the case law and interviews reveal wide inconsistencies in the 
application of many aspects of the Practice Direction by courts, and suggest that 
many judges and magistrates are not applying or even considering the Practice 
Direction, mainly because they have been focusing on promoting contact rather 
than on the consequences of the father’s conduct.  
                                                 
1
 Christine Harrison ‘Implacably Hostile or Appropriately Protective?: Women Managing Child 
Contact in the Context of Domestic Violence’(2008) 14 Violence Against Women 381-405, 382. 
See also Ministry of Justice, Judicial and Court Statistics 2011 (Ministry of Justice 2012), which 
reveals that in 2011 less than 0.3% of applications for contact orders were refused by courts;  
Elizabeth Butler, ‘Safer Contact Arrangements?’ (2006) Childright 12, 13; Brid Featherstone, 
‘Writing fathers in but mothers out!!!’ (2010) 30 Critical Social Policy 208-224,  212 
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The theoretical perspectives informing this study have enabled us to understand 
why this is the case and what the possibilities are for transforming existing 
relations of power, by opening up to scrutiny the world constructed in and by 
current family law. We have explored the harsh regulation of women as mothers 
and have made visible the powerful discourses which construct the dominant 
gendered subjectivities that structure decision-making and professional 
perceptions and practices informing the issue of child contact.
2
 We have seen 
that the parents and children who come to private law Children Act proceedings 
enter a social system that selectively simplifies and reconstructs the chaotic, 
contingent world ‘out there’ in ways that are consistent with, and advance, the 
prevailing political and ideological imperative to reinstate the father in the post-
separation family. This creates a discursive and ideological terrain that 
downplays, trivialises and erases women’s concerns about continued contact with 
violent fathers and has a powerful normative influence on professional and 
judicial perceptions and practices.   
 
1. The presumption of contact 
At the heart of private law Children Act proceedings lies ‘the welfare of the 
child’, a ‘civilising’ device that has been selectively constructed by and in family 
law at different times and in response to different social, political and cultural 
demands, and which currently works to place fathers at the centre of children’s 
well-being after parental separation.  By locating this dominant construct in its 
historical, political and material context, we have seen how it operates as a 
mechanism of power to reinstate and maintain the father in the post-separation 
family, and how it regulates and disciplines mothers by constraining their self-
determination. The gendered relations of power that construct, underpin and 
sustain law’s current construction of ‘the truth’ about children’s welfare 
constantly challenge and subvert attempts to focus professionals and courts on 
protecting children and women in private law Children Act proceedings, and 
deny mothers the autonomy after parental separation that is unquestioningly 
afforded to fathers. The strong belief of nearly all of the professionals 
                                                 
2
 Vanessa Munro, Law and Politics at the Perimeter: Re-evaluating Key Debates in Feminist 
Theory (Hart 2007) 11 
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interviewed in the benefits of contact shows how law’s current construction of 
children’s welfare has acquired almost hegemonic status. The dominant welfare 
discourse has become increasingly axiomatic and incontestable by marginalising 
and discrediting oppositional meanings about children’s welfare, and by 
trivialising and rendering irrational women’s reasons for opposing contact with 
non-resident fathers. This process is reinforced by unrelenting messages from the 
higher courts about the importance of contact, and the strenuous efforts made to 
promote it, even in cases of proven domestic violence.  
 
Powerful familial ideologies of the equal, democratic family and the ‘new 
fatherhood’ which are built on abstract notions of ‘welfare’ and ‘justice’ 
reinforce the invisibility of care as a moral practice and domestic violence as a 
moral failure. This invisibility, together with the assumed benefits of contact, 
enables contact between children and violent fathers to be seen as not only 
possible but positively desirable.   
 
“When the absence of men from children’s lives is strongly, if 
erroneously, associated with a range of social problems, and the 
significance of domestic violence is underestimated, a ‘contact at any 
cost’ philosophy can flourish.”3 
 
2. The ‘relevance’ of domestic violence to contact 
While many family lawyers (although fewer barristers) and Cafcass officers 
demonstrate a broad and insightful theoretical understanding of domestic 
violence and some understand its coercive, controlling nature, there are still 
many family lawyers and judges, and a minority of Cafcass officers, who 
continue to apply a narrow, legalistic approach to domestic violence and fail to 
understand how ‘historic’ violence can have a continuing controlling effect. The 
acontextual, incident-based approach to domestic violence that dominates 
Children Act proceedings and the strong belief in the benefits of contact 
reinforce each other and permeate every aspect of contact proceedings. This 
means that, even where courts and professionals acknowledge the seriousness of 
domestic violence, ‘other’ forms of abuse may be seen as less important or 
                                                 
3
 Harrison (n1) 398. See Carol Smart, ‘Losing the Struggle for Another Voice: The Case of 
Family Law’ (1995) 18 Dalhousie Law Journal 173-195, 192 
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‘relevant’ than physical violence so that anything other than very ‘serious’ 
incidents of physical abuse are not ‘real’ violence or sufficient to deny children 
the ‘benefits’ of contact. The types of conduct that the women interviewed by 
Coy et al found most frightening and debilitating, such as manipulating, isolating 
and controlling behaviours, would not, therefore, have been seen as ‘relevant’ or 
have justified their opposition to contact.
4
  
 
So we can see a bifurcated approach: while more judges and professionals are 
developing their understanding of domestic violence and taking it more seriously, 
the ambit of when and how it is relevant to contact has grown increasingly 
narrow. This means that, for most courts and family lawyers, and some Cafcass 
officers, there is an ‘acceptable’ level of abuse that mothers should be prepared 
to tolerate for the sake of their children; the professionals’ broader, theoretical 
perceptions of domestic violence do not necessarily translate into practice. So the 
parameters of what constitutes the ‘safe family man’ expand to include 
increasingly abusive, ‘dangerous’ and ‘irrational’ fathers to the point where the 
father has to be practically a monster for his conduct to be seen by courts as 
relevant to contact. 
 
Additionally, we have seen that fact-finding hearings are usually restricted to 
cases involving ‘incidents’ of recent, severe physical violence, particularly if 
contact has continued or resumed by the time of, or during the proceedings.
5
 The 
expressed willingness of family lawyers to request fact-finding hearings and of 
courts to hold them needs to be seen in the context of the extremely narrow 
circumstances in which judges and professionals consider domestic violence 
‘relevant’ to contact and therefore requiring determination by the court. While 
most Cafcass officers and a small minority of family lawyers expressed concern 
about the ‘backlash’ against fact-finding hearings, most family lawyers agreed 
with the courts’ restrictive approach, and a significant minority of barristers 
                                                 
4
 Maddy Coy, Katherine Perks, Emma Scott and Ruth Tweedale, Picking up the pieces: domestic 
violence and child contact (Rights of Women 2012) 
5
 Similar findings were made by Coy et al (n 2) and Rosemary Hunter and Adrienne Barnett, 
Fact-Finding Hearings and the Implementation of the President’s Practice Direction: Residence 
and Contact Orders: Domestic Violence and Harm (Family Justice Council 2013) 
www.familyjusticecouncil.org.uk, last accessed 12.11.13 
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wanted them restricted even further. This suggests that the legalistic approach to 
domestic violence and the dominant welfare discourse resonates particularly 
strongly with barristers. 
 
3. Dominant parental subjectivities       
A powerful effect of the dominant welfare discourse is the construction of 
parental subjectivities of ‘implacably hostile mothers’ and ‘safe family men’ 
which marginalise other subject positions, and are portrayed as natural and 
obvious. The construction of mothers as ‘hostile’ “is only possible when [there is] 
a gendered structure of moral accountability that holds mothers to higher 
standards of care and protection than fathers”,6 and a differential ability of men 
and women to achieve autonomy after parental separation within the current 
regime of family law.
7
 It is the invisibility and denial of these gendered processes 
in and by current family law that enable dominant parental constructs to be seen 
as unquestioningly obvious and acceptable. 
 
The demonised figure of the implacably hostile mother has important 
implications for the way in which courts and professionals respond to mothers 
who oppose contact. We have seen that when women assert what are essentially 
moral claims to the value of their own self-worth, safety and autonomy, these 
may still be seen by many courts and professionals as selfishness, hostility and 
self-interest.
8
 Despite a number of professionals expressing low opinions of 
fathers involved in contact proceedings, and a few recognising the efforts 
mothers make to sustain contact, most professionals still attribute the ‘problem’ 
with contact to the mother’s unjustified obstruction.  
 
Although most respondents did not see mothers as deliberately malicious and 
hostile to contact, images of implacably hostile mothers continue to exert a 
powerful influence. This can be seen in the views of a significant minority of 
                                                 
6
 Vivienne Elizabeth, Nicola Gavey and Julia Tolmie, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: 
Resident Mothers and the Moral Dilemmas they Face During Custody Disputes’ (2010) 18 
Feminist Legal Studies 253-274, 270 
7
 See Susan Boyd, ‘Autonomy for Mothers? Relational Theory and Parenting Apart’ (2010) 18 
Feminist Legal Studies 137-158, 146 
8
 Julie Wallbank, ‘Getting Tough on Mothers: Regulating Contact and Residence’ (2007) 15 
Feminist Legal Studies 189-222, 197; see also at 214 
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family lawyers who perceived mothers as manipulative and devious, and in the 
harsh, condemnatory approach to mothers demonstrated by some barristers and a 
few solicitors. Judges and professionals may continue to view women’s 
complaints about domestic violence with suspicion, perceiving them to be a 
delaying tactic and/or designed to disrupt the other party’s relationship with the 
child.
9
  Because there is no valid discourse for expressing the moral value of the 
mother’s wellbeing and autonomy, almost any opposition to contact may be  seen 
as ‘petty’ or ‘unreasonable’. This is exacerbated by the way in which domestic 
violence ‘disappears’ during the course of proceedings and judgments, so that the 
‘problem’ of contact is laid at the door of the mother, who is constructed as 
irrational, pathological or malicious, and thus deserving of a ‘robust’ response.  
 
While the majority of Cafcass officers, half of solicitors and a small minority of 
barristers did recognise the fear of domestic violence as a justifiable reason for 
the mother to oppose contact, for others, women’s fears of domestic violence in 
all but the most extreme circumstances may be viewed as another obstacle to 
overcome in the pursuit of contact.  
 
Law’s self-referential procedures for determining domestic violence, and the 
binary nature of its decision-making place a particularly heavy burden on 
mothers to ‘prove’ their allegations, as their uncorroborated oral testimony may 
be viewed with suspicion and discounted as not being ‘real’ evidence. As a 
consequence, judges and professionals may avoid fact-finding hearings if the 
only evidence in support of the allegations is the mother’s oral testimony. 
Additionally, stereotypes of ‘real’ victims and perpetrators may underpin the way 
in which courts and professionals respond to parents’ evidence. The failure of 
many judges and some professionals to understand the difficulties for victims of 
domestic violence to provide ‘hard’ evidence and give ‘rational’, coherent 
                                                 
9
 Similar findings were made by Coy et al (n 4) and Hunter and Barnett (n 53). Contrary to the 
suspicion with which mothers are viewed if they allege domestic violence, a recent study for the 
Director of Public Prosecutions revealed that ‘false’ allegations of domestic violence and rape are 
extremely rare – see Alison Levitt, Charging Perverting the Course of Justice and Wasting 
Police Time in Cases Involving Allegedly False Rape and Domestic Violence Allegations 
(Director of Public Prosecutions and the Crown Prosecution Service 2013), 
www.cps.gov.uk/publications/research/perverting_course_of_justice_march_2013.pdf last 
accessed 02.08.13 
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accounts of abuse that are acceptable to law can undermine their credibility. 
Furthermore, the binary nature of law’s decision-making means that if the mother 
fails to prove her allegations, in law the father has not been violent and is not, 
therefore, a ‘risk’, whether or not outside observers perceive the ‘real truth’ 
differently.  
 
The valorisation of fatherhood in political, popular and legal discourses, 
reinforced by ideologies of the democratic, equal family, the ‘new 
fatherhood’ and the theoretical benefits of contact, mean that fatherhood 
continues to be seen as an essentially ‘safe’ domain, and “there remains an 
enduring distinction in legal and [child welfare] thinking between violent 
men and good fathers” which underlies the “separation of men’s violence 
from their parenting capacity”.10 These discourses have so resonated with 
professionals, including Cafcass officers, that they rarely question or even 
consider the quality of parenting by non-resident fathers, even those who are 
perpetrators of domestic violence. Indeed, professionals and courts may treat 
violent fathers with more latitude, sympathy and understanding than the 
mothers who have been subjected to abuse.
11
 Very few family lawyers or 
judges consider “the role of a domestic violence perpetrator as a parent and 
have focused on a father’s emotional investment in caring about his children 
while overlooking his ability to care for them”.12 Harne warns that courts 
need to “look beyond violent fathers’ expressions of love for their children, 
and their involvement in childcaring activities, since these are not 
necessarily indications that children will be safe from abuse or neglect.”13  
 
Images of safe family men can work to reconstruct fathers’ violence as 
‘normal’ or understandable behaviour, so that even fathers with proven 
histories of violence are seen as important for their children’s welfare. The 
notion that domestic violence is morally reprehensible and violent fathers 
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 Coy et al (n 4) 11 
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 Calvin Bell, ‘Domestic Violence and Contact: 10 Reasons Why’ (2008) 38 Family Law 1139-
1143, 1140, referring to Lundy Bancroft and Jay G Silverman, The Batterer as Parent: 
Addressing the Impact of Domestic Violence on Family Dynamics (Sage 2002) 
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are ‘undeserving’ of contact, and that women’s desire for safety, wellbeing 
and autonomy is morally legitimate finds very little expression in current 
family law. However, where judges and professionals do recognise the 
conjoined and contextual nature of domestic violence and parenting, the 
masculine subjectivity of the safe family man is disrupted and the perceived 
importance of contact is less likely to take priority over the father’s conduct 
and its effects on the mother and child. 
 
Despite the high rate of findings of domestic violence in disputed fact-finding 
hearings and the rarity of perpetrators accepting those findings, neither 
professionals nor judges blame fathers ‘in denial’ for what are perceived to be 
unnecessary fact-finding hearings ‘clogging up’ the court system. It is the mother 
who is at fault for bringing conflict into the conciliatory ethos of family 
proceedings. Additionally, courts and professionals are more than willing to 
reconstruct perpetrators as ‘risky’ rather than ‘dangerous’.  
 
The desire to keep intact the image of the ‘safe family man’ means that many 
courts and professionals are very unwilling to perceive fathers in a negative light 
even when findings of domestic violence are made. Judges are very reluctant to 
accept that an abusive father is motivated by anything other than a desire to see 
the child, and are willing to accept expressions of ‘genuine’ motivation and 
contrition at face value. Coy et al point out that the fact that perpetrators are 
rarely, if ever, identified as vexatious litigants suggests that the family courts fail 
to recognise the way in which men may pursue contact as part of a strategy of 
harassment and control.
14
 With a few notable exceptions amongst family lawyers, 
it was primarily Cafcass officers who seemed to have the keenest insights into 
the behaviours of abusive fathers but this did not appear to affect their 
endorsement of the presumption of contact.  
 
4. Pressure to agree to contact     
We have seen how mothers are, from the outset, propelled into a discursive arena 
in which their concerns about contact are constructed as at odds with the 
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 Coy et al (n 4) 
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agreement-seeking ethos of contact proceedings. The responses of participants to 
this study suggest that more family lawyers and Cafcass officers understand the 
importance of not pressurising mothers to agree to contact, particularly where 
they have sustained domestic violence. However, so strong is the presumption of 
contact that, in practice, it seems that most family lawyers continue to persuade 
mothers to capitulate. This may go a long way to explaining why refusal rates of 
contact applications are so low.  
 
The partisan aspect of safeguarding the client against violence from the other 
parent, and looking ‘backwards’ at past abuse rather than ‘forwards’ at future 
harmonious arrangements runs counter to prevailing images of ‘good’ family 
lawyers, which may inhibit their ability to ‘stand up for’ their clients. The ‘good’ 
family lawyer is one who puts dominant assumptions about children’s welfare 
before their own client’s interests by encouraging clients to be ‘sensible’ and 
implacably hostile mothers to agree to contact.  As a consequence, advice can 
easily become pressure even if not intended by the lawyer, although more overt 
coercion may be exerted on mothers by a sizeable minority of family lawyers, 
particularly if they discern no good reason for the mother’s opposition to contact. 
The mother may also experience pressure to agree from the father’s 
representative, and ‘encouragement’ from the Cafcass officer and the court. 
 
The drive towards ‘agreement’ to contact means that it is even more important 
for courts to scrutinise proposed consent orders. However, there appears to be a 
wide variation in the extent to which judges and magistrates do so, with some 
judicial officers being reluctant to enquire about domestic violence so that 
consent orders do not ‘unravel’ and many still ‘rubber-stamping’ them without 
any enquiry or even seeing the parties. Lawyers and judicial officers may not 
only ignore the concerns and advice of Cafcass officers, but actively avoid their 
involvement in cases in order to achieve agreements for contact. As a 
consequence, many women may continue to be pushed into unsafe agreements, 
sanctioned by the courts. 
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5. Fact-finding hearings 
The findings of this study are strongly indicative of an increase in the numbers of 
fact-finding hearings following the implementation of the Practice Direction in 
May 2008. However, there appears to have been a subsequent backlash against it, 
exacerbated by the Guidance on Split Hearings, as most professionals 
interviewed reported preliminary fact-finding hearings becoming rarer.
15
 
Although the Guidance on Split Hearings discourages the holding of split 
hearings, it does not encourage courts to disregard allegations of domestic 
violence. However, the case law and the interviews do not suggest that the lower 
courts regularly hold composite hearings; rather, it appears that the approach of 
the lower courts is to ignore allegations of domestic violence altogether if a 
separate fact-finding hearing is considered unnecessary. This suggests that many 
disputed allegations of domestic violence continue to be disregarded.  
 
Even if allegations of domestic violence are considered recent and serious 
enough to warrant a fact-finding hearing, the number of allegations to be tried 
may be restricted, or the trial may not end up taking place at all if the father 
makes limited admissions, ending up with a ‘watered down’ compromise. 
Alternatively, the mother may have been pushed into ‘moving on’ and allowing 
contact by the time of the hearing so that the fact-finding exercise is considered 
unhelpful and unnecessary. In this way, we can see how domestic violence 
‘fizzles out’ during the course of proceedings so that the full extent of the abuse 
is obscured and decontextualized from the gendered power dynamics informing 
the relationship. 
  
6. Interim and final orders 
The dominant construction of children’s welfare that underpins current family 
law, together with the narrow, incident based approach to domestic violence can 
result in mother’s and children’s safety and welfare being compromised pending 
fact-finding hearings as well as after domestic violence has been proved, and 
women may find that their voices are increasingly silenced as the proceedings 
progress. 
                                                 
15
 Research by Coy et al (n 4) supports these findings 
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Most participants to this study did not discern any clear judicial pattern if the 
mother opposed direct contact pending fact-finding hearings. Although the 
majority of solicitors were of the firm view that courts do not tend to order such 
contact, other professionals felt that mothers would have an uphill battle 
opposing interim contact and only three family lawyers indicated that they would 
not try to persuade the mother to agree.
16
 So direct contact pending fact-finding 
hearings may happen because family lawyers persuade mothers to agree, rather 
than because it is ordered by the court against the expressed wishes of the mother.   
 
The most common factor in deciding if direct contact should be ordered against 
the wishes of the mother was the ‘status quo’, that is, whether contact was or was 
not taking place at the time of the proceedings. So if the ‘good mother’ permits 
the father to have contact, despite his violence, or was persuaded by her lawyer 
from the outset to agree to it, she may be penalised for this at the point when she 
wants the court and professionals to protect her and the child.  
 
Even where findings of domestic violence are made, it seems that some form of 
direct contact is invariably ordered by the court other than in ‘extreme’ cases, 
even for ‘high risk’ fathers who do not accept the findings against them. This 
suggests that even ‘justified’ opposition to contact may be fruitless or that, by the 
final stages of proceedings, mothers have been persuaded to ‘cave in’. Most 
family lawyers, including some of those with a good understanding of domestic 
violence, would try to persuade mothers to agree to contact and only a small 
minority would support them in opposing it. So even in circumstances where the 
court could potentially be persuaded to refuse direct contact, family lawyers may 
persuade mothers to agree because of their perceptions that any opposition is 
futile. Although Cafcass officers expressed concern about the courts’ restrictive 
approach they, too, may recommend no direct contact only in the most ‘extreme’ 
cases.  
 
                                                 
16
 See Coy et al (n 4) and Hunter and Barnett (n 5) who found that some form of restricted direct 
contact is the most likely outcome in the interim. 
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So it seems that the circumstances in which lawyers would support mothers in 
opposing contact, Cafcass officers would not recommend direct contact, and 
courts would not order it seem to be getting more limited and extreme, and the 
courts appear to be increasingly reluctant to ‘give up on’ contact. This means that 
the bar of ‘acceptable’ domestic violence is being increasingly raised and the 
obligation of the ‘good mother’ can include putting up with very abusive 
behaviour. The incremental approach described by Hunt and Macleod appears to 
be a continuing feature of contact cases since the implementation of the Practice 
Direction,
17
 and courts and professionals find it difficult to envisage 
circumstances where domestic violence could constitute a bar to contact, so that 
the possibility of no contact taking place has almost passed into the realms of the 
unimaginable.  
 
If findings of domestic violence are made, the acontextual, incident-based 
approach to domestic violence leads to a focus on physical safety because the 
‘bigger picture’ is lost and the wider implications of contact for children and 
mothers are marginalised or invisible. As a consequence, most family lawyers 
fail to understand that ‘standard’ safety measures such as contact centres may 
leave women and children vulnerable to further abuse.
18
 Furthermore, the 
absence of facilities for both supervised and supported contact and the 
minimisation of domestic violence, result in unsafe strategies being used in what 
professionals would consider medium and even high risk cases, such as 
supervision by family members or friends, ‘staggered’ handovers or the parents 
meeting in ‘public places’. 
 
It is primarily Cafcass officers (although not all) and a small minority of family 
lawyers who have a better understanding of the risks to children’s and mothers’ 
safety and wellbeing, and query the merits of contact between children and 
perpetrators of domestic violence, but their voices may be marginalised and 
discounted in the drive to promote contact. 
 
                                                 
17
 Joan Hunt and Alison Macleod, Outcomes of applications to court for contact orders after 
parental separation or divorce  (Ministry of Justice 2008) 
18
 Harrison’s research (n 1) revealed that women may continue to sustain violence, threats and 
intimidation at supervised and supported contact centres – see in particular at 392 
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7. Intervention for perpetrators 
While it is very positive that so many professionals consider that some 
intervention is necessary for perpetrators of domestic violence, the fact that this 
area of service provision is inadequate, and many fathers may not be suitable for 
attendance at a DVPP, does not mean that children and mothers should be put at 
risk and have their safety compromised because there is no effective means of 
dealing with the perpetrator’s abusive behaviour.19 Perceiving the appropriate 
intervention for perpetrators to be anger management counselling or therapy 
minimises and misrepresents domestic violence by portraying it as a loss of 
control, rather than “the mechanism (or one mechanism) used by an abuser to 
exercise control by physically assaulting, threatening or intimidating the 
victim”.20 It also reinforces those discourses that construct domestic violence as a 
mental or emotional problem that can be ‘cured’, thereby obscuring the power 
and control dynamics of domestic violence and its effects. Additionally, seeing 
DVPPs, rather than the father’s violence, as impeding contact adopts the 
perpetrator’s perspective and further erases his conduct. 
 
8. Opposition and resistance 
Despite the increasingly strong gendered relations of power informing 
current family law, it is not suggested that seeking to regain a valid and 
authoritative voice for women is a futile exercise.  On the contrary, 
deconstructing legal and professional discourses can make visible “the range 
of points of resistance inherent in the network of power relations,” and the 
conceptual spaces where oppositional meanings have and may emerge and 
gain currency.
21
 
 
Using gender as a tool for analysis, we have opened up for scrutiny the 
discursive and ideological claims to truth articulated in and through family 
law, and their consequences for the way in which women are currently 
regulated, controlled and governed – in the way in which judges and 
                                                 
19
 See Hunter and Barnett (n 5) 
20
 ibid 49 
21
 Chris Weedon, Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory (Blackwell 1987) 124. See also 
Susan Boyd, ‘Some post-modernist challenges to feminist analyses of law, family and State: 
ideology and discourse in child custody law’ (1991) 10 Canadian Journal of Family Law 79, 113 
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professionals understand domestic violence, perceive the importance of 
contact, constitute parents and children, and evaluate evidence and risk - as 
part of the strategy to shift discursive meanings and practices. Most 
importantly, by deploying ‘oppositional truths’ strategically, we have 
exposed the partial and ideological nature of the ‘scientific truth’ about 
children’s welfare by raising ‘other’ ways of understanding children and 
their families. The fact that some judges and professionals have started to 
demonstrate a broader understanding of the coercively controlling nature of 
domestic violence and its implications for contact, even within the 
framework of the presumption of contact, demonstrates that dominant 
meanings are not immutable or inevitable and indicates the powerful 
potential of oppositional discourses.  
 
We need to acknowledge that the purpose of fact-finding hearings for law – to 
provide a mechanism for further self-referential decision-making – may or may 
not lead to decisions that are safe or which benefit the child. The way in which 
separate fact-finding hearings currently reinforce the legalistic, incident-based 
approach to domestic violence may suggest that allegations of domestic violence 
would more productively be dealt with in ‘composite’ hearings, so that the 
father’s conduct and behaviour could be situated within the broader ‘welfare’ 
context and recognised as a ‘significant failure in parenting’.  
 
It is suggested, however that, within the discursive and ideological context of 
current family proceedings, the abuse may end up being weeded out and 
disregarded altogether in the drive to promote contact. Fact-finding hearings, 
therefore, may serve an important function in keeping domestic violence visible. 
Accordingly, it is suggested that it is still strategically necessary for preliminary 
fact-finding hearings to be maintained. Indeed, their remit should be broadened 
to include all the varied ways in which the gendered power and control dynamics 
of domestic violence are exercised. This would assist in making visible ‘other’ 
knowledge such as the difficulties for many women in disclosing and reporting 
domestic violence and in providing a coherent account of it, and the charming 
and manipulative behaviours and other strategies of perpetrators. 
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Courts and professionals need to recognise that denial of the violence by 
perpetrators is itself a hallmark of domestic abuse, and to recognise that it is 
those denials, not the mother’s allegations, that necessitate the holding of fact-
finding hearings. We also need to acknowledge that reconstructing the 
‘dangerous abuser’ as a ‘safe family man’ may contribute towards sustaining the 
image of law’s ‘ideal’ post-separation family but will not make fathers ‘safe’, 
which may be an unattainable goal.  
 
In order to achieve the ‘cultural shift’ called for by the Family Justice Council, 
we need to see beyond images of ‘safe family men’ and ‘implacably hostile 
mothers’ so that we can properly acknowledge that ‘the family’ is not always a 
safe haven but a place where abuse can occur. Until we are able to do so, many 
children may continue to be disadvantaged by a prescriptive application of the 
welfare principle, courts will continue to clash with ‘implacably hostile mothers’ 
and we will continue to do a disservice to non-abusive fathers who do undertake 
fully the tasks of caring for children, by conflating their efforts and experiences 
with those of fathers who simply express a desire to ‘be there for’ and ‘care 
about’ their children. In order to do so, we need to make visible the moral claims 
that parents are asserting through the only legitimate vehicle available to them in 
child contact law, ‘the welfare of the child’.  
 
9. Legal reform? 
If law is part of the problem, and the consequences of system operations 
have infinite possibilities, is there a place for law reform within the 
theoretical perspectives informing this study?  Munro questions whether 
even “strategic attempts to use law to bring about change, in the end, simply 
operate to reaffirm law’s power”,22 and Diduck and O’Donovan query 
whether promoting law reform as a means of achieving gender equality both 
masks and reinforces law’s gendering role.23 From the perspective of 
autopoietic theory, we cannot ‘use’ law to solve social problems or create 
order out of chaos. “This is not to say, of course, that regulatory attempts 
                                                 
22
 Munro (n 2) 64-65 
23
 Alison Diduck and Katherine O’Donovan (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Family Law (1st edn, 
Routledge-Cavendish 2006) 3 
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produce no effects, only that those effects cannot properly be regarded as 
steering in the sense implied by traditional theories.”24 This enables us to see 
how the effects of campaigns, legislation and guidelines aimed at improving 
protection for children and women from violent fathers can be highly 
contingent. Further, whether change achieves ‘progress’ will depend on the 
beliefs of observers about what constitutes progress.
25
 
 
However, a number of theorists have suggested that it is not only possible, 
but desirable and necessary to use law reform to challenge “juridical or 
disciplinary forms of patriarchal power”.26 Most importantly, while relying 
on law to achieve social change “remains a high risk strategy…it would be 
riskier still to abandon it to those who are unconcerned with, or opposed to, 
the goal of gender equality”.27 
 
With these thoughts in mind, the following practical recommendations are 
made. It is recognised that some of these will involve additional resources 
which may prove challenging in the current economic climate. However, as 
Hunter and Barnett observe: 
 
“It is important…to have a system which operates as effectively as 
possible within resource constraints, rather than one which adapts 
dysfunctionally to resource limitations by attempting to minimise the 
relevance of domestic violence.”28 
 
9.1 Amendment of the Children Act 1989 
 The Children and Families Bill 2013, which the Coalition 
Government hopes to implement on 1
st
 April 2014, will amend the 
Children Act 1989 to include a statement which provides for courts 
to presume that the involvement of both parents in the child’s life 
will benefit the child unless such involvement would put the child or 
                                                 
24
 John Patterson and Gunther Teubner, ‘Changing Maps: Empirical Legal Autopoiesis’ in Reza 
Banakar and Max Travers (eds), Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart 2005) 222 
25
 See Michael King, ‘What’s the Use of Luhmann’s Theory?’ in Michael King and Chris 
Thornhill (eds), Luhmann on Law and Politics (Hart 2006) 41 
26
 Munro (n 2) 70 
27
 ibid 84 
28
 Hunter and Barnett (n 5) 73 
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the other parent at risk of suffering harm.
29
 This provision was 
included against the recommendations of the Family Justice Review 
and in the face of strong opposition from lawyers, academics and the 
judiciary.
30
 While, ideally, there should be no presumption of 
involvement, it is accepted that this provision will inevitably be 
implemented. In order to ensure that it does not have the effect of 
further marginalising domestic violence, a presumption against 
contact where domestic violence is admitted or proved should be 
included in the Children Act 1989. 
 
9.2 Revision of the Practice Direction 
 The description of ‘domestic violence’ in the Practice Direction 
should be replaced with the current cross-government definition. 
This would assist in highlighting the coercively controlling nature of 
domestic violence and in broadening perceptions of its ‘relevance’ to 
contact. 
 It should be made clear that domestic violence is always relevant to 
contact, regardless of its age or perceived severity 
 The term ‘fact-finding hearing’ should be replaced with ‘domestic 
violence hearing’. 
 Domestic violence hearings should assume an inquisitorial, rather 
than adversarial form, so that the complainant is not disadvantaged 
by the burden of proof. 
 Domestic violence hearings should always be held where alleged 
perpetrators dispute allegations, unless the court is satisfied that the 
factors set out in Paragraphs 26 and 27 can be fully assessed without 
one. Cafcass should always be consulted about the need to hold a 
domestic violence hearing. 
                                                 
29
 Department for Education, Ministry of Justice & Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2012-2013/0131/2013131.pdf  last 
accessed 15.01.14; Department for Education, Children and Families Bill 2013: Contextual 
Information and Responses to Pre-legislative Scrutiny (Cm 8540, 2012)   
30
 Family Justice Review Panel, Family Justice Review Final Report (Ministry of Justice, 
Department for Education, Welsh Government 2011) [109]. See also Julie Exton, ‘ADJ news: 
Shared Parenting’ (2012) 42 Family Law 1403-1404 articulating the views of the Association of 
District Judges; Liz Trinder, ‘Shared residence: A Review of Recent Research Evidence’ (2010) 
40 Family Law 1192-1197 
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 If the court considers that a preliminary domestic violence hearing is 
not required, disputed allegations should be determined at the 
‘welfare’ hearing unless the court is satisfied that the factors set out 
in Paragraphs 26 and 27 can be fully assessed without those 
allegations being determined. 
 Consent orders should not be approved by the court unless the 
parties are present in court and all safeguarding enquiries have been 
undertaken by Cafcass and provided to the court. 
 Interim contact pending domestic violence hearings should not be 
ordered against the wishes of the resident parent unless all 
safeguarding enquiries have been obtained by the court and Cafcass 
has been consulted. 
 Paragraph 25 of the Practice Direction should be amended to provide 
that, where domestic violence is admitted or proved, the court should 
consider whether the perpetrator should attend a DVPP (rather than 
‘seek advice or treatment’). 
 
9.3  Training 
 There should be uniformity in the domestic violence training that 
judicial officers undertake, which should be regularly updated. 
 Family lawyers should be required to undergo compulsory domestic 
violence training by accredited providers, which should be attended 
in person (and not undertaken online).
31 
 Domestic violence training should cover the gendered nature of 
domestic violence, its power and control dynamics, the effects of 
domestic violence on women and children, the strategies employed 
by abusers including the pursuit of contact and residence 
proceedings, and the broader consequences of contact between 
children and abusive fathers. 
 
 
                                                 
31
 Solicitors and barristers are not required to undertake domestic violence training, and research 
by Hunter and Barnett (n 5) suggests that most family lawyers have had no training. 
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9.4  Risk and ‘welfare’ assessment 
 Since Part 25 of the Family Proceedings Rules 2010 was 
implemented with the aim of curtailing the use of expert reports in 
family law proceedings, and the recent funding restrictions on the 
use of experts including DVPPs, it is anticipated that the role of 
Cafcass in assessing risk will markedly increase. It is suggested that 
the Domestic Violence Toolkit should be reinstated, and that Cafcass 
officers be properly trained to use the toolkit and the CAADA 
DASH risk identification checklist. 
 Safeguarding enquiries should be extended to include Family Law 
Act and Protection from Harassment Act injunctions. While all 
Cafcass officers interviewed thought this would be extremely helpful, 
many queried how this could be achieved, and there are a number of 
logistical and resource issues. This is clearly an area that will require 
some consideration and, inevitably, resources, including the 
possibility of a national register of injunctions. 
 All respondents considered that it would be extremely beneficial for 
courts and Cafcass officers to be required to consider the factors set out in 
Paragraph 27 by way of a ‘checklist’ in all cases where domestic violence 
has been admitted or proved; they should also form part of the questions 
to experts.  
 
9.5 Final orders – ensuring safety 
 If the court decides, after applying the factors in Paragraphs 26 and 27, 
that contact should be professionally supervised, it should not order such 
contact unless it can be satisfied at the time of making the order that, after 
a finite period, professional supervision will no longer be necessary. 
 If the parties agree and/or the court decides that contact should be fully 
supervised at a contact centre, this requirement should not be downgraded 
to a supported contact centre, contact supervised by family members or 
friends, or any other mechanism because facilities for professionally 
supervised contact are not available. 
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9.6 Consent orders 
 With the recent restrictions on legal aid for the vast majority of parents 
involved in private law Children Act proceedings, it is even more 
important that courts take the initiative to scrutinise proposed consent 
orders, and ensure that a Cafcass officer is always present at court and has 
spoken to both parties separately before such orders are approved.  
 A Cafcass officer should always ensure that any litigant in person who is 
or may be a victim of domestic violence has voluntarily agreed to a 
proposed consent order before the court is asked to approve it. 
 Judicial officers should have a ‘checklist’ of factors to consider when 
asked to approve consent orders, the first item on which should be 
domestic violence.
32
 Judicial officers should also ensure that any litigant 
in person has voluntarily agreed to a proposed consent order. 
 Consent orders submitted during the course of or after ‘without notice’ 
applications, or in the context of injunction proceedings, should be 
subjected to particular scrutiny and should not be approved until all 
safeguarding enquiries have been obtained. 
 
9.7 Litigants in person and fact-finding hearings 
 Fact-finding hearings are likely to be the aspect of private law Children 
Act proceedings that litigants in person find most difficult to manage. 
Inevitably, the role of judicial officers will increase in significance as 
they may well need to take on a more interventionist approach to assist 
the parties. It is recommended that empirical research is undertaken to 
determine how disputed allegations of domestic violence are being 
resolved where one or both parents are acting in person, what difficulties 
are being encountered by courts and parties to proceedings, and how 
determining allegations of domestic violence can best be managed in 
these circumstances. 
 
 
 
                                                 
32
 Ms A [Solicitor, London] is to be credited with this helpful suggestion 
338 
 
TABLE OF CASES 
 
Re A (Minors) (Access) [1992] Family Law 67 
 
Re A (Contact: Domestic Violence) [1998] 2 FLR 171 
 
Re A (Contact: Risk of Violence) [2006] 1 FLR 283 
 
Re A (Residence Order) [2009] EWCA Civ 1141, [2010] 1 FLR 1083 
 
Re A (Fact-Finding: Disputed Facts) [2011] EWCA Civ 12, [2011] 1 FLR 1817 
 
A v A (Shared Residence) [2004] EWHC 142 (Fam), [2004] 1 FLR 1195 
 
A v A (Appeal: Fact-finding) [2010] EWHC 1282 (Fam) 
 
A v L (Contact) [1998] 1 FLR 361 
 
A v N (Committal: Refusal of Contact) [1997] 1 FLR 533 
 
Re Agar-Ellis v Lascelles (1883) 24 Ch D 317 
 
Re A-T (Children) [2008] EWCA Civ 652 
 
Re B (A Minor) (Access) [1984] 1 FLR 648 
 
Re B (A Child); Re O (Children) [2006] EWCA Civ 1199, [2007] 1 FLR 530 
 
Re B (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2008] UKHL 35, [2009] AC 11 
 
Re B (Transfer of Residence to Grandmother) [2012] EWCA Civ 858, [2013] 1 
FLR 275 
 
Re B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33 
 
Re BC (A Minor) (Access) [1985] FLR 639 
 
Re C (Children Proceedings: Powers of Transfer) [2008] EWCA Civ 502, [2008] 
2 FLR 815 
 
Re C (Contact: Conduct of Hearing) [2006] EWCA Civ 144, [2006] 2 FLR 289 
 
Re C (A Child) [2008] EWCA Civ 551 
 
Re C (Domestic Violence: Fact-Finding Hearing) [2009] EWCA Civ 994, [2010] 
1 FLR 1728 
 
C v C (Access Order: Enforcement) [1990] 1 FLR 462 
339 
 
 
Churchyard v Churchyard [1984] FLR 635 
 
Re D (A Minor) (Contact: Mother’s Hostility) [1993] 2 FLR 1 
 
Re D (Contact: Reasons for Refusal) [1997] 2 FLR 48 
 
Re D (Intractable Contact Dispute: Publicity) [2004] EWHC 727 (Fam), [2004] 1 
FLR 1226 
 
D v D (Contact Order: Conditions) [1997] 2 FLR 797 
 
Re E (Children) (Lawtel, 11
th
 April 2005) 
 
Re E (Contact) [2009] EWCA Civ 1238, [2010] 1 FLR 1738 
 
Re F (Minors) (Contact: Mother’s Anxiety) [1993] 2 FLR 830 
 
Re F (Minors) (Contact: Appeal) [1997] 1 FCR 523 
 
Re F (Restrictions on Applications) [2005] 2 FLR 950 
 
F v F (Contact: Committal) [1998] 2 FLR 237 
 
Re G (Children) [2005] EWCA Civ 1283, [2006] 1 FLR 771 
 
Re G (Restricting Contact) [2010] EWCA Civ 470, [2010] 2 FLR 692 
 
Re G (A Child) [2011] EWCA Civ 1147 
 
G v F (Contact: Allegations of Violence) [1999] Family Law 809 
 
G v G [1985] UKHL 13, 1 WLR 647 
 
Re H (A Minor) (Contact) [1994] 2 FLR 776 
 
Re H (Contact) (Principles) [1994] 2 FLR 969 
 
Re H (Contact: Domestic Violence) [1998] 2 FLR 42 
 
Re H (A Child) (Contact: Mother’s Opposition) [2001] FCR 59 
 
Re H (A Child) (Contact: Domestic Violence) [2006] 1 FCR 102 
 
Re H (Contact Order) [2010] EWCA Civ 448, [2010] 2 FLR 866 
 
H v H (Lawtel, 1
st
 February 2001) 
 
Re J (Children) (Lawtel, 25
th
 July 2000) 
 
340 
 
Re J (A Minor) (Contact) [2004] 1 FLR 729 
 
Re J (Costs of Fact-Finding Hearing) [2009] EWCA Civ 1350, [2010] 1 FLR 
1893 
 
Re J (A Child) [2012] EWCA Civ 720 
 
Re J-S (Contact: Parental Responsibility) [2002] EWCA Civ 1028, [2003] 1 FLR 
399 
 
Re K (Contact: Mother’s Anxiety) [1999] 2 FLR 703 
 
Re K (Appeal: Contact) [2010] EWCA Civ 1365, [2011] 1 FLR 1592 
 
Re K (Children: Refusal of Direct Contact) [2011] EWCA Civ 1064 
 
Re K (A Child) [2012] EWCA Civ 1306 
 
Re KD (A Minor) (Access: Principles) [1998] AC 806, 2 FLR 39 
 
Re K and S (Children) (Contact: Domestic Violence) [2006] FCR 316 
 
Re L (Minors) (Access order: Enforcement) [1989] 2 FLR 359 
 
Re L (Contact: Genuine Fear) [2002] 1 FLR 621 
 
Re L, V, M, H (Contact: Domestic Violence) [2000] 4 All ER 609, [2000] 2 FLR 
334 
 
Re M (Minors) (Access: Contempt: Committal) [1991] 1 FLR 355 
 
Re M (A Minor) (Contact: Conditions) [1994] 1 FLR 272 
 
Re M (Contact: Welfare Test) [1995] 1 FLR 274 
 
Re M (Contact: Supervision) [1996] 2 FLR 314 
 
Re M (Contact: Violent Parent) [1999] 2 FLR 321 
 
Re M (Interim Contact: Domestic Violence) [2000] 2 FLR 377 
 
Re M (Intractable Contact Dispute: Interim Care Order) [2003] EWHC 1024 
(Fam), [2003] 2 FLR 636 
 
Re M (Children) [2009] EWCA Civ 1216, [2010] 1 FLR 1089 
 
Re M and B (Children: Domestic Violence) [2001] 1 FCR 116 
 
M v A (Contact: Domestic Violence) [2002] 2 FLR 921 
 
341 
 
M v M [1973] 2 All ER 81 
 
M v M (Parental Responsibility) [1999] 2 FLR 737 
 
M v M (Residence) [2010] EWHC 3579 (Fam), [2011] 1 FLR 1951 
 
Re M (Section 91(14) Order) [2012] EWCA Civ 446, [2012] 2 FLR 758 
 
Re N (A Minor) (Access: Penal Notice) [1992] 1 FLR 134 
 
Re O (Contact: Imposition of Conditions) [1995] 2 FLR 124 
 
Re O (Contact: Withdrawal of Application) [2003] EWHC 3031 (Fam), [2004] 1 
FLR 1258 
 
Re P (Contact: Supervision) [1996] 2 FLR 314 
 
Re P (Contact: Discretion) [1998] 1 FLR 696 
 
Re P (Children) (Contact) [2008] EWCA Civ 1431, [2009] 1 FLR 1056 
 
Patterson v Walcott [1984] FLR 408 
 
Re R (A Minor) (Contact) [1993] 2 FLR 762 
 
Re R (Family Proceedings: No Case to Answer) [2009] EWCA Civ 1619, [2009] 
2 FLR 82 
 
Re S (Minors) (Access: Appeal) [1990] Family Law 336 
 
Re S (Contact: Grandparents) [1996] 1 FLR 158 
 
Re S (Care Proceedings: Split Hearing) [1996] 2 FLR 773 
 
Re S (Violent Parent: Indirect Contact) [2000] 1 FLR 481 
 
Re S (Contact: Promoting Relationship with Absent Parent) [2004] EWCA Civ 
18, [2004] 1 FLR 1279 
 
Re S (Unco-operative Mother) [2004] 2 FLR 710 
 
Re S (A Child) [2012] EWCA Civ 617 
 
Re S (A Child) [2012] EWCA Civ 1031 
 
Sheppard v Miller (1982) 3 FLR 124 
 
SS v KS [2009] EWHC 1575 (Fam), S v S (Interim Contact) [2009] 2 FLR 1586 
 
Re T (A Minor) (Parental Responsibility: Contact) [1993] 2 FLR 450 
342 
 
 
Re T (Contact: Alienation: Permission to Appeal) [2003] 1 FLR 531 
 
Thomason v Thomason [1985] FLR 214 
 
V v V (Contact: Implacable Hostility) [2004] EWHC 1215 (Fam), [2004] 2 FLR 
851 
 
Re W (A Minor) (Contact) [1994] 2 FLR 441 
 
Re W (Contact: Joining Child as Party) [2001] EWCA Civ 1830, [2003] 1 FLR 
681 
 
Re W (Contact) [2007] EWCA Civ 753, [2007] 2 FLR 1122 
 
Re W (Permission to Appeal) [2007] EWCA Civ 768, [2008] 1 FLR 406 
 
Re W (Residence Order: Leave to Appeal) [2010] EWCA Civ 1280, [2011] 1 
FLR 1143 
 
Re W (Family Proceedings: Applications) [2011] EWHC 76 (Fam), [2011] 1 
FLR 2163 
 
Re W (Children) [2012] EWCA Civ 528 
 
Re W (Direct Contact) [2012] EWCA Civ 999, [2013] 1 FLR 494 
 
Re W (Contact: Permission to Appeal) [2012] EWCA Civ 1214, [2013] 1 FLR 
609 
 
Re W (Children) [2012] EWCA Civ 1788 
 
Williams v Williams [1985] FLR 509 
 
Yemshaw v London Borough of Hounslow [2011] UKSC 3, [2011] All ER 187 
 
Re Z (Unsupervised Contact: Allegations of Domestic Violence) [2009] EWCA 
Civ 430, [2009] 2 FLR 877 
 
Z v Z (Refusal of Contact: Committal) [1996] 1 FCR 538 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
343 
 
TABLE OF LEGISLATION 
 
 
Adoption and Children Act 2002 
 
Children Act 1989 
 
Children and Adoption Act 2006 
 
Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 
 
Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 
 
Family Law Act 1996 
 
Guardianship Act 1973 
 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1873 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
344 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
Adams S, ‘Parents’ Rights v Children’s Needs in Private Cases’ (2007) 37 Family 
Law 257-261 
 
Agnew-Davies R, ‘Children who Experience Domestic Violence’ (‘Making Contact 
Safe’ Conference, London, September 2004) 
 
Amato PR, ‘Children of divorce in the 1990s: An update of the Amato and Keith 
(1991) meta analysis’ (2001) 15 Journal of Family Psychology 355 
 
Amato PR and Keith B, ‘Parental Divorce and the Well-being of Children: A Meta-
analysis’ (1991) Psychological Bulletin 26 
 
Amato PR, Meyers C and Emery R, ‘Changes in non-resident father-child contact 
from 1976-2002’ (2009) 58 Family Relations 41 
 
Anderson L, Contact between Children and Violent Fathers (Rights of Women 1997) 
 
Archard D, Children: Rights and Childhood (Routledge 1993) 
 
Aris R and Harrison C, Domestic violence and the supplemental information form 
(Ministry of Justice 2007) 
 
Aris R, Harrison C and Humphreys C, Safety and child contact: An analysis of the 
role of child contact centres in the context of domestic violence and child welfare 
concerns (TSO 2002) 
 
Ashenden S, ‘The Problem of Power in Luhmann’s Systems Theory’ in M King and 
C Thornhill (eds), Luhmann on Law and Politics (Hart 2006) 
 
Babbie E, The Practice of Social Research (7
th
 edn, Wadsworth 1995) 
 
Bailey-Harris R, Davis G, Barron J and Pearce J, Monitoring Private Law 
Applications under the Children Act 1989. Report to the Nuffield Foundation 
(University of Bristol 1998) 
 
Bailey-Harris R, Barron J and Pearce J, ‘From Utility to Rights? The Presumption of 
Contact in Practice’ (1999) 13 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 
111-131 
 
Banakar R, ‘Studying Cases Empirically: A Sociological Method for Studying 
Discrimination Cases in Sweden’ in R Banakar and M Travers (eds), Theory and 
Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart 2005) 
 
Banakar R and Travers M, ‘Ethnography and Law’ in R Banakar and M Travers 
(eds), Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart 2005) 
 
345 
 
Banakar R and Travers M, ‘Method Versus Methodology’ R Banakar and M Travers 
(eds), Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart 2005) 
 
Banakar R and Travers M, ‘Structural Approaches’ in R Banakar and M Travers 
(eds), Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart 2005) 
 
Banakar R and Travers M, ‘Studying Legal Texts’ in R Banakar and M Travers (eds), 
Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart 2005) 
 
Bancroft L and Silverman JG, The Batterer as Parent: Addressing the Impact of 
Domestic Violence on Family Dynamics (Sage 2002) 
 
Bar Council, Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales (The Bar Council 
2012), www.barstandarsboard.org.uk/regulatory-requirements/the-code-of-conduct/, 
last accessed 28.06.13  
 
Barlow A, Duncan S and James G, ‘New Labour, the rationality mistake and family 
policy in Britain’ in A Carling, S Duncan and R Edwards (eds), Analysing Families: 
Morality and rationality in policy and practice (Routledge 2002) 
 
Barnett A, ‘Disclosure of domestic violence by women involved in child contact 
disputes’ (1999) 29 Family Law 104 
 
Barnett A, ‘Contact and Domestic Violence: The Ideological Divide’ in J Bridgeman 
and D Monk (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Child Law (Cavendish 2000) 
 
Barnett A, ‘The Welfare of the Child Re-Visited: In Whose Best Interests? Part I’ 
(2009) 39 Family Law 50-54 
 
Barnett A, ‘The Welfare of the Child Re-Visited: In Whose Best Interests? Part II’ 
(2009) 39 Family Law 135-141 
 
Barron J, Not Worth the Paper? The effectiveness of legal protection for women and 
children experiencing domestic violence (Women’s Aid Federation of England 1990) 
 
Bell C, ‘Domestic Violence and Contact: 10 Reasons Why’ (2008) 38 Family Law 
1139-1143 
 
Berns S, ‘Parents Behaving Badly: Parental Alienation Syndrome and the Family 
Court – Magic Bullet or Poisoned Chalice’ (2001) Australian Journal on Family Law 
6 
 
Blackwell A and Dawe F, Non-Resident Parental Contact: Final Report (ONS 2003) 
 
Borch C, ‘Systemic Power: Luhmann, Foucault and Analytics of Power’ (2005) 48(2) 
Acta Sociologica 155-167 
 
Bossy J and Coleman S, A Research and Literature Review: Protection and 
Accountability (HMCPSI 2004) 
 
346 
 
Bowlby J, Child Care and the Growth of Love (Penguin 1953) 
 
Boyd S, ‘Some post-modernist challenges to feminist analyses of law, family and 
State: ideology and discourse in child custody law’ (1991) 10 Canadian Journal of 
Family Law 79 
 
Boyd S, ‘Is there an Ideology of Motherhood in (Post)Modern Child Custody law?’ 
(1996) 5(4) Social and Legal Studies 495-521 
 
Boyd S, ‘Backlash and the Construction of Legal Knowledge: The Case of Child 
Custody Law’ (2001) 20 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 141-165 
 
Boyd S, ‘Demonizing Mothers: Fathers’ Rights Discourses in Child Custody Law 
Reform Processes’ (2004) 6(1) Journal of the Association for Research on Mothering 
52-74 
 
Boyd S, ‘ “Robbed of their Families?” Fathers’ Rights Discourses in Canadian 
Parenting Law Reform Processes’ in R Collier and S Sheldon (eds), Fathers’ Rights 
Activism and Law Reform in Comparative Perspective (Hart 2006) 
 
Boyd S, ‘Autonomy for Mothers? Relational Theory and Parenting Apart’ (2010) 18 
Feminist Legal Studies 137-158 
 
Bretherton H, ‘ “Because it’s Me the Decisions Are About”’ (2002) 32 Family Law 
450-457 
 
Bryman A, ‘Quantitative and Qualitative Research: Further Reflections on their 
Integration’ from A Bryman (ed) Mixing Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Research (Avebury 1992) in C Seale (ed), Social Research Methods: A Reader 
(Routledge 2004) 
 
Buchanan A and Hunt J, ‘Disputes Contact Cases in the Courts’ in A Bainham,  B 
Lindley, M Richards L Trinder (eds), Children and Their Families: Contact, Rights 
and Welfare (Hart 2003) 
 
Buchanan A, Hunt J, Bretherton H and Bream V, Families in Conflict: Perspectives 
of children and parents on the Family Court Welfare Service (The Policy Press 2001) 
 
Burghes L, Lone Parenthood and Family Disruption: the Outcomes for Children 
(Family Policy Studies Centre 1994) 
 
Butler E, ‘Safer Contact Arrangements?’ (2006) Childright 12 
 
Butler-Sloss LJ, ‘Contact and Domestic Violence’ (2001) 31 Family Law 355-358 
 
Cafcass, Domestic Violence Toolkit, Version 2.1 (Cafcass 2007) 
 
Cafcass, ‘Child Protection Policy’, https://www.cafcass.gov.uk/leaflets-
resources/policies-and-templates-for-secs/policies.aspx, last accessed 29.11.13  
 
347 
 
Cardia-Voneche L and Bastard B, ‘Why Some Children see their Father and Others 
do not; Questions Arising from a Pilot Study’ in M Maclean (ed), Parenting After 
Partnering (Hart 2007) 
 
Carling A, Duncan S and Edwards R (eds), Analysing Families: Morality and 
rationality in policy and practice (Routledge 2002) 
 
Carvel J, ‘More Women Work as Pay Gap Narrows Slightly’ (The Guardian, 
London 27 September 2008) 
 
Chambers and Partners, ‘Directory’ www.chambersandpartners.com, last accessed 
15.10.11  
 
Choudhry S and Herring J, ‘Righting Domestic Violence’ (2006) 20 International 
Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 95-119 
 
Clarke J, Cochrane A and Smart C, Ideologies of Welfare: From Dreams to 
Disillusion (Routledge 1992) 
 
Clarke L and Roberts C, ‘Policy and rhetoric: The growing interest in fathers and 
grandparents in Britain’ in A Carling, S Duncan and R Edwards (eds), Analysing 
Families: Morality and rationality in policy and practice (Routledge 2002) 
 
Collier R, Masculinity, Law and the Family (Routledge 1995) 
 
Collier R, ‘Waiting Till Father Gets Home…’: The Reconstruction of Fatherhood in 
Family Law’ (1995) 4(1) Social and Legal Studies 5-30 
 
Collier R, ‘From Women’s Emancipation to Sex War? Men, Heterosexuality and the 
Politics of Divorce’ in S Day Sclater and C Piper (eds), Undercurrents of Divorce 
(Ashgate 1999) 
 
Collier R, ‘A Hard Time to be a Father?: Reassessing the Relationship Between Law, 
Policy and Family (Practices)’ (2001) 28(4) Journal of Law and Society 520-545 
 
Collier R, ‘Fathers 4 Justice, law and the new politics of fatherhood’ (2005) 17(4) 
CFLQ 511-533 
 
Collier R, ‘Feminist Legal Studies and the Subject(s) of Men: Questions of Text, 
Terrain and Context in the Politics of Family Law and Gender’ in A Diduck and K 
O’Donovan (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Family Law (1st edn, Routledge 
Cavendish 2006) 
 
Collier R, ‘ “The Outlaw Fathers Fight Back”: Fathers’ Rights Groups, Fathers 4 
Justice and the Politics of Family Law Reform – Reflections on the UK Experience’ 
in R Collier and S Sheldon (eds), Fathers’ Rights Activism and Law Reform in 
Comparative Perspective (Hart 2006) 
 
Collier R and Sheldon S (eds), Fathers’ Rights Activism and Law Reform in 
Comparative Perspective (Hart 2006) 
348 
 
 
Collier R and Sheldon S, ‘Fathers Rights, Fatherhood and Law Reform: International 
Perspectives’ in R Collier and S Sheldon (eds), Fathers’ Rights Activism and Law 
Reform in Comparative Perspective (Hart 2006) 
 
Cook JA and Fonow MM, ‘Knowledge and Women’s Interests: Issues of 
Epistemology in Feminist Sociological Research’ in JM Nielsen (ed), Feminist 
Research Methods (Westview Press 1990) 
 
Coy M, Lovett J and Kelly L, Realising Rights, Fulfilling Obligations: A Template 
for an Integrated Strategy on Violence Against Women for the UK (End Violence 
Against Women 2008) 
 
Coy M, Perks K, Scott E and Tweedale R, Picking up the pieces: domestic violence 
and child contact (Rights of Women 2012) 
 
Craig J, ‘Everybody’s Business: Applications for Contact Orders by Consent’ (2007) 
37 Family Law 26 
 
Creswell JW, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design (1
st
 edn, Sage 1998) 
 
Crown Prosecution Service, Violence Against Women and Girls: Crime Report 
2011-2012 (CPS 2012) 
 
David M, ‘Moral and Maternal: The Family in the New Right’ in R Levitas (ed), The 
Ideology of the New Right (Polity Press 1986) 
 
Day Sclater S and Kaganas F, ‘Contact: Mothers, Welfare and Rights’ in A Bainham, 
B Lindley, M Richards and L Trinder (eds), Children and their Families: Contact, 
Rights and Welfare (Hart 2003) 
 
DCA and DfES, The Government’s Response to the Children Act Sub-Committee 
(CASC) Report: Making Contact Work (DCA, DfES 2004), 
http://www.dfes.gov.uk/childrenandfamilies/docs/CASC%20Final%20Version.doc, 
last accessed 17.06.12  
 
DCA, DfES and DTI, Parental Separation: Children’s Needs and Parents’ 
Responsibilities (Cm 6273, 2004) 
 
DCA, DfES and DTI, Parental Separation: Children’s Needs and Parents’ 
Responsibilities Next Steps (Cm 6452, 2005) 
 
Dennis N and Erdos G, Families Without Fatherhood (Civitas 1992) 
 
Department for Education, Children and Families Bill 2013: Contextual Information 
and Responses to Pre-legislative Scrutiny (Cm 8540, 2012) 
 
 
 
349 
 
Department for Education, Ministry of Justice and Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills, ‘Children and Families Bill 2013’, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2012-2013’0131/2013131.pdf, 
last accessed 15.01.14  
 
Dewar J and Parker S, ‘The Impact of the New Part VII Family Law Act 1975’ 
(1999) 13 Australian Journal of Family Law 96 
 
Diduck A, ‘Legislating Ideologies of Motherhood’ (1993) 2 Social and Legal Studies 
462 
 
Diduck A, Law’s Families (LexisNexis UK 2003) 
 
Diduck A and Kaganas F, Family Law, Gender and the State: Text, Cases and 
Materials (Hart 2006) 
 
Diduck A and O’Donovan K (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Family Law (1st edn, 
Routledge-Cavendish 2006) 
 
Dobash RE and Dobash RP, Women, Violence and Social Change (Routledge 1992) 
 
Dodd T, Crime in England and Wales 2003-2004 (Home Office 2004) 
 
Douglas H and Walsh T, ‘Mothers, Domestic Violence and Child Protection’ (2010) 
16(5) Violence Against Women 489-508 
 
Douglas H and Walsh T, ‘Mothers, Domestic Violence and Child Protection: 
Towards Collaboration and Engagement’ (2010) 16(5) Violence Against Women 37-
542 
 
Drakopoulou M, ‘The Ethic of Care, Female Subjectivity and Feminist Legal 
Scholarship’ (2000) 8 Feminist Legal Studies 199 
 
Dreyfus HL and Rabinow P, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics (Harvester Wheatsheaf 1982) 
 
Dunn J, ‘Contact and Children’s Perspectives on Parental Relationships’ in A 
Bainham, B Lindley, M Richards and L Trinder (eds), Children and their Families: 
Contact, Rights and Welfare (Hart 2003) 
 
Dyer C, McCrum S, Thomas R, Ward R and Wookey S, ‘Making Contact Work: Is 
the Children and Adoption Act 2006 Enough for Resident Parents and Children?’ 
(2008) 38 Family Law 1237-1240 
 
Edleson JL, ‘The overlap between child maltreatment and woman battering’ (1999) 
5(2) Violence Against Women 134-154 
 
Edleson JL, ‘Children witnessing of adult domestic violence’ (1999) 14 Journal of 
Interpersonal Violence 839-870 
 
350 
 
Edwards E, ‘Making the Protocol Work – An SFLA Perspective’ (2002) 32 Family 
Law 561-562 
 
Edwards S, Policing Domestic Violence (Sage 1989) 
 
Eekelaar J, Maclean M and Beinart S, Family Lawyers: The Divorce Work of 
Solicitors (Hart 2000) 
 
Elbow M, ‘Children of Violent Marriages: The Forgotten Victims’ (1982) 63 Social 
Casework 465 
 
Elizabeth V, Gavey E and Tolmie J, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Resident 
Mothers and the Moral Dilemmas they Face During Custody Disputes’ (2010) 18 
Feminist Legal Studies 253-274 
 
Elliott J, Ochiltree G, Sinclair M and Tasker F, ‘Divorce and Children: A British 
Challenge to the Wallerstein View’ (1990) Family Law 309 
 
Elliott J and Richards M, ‘Parental Divorce and the Life chances of Children’ (1991) 
Family Law 481 
 
Eriksson M and Hester M, ‘Violent Men as Good-enough Fathers?: A Look at 
England and Sweden’ (2001) 7(7) Violence Against Women 779-798 
 
Exton J, ‘ADJ news: Shared Parenting’ (2012) 42 Family Law 1403-1404 
 
Fairclough N and Wodak R, ‘Critical discourse analysis’ from TA van Dijk (ed), 
Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction Vol 2 (Sage 2004) in C Seale 
(ed), Social Research Methods: A Reader (Routledge 2004) 
 
Family Justice Review Panel, Family Justice Review Final Report (Ministry of 
Justice, Department for Education, Welsh Government 2011) 
 
Fantuzzo J and Lindquist C, ‘The Effects of Observing Conjugal Violence on 
Children: a review and analysis of research methodology’ (1989) 4 Journal of Family 
Violence 77 
 
Featherstone B, ‘Why gender matters in child welfare and protection’ (2006) 26(2) 
Critical Social Policy 294-341 
 
Featherstone B, ‘Writing fathers in but mothers out!!!’ (2010) 30(2) Critical Social 
Policy 208-224 
 
Featherstone B, Hooper C and Scourfield J, ‘Why Gender Matters for Every Child 
Matters’ (2005) 35 British Journal of Social Work 1343-1355 
 
Featherstone B and Peckover S, ‘Letting them get away with it: Fathers, domestic 
violence and child welfare’ (2007) 27(2) Critical Social Policy181-202 
 
351 
 
Fegan E, ‘ “Ideology after Discourse”: A reconceptualisation for feminist analyses of 
law’ (1996) 23 JLS 173 
 
Fehlberg, ‘Legislating for shared parenting: how the Family Justice Review got it 
right’ (2012) 42 Family Law 709-713 
 
Fetterman DM, Ethnography: Step by Step (2
nd
 edn, Sage 1989) 
 
Fineman M, ‘The Politics of Custody and Gender’ in C Smart and S Sevenhuijsen 
(eds), Child Custody and the Politics of Gender (Routledge 1989) 
 
Fineman M and Mykituik R (eds), The Public Nature of Private Violence (Routledge 
1994) 
 
Flood, Michael, ‘Family Court Crisis – Abusers Getting Custody”’ (2009 
http://angelzfury.blogspot.co.uk/2009/09/fathers-rights-and-violence-against.html 
last accessed 11.12.12) 
 
Fortin J, ‘Taking a longer view of contact: forthcoming research’ (2012) 42 Family 
Law 906-908 
 
Fortin J, Hunt J and Scanlan L, Taking a longer view of contact: The perspectives of 
young adults who experienced parental separation in their youth (University of 
Sussex Law School 2012) 
 
Foucault M, Discipline and Punish (Penguin 1977) 
 
Foucault M, ‘Body/Power’ in C Gordon (ed), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews 
and Other Writings 1972-1977 (Pantheon Books 1980) 
 
Foucault M, ‘Power/Knowledge’ in C Gordon (ed), Power/Knowledge: Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 (Pantheon Books 1980) 
 
Foucault M, ‘Truth and Power’ in C Gordon (ed), Power/Knowledge: Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 (Pantheon Books 1980) 
 
Furstenberg F and Cherlin A, Divided Families: What happens to children when 
parents part (Harvard University Press 1991) 
 
Furstenberg F, Morgan SP and Allinson P, ‘Paternal Participation and Children’s 
Wellbeing after Marital Dissolution’ (1987) 52 American Sociological Review 695 
 
Gadd D, ‘Masculinities and Violence Against Female Partners’ (2002) 11 Social and 
Legal Studies 61-80 
 
Gilder G, Wealth and Poverty (Basic Books 1980) 
 
Gill R, ‘Discourse analysis: practical implementation’ in JTE Richardson (ed), 
Handbook of Qualitative Research Methods for Psychology and the Social Sciences 
(BPS Books 1996) 
352 
 
 
Gilmore S, ‘Contact/Shared Residence and Child Well-being: Research Evidence 
and its Implications for Legal Decision-Making’ (2006) 20 International Journal of 
Law, Policy and the Family 344 
 
Gilmore S, ‘The Assumption That Contact is Beneficial: Challenging the “Secure 
Foundation”’ (2008) 38 Family Law 1226-1229 
 
Gilmore S, ‘Disputing contact: challenging some assumptions’ (2008) CFLQ 285-
311 
 
Glendinning C, Clarke K and Craig G, ‘Implementing the Child Support Act’ (1996) 
18(3) JSWFL 273 
 
Gray DE, Doing Research in the Real World (1
st
 edn, Sage 2004) 
 
Graycar R and Morgan J, The Hidden Gender of Law (Federation Press 2002) 
 
Hague G and Wilson C, The Silenced Pain: Domestic Violence 1945-1970 (The 
Policy Press 1996) 
 
Hale LJ, ‘The View from Court 45’ (1999) 11 CFLQ 377 
 
Hall S, ‘Foucault and Discourse’ in S Hall (ed), Representation: Cultural 
Representations and Signifying Practices (Open University Press 1997) 
 
Hantrais L, ‘Comparing Family Policy in Britian, France and Germany’ (1994) 23 
Journal of Social Policy 35 
 
Harding S, ‘Is there a feminist method?’ from Harding S, Feminism and 
Methodology (Indiana University Press and Open University Press 1987) in C Seale 
(ed), Social Research Methods: A Reader (Routledge 2004) 
 
Harne L, ‘Violent fathers – “good enough” parents?’ (2004) The Domestic Abuse 
Quarterly 19 
 
Harold G and Leve L, ‘Parents as partners: How the parental relationship affects 
children’s psychological development’ in A Balfour, M Morgan and C Vincent (eds), 
How couple relationships shape our world: Clinical practice, research and policy 
perspectives (Karnac 2012) 
 
Harold G and Murch M, ‘Inter-parental conflict and children’s adaptation to 
separation and divorce: theory, research and implications for family law, practice 
and policy’ (2005) 17(2) CFLQ 185 
 
Harrison C, ‘Implacably Hostile or Appropriately Protective?: Women Managing 
Child Contact in the Context of Domestic Violence’ (2008) 14(4) Violence Against 
Women 381-405 
 
353 
 
Harwin N, ‘Putting a stop to domestic violence in the United Kingdom: Challenges 
and Opportunities’ (2006) 126 Violence Against Women 556-567 
 
Healy J, Malley J and Stewart A, ‘Children and their fathers after parental 
separation’ (1990) 60(4) American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 531 
 
Hekman S, Gender and Knowledge: Elements of a Post-Modern Feminism (Polity 
Press 1990) 
 
Herring J, ‘Contact in a Private Law Context’ in A Bainham, B Lindley, M Richards 
and L Trinder (eds), Children and their Families: Contact, Rights and Welfare (Hart 
2003) 
 
Herring J, ‘Why Financial Orders on Divorce Should be Unfair’ (2005) 19 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 218 
 
Hershorn M and Rosenbaum A, ‘Children of Marital Violence: A Closer Look at the 
Unintended Victims’ (1985) 55 American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 260 
 
Hesse-Biber SN, ‘The Practice of Feminist In-Depth Interviewing’ in SN Hesse-
Biber and PL Leavy (eds), Feminist Research Practice (Sage 2007) 
 
Hesse-Biber SN, ‘Putting it Together: Feminist Research Praxis’ in SN Hesse-Biber 
and PL Leavy (eds), Feminist Research Practice (Sage 2007) 
 
Hester M, Who does what to whom? Gender and domestic violence perpetrators 
(University of Bristol 2009) 
 
Hester M, ‘Commentary on “Mothers, Domestic Violence, and Child Protection,” by 
Heather Douglas and Tamara Walsh’ (2010) 16(5) Violence Against Women 516-
523 
 
Hester M, Humphries J and Pearson C, ‘Separation, divorce, child contact and 
domestic violence’ in Mullender A and Morley R (eds), Children Living with 
Domestic Violence (Whiting and Birch 1994) 
 
Hester M and Pearson C, ‘Domestic Violence and children – the practice of family 
court welfare officers’ (1997) 9(3) CFLQ 281 
 
Hester M, Pearson C and Radford L, Domestic Violence: A National Survey of Child 
Welfare and Voluntary Sector Mediation Practice (The Policy Press 1997) 
 
Hester M and Radford L, Domestic Violence and Child Contact Arrangements in 
England and Denmark (The Policy Press 1996) 
 
Hester M and Westmarland N, Tackling Domestic Violence – Effective Interventions 
and Approaches (Home Office 2005) 
 
354 
 
Hetherington EM, Cox M and Cox R, ‘The Aftermath of Divorce’ in JH Stevens and 
M Matthews (eds), Mother-child, father-child relations (National Association for the 
Education of Young Children 1979) 
 
Hewitt K, ‘Divorce and Parental Disagreement’ (1996) Family Law 368 
 
HM Government, Together we can end violence against women and girls: a 
consultation paper (Home Office 2009) 
 
HM Government, Together we can end violence against women and girls: a strategy 
(Home Office 2009) 
 
HM Inspectorate of Court Administration, Domestic Violence, Safety and Family 
Proceedings: Thematic review of the handling of domestic violence issues by the 
Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service (CAFCASS) and the 
administration of family courts in Her Majesty’s Courts Service (HMCS) (HMICA 
2005) 
 
Home Office, www.gov.uk/government/news/new-definition-of-domestic-violence, 
last accessed 18.07.l3  
 
Home Office, Safety and Justice: the Government’s proposals on domestic violence 
(Cm 5847, 2003) 
 
Home Office, British Crime Survey (Home Office 2010) 
 
Hooper C, ‘Do Families Need Fathers? The Impact of Divorce on Children in A 
Mullender and R Morley (eds), Children Living with Domestic Violence (Whiting 
and Birch 1994) 
 
Home Office Violent Crime Unit, Developing Domestic Violence Strategies – A 
Guide for Partnerships (Home Office 2004) 
 
House of Commons Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Fourth Report: 
Family Justice: The Operation of the Family Courts  (TSO HC 116-1, 2005) 
 
Hughes H, ‘Psychological and Behavioural Correlates of Family Violence in Child 
Witnesses and Victims’ (1988) 58 American Journal of Ortho-Psychiatry 77 
 
Humphreys C, ‘Judicial alienation syndrome – failures to respond to post-separation 
violence’ (1999) 29 Family Law 313-316 
 
Humphreys C, ‘Domestic violence and child abuse’ (DfES Research and Practice 
Briefings 2006) 
 
Humphreys C, ‘Crossing the Great Divide: Response to Douglas and Walsh’ (2010) 
16(5) Violence Against Women 509-515 
 
Humphreys C and Harrison C, ‘Squaring the Circle – Contact and Domestic 
Violence’ (2003) 33 Family Law 419-423 
355 
 
 
Humphreys C and Mullender A, Children and domestic violence: a research 
overview of the impact on children (Research in Practice, undated) www.rip.org.uk, 
last accessed 04.08.13  
 
Humphreys C and Thiara R, Routes to Safety: Protection issues facing abused 
women and children and the role of outreach services (The Policy Press 2002) 
 
Hunt J and Roberts C, Child contact with non-resident parents, Family Policy 
Briefing 3 (University of Oxford 2004) 
 
Hunt J and Macleod A, Outcomes of applications to court for contact orders after 
parental separation or divorce (Ministry of Justice 2008) 
 
Hunter R and Barnett A, Fact-Finding Hearings and the Implementation of the 
President’s Practice Direction: Residence and Contact Orders: Domestic Violence 
and Harm (Family Justice Council 2013) www.familyjusticecouncil.org.uk, last 
accessed 11.12.13 
 
Ingham T, ‘Contact and the Obdurate Parent’ (1996) 26 Family Law 615 
 
Jaffe P, Lemon N and Poisson S, Child custody and domestic violence: A call for 
safety and accountability (Sage 2003) 
 
Jaffe P, Wolfe D and Wilson S, Children of Battered Women (Sage 1990) 
 
Jaffe P, Wolfe D, Wilson S and Zak L, ‘Similarities in behavioural and social 
maladjustment among child victims and witnesses to family violence’ (1986) 56 
American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 142 
 
James A, James A and Mcnamee S, ‘Constructing Children’s Welfare in Family 
Proceedings’ (2003) 33 Family Law 889-895 
 
Jayaratne T, ‘The Value of Quantitative Methodology for Feminist Research’ in G 
Bowles and R D Klein (eds), Theories of Women’s Studies (Routledge & Kegan Paul 
1983) 
 
Jenks C, Childhood (Routledge 1996) 
 
Johnston J, ‘Domestic violence and parent-child relationships in families disputing 
custody’ (1995) Australian Journal of Family Law (Special Edition) 12-25 
 
Johnston J, Kline M and Tschann J, ‘On-going post-divorce conflict: Effects on 
children of joint custody and frequent access’ (1989) 59 American Journal of 
Orthopsychiatry 190-199 
 
Jordan A, ‘ “Dads aren’t demons. Mums aren’t madonnas. Constructions of 
fatherhood and masculinities in the (real) Fathers 4 Justice campaign’ (2009) 31(4) 
JSWFL 419-433 
 
356 
 
Judd CM, Smith ER and Kidder LH, Research Methods in Social Relations (6
th
 edn, 
Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich 1991) 
 
Kaganas F, ‘Responsible or feckless fathers? Re S (Parental Responsibility)’ (1996) 
8(2) CFLQ 165-173 
 
Kaganas F, ‘Contact, Conflict and Risk’ in S Day Sclater and C Piper (eds), 
Undercurrents of Divorce (Ashgate 1999) 
 
Kaganas F, ‘Domestic Violence, Men’s Groups and the Equivalence Argument’ in A 
Diduck and K O’Donovan (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Family Law (1st edn, 
Routledge-Cavendish 2006) 
 
Kaganas F, ‘Regulating Emotion: Judging Contact Disputes’ (2011) 23(1) CFLQ 63-
93 
 
Kaganas F and Day Sclater S, ‘Contact and Domestic Violence: The Winds of 
Change?’ (2000) 30 Family Law 630-636 
 
Kaganas F and Day Sclater S, ‘Contact Disputes: Narrative Constructions of “Good” 
Parents’ (2004) 12 Feminist Legal Studies 1-27 
 
Kaganas F and Piper, ‘Divorce and Domestic Violence’ in S Day Sclater and C Piper 
(eds), Undercurrents of Divorce (Ashgate 1999) 
 
Kaganas F and Piper C, ‘Shared Parenting – a 70% Solution?’ (2002) 14(4) CFLQ 
365-484 
 
Kane E, Doing your own Research (2
nd
 edn, Marion Boyars 1985) 
 
Kaye M, ‘Domestic violence, Contact and Residence’ (1996) 8(4) CFLQ 285 
 
Kaye M and Tolmie J, ‘ “Lollies at a Children’s Party” and other Myths: Violence, 
Protection orders and fathers’ rights groups’ (1998) 10 Current Issues in Criminal 
Justice 52-62 
 
Kelly J, ‘Children’s Post-Divorce Adjustment’ (1991) 31 Family Law 52 
 
King M (ed), Childhood, Welfare and Justice (Batsford 1981) 
 
King M, ‘Welfare and Justice’ in M King (ed), Childhood, Welfare and Justice 
(Batsford 1981) 
 
King M, ‘The “truth” about autopoiesis’ (1993) 20 Journal of Law and Society 1 
 
King M, A Better World for Children (Routledge 1997) 
 
King M, ‘ “Being sensible”: Images and Practices of the new Family Lawyers’ (1999) 
28 Journal of Social Policy 249 
 
357 
 
King M, ‘What’s the Use of Luhmann’s Theory?’ in M King and C Thornhill (eds), 
Luhmann on Law and Politics (Hart 2006)  
 
King M and Piper C, How the Law Thinks about Children (2
nd
 edn, Gower 1995) 
 
King M and Thornhill C, ‘Introduction’ in M King and C Thornhill (eds), Luhmann 
on Law and Politics (Hart 2006)  
 
Kinsman G, ‘Queerness is Not in our Genes: Biological Determinism Versus Social 
Liberation’ in DR Brock (ed), Making Normal: Social Regulation in Canada 
(Harcourt 2003) 
 
Kitzman K, Gaylord N, Holt A and Kenny E, ‘Child witnesses to domestic violence: 
a meta-analytic review’ (2003) 71(2) Journal of Consultative Clinical Psychology 
339-352 
 
Lacey N, Unspeakable Subjects: Feminist Essays in Legal and Social Theory (Hart 
1998) 
 
Lacroix C, ‘Freedom, desire and power: Gender processes and presumptions of 
shared care and responsibility after parental separation’ (2006) 29 Women’s Studies 
International Forum 184-196 
 
Lange B, ‘Researching Discourse and Behaviour as Elements of Law in Action’ in R 
Banakar and M Travers (eds), Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart 
2005) 
 
Law Commission, Domestic Violence and Occupation of the Family Home (Cm 207, 
1992) 
 
Law Society, Family Law Protocol (The Law Society 2006) 
 
Lawson E, Johnson M, Adams L, Lamb J and Field S, Blackstone’s Guide to the 
Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004) (OUP 2005) 
 
Leavy P, ‘Feminist Postmodernism and Poststructuralism’ in SN Hesse-Biber and 
PL Leavy (eds), Feminist Research Practice (Sage 2007) 
 
Leavy P, ‘The Feminist Practice of Content Analysis’ in SN Hesse-Biber and PL 
Leavy (eds), Feminist Research Practice (Sage 2007) 
 
Leckenby D and Hesse-Biber SN, ‘Feminist Approaches to Mixed-Methods 
Research’ in SN Hesse-Biber and PL Leavy (eds), Feminist Research Practice (Sage 
2007) 
 
Leigh S, ‘A Legal Presumption in Matters of Child Contact’ (2004) 34 Family Law 
533-535 
 
Levitt A, Charging Perverting the Course of Justice and Wasting Police Time in 
Cases Involving Allegedly False Rape and Domestic Violence Allegations (Director 
358 
 
of Public Prosecutions and the Crown Prosecution Service 2013), 
www.cps.gov.uk/publications/research/perverting_course_of_justice_march_2013.p
df, last accessed 02.08.13  
 
Lewis J, ‘Political interventions and family policy in Britain’ in A Carling, S Duncan 
and R Edwards (eds), Analysing Families: Morality and rationality in policy and 
practice (Routledge 2002) 
 
Lewis J, ‘Fathering Practices in Twenty-Six Intact Families and the Implications for 
Child Contact’ (2005) 1 International Journal of Law in Context 81 
 
Little R, ‘Re L Revisited’ (2006) 36 Family Law 532 
 
Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Board on Family Law: Children Act Sub-Committee, A 
Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Question of Parental Contact in Cases where 
there is Domestic Violence (TSO 2000) 
 
Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Board on Family Law: Children Act Sub-Committee, 
Guidelines for Good Practice on Parental Contact in cases where there is Domestic 
Violence (TSO 2001)  
 
Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Board on Family Law: Children Act Sub-Committee, 
Making Contact Work: A Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Facilitation of 
Arrangements for Contact Between Children and their Non-Residential Parents and 
the Enforcement of Court Orders for Contact (TSO 2001) 
 
Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Board on Family Law: Children Act Sub-Committee, 
Making Contact Work: A Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Facilitation of 
Arrangements for Contact Between Children and their Non-Residential Parents and 
the Enforcement of Court Orders for Contact (TSO 2002) 
 
Lord Chancellor’s Departments, Departmental Report: The Government’s 
Expenditure Plans 2001-2002 to 2003-2004 (Cm 5107, 2001) 
 
Luhmann N, ‘Differentiation in Society’ (1977) 2(2) Canadian Journal of Society  
2 
 
Luhmann N, ‘Closure and Openness: On Reality in the World of Law’ in G Teubner 
(ed), Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society (de Gruyter 1988) 
 
Luhmann N, Ecological Communications (University of Chicago Press 1989) 
 
Luhmann N, ‘Law as a Social System’ (1989) 83 Northwestern University Law 
Review 136 
 
Luhmann N, Political Theory in the Welfare State (de Gruyter 1990) 
 
Mac an Ghaill M and Haywood C, Gender, Culture and Society (Palgrave 
MacMillan 2007) 
 
359 
 
Mandel D, ‘Child Welfare and Domestic Violence: Tackling the Themes and Thorny 
Questions That Stand in the Way of Collaboration and Improvement of Child 
Welfare Practice’ (2010) 16(5) Violence Against Women 530-536 
 
Marcus I, ‘Reframing “Domestic Violence”: Terrorism in the Home’ in M Fineman 
and R Mykituik (eds), The Public Nature of Private Violence (Routledge 1994) 
 
Masson J, ‘Facilitating and Enforcing Contact: The Bill and the Ten Per Cent’ (2005) 
35 Family Law 548-554 
 
Masson J, ‘What is the role of law, lawyers and the courts in post separation 
parenting?’ (2006) www.uea.ac.uk/swk/iccd2006/Presentations/masson29.pdf  last 
accessed 13.4.10 
 
Masson J, ‘Consent Orders in Contact Cases: A Survey of Resolution Members’ 
(2006) 36 Family Law 1041 
 
May T, Social Research (Open University Press 1993) 
 
May T, Social Research Issues, Methods and Process (Open University Press 2001) 
 
May V, ‘On being a “good” mother: The moral presentation of self’ (2008) 42 
Sociology 470-486 
 
Mayhew P, Maung NA and Mirrlees-Black C, The 1992 British Crime Survey 
(Home Office Research Study 132, HMSO 1993) 
 
Mahoney M, ‘Legal images of battered women: Redefining the issue of separation’ 
(1991) 90 Michigan Law Review 1-94 
 
Maynard M, ‘Methods, Practice and Epistemology’ from M Maynard and J Purvis 
(eds), Researching women’s Lives from a Feminist Perspective (Taylor and Frances 
1994) in C Seale (ed), Social Research Methods: A Reader (Routledge 2004) 
 
McGee C, Childhood Experiences of Domestic Violence (Jessica Kingsley 
Publishers 2000) 
 
McNay L, Foucault and Feminism: Power, Gender and the Self (Polity Press 1992) 
 
Mills O, ‘Effects of Domestic Violence on Children’ (2008) 38 Family Law 165-171 
 
Mills S, Michel Foucault (Routledge 2003) 
 
Miner-Rubino K and Jayaratne TE, ‘Feminist Survey Research’ in SN Hesse-Biber 
and PL Leavy (eds), Feminist Research Practice (Sage 2007) 
 
Ministry of Justice, Judicial and Court Statistics 2006 (Cm 7273, 2007) 
 
Ministry of Justice, Judicial and Court Statistics 2007 (Cm 7467, 2008) 
 
360 
 
Ministry of Justice, Judicial and Court Statistics 2011 (Ministry of Justice 2012) 
 
Ministry of Justice, http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/research-and-
analysis/courts, last accessed 12.10.13  
 
Mirrlees-Black C, Domestic Violence: Findings from a new British Crime Survey 
self-completion questionnaire (Home Office Research Study 191, 1999) 
 
Mirrlees-Black C, Mayhew P and Percy A, The 1996 British Crime Survey England 
and Wales (Home Office Research and Statistics Directorate 1996) 
 
Mitchell J, ‘Contact Orders and the Obstructive Parent – A Third Way?’ (1998) 28 
Family Law 678 
 
Mooney J, The Hidden Figure: Domestic Violence in North London (Islington Police 
and Crime Prevention Unit 1994) 
 
Moore JG, ‘Yo-yo children: Victims of matrimonial violence’ (1975) 43 Child 
Welfare 557 
 
Morgan J and Zedner L, Child Victims (OUP 1992) 
 
Morley R and Mullender A, ‘Domestic Violence and Children: What do we Know 
from Research?’ in A Mullender and R Morley (eds), Children Living with Domestic 
Violence (Whiting and Birch 1994) 
 
Morris P, ‘Screening for Domestic Violence in Family Mediation Practice’ (2011) 
41 Family Law 649-651 
 
Mullender A, Reducing domestic violence … what works? Meeting the needs of 
children (Home Office Crime Reduction Research Series No. 4, 2000) 
 
Mullender A, Tackling Domestic Violence: providing support for children who have 
witnessed domestic violence (Home Office 2004) 
 
Munro V, ‘Legal Feminism and Foucault – A Critique of the Expulsion of Law’ 
(2001) 28(4) Journal of Law and Society 546-567 
 
Munro V, Law and Politics at the Perimeter: Re-evaluating Key Debates in Feminist 
Theory (Hart 2007) 
 
Neale B and Smart C, ‘ “Good” and “bad” lawyers: Struggling in the shadow of the 
new law’ (1997) 19(4) JSWFL 377-402 
 
Neale B and Smart C, ‘Caring, Earning and Changing: Parenthood and Employment 
After Divorce’ in A Carling, S Duncan and R Edwards (eds), Analysing Families: 
Morality and rationality in policy and practice (Routledge 2002) 
 
Newman C, Expert Domestic Violence Risk Assessments in the Family Courts 
(Respect 2010), 
361 
 
www.respect.uk.net/data/files/domestic_violence_risk_assessment_in_family_court.
pdf, last accessed 03.02.13  
 
Newsline, ‘Contact Report’ (2002) 32 Family Law 164-167 
 
Newsline, ‘Making Contact’ (2003) 33 Family Law 275 
 
Newsline Extra, ‘Domestic Violence Commons Inquiry’ (2008) 38 Family Law 269-
271 
 
Newsline Extra, ‘Violence Against Women’ (2009) 39 Family Law 987 
 
Office for National Statistics, Focus on: Violent Crime and Sexual Offences 
2011/2012 (ONS Bulletin 2013) 
 
Pagelow MD, Woman-battering: Victims and their experiences (Sage 1981) 
 
Parton N, Governing the Family: Child Care, Child Protection and the State 
(Macmillan Education 1991) 
 
Patterson J, ‘Trans-Science, Trans-Law and Proceduralisation’ (2003) 12 Social and 
Legal Studies 525 
 
Patterson J and Teubner G, ‘Changing Maps: Empirical Legal Autopoiesis’ in R 
Banakar and M Travers (eds), Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart 
2005) 
 
Patton MQ, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods (3
rd
 edn, Sage 2002) 
 
Peacey V and Hunt J, Problematic contact after separation and divorce? A national 
survey of parents (One Parent Families/Gingerbread 2008) 
 
Pence P and Paymar M, Power and Control: Tactics of Men who Batter. An 
Educational Curriculum (Minnesota Program Development Inc 1990) 
 
Perry A and Rainey B, ‘Supervised, Supported and Indirect Contact Orders: 
Research Findings’ (2007) 21 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 
21-47 
 
Piper C, The Responsible Parent: A Study of Divorce Mediation (Harvester 
Wheatsheaf 1993) 
 
Piper C, ‘Divorce Reform and the Image of the Child’ (1996) 23 Journal of Law and 
Society 364 
 
Piper C, ‘Assumptions about children’s best interests’ (2000) 22(3) JSWFL 261-276 
 
Piper C and Day Sclater S, ‘Changing Divorce’ in C Piper and S Day Sclater (eds), 
Undercurrents of Divorce (Ashgate 1999) 
 
362 
 
Piper C and Kaganas F, ‘The Family Law Act 1996 s1(d): How Will “They” Know 
There is a Risk of Violence?’ (1997) 9(3) CFLQ 279-289 
 
Pirrie J, ‘Making Contact Safe’ (2004) 34 Family Law 837-843 
 
Pleasence P, Balmer N, Buck A, O’Grady A, Maclean M and Genn G, ‘Family 
Problems – What Happens and To Whom’ (2003) 33 Family Law 497-501 
 
Polkinghorne DE, ‘Language and Meaning: Data Collection in Qualitative Research’ 
(2005) 52(2) Journal of Counselling Psychology 137-145 
 
Potter J, ‘Discourse analysis and constructionist approaches: theoretical background’ 
in JTE Richardson (ed), Handbook of Qualitative Research Methods for Psychology 
and the Social Sciences (BPS Books 1996) 
 
Potter J and Wetherell M, ‘Discourse Analysis’ in JA Smith, R Hare and L van 
Langenhove (eds), Rethinking Methods in Psychology (Sage 1995) 
 
Potter P, Practice Direction: Residence and Contact Orders: Domestic Violence and 
Harm [2008] 2 FLR 103, reissued at [2009] 2 FLR 1400 
 
Priban J, ‘Beyond procedural legitimation: legality and its “infictions”’ (1997) 24 
Journal of Law and Society 331-347 
 
Pryor J and Rogers B, Children in Changing Families: Life after Parental 
Separation (Blackwell 2001) 
 
Pryor J and Seymour F, ‘Making decisions about children after parental separation’ 
(1996) 8 CFLQ 229 
 
Radford L and Hester M, Mothering Through Domestic Violence (Jessica Kingsley 
Publishers 2006) 
 
Radford L, Sayer S and AMICA, Unreasonable Fears? Child Contact in the Context 
of Domestic Violence: A Survey of Mothers’ Perceptions of Harm (Women’s Aid 
Federation of England 1999) 
 
Reece H, ‘From Parental Responsibility to Parenting Responsibly’ in M Freeman 
(ed), Law and Sociology: Current Legal Issues (OUP 2005) 
 
Reece H, ‘UK Women’s Groups’ child contact campaign: “so long as it is safe”’ 
(2006) 18(4) CFLQ 538 
 
Reinharz S, Feminist Methods in Social Research (OUP 1991) 
 
Rhoades H, ‘The “No Contact Mother”: Reconstructions of Motherhood in the Era 
of the “New Father” (2002) 16 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 
71-94 
 
363 
 
Resolution, ‘Codes of Practice’ in Resolution Guides to Good Practice (Resolution 
2012), www.resolution.org.uk, last accessed 13.10.12 
 
Roberts AR (ed), Battered Women and their Families (Springer 1984) 
 
Roche J, ‘The Children Act 1989: once a parent always a parent?’ (1991) 13(5) 
JSWFL 345-361 
 
Rogers B and Pryor J, Divorce and Separation: The Outcomes for Children (Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation 1998) 
 
Rosen L, Dragiewicz M and Gibbs J, ‘Fathers’ Rights Groups: Demographic 
Correlates and Impact on Custody Policy’ (2009) 15 Violence Against Women 513-
531 
 
Rosenbaum A and O’Leary D, ‘Children: The Unintended Victims of Marital 
Violence’ (1981) 51 American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 692 
 
Rowe J, ‘Private Children Law Relating to Children An Update’ (FLBA 2010) 
 
Rudestam KE and Newton RR, Surviving your Dissertation (Sage 1992) 
 
Saunders A, ‘Children in Women’s Refuges: A Retrospective Study’ in A Mullender 
and R Morley (eds), Children Living with Domestic Violence (Whiting and Birch 
1994) 
 
Saunders A, Keep G and Debbonaire T, ‘It Hurts me too: Children’s Experiences of 
Refuge Life’ (Women’s Aid Federation England 1995) 
 
Saunders H, ‘Making Contact Worse?’ (Women’s Aid Federation of England 2001) 
 
Saunders H, Twenty-nine Child Homicides: Lessons still to be learnt on domestic 
violence and child protection (Women’s Aid Federation of England 2004) 
 
Scourfield J and Drakeford M, ‘New Labour and the “problem of men”’ (2002) 22 
Critical Social Policy 619-640 
 
Slade A, ‘Supervised Contact between Children and Violent Fathers’ (2000) 30 
Family Law 506-508 
 
Seneviratne M, ‘Researching Ombudsmen’ in R Banakar and M Travers (eds), 
Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart 2005) 
 
Sevenhuijsen S, Citizenship and the Ethics of Care (Routledge 1998) 
 
Shaw M and Bazley J, ‘Effective Strategies in High Conflict Contact Disputes’ 
(2011) 41 Family Law 1129-1137 
 
Sheldon S, ‘Unmarried fathers and parental responsibility: a Case for Reform?’ 
(2001) 9(2) Feminist Legal Studies 93-118 
364 
 
 
Silverman D, Interpreting Qualitative Data (Sage 1997) 
 
Silvern L and Kaersvang L, ‘The Traumatised Children of Violent Marriages’ (1989) 
68 Child Welfare 421 
 
Smart B, Michel Foucault (rev. edn, Routledge 2002) 
 
Smart C, ‘Power and the Politics of Gender’ in C Smart and S Sevenhuijsen (eds), 
Child Custody and the Politics of Gender (Routledge 1989) 
 
Smart C, ‘The Legal and Moral Ordering of Child Custody’ (1991) 18(4) Journal of 
Law and Society 485 
 
Smart C, ‘Losing the Struggle for Another Voice: The Case of Family Law’ (1995) 
18 Dalhousie Law Journal 173-195 
 
Smart C, ‘Wishful thinking and harmful tinkering? Sociological reflections on 
family policy’ (1997) 26 Journal of social Policy 1 
 
Smart C, ‘Equal shares: rights for fathers or recognition for children?’ (2004) 24 
Critical Social Policy 484-503 
 
Smart C, ‘The Ethic of Justice Strikes Back: Changing Narratives of Fatherhood’ in 
A Diduck and K O’Donovan (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Family Law (1st edn, 
Routledge Cavendish 2006) 
 
Smart C and May V, ‘Residence and Contact Disputes in Court’ (2004) 34 Family 
Law 36 
 
Smart C and May V, ‘Why Can’t They Agree? The Underlying Complexity of 
Contact and Residence Disputes’ (2004) 26(4) Journal of Social Welfare and Family 
Law 347-360 
 
Smart C, May V, Wade A and Furniss C, Residence and Contact Disputes in Court 
Volume 2 (DCA Research Series 4/05, 2005) 
 
Smart C and Neale B, ‘Arguments Against Virtue – Must Contact be Enforced?’ 
(1997) 27 Family Law 332-336 
 
Smart C and Neale B, Family Fragments (Polity Press 1999) 
 
Smith C, ‘Autopoietic Law and the “Epistemic Trap”: A Case Study of Adoption  
and Contact’ (2004) 31(3) Journal of Law and Society 318-344 
 
Smith LFJ, Domestic Violence: An Overview of the Literature (HMSO 1989) 
 
Smith M, Robertson J, Dixon J, Quigley M and Whitehead Z, A Study of 
Stepchildren and Step-parenting (Thomas Coram Institute 2001) 
 
365 
 
Stark E and Flitcraft A, ‘Woman-battering, child abuse and social heredity: what is 
the relationship?’ in N Johnson (ed) Marital Violence (Routledge 1985) 
 
Strauss AM, Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists (CUP 1987) 
 
Strauss AM and Corbin JM, Basics of Qualitative Research (Sage 1990) 
 
Sturge C and Glaser D, ‘Contact and Domestic Violence – The Experts’ Court 
Report’ (2000) 30 Family Law 615-629 
 
Taylor S, Bennett F and Sung S, ‘Unequal but “fair”? Housework and child care in a 
sample of low- to moderate-income British couples’ (University of Oxford 2010) 
 
Teubner G, Law as an Autopoietic System (Blackwell 1993) 
 
Thiriot TL and Buckner ET, ‘Multiple Predictors of Satisfactory Post-Divorce 
Adjustment of Single Custodial Parents’ (1991) 17 Journal of Divorce and 
Remarriage 27 
 
Thompson G, Domestic Violence Statistics March 2010 (House of Commons Library 
2010) 
 
Thornhill C, ‘Luhmann’s Political Theory: Politics After Metaphysics?’ in M King 
and C Thornhill (eds), Luhmann on Law and Politics (Hart 2006) 
 
Trinder L, ‘Dangerous Dads and Malicious Mothers: The Relevance of Gender to 
Contact Disputes’ in M Maclean (ed), Parenting After Partnering (Hart 2007) 
 
Trinder L, ‘Conciliation, The Private Law Programme and Children’s Welfare: Two 
Steps Forward, One Step Back?’ (2008) 38 Family Law 338-32 
 
Trinder L, ‘Shared residence: A Review of Recent Research Evidence’ (2010) 40 
Family Law 1192-1197 
 
Trinder L, Connolly J, Kellett J and Notley C, A Profile of Applicants and 
Respondents in Contact Cases in Essex (DCA Research Series 1/05, 2005) 
 
Trinder L, Connolly J, Kellett J, Notley C and Swift L, Making Contact Happen or 
Making Contact Work? The process and outcome of in-court conciliation (DCA 
Research Series 3/06, 2006) 
 
Trinder L, Connolly J, Kellett J and Thoday C, ‘Families in Contact Disputes: A 
Profile’ (2004) 34 Family Law 877-881 
 
Trowell J, ‘Marital Breakdown, Divorce and the Effects on Children’ (1988) Family 
Law 156 
 
Turkel G, ‘Michel Foucault: law, power and knowledge’ (1990) 17 Journal of Law 
and Society 170. 
 
366 
 
Vallance-Webb G, ‘Child Contact: Vengeful Mothers, Good Fathers and Vice Versa’ 
(2008) 38 Family Law 678-681 
 
Van Krieken R, ‘The “Best Interests of the Child” and Parental Separation: on the 
“Civilising of Parents”’ (2005) 68(1) Modern Law Review 25-48 
 
Van Krieken R, ‘The Socio-Legal Construction of the “Best Interests of the Child”: 
Law’s Autonomy, Sociology, and Family Law’ in M Freeman (ed), Law and 
Sociology: Current Legal Issues (OUP 2005) 
 
Walby K, ‘Contributions to a Post-Sovereigntist Understanding of Law: Foucault, 
Law as Governance, and Legal Pluralism’ (2007) 16(4) Social and Legal Studies 
551-571 
 
Walby S and Allen J, Domestic violence, sexual assault and stalking: Findings from 
the British Crime Survey (Home Office Research Unit Study 276, 2004) 
 
Walker J, McCarthy P, Stark C and Laing K, Picking Up the Pieces: Marriage and 
Divorce: Two Years After Information Provision (DCA 2004) 
 
Wall LJ, ‘Enforcement of Contact Orders’ (2005) 35 Family Law 26-32 
 
Wall LJ, A Report to the President of the Family Division on the Publication by The 
Women’s Aid Federation of England and entitled ‘Twenty-Nine Child Homicides: 
Lessons still to be learnt on domestic violence and child protection’ with Particular 
Reference to the Five Cases in which there was Judicial Involvement (2006) 
www.judiciary.gov.uk/resources/JCO/documents/report_childhomicides.pdf, last 
accessed 05.08.13  
 
Wall P, The President’s Guidance in Relation to Split Hearings [2010] 2 FLR 1897 
 
Wall P, ‘The President’s Resolution Address 2012’ (2012) 42 Family Law 817-825 
 
Wallbank J, ‘Castigating Mothers: The Judicial Response to Wilful Women in Cases 
Concerning Contact’ (1998) 20 JSWFL 357-377 
 
Wallbank J, ‘Clause 106 of the Adoption and Children Bill: legislation for the 
“good” father?’ (2002) 22 Legal Studies 276-296 
 
Wallbank J, ‘Getting Tough on Mothers: Regulating Contact and Residence’ (2007) 
15 Feminist Legal Studies 189-222 
 
Wallerstein J and Blakeslee S, Second Chances: Men, Women and Children a 
Decade after Divorce (Ticknor and Fields 1989) 
 
Wallerstein J and Kelly J, Surviving the Breakup: How Children and Parents Cope 
with Divorce (Basic Books 1980) 
 
367 
 
Wallerstein J and Tanke T, ‘To Move or Not to Move – Psychological and Legal 
Considerations in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce’ (1996) 30 Family 
Law Quarterly 305 
 
Washbrook E, ‘Fathers, Childcare and Children’s Readiness to Learn’ (Working 
Paper No 07/175, University of Bristol 2007) 
 
Wasoff F, ‘Mutual consent: Separation Agreements and the Outcomes of Private 
Ordering in Divorce’ (2005) 27(3) JSWFL 237-250 
 
Waterlow, Waterlow’s Solicitors’ and Barristers’ Directory (Waterlow Publishing 
2010) 
 
Weedon C, Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory (1
st
 edn, Blackwell 1987) 
 
Weiss CH, ‘The many meanings of research utilisation’ from (1979) 39(5) Public 
Administration Review 426-431, in C Seale (ed), Social Research Methods: A 
Reader (Routledge 2004) 
 
Weitzman LJ, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and Economic 
Consequences for Women and Children in America (Free Press 1985) 
 
Westcott M, ‘Feminist Criticism of the Social Sciences’ in JM Nielsen (ed), Feminist 
Research Methods (Westview Press 1990) 
 
Westmarland N and Hester M, Time for Change (University of Bristol 2006) 
 
Wicherek A, ‘Making Contact Work’ (2003) 33 Family Law 350-353 
 
Willbourne C and Cull L, ‘The Emerging Problem of Parental Alienation’ (1997) 27 
Family Law 807 
 
Willbourne C and Stanley G, ‘Contact Under the Microscope’ (2002) 32 Family Law 
687-690 
 
Williams F, Social Policy: A Critical Introduction (Polity Press 1989) 
 
Willke H, ‘The autopoietic theory of law: autonomy of law and contextual transfer’ 
in P Amselek and N MacCormick (eds), Controversies about Law (Edinburgh 
University Press 1991) 
 
Women’s Aid, Women’s Aid Federation Briefing Paper on Child Contact and 
Domestic Violence (Women’s Aid Federation of England 1997) 
 
Women’s Aid, www.womensaid.org.uk/domestic-violence-survivors-handbook, last 
accessed 09.11.13  
 
Women’s Aid, NSPCC and Barnado’s, Joint charities briefing on the Children and 
Adoption Bill (Women’s Aid 2005) 
 
368 
 
Worrall A, Boylan J and Roberts D, SCIE Research Briefing 25: Children’s and 
young people’s experiences of domestic violence involving adults in a parenting role 
(Social Care Institute for Excellence 2008) 
 
Wright K, ‘The Role of Solicitors in Divorce: A Note of Caution’ (2007) 19(4) 
CFLQ 481 
 
Wright K, ‘The evolving role of the family lawyer: the impact of collaborative law 
on family law practice’ (2011) 23(3) CFLQ 370-392 
 
Young IM, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton University Press 1990) 
 
Ziegert KA, ‘Systems Theory and Qualitative Socio-Legal Research’ in R Banakar 
and M Travers (eds), Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
369 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
Practice Direction: Residence & Contact Orders: 
Domestic Violence & Harm 
Revised Practice Direction superseding guidance first issued 
on 14 May 2008 
14 January 2009 
 
The Practice Direction issued on 9 May 2008 is re-issued in 
the following revised form to reflect the decision of the 
House of Lords in Re B (Children)[2008] UKHL 35, in which 
Baroness Hale confirmed (at [76]) that a fact-finding 
hearing is part of the process of trying a case and is not a 
separate exercise and that where the case is then adjourned 
for further hearing it remains part heard. This principle 
applies equally in private law and public law family cases. 
Paragraphs 15 and 23 of the Practice Direction have been 
amended to reinforce this principle. 
1. This Practice Direction applies to any family proceedings in the 
High Court, a county court or a magistrates’ court in which an 
application is made for a residence order or a contact order in 
respect of a child under the Children Act 1989 (“the 1989 Act”) or 
the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”) or in which 
any question arises about residence or about contact between a 
child and a parent or other family member. 
 
2. The practice set out in this Direction is to be followed in any 
case in which it is alleged, or there is otherwise reason to suppose, 
that the subject child or a party has experienced domestic violence 
perpetrated by another party or that there is a risk of such 
violence. For the purpose of this Direction, the term ‘domestic 
violence’ includes physical violence, threatening or intimidating 
behaviour and any other form of abuse which, directly or indirectly, 
may have caused harm to the other party or to the child or which 
may give rise to the risk of harm. 
(‘Harm’ in relation to a child means ill-treatment or the impairment 
of health or development, including, for example, impairment 
suffered from seeing or hearing the ill-treatment of another: 
Children Act 1989, ss 31(9),105(1)) 
General principles 
3. The court must, at all stages of the proceedings, consider 
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whether domestic violence is raised as an issue, either by the 
parties or otherwise, and if so must: 
 identify at the earliest opportunity the factual and welfare 
issues involved; 
 consider the nature of any allegation or admission of 
domestic violence and the extent to which any domestic 
violence which is admitted, or which may be proved, would 
be relevant in deciding whether to make an order about 
residence or contact and, if so, in what terms; 
 give directions to enable the relevant factual and welfare 
issues to be determined expeditiously and fairly. 
4. In all cases it is for the court to decide whether an order for 
residence or contact accords with Section 1(1) of the 1989 Act or 
section 1(2) of the 2002 Act, as appropriate; any proposed 
residence or contact order, whether to be made by agreement 
between the parties or otherwise must be scrutinised by the court 
accordingly. The court shall not make a consent order for residence 
or contact or give permission for an application for a residence or 
contact order to be withdrawn, unless the parties are present in 
court, except where it is satisfied that there is no risk of harm to 
the child in so doing. 
5 In considering, on an application for a consent order for 
residence or contact, whether there is any risk of harm to the child, 
the court shall consider all the evidence and information available. 
The court may direct a report under Section 7 of the 1989 Act 
either orally or in writing before it makes its determination; in such 
a case, the court may ask for information about any advice given 
by the officer preparing the report to the parties and whether they 
or the child have been referred to any other agency, including local 
authority children’s services. If the report is not in writing, the 
court shall make a note of its substance on the court file. 
Issue 
6. Immediately on receipt of an application for a residence order or 
a contact order, or of the acknowledgement of the application, the 
court shall send a copy of it, together with any accompanying 
documents, to Cafcass or Cafcass Cymru, as appropriate, to enable 
Cafcass or Cafcass Cymru to undertake initial screening in 
accordance with their safeguarding policies. 
Liaison 
7. The Designated Family Judge, or in the magistrates’ court the 
Justices’ Clerk, shall take steps to ensure that arrangements are in 
place for: 
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 the prompt delivery of documents to Cafcass or Cafcass 
Cymru in accordance with paragraph 6 
 any information obtained by Cafcass or Cafcass Cymru as a 
result of initial screening or otherwise and any risk 
assessments prepared by Cafcass or Cafcass Cymru under 
section 16A of the 1989 Act to be placed before the 
appropriate court for consideration and directions 
 a copy of any record of admissions or findings of fact made 
pursuant to paragraphs 12 & 21 below to be made available 
as soon as possible to any Officer of Cafcass or Welsh family 
proceedings officer or local authority officer preparing a 
report under section 7 of the 1989 Act. 
Response of the court on receipt of information 
8. Where any information provided to the court before the first 
hearing, whether as a result of initial screening by Cafcass or 
Cafcass Cymru or otherwise, indicates that there are issues of 
domestic violence which may be relevant to the court’s 
determination, the court may give directions about the conduct of 
the hearing and for written evidence to be filed by the parties 
before the hearing. 
9. If at any stage the court is advised by Cafcass or Cafcass Cymru 
or otherwise that there is a need for special arrangements to 
secure the safety of any party or child attending any hearing, the 
court shall ensure that appropriate arrangements are made for the 
hearing and for all subsequent hearings in the case, unless it 
considers that these are no longer necessary. 
First hearing 
10. At the first hearing, the court shall inform the parties of the 
content of any screening report or other information which has 
been provided by Cafcass or Cafcass Cymru, unless it considers 
that to do so would create a risk of harm to a party or the child. 
(Specific provision about service of a risk assessment under 
section 16A of the 1989 Act is made by the Family 
Proceedings Rules 1991, r 4.17AA and by the Family 
Proceedings Courts (Children Act 1989) Rules 1991, r 
17AA.) 
11. The court must ascertain at the earliest opportunity whether 
domestic violence is raised as an issue and must consider the likely 
impact of that issue on the conduct and outcome of the 
proceedings. In particular, the court should consider whether the 
nature and effect of the domestic violence alleged is such that, if 
proved, the decision of the court is likely to be affected. 
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Admissions 
12. Where at any hearing an admission of domestic violence to 
another person or the child is made by a party, the admission 
should be recorded in writing and retained on the court file. 
Directions for a fact-finding hearing 
13. The court should determine as soon as possible whether it is 
necessary to conduct a fact-finding hearing in relation to any 
disputed allegation of domestic violence before it can proceed to 
consider any final order(s) for residence or contact. Where the 
court determines that a finding of fact hearing is not necessary, the 
order shall record the reasons for that decision. 
14. Where the court considers that a fact-finding hearing is 
necessary, it must give directions to ensure that the matters in 
issue are determined expeditiously and fairly and in particular it 
should consider: 
 directing the parties to file written statements giving 
particulars of the allegations made and of any response in 
such a way as to identify clearly the issues for determination; 
 whether material is required from third parties such as the 
police or health services and may give directions accordingly; 
 whether any other evidence is required to enable the court to 
make findings of fact in relation to the allegations and may 
give directions accordingly. 
15. Where the court fixes a fact-finding hearing, it must at the 
same time fix a further hearing for determination of the 
application. The hearings should be arranged in such a way that 
they are conducted by the same judge or, in the magistrates’ 
court, by at least the same chairperson of the justices. 
 
Reports under Section 7 
16. In any case where domestic violence is raised as an issue, the 
court should consider directing that a report on the question of 
contact, or any other matters relating to the welfare of the child, 
be prepared under section 7 of the 1989 Act by an Officer of 
Cafcass or a Welsh family proceedings officer (or local authority 
officer if appropriate), unless the court is satisfied that it is not 
necessary to do so in order to safeguard the child's interests. If the 
court so directs, it should consider the extent of any enquiries 
which can properly be made at this stage and whether it is 
appropriate to seek information on the wishes and feelings of the 
child before findings of fact have been made. 
Representation of the child 
17. Subject to the seriousness of the allegations made and the 
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difficulty of the case, the court shall consider whether it is 
appropriate for the child who is the subject of the application to be 
made a party to the proceedings and be separately represented. If 
the case is proceeding in the magistrates’ court and the court 
considers that it may be appropriate for the child to be made a 
party to the proceedings, it may transfer the case to the relevant 
county court for determination of that issue and following such 
transfer the county court shall give such directions for the further 
conduct of the case as it considers appropriate. 
Interim orders before determination of relevant facts 
18. Where the court gives directions for a fact-finding hearing, the 
court should consider whether an interim order for residence or 
contact is in the interests of the child; and in particular whether 
the safety of the child and the residential parent can be secured 
before, during and after any contact. 
19. In deciding any question of interim residence or contact 
pending a full hearing 
the court should: - 
(a) take into account the matters set out in section 1(3) of the 
1989 Act or section 1(4) of the 2002 Act ("the welfare check-
list"), as appropriate; 
(b) give particular consideration to the likely effect on the child 
of any contact and any risk of harm, whether physical, 
emotional or psychological, which the child is likely to suffer as 
a consequence of making or declining to make an order; 
20. Where the court is considering whether to make an order for 
interim contact, it should in addition consider 
(a) the arrangements required to ensure, as far as possible, 
that any risk of harm to the child is minimised and that the 
safety of the child and the parties is secured; and in particular: 
(i) whether the contact should be supervised or supported, 
and if so, where and by whom; and 
(ii) the availability of appropriate facilities for that purpose 
(b) if direct contact is not appropriate, whether it is in the best 
interests of the child to make an order for indirect contact. 
The fact-finding hearing 
21. At the fact-finding hearing, the court should, wherever 
practicable, make findings of fact as to the nature and degree of 
any domestic violence which is established and its effect on the 
child, the child’s parents and any other relevant person. The court 
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shall record its findings in writing, and shall serve a copy on the 
parties. A copy of any record of findings of fact or of admissions 
must be sent to any officer preparing a report under Section 7 of 
the 1989 Act 
22. At the conclusion of any fact-finding hearing, the court shall 
consider, notwithstanding any earlier direction for a section 7 
report, whether it is in the best interests of the child for the court 
to give further directions about the preparation or scope of any 
report under section 7; where necessary, it may adjourn the 
proceedings for a brief period to enable the officer to make 
representations about the preparation or scope of any further 
enquiries. 
The court should also consider whether it would be assisted by any 
social work, psychiatric, psychological or other assessment of any 
party or the child and if so (subject to any necessary consent) 
make directions for such assessment to be undertaken and for the 
filing of any consequent report. 
23. Where the court has made findings of fact on disputed 
allegations, any subsequent hearing in the proceedings should be 
conducted by the same judge or, in the magistrates’ court, by at 
least the same chairperson of the justices. Exceptions may be 
made only where observing this requirement would result in delay 
to the planned timetable and the judge or chairperson is satisfied, 
for reasons recorded in writing, that the detriment to the welfare of 
the child would outweigh the detriment to the fair trial of the 
proceedings. 
In all cases where domestic violence has occurred 
24. The court should take steps to obtain (or direct the parties or 
an Officer of Cafcass or a Welsh family proceedings officer to 
obtain) information about the facilities available locally to assist 
any party or the child in cases where domestic violence has 
occurred. 
25. Following any determination of the nature and extent of 
domestic violence, whether or not following a fact-finding hearing, 
the court should consider whether any party should seek advice or 
treatment as a precondition to an order for residence or contact 
being made or as a means of assisting the court in ascertaining the 
likely risk of harm to the child from that person, and may (with the 
consent of that party) give directions for such attendance and the 
filing of any consequent report. 
 
375 
 
Factors to be taken into account when determining whether 
to make residence or contact orders in all cases where 
domestic violence has occurred 
26. When deciding the issue of residence or contact the court 
should, in the light of any findings of fact, apply the individual 
matters in the welfare checklist with reference to those findings; in 
particular, where relevant findings of domestic violence have been 
made, the court should in every case consider any harm which the 
child has suffered as a consequence of that violence and any harm 
which the child is at risk of suffering if an order for residence or 
contact is made and should only make an order for contact if it can 
be satisfied that the physical and emotional safety of the child and 
the parent with whom the child is living can, as far as possible, be 
secured before during and after contact. 
27. In every case where a finding of domestic violence is made, 
the court should consider the conduct of both parents towards each 
other and towards the child; in particular, the court should 
consider; 
(a) the effect of the domestic violence which has been 
established on the child and on the parent with whom the child 
is living; 
(b) the extent to which the parent seeking residence or contact 
is motivated by a desire to promote the best interests of the 
child or may be doing so as a means of continuing a process of 
violence, intimidation or harassment against the other parent; 
(c) the likely behaviour during contact of the parent seeking 
contact and its effect on the child; 
(d) the capacity of the parent seeking residence or contact to 
appreciate the effect of past violence and the potential for 
future violence on the other parent and the child; 
(e) the attitude of the parent seeking residence or contact to 
past violent conduct by that parent; and in particular whether 
that parent has the capacity to change and to behave 
appropriately. 
Directions as to how contact is to proceed 
28. Where the court has made findings of domestic violence but, 
having applied the welfare checklist, nonetheless considers that 
direct contact is in the best interests of the child, the court should 
consider what if any directions or conditions are required to enable 
the order to be carried into effect and in particular should consider: 
(a) whether or not contact should be supervised, and if so, 
where and by whom; 
(b) whether to impose any conditions to be complied with by 
the party in whose favour the order for contact has been made 
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and if so, the nature of those conditions, for example by way of 
seeking advice or treatment (subject to any necessary 
consent); 
(c) whether such contact should be for a specified period or 
should contain provisions which are to have effect for a 
specified period; 
(d) whether or not the operation of the order needs to be 
reviewed; if so the court should set a date for the review and 
give directions to ensure that at the review the court has full 
information about the operation of the order. 
29. Where the court does not consider direct contact to be 
appropriate, it shall consider whether it is in the best interests of 
the child to make an order for indirect contact. 
The reasons of the court 
30. In its judgment or reasons the court should always make clear 
how its findings on the issue of domestic violence have influenced 
its decision on the issue of residence or contact. In particular, 
where the court has found domestic violence proved but 
nonetheless makes an order, the court should always explain, 
whether by way of reference to the welfare check-list or otherwise, 
why it takes the view that the order which it has made is in the 
best interests of the child. 
31. This Practice Direction is issued by the President of the Family 
Division, as the nominee of the Lord Chief Justice, with the 
agreement of the Lord Chancellor. 
The Right Honourable Sir Mark Potter 
President of the Family Division and Head of Family Justice 
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APPENDIX B 
 
COURTS SELECTED FOR RECORDS REVIEW 
 
1. Inner city court in London 
The Principal Registry of the Family Division (‘the PRFD’): This is the busiest 
court in London and indeed nationally. In the year April 2006 to March 2007 it 
received 3,925 private law Children Act applications. This figure is over three 
times the number filed at the County Court which had the second highest number 
of applications for the same period. Applications are received at the PRFD from 
all areas of London. London also has the highest number of solicitors available to 
undertake private law Children Act cases. London was selected for the large 
inner city area as the PRFD, being the largest family court nationwide, is based 
there, and for reasons of convenience, as the researcher is based in London. 
 
2. Provincial town in the North East  
The county court in the town selected received 481 private law applications 
during the period April 2006 to March 2007; the attached chart at Appendix A 
demonstrates that this number is typical of courts receiving a medium number of 
applications per year. There are 30 Resolution members based in Doncaster. The 
attached graph at Appendix B demonstrates that this is slightly higher than the 
median number for courts with medium numbers of private law Children Act 
applications (n = 25). 
 
3. Rural town in the South West  
The county court in the small town selected received 183 private law Children 
Act applications during the period April 2006 to March 2007, a number typical 
of courts receiving relatively low numbers of applications per year. There are 5 
Resolution members practising in this town, again a number that is representative 
of courts with low numbers of private law applications.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
TIMELINE FOR OBTAINING ACCESS TO COURT 
RECORDS 
 
Date  
00.03.08 Researcher wrote to chair of Children in Families Committee of the FJC 
to enquire whether the FJC would have an interest in the research 
findings. At this stage, subject of research was extent to which the courts 
and professionals followed the Re L guidelines. 
00.04.08 Researcher informed that FJC would be interested in seeing the 
completed research and advised to contact President of the Family 
Division for approval for access to court records. 
15.04.08 Researcher was sent relevant application form [DAP-PA (ADR)] and was 
advised to return it completed to a contact person allocated at HMCS. 
30.06.08 Researcher wrote to Ministry of Justice representative to inform her of the                    
change in the research topic since the Practice Direction was issued and to 
request the name of the appropriate person to contact in the President’s 
office.                       
 
08.08.08 Researcher wrote to the President’s private secretary, as advised, 
requesting that the President consider the research proposal. 
03.09.08 Researcher was informed that, subject to methodology, the President had 
no objection in principle to the proposed research, and that in order to 
obtain his permission for access to court files, she would have to gain 
approval for the project from HMCS. 
20.01.09 Application form completed by researcher. Clarification sought on 
submitting an application to interview members of the judiciary. 
21.01.09 MoJ representative advised who the researcher’s contact at the DAP was 
and suggested that the researcher send her the proposal with detailed 
information about the proposed judicial interviews; she would then find 
an in-house researcher to assess the project 
23.01.09 Researcher corresponded with DAP contact re calculating the impact 
assessment; also confirmed that permission is required from the Judicial 
Office for Senior Judicial Approval to interview members of the judiciary 
once the DAP application is approved. 
17.03.09 Researcher sent the completed form to the DAP contact. 
30.03.09 Final application form and supporting documents sent to DAP contact. 
02.06.09 Email received from researcher’s allocated sponsor from Family Law and 
Justice Division of the MoJ, advising that the application had been 
rejected, and that the President considered that the research be deferred 
until proposed revisions to the Practice Direction took place and could be 
tested. 
 
23.06.09 
 
 
Researcher was informed that the Practice Direction had been redrafted in 
January 2009 (relating to judicial continuity) but no further revisions were 
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planned; however, the Private law Programme was to be revised 
16.07.09 In light of this information, researcher asked original DAP contact if the 
request for access to court records could be reconsidered. 
18.07.09 DAP representative informed researcher that he had put in a request for a 
business sponsor for the researcher from the Civil and Family Unit 
22.07.09 Email received from representative of the Civil and Family Unit advising 
the researcher that the proposal had been rejected on the basis that it was 
of limited use due to further changes being considered in the area of 
private law, which could alter the process further; additionally there were 
concerns about access to court material because of increased emphasis on 
security and pressure on court staff resources. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
 
 
 
Request to  
Her Majesty’s Courts Service (HMCS)  
Data Access Panel  
and Performance Committee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Covering new / revised data collections 
and research to be undertaken 
in the Crown, county and magistrates’ courts 
in England and Wales 
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Part A – Request to HMCS Data Access Panel 
 
1. Title of data collection / research request 
 
 
Contact only when it is Safe 
 
 
2. Date of request  
 
16th March 2009 
 
3. Type of Request.  Is this:- 
 
a)     a new data collection  
b)     a change to a current data collection  
c)     a research request from within HMCS or the Ministry of Justice  
d)     an external research request x 
 
Please provide details: 
 
This is a request from a PhD student at Brunel University 
 
 
 
4. Applicant details 
 
Principal 
contact’s name  
Adrienne Barnett 
Post PhD Researcher 
Location Brunel University 
Telephone 02078427070 
E mail ab@1pumpcourt.co.uk 
 
5. HMCS Business Area Sponsor’s details (if different to above) 
 
Name  
Post  
Location  
Telephone  
E mail  
 
6. HMCS Business Area’s principal contact (to be supplied by the Business Area 
sponsor) 
 
Name  
Post  
Location  
Telephone  
E mail  
 
7. Timing   
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What is the latest date for approval by the HMCS Performance Committee 
(and if relevant, to issue a Privileged Access Agreement (PAA)).   
Note: Remember to take into account an estimate of the time needed to 
implement the proposal.  If this is less than eight weeks from receipt of full 
details by the HMCS-DAP secretariat, please state why 
 
14th May 2009 
 
 
8. Key details of your proposed changes  
Please give the key details of your changes to data collection / the aims and 
objectives of your research.  Attach any supporting documentation / 
methodology.  It is important that there is a clear business process devised 
in order for there to be clarity about the impact on HMCS staff.  Therefore a 
full methodology at this stage is highly desirable and any lack of clarity may 
well delay/stall the Application.   If your research does include interviews or 
focus groups with court staff or judiciary, you must supply an outline of the 
areas under discussion or, where possible, the questions in advance.  If you 
are seeking questionnaire responses then you should supply a copy 
questionnaire with this completed application form. 
 
 
Please see attached Background Statement and Methodology 
 
 
9. Link to Government Objectives 
What Public Service Agreements (PSAs) or other key ‘targets’ does the 
proposal support?  
Note: State explicitly which are directly involved. If ‘none’, give reasons why 
the proposal should be recommended / approved 
 
 
PSA 13 
 
 
10. Who supports this proposal? 
Note: State which Ministers and/or senior staff are aware of the proposal and 
which support it 
 
 
The office of the President of the Family Division and the Family Justice Council are 
aware of the proposal and have expressed interest in it. 
 
 
11. Who or what will the information be collected from?   
Note: State which business area; whether direct from the courts or 
electronically by use of a computer system; whether the data are already 
available in the database 
 
 
 
The information will be collected directly from the following courts: 
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The Principal Registry of the Family Division; Wimbledon Family Proceedings Court; 
Doncaster County Court; Doncaster Family Proceedings Court; XXX County Court; 
XXX Family Proceedings Court. 
 
12. How will the information be stored? 
 
The information will be stored electronically in the Applicant’s computer. Any paper 
copies of the information will be stored by the Applicant in a locked filing cabinet. 
 
 
 
13. Do you intend to share this information (between researchers / HMCS / 
business are / government agencies / others?)   
If yes, please provide clear detail and explain what data protection controls 
you will employ and therefore how you will GUARANTEE the security of the 
data? 
 
Information obtained directly from court records will be available only to the 
Applicant and her supervisor, Ms. Felicity Kaganas, Department of Law, Brunel 
University. The security of such data will be guaranteed by keeping all paper copies 
of data in the Applicant’s locked filing cabinet, and electronic information in the 
Applicant’s computer, to which no other persons have access. 
 
The Applicant’s PhD thesis, which will contain the results of the study, will be 
available to academic staff and researchers. The Applicant hopes to publish the 
results of her study in professional and academic publications, and to make such 
findings available to other interested organisations such as HM Courts Service, the 
Family Justice Council, the Family Law Bar Association and the President’s office. 
Additionally, the findings will be made available to the Applicant’s Business Sponsor 
and to the Ministry of Justice Records Management Service prior to publication. The 
identities of all parties to the legal proceedings studied and of participants in the 
study will be anonymised by assigning a letter code or pseudonym to all such 
persons. 
 
14. What other agencies have been considered to provide this information?  
 What information is to be obtained from them?  
Note: If ‘none’, explain why the data can only be obtained from the courts 
 
No other agencies are able to provide this information, because no other agencies 
will maintain information required for the Applicant’s study. This is primarily because 
the type of data sought will only be available from case files maintained by individual 
courts – see attached Data Collection Themes. 
 
15. Timing  
What is the anticipated start date for this data collection / timetable for this 
research?  
Note: If your research includes court visits, please attach details including 
duration of visit, local facilities required and, if available, proposed dates 
(please also note Question 17 below) 
 
June 2009: feasibility stage of the research, which will involve half a day at each 
court. The local facilities required will be desk space to review court files. 
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August 2009: main stage of the research. The amount of time required at each court 
will depend on whether the Applicant will be permitted to take photocopies of court 
records. If such photocopying is permitted, it is anticipated that the Applicant will 
require 1 full day in each county court and half a day in each Family Proceedings 
Court. If photocopying is not permitted, it is anticipated that the Applicant will require 
3 days in each county court and 1 day in each Family Proceedings Court. The local 
facilities required will be: desk space to review court files and use of a photocopier 
(if permitted). I have estimated the amount of time involved in reviewing case files 
from my own knowledge of the size of private law Children Act cases, based on my 
professional experience over 20 years as a barrister practising in family law. 
 
16. What collection method do you propose to use? 
 
 On line (web based collection)  
 E Mail  
 Extract from existing systems x 
 Other electronic (e.g. spreadsheet or disk) x 
 Telephone  
 Paper x 
 Interview x 
If interview, please specify:  
 Court admin staff  
 Court legal staff  
 Court staff AND judiciary  
 Judiciary only x 
 
NB: If your request is to interview ‘judiciary only’ please 
contact the MoJ Research Unit for details of the separate 
arrangements for this process 
 
 
 Other (please give details 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17. IMPACT ASSESSMENT  
 
Give an estimate of the burden for each HMCS Business Area affected, 
indicating in person days how long it will take each business area to 
complete the exercise and remember to include all levels of staff – e.g. if 
data are to be gathered by Areas or Regions.  A ‘person day’ is equal to 7.2 
hours   
 
If your request includes looking at unanonymised data held within court files, 
you must remember to take into account the time it will take for court staff to 
retrieve and replace files, from various (including off-site) storage 
arrangements (Note: need for a Privileged Access Agreement - see Part B) 
 
HMCS Business Area  Estimated Person days for 
each business to provide the 
information  
State number of locations to be 
visited / affected. 
If ‘All’ see Question 19 below) 
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(State per year / per request) 
Crown Court   
County Courts 1 person day – feasibility 
stage 
1 person day – main stage 
3 
Magistrates’ Courts 1 person day – feasibility 
stage 
1 person day – main stage 
3 
RCJ   
Regional and Area offices   
HQ (specify area)   
Other (give details   
 
18. Please give the net effect of the impact assessment, clearly stating any 
off-setting factors (e.g. reduced data collection / removal of processes) 
 
Feasibility stage: 6 person days 
Main stage: 6 person days 
 
19. If ‘All’ or a majority of locations, is stated above in Qu.17, for any 
business type, please give explicit reasons why a sample is not 
appropriate  
Note: if detailed low-level analyses are not required, sample surveys should 
be the default option 
 
 
 
 
 
20. Are the estimates above and the collection’s design supported by any 
consultation exercises, pilots or other tests of the proposal?  If so, 
please give details below.  
Note: State who was involved; or, if yet to take place, is there sufficient 
detail set out in the answer to Questions 3 & 8 and in any attached 
methodology 
 
The estimates of person days set out above have been made with advice from 
HMCS Resources Directorate 
 
 
 
21. Does the collection include information of ethnic category?   
If yes, please confirm that the standard 16+1 categorisation is being used 
 
 
No 
 
 
22. Analysis of Data?   
   Who will be responsibly for analysing the data?   
   Is there a clear analysis methodology? please specify  
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The Applicant will be responsible for analysing the data. Please see the attached 
Methodology with respect to the method of analysis 
 
23. Is the information intended for publication or other release?   
 If “no”, please give reasons why not (Note: Open Government guidelines 
and the Freedom of Information Act assume most data can be released 
unless there are specific confidentiality issues)   
 If “yes”, please give details of the publication or release strategy 
 
NB: If your request includes looking at unanonymised data held within 
court files, it will be a requirement of the Privileged Access Agreement 
(PAA) that you MUST submit a copy of your publication to your 
Business Sponsor, and to the Ministry of Justice Records Management 
Services (MoJ RMS) (details in Part D) for approval PRIOR to 
publication 
 
Yes. See response to question 13 
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Part B – Further details to support a Privileged Access Agreement (PAA) 
This section must be completed if you need access to court data - such as files, 
documents or other records held at court which are not available to the public.   
You do not need to complete this section where your data collection is only for 
information available to the public or of a purely statistical nature (i.e. does not 
involve direct case/court user identification) - but even when not mandatory, 
additional information may facilitate the Data Access Panel application process. 
 
It is not possible for researchers to have blanket access to court filing stores 
or data systems.  Before a PAA can be issued you will need to specify which court 
files you wish to inspect and which data you hope to extract from them.  If your 
study is a broad based one and you are sure that all or most files contain the 
information you seek, then you should consider specifying a sample of cases - for 
example, all cases at a particular court between March and June of a certain year or 
every third case between certain dates.  This will enable court staff to more easily 
identify the files involved.  You should also appreciate that court files may well be 
stored away from the courthouse, depending upon how old they are.  Retrieval of 
such files may well involve a specific cost. 
 
Additional Information: 
It is possible to approach court staff for general enquiries without a PAA but only 
with the sponsorship of the appropriate HMCS Business Area and an approved 
DAP application.  
Although a PAA may not be necessary for research that relies solely on an interview 
or questionnaire approach, researchers may find that court staff are more willing to 
become involved if the interview/questionnaire element is included within a PAA. 
However, research which includes interviews with members of the judiciary does 
require Senior Judicial agreement and a PAA will not be drafted until this has 
been secured.  This will be sought by the appropriate HMCS Business Team and 
inevitably does increase the length of the application process, and applicants should 
take this into account.  
If your research does include interviews or focus groups with court staff or judiciary, 
you must supply an outline of the areas under discussion or, where possible, the 
questions in advance. 
If you are seeking questionnaire responses then you should supply a copy 
questionnaire with this completed application form.  
 
24. Please attach the following documents: 
a) A full methodology, detailing the elements relating to court access.  
Including: which courts; sample size; type of court record involved – 
e.g. files/computer systems; method of identification; 
interviews/questionnaires/focus groups 
(tick box if attached) 
   
 x  
   
b) The names of all the people involved in your study who could have 
access to unanonymised court data, with CVs for each 
(tick box if attached) 
 x  
  
   
c) Where formal senior judicial approval is required, relevant documents 
confirming approval and any supporting documentation. 
(tick box if attached) 
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Part C - Clarifying your methodology 
 
Part B provides information on the circumstances when a PAA is required, e.g., 
when you need access to court files.  To obtain a PAA, you must be able to identify 
the exact case files you require, because you cannot have general access to case 
files.  Court staff must receive a list of specific cases in order to be able to retrieve 
the files for a researcher, or appropriate parameters from which to select files (e.g. 
all trials on a particular day).    
 
A researcher cannot have general access to case files.   
 
You may, however, be uncertain about whether court files contain the information 
you need, or how to identify a sample of case files for your study.  In these 
circumstances, we suggest that you complete all parts of this Application as fully as 
possible and request a two-stage approach.  A feasibility stage to test the 
availability of data and, if this is successful, a main stage of data collection.  The 
Ministry of Justice’s Records Management Services will assess whether a separate 
PAA should be issued for the feasibility stage and the Business Sponsor will assess 
what support and guidance court staff might be able to provide to help identify 
suitable cases. 
 
Some cases can be identified through central electronic databases held by HMCS 
(for the Crown Court and county court family cases) and currently by the Office for 
Criminal Justice Reform (for magistrates’ court cases).  The HMCS Resources 
Directorate should be contacted on the data available from these sources (contact 
details in Part D).  
 
The feasibility stage would involve your request to conduct a limited study in order 
to ascertain whether the information is held in the court files and how you will select 
files for your study.  You should clearly set out in your Application details of the 
information you want to find.  The likely points to be clarified include: 
  
 a list of specific types of case kept;  
 how are the cases logged;  
 how are the files stored;  
 can the specific cases be identified;  
 what data are contained on the ‘file’;  
 How can a list of cases be created in order that it can be used to attach to the 
PAA, or if the aim is to be completely random, how best that can be achieved. 
It must be stressed that agreement to the feasibility stage does not necessarily 
imply agreement to the main study.  Each application will be assessed on the 
comprehensiveness of the information supplied and, crucially, the impact of the 
research on the operation of the courts.  Courts are subject to time and case volume 
pressures and staff may not be able to accommodate additional demands.   
REMINDER: 
Court staff will always have to obtain case files for external researchers.  The case 
files will need to be obtained from various (sometimes off-site) storage 
arrangements.  The pre-identification of cases is therefore essential if your project is 
to be viable. You should consider whether the identification of cases or even the 
collection of the data you seek may be better done through some other source (see 
Question 14). 
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GUIDANCE NOTES 
 
1. HMCS Data Access Panel (HMCS DAP) and HMCS Annual Data 
Requirements (HMCS ADR) 
 
Her Majesty’s Courts Service (HMCS) is a separate Executive Agency within the 
Ministry of Justice.  It is imperative that data collections or research investigations 
within HMCS courts or other offices should not impede the operation of that court / 
office.  Accordingly all requests for changes to established data collections, new 
data collections and research using court records or involving interviews with court 
staff, must be: 
 
 considered by the HMCS Data Access Panel (DAP), and following their 
recommendation 
 
 approved by the HMCS Performance Committee 
 
Court files are closed to the public until they are a minimum of thirty years 
old.  This was set out in the Public Records Acts 1958 and 1967 (PRAs) and has 
not been altered by the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FoI).  It is worth noting 
that granting any requests made under the FoI would makes the information 
released to one requestor available to the wider public.   
 
However, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) can grant special authority, subject to various 
conditions, to inspect otherwise exempt court files in England and Wales.  This may 
be possible through the granting of a Privileged Access Agreement (PAA) by the 
Departmental Records Officer who has authority delegated from the Lord 
Chancellor.  The requestor must demonstrate that it would be appropriate or 
desirable for access to be allowed to files for a specified reason which will be judged 
on the merits of the application but would need to be substantive and sufficient to 
outweigh the exemption.  This requirement applies equally to other Government 
Departments as well as individuals and external organisations.  No reference is 
made in the PRAs or the FoI to Government Departments having automatic rights of 
access to each other's records. 
 
HMCS produces an Annual Data Requirements (ADR), which identifies the data 
collected centrally by HMCS, via various sources and where it is used whether it be 
for management information, planning, briefings, publications or sharing with 
external agencies. 
   
A further role of the HMCS Data Access Panel is to provide governance over 
HMCS’ ADR, and act as the ADR’s ‘gatekeeper’ by ensuring that: 
 
 All requests for new regular data collections which receive approval, are added 
to the ADR (it will be the successful applicant’s responsibility to provide a 
completed template for inclusion) 
 All requests for one-off data collections or research requests which receive 
approval are included in an annex to the ADR 
 All refused requests for data collection will be included in an annex to the ADR 
 
2. Exceptions 
 
a) There are separate arrangements for research with only involves members 
of the judiciary; and 
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b) These instructions do not currently apply to changes in data collection or 
research requests outside of HMCS, e.g. other MoJ agencies such as the 
Tribunals. 
 
3. Data Collection – amendments to Annual Data Requirements 
 
An Annual Data Requirement (ADR), which outlines the data provided by the Crown, 
County and Magistrates’ Courts in England and Wales, was formally implemented in 
HMCS from April 2008.  Any requests for changes to the ADR must be made 
through the HMCS Data Access Panel and the Performance Committee. 
 
The principle method to have approval granted for a change to the ADR is as 
follows: 
 
a) completion of the DAP application form by the applicant / Business Area 
requesting the change 
b) Application form and supporting documents are submitted to the HMCS Data 
Access Panel secretariat  
c) consideration by the HMCS Data Access Panel (HMCS–DAP) 
d) recommendation by HMCS–DAP to the HMCS Performance Committee 
 
4. Research Requests 
 
Research requests will often involve access to court files.  Inevitably, data held in 
court files and other court records (including electronic systems) can be of a 
sensitive and personal nature, and access to it is subject to legal restrictions – most 
notably the Public Records Acts 1958 & 1967, and the Data Protection Act 1998. 
If the request is made by an external researcher (i.e., not employed by HMCS or the 
Ministry of Justice) and includes a request for access to unanonymised data held 
within court files, a Privileged Access Agreement is required, under the provisions of 
the Public Records Act 1958.  Please see Part B – Further details to support a 
Privileged Access Agreement (PAA) and Part C – Clarifying your methodology 
for more information specifically for external researchers. 
 
The process to be followed in order to have a successful research request approved 
is: 
a) Completion of the application form by the researcher  
b) Application form is submitted to the HMCS Data Access Panel Secretariat, who 
will approach an HMCS Business Area to act as sponsor (unless one has 
already been identified).  Sponsorship is essential for the application to 
proceed 
c) Only once sponsorship is given, will the application be considered by the 
HMCS-DAP 
d) Recommendation by HMCS-DAP to the HMCS Performance Committee 
 
5. Timetable 
 
These processes take time, depending upon the complexity of your request. 
Once the completed application has been received, it takes, on average, three 
weeks for the HMCS-DAP stage.  The recommendations are then passed to the 
HMCS Performance Committee where approval will usually be sought at the 
monthly Committee meetings.  Only once approval has been given will the 
drafting of the PAA (if required) commence. 
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You should therefore build this into your timetable and make sure that you start the 
process in good time for the beginning of your proposed data collection / research.  
It is also important that the information you provide is part of the final plan for the 
project, since any substantive changes may mean restarting the process from 
scratch. 
 
In general, you should submit the application once you have secured funding (at 
least in principle), and when your proposals are clear. 
 
6. HMCS Business Area Sponsors 
 
The HMCS Data Access Panel will usually only consider applications that have a 
Business Area sponsor.  For data collections and internal research, this will initially 
be the business area that makes the request.  External researchers should send 
their completed application to the HMCS Data Access Panel secretariat, which will 
approach the appropriate business area to request their sponsorship, if that 
approach/contact has not already been made and been successful. 
 
If supported, the Business Area will appoint a named contact, who will usually have 
responsibility for making arrangements for you to contact / visit courts. 
If your request includes interviews with the judiciary, senior Judicial Agreement is 
required and this will be sought by the Business Area sponsor (see Part B). 
 
Business Sponsors should note that they are responsible for ensuring that the 
proposed data collection / research request is legally defendable.  If there is any 
doubt, either about the planned sampling method or the research topic, the 
business sponsor MUST seek an independent legal view and provide this to the 
HMCS Data Access Panel before applications can be progressed. 
 
7. Further Information 
 
 Answers to Part A should be as full as possible; incomplete forms or inadequate 
answers may result in not obtaining HMCS Business Sponsorship, or at least a 
delay in the HMCS Data Access Panel’s consideration of the Application 
 
 Alternative sources of the data must be considered fully before the courts are 
considered (see Part A Question 14 below) 
 
 Where detailed research tender / proposal documents are available, these 
should be attached to the Application and answers to appropriate questions 
should refer to these documents 
 
 If there are uncertainties about the way you will conduct your research / what 
data is available, further guidance is supplied in Part C 
 
 If you need advice on setting up and analysing this research / data collection, 
please contact the Ministry of Justice’s Economics and Statistics Division (see 
Part D for details) who will be pleased to help 
 
 All new MoJ research projects that have not yet received ministerial approval 
must enter the new research quality assurance (RQA) process at the link below.  
http://libra-infonet.lcd.gsi.gov.uk/justice/business/tools/research/rqa.htm 
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ANNEX: QUESTION 8 : AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
 
Introduction 
This PhD study will examine the extent to which the courts and professionals 
working in the family justice system follow the Practice Direction: Residence and 
Contact Orders: Domestic Violence and Harm [2008] 2 FLR 103. This Practice 
Direction raises questions about identifying and proving domestic violence as well as 
the management of risk. This study will focus, in particular, on those issues that have 
been highlighted in previous research
1
, in policy reviews
2
, by the Court of Appeal in 
the leading case of Re L
3
 and subsequent cases, and by the Family Justice Council
4
 
as causing particular problems for children and parents in contact and residence 
cases where domestic violence is an issue. These are the identification of domestic 
violence in residence and contact cases, the extent to which the courts and 
professionals are willing to enable fact-finding hearings to take place, the practice of 
the courts where consent orders are invited in such cases, and the steps taken to 
ensure the safety of the child and the parties. 
 
Background context of the study 
Until relatively recently, the connection between the welfare of children on parental 
separation, and the perpetration of abuse on primary carers by non-resident parents 
was almost totally absent in family law. Courts and professionals working within the 
family justice system tended to treat cases involving contact and residence separately 
from issues involving domestic violence.  
 
                                                 
1
 See, eg, Hester, M. and Radford, L. (1996) Domestic Violence and Child Contact Arrangements in 
England and Denmark, Bristol: The Polity Press;  Hester, M., Pearson, C. and Radford, L. (1997) 
Domestic Violence: A National Survey of Child Welfare and Voluntary Sector Mediation Practice, 
Bristol: The Polity Press;  Anderson, L. (1997) Contact between Children and Violent Fathers, 
London: Rights of Women 
2
 For example, The Advisory Board on Family Law: Children Act Sub-Committee (2000) A Report to 
the Lord Chancellor’s Department on the Question of Contact in Cases where there is Domestic 
Violence, London: The Stationery Office 
3
 Re L (Contact: Domestic Violence), Re V (Contact: Domestic Violence), Re M (Contact: Domestic 
Violence), Re H (Contact: Domestic Violence) [2002] 2 FLR 334, CA 
4
 See Craig, J. (2007) ‘Everybody’s Business: Applications for Contact Orders by Consent’, Fam Law 
26 
 394 
 
Approximately 17 years ago research was initiated which inquired into the 
implications for women and children of continued contact with violent fathers
5
. It 
was found that the practices and perceptions of professionals working in family 
proceedings were both influenced by, and also reinforced, the ideological separation 
of contact and domestic violence, with serious consequences for children and 
resident parents
6
. This research led to a number of important legal and policy 
developments, which resulted in ‘good practice’ guidelines issued by the Children 
Act Sub-Committee of the Advisory Board on Family Law (CASC)
7
, which were 
shortly afterwards followed by the landmark combined appeals of Re L
8
 in which the 
Court of Appeal decided, inter alia, that courts should consider the nature and effect 
of the alleged violence at the earliest opportunity and investigate allegations of 
violence so that findings of fact can be made. 
 
Since the CASC Report and the decision in Re L, the Court of Appeal has expressed 
concern at the failure of the lower courts to follow the CASC and Re L guidelines
9
. 
This concern was reinforced by recent research initiated by the Family Justice 
Council which found, inter alia, that in general, the guidelines in Re L are more 
honoured in the breach than the observance and that pressure can be put on victims 
of domestic violence to agree to contact orders; in the case of consent orders, the Re 
L guidelines were virtually ignored
10
. One of the principal recommendations of the 
Family Justice Council was that a Practice Direction should be issued setting out the 
practice to be followed in all such cases. The resulting President’s Practice Direction 
forms the subject of this study. 
 
Aims and Objectives 
The aim of the study is to identify whether the courts and professionals have changed 
their practices in private law Children Act proceedings in such a way as to comply 
with the Practice Direction; if this is not the case, to ascertain why its provisions are 
                                                 
5
 Hester, M. and Radford, L. (1992), ‘Domestic Violence and Access Arrangements for Children in 
Denmark and Britain’, Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 57 
6
 See Fn 1 above 
7
 See Fn 2 above 
8
 See Fn 3 above 
9
 See, eg, Re K and S (Children) [2006] FCR 316, CA;  Re H (A Child) (Contact: Domestic Violence) 
[2006] 1 FCR 102, CA  
10
 See Fn 4 above 
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not being adhered to; to determine what can be done to improve practice in this area 
to ensure that the safety and well-being of children and parents in residence and 
contact cases is not jeopardised. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                    Adrienne Barnett 
                                                                                    Brunel University 
                                                                                    10
th
 March 2009 
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QUESTION 8: METHODOLOGY : REVIEW OF COURT 
RECORDS 
 
 
Introduction 
I propose to adopt a primarily qualitative approach to the research, while using 
principally qualitative and some quantitative methods.  
 
Choice of Methods 
The following methods have been identified as most appropriate to the subject and 
theoretical perspective of this study: 
 
i. Review of Court Records 
ii. Interviews with solicitors, barristers, CAFCASS officers and members of the 
judiciary 
 
Review of Court Records 
This will be the principal source of both quantitative and qualitative data for 
this project. My study population of courts is defined as: all county courts and 
family proceedings courts (‘FPCs’) in England and Wales that hear private law 
Children Act cases involving residence and contact disputes. 
 
1. Selection of court sample 
I have obtained a complete up-to-date list of all such courts from the HMCS 
website. Given sufficient time and resources, I would conduct a power analysis 
to ensure that my sample is representative of the parent population
11
. Since my 
sample size would have to be severely limited by restraints of time and 
resources in any event, 
12
 I decided that this was not feasible or necessary. In 
order to ensure that I cover as representative as possible a selection of courts by 
ensuring a geographical and demographic spread, I would ideally have wished 
to select one county court and one FPC within each of the HMCS regions in 
England and Wales, namely: London, Midlands, North East, North West, 
South East, South West, Wales. However, this would result in having to review 
                                                 
11
 See Babbie, E. (1995) The Practice of Social Research, London: Wadsworth 
12
 There are 75 county courts and over 300 FPCs in the parent population 
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the records of at least 14 courts, which would not be possible for reasons of 
time and resources.  
 
On the basis that the maximum number of courts whose records would be 
feasible to review is six, I have decided to select courts in a large inner city 
area (in London), a smaller rural area (in the South West) and a provincial town 
(in the North East), thus covering a diverse geographical and demographic 
area
13
. 
 
I obtained the information upon which the selection of the specific courts was 
based from a review of all the latest HMCS Annual Family Court Reports, 
which are available for all county courts in England and Wales
14
. The latest 
reports cover the period from April 2006 to March 2007
15
.  The reports provide 
the figures for the total numbers of private law Children Act applications per 
court per year. These figures were categorised into courts with relatively low 
numbers of such applications per year (1 – 299), medium numbers of 
applications per year (300 – 699) and high numbers of applications per year 
(700 and above).   
 
In order to ensure that the courts reviewed also cover a broad range in terms of 
the numbers of solicitors available to represent parties in private law Children 
Act disputes, I reviewed the list of Resolution members based in each county 
court city and town
16
. This enabled me to ascertain the number of solicitors 
most commonly available to undertake family law work for each geographical 
sub-category of court
17
.  
                                                 
13
 Similar studies that have involved a review of court records have selected 3 courts covering diverse 
catchment areas – see Smart, C. and May, V. (2004), ‘Why Can’t They Agree? The Underlying 
Complexity of Contact and Residence Disputes’, Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, 26(4): 
347 
14
 Such reports are not available for the FPCs. 
15
 Only the 2005 – 2006 reports were available for a small number of courts. The 2006-2007 reports 
were published by HMCS in September 2008; it is therefore assumed that the 2007-2008 reports will 
not be available until approximately September 2009. 
16
 Resolution’s website lists all its members per town throughout England and Wales 
17
 These figures will not be 100 per cent accurate, because I recognise that there may be solicitors 
based in towns surrounding those in which each county court is based who act in such cases, but for 
reasons of time and resources, it was not possible to review Resolution’s membership list for every 
town and village throughout England and Wales. It is also recognised that some solicitors who are not 
members of Resolution may undertake private law Children Act work.  
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Utilising the information from the HMCS Family Court Reports and 
Resolution’s list of members, the following courts have been selected for the 
case review: 
 
Inner city court in London: The Principal Registry of the Family Division (‘the 
PRFD’). This is the busiest court in London and indeed nationally. In the year 
April 2006 to March 2007 it received 3,925 such applications (over three times 
the number filed at Liverpool County Court, which has the second highest 
number of applications). Applications are received at the PRFD from all areas 
of London.  
 
Rural town court in the South West: XX County Court. This court received 183 
private law applications during the period April 2006 to March 2007, a number 
typical for courts receiving relatively low number of applications per year. 
There are 5 Resolution members practising in XX, again a number that is 
representative for courts with low numbers of private law applications.  
 
Provincial town court in the North East: Doncaster County Court. This court 
received 481 private law applications during the period April 2006 to March 
2007; the attached chart demonstrates that this number is typical for courts 
receiving a medium number of applications per year. There are 30 Resolution 
members based in Doncaster. This is slightly higher than the median number 
for courts with medium numbers of private law applications (25). However, a 
high proportion of Resolution members in Doncaster undertake publicly 
funded work, and there are a high number of public law applications received 
by that court; therefore it is hypothesised that many of those solicitors may 
undertake predominantly public law work. 
 
As far as the FPCs are concerned, it was not possible to determine the numbers 
of applications per court, because these are not currently published by HMCS. 
Information from the county courts is available from the computer system, 
FamilyMan; the FPCs did not have FamilyMan or a similar system in place 
during 2007 and information for HMCS for 2007 and previous years was 
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sourced manually
18
. I therefore decided to select FPCs in each of the county 
court towns selected for review, namely Doncaster FPC and XX FPC, and 
Wimbledon FPC
19
 in London, for reasons of time and resources, and because 
the county court family court reports indicate that individual cases are on 
occasions transferred between county courts and the local FPCs.  
 
2. Selection of cases for review 
I intend to select 20 cases from each county court and 6 cases from each FPC for 
review. The reason for the much lower number of cases for review in the FPCs is 
because those courts receive far fewer private law Children Act applications than the 
county courts. In the year April 2007 to March 2006 the total number of private law 
applications made to the county courts was 86,771 and to the FPCs was 19,600
20
.  
 
If access is granted by HMCS for the review of court records, the cases to be 
reviewed will be selected as follows. The cases selected for review would be those 
initiated after the Practice Direction has been in effect for at least 3 months, to enable 
courts and practitioners to become familiar with its operation. Ideally I would like to 
be able to review cases that start and finish during the review period. Since it is clear 
from the Family Court Reports that the target for each court is to complete a case 
within 40 weeks,
21
 I decided to review a sample of cases initiated in each subject 
court from the beginning of September 2008, the majority of which it is anticipated 
would be completed by the time of my main stage record review in August 2009
22
. 
 
The first stage of the selection process would be a feasibility study to identify the 
specific cases to be reviewed. I would hope to be able to undertake this stage by June 
2009. This would involve a review of the following cases in each court: 
 
                                                 
18
 See Judicial and Court Statistics 2007 (London: TSO) Cm 7467 at Pg. 203 
19
 Because no information on the numbers of applications is available for FPCs in London, the 
selection had to be made on a random basis, and Wimbledon FPC was selected on the basis of 
convenience. 
20
  See Fn 8 at Pg. 91 
21
 The degree to which this target is met varies, but is generally well above 70% 
22
 It is recognised that some cases commenced in Yeovil County Court and the FPCs in the later 
months of the selection period may not be completed during the review period, but for reasons of time, 
the main stage of the case review will have to take place during August 2009 
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The PRFD: all private law applications issued during the first two weeks of October 
2008. This period is based on the average number of applications per fortnight for 
the period April 2006 to March 2007 being 166. It is considered that a one-week 
time frame may be too small as it may contain anomalies or atypical cases. From this 
sample, a random sample of 20 cases will be selected
23
.  
 
Doncaster County Court: all private law applications issued during September and 
October 2008. This period is based on the average number of applications per month 
for the period April 2006 to March 2007 being 40. From the sample of 80 cases, a 
random sample of 20 cases will be selected. 
 
XX County Court: all private law applications issued from the beginning of 
September to the end of January 2009. This period is based on the average number of 
applications per month for the period April 2006 to March 2007 being 15.  
 
The four-month period from the beginning of September 2008 until the end of 
December 2008 will be selected for each FPC, as it is not known what the average 
number of applications per month for those courts is.  
 
3. Review of court records : main stage of the review 
It is intended that the cases selected during the feasibility stage of the study will be 
reviewed during August 2009. If I am permitted to photocopy case records, the 
relevant papers from each case will be photocopied at each court. If photocopying is 
not permitted, I will record the relevant information electronically on my laptop 
computer; clearly this will necessitate a longer period for this stage of the review.  
 
4. Analysis 
Qualitative data obtained from the review of court records will be analysed 
thematically. Attached herewith at Appendix D is a summary of the Data Collection 
Themes. Statistical analysis will be undertaken of the (lesser amount of) quantitative 
data collected, such as the proportion of residence and contact cases involving 
allegations of domestic violence; the numbers of fact-finding hearings held; the stage 
                                                 
23
 I intend to filter out any cases in which I have been instructed by any of the parties in my 
professional capacity. 
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of the proceedings at which fact-finding hearings are held; the proportion of consent 
orders that can be identified as involving allegations of domestic violence. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                         Adrienne Barnett 
                                                                                          Brunel University 
                                                                                          10
th
 March 2009 
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ANNEX: QUESTION 14 : DATA COLLECTION THEMES 
 
 
1. Domestic violence as a factor in residence and contact cases 
- what proportion of residence cases involve domestic violence, as far as can 
be identified 
- what proportion of contact cases involve domestic violence, as far as can be 
identified 
 
2. Identifying domestic violence as an issue and making the court aware of 
it 
- documentary information available to the court on issue of proceedings, eg, 
C1 and C1A forms 
- do courts consider whether domestic violence is an issue whether or not it is 
raised as an issue by the parties 
- initial screening by CAFCASS 
- does the designated family judge/justices clerk send issue documents to 
CAFCASS 
- do courts inform the parties of screening reports or other information from 
CAFCASS at the first hearing 
- to what extent do solicitors/barristers find out about domestic from clients 
and its effect on the child and the parties 
- to what extent do solicitors/barristers make the court aware of domestic 
violence and its effect on the child and the parties 
 
3. Deciding on the relevance of domestic violence to the conduct of the 
proceedings and the orders sought 
- how and when do courts decide ‘the factual and welfare issues’ involved [PD 
Para 3] 
- how and when do courts decide the extent to which domestic violence would 
be relevant in deciding orders for contact and residence 
- at the first hearing, do courts consider: (a) the likely impact of domestic 
violence on the conduct and outcome of the proceedings, and (b) whether the 
nature and effect of domestic violence is likely to affect the court’s decision? 
If so, how do they carry out this consideration? 
 
4. Consent Orders 
- what proportion of consent orders in the court records reviewed are identified 
as involving domestic violence  
- what information is available to courts on a consent order [subdivided into: 
information requested by the court; information provided by representatives] 
- how would the court be aware of domestic violence when a consent order is 
proposed 
- to what extent do courts scrutinise proposed consent orders 
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- to what extent do courts refuse to make a proposed consent order because of 
issues of domestic violence/ or request further information/ or involve 
CAFCASS 
- are consent orders made where CAFCASS express concerns about domestic 
violence 
- what is the attitude/practice of solicitors and barristers to consent orders 
sought 
 
5. The practice of courts in respect of fact-finding hearings 
- number of fact-finding hearings held 
- at what stage in the proceedings are fact-finding hearings held 
- how do fact-finding hearings get listed, eg, at the request of the parties/courts 
own motion/request by CAFCASS 
- how do courts decide whether to list a fact-finding hearing 
- if fact-finding hearings are recommended in a CAFCASS report, to what 
extent do they take place 
- willingness of courts to list fact-finding hearings if requested to do so by 
either or all of the parties 
- do fact-finding hearings take place on the listed date; if not, reasons for this 
- do courts ever refuse to hold fact-finding hearings if requested and if so, what 
factors influence this decision 
- do courts make findings about the following: 
o nature and degree of domestic violence 
o its effect on the child 
o its effect on the parents 
- do courts make clear in their judgments or reasons how their findings on 
domestic violence have influenced their decisions in respect of residence and 
contact and if they make an order, do they explain the reasons why 
 
6. Interim orders – assessing risk and ensuring safety 
- do courts consider the following factors when deciding whether to make 
interim residence or contact orders when a fact-finding hearing [or 
CAFCASS report] has been directed: 
o the safety of the child and resident parent  
o the risk of harm to the child 
- if the court decides to make an interim contact order, do they consider: 
o how the risks and safety for the child and resident parent can be 
secured 
o how to minimise the risks and secure safety 
o what arrangements can be made to secure safety, eg, supervised or 
supported contact 
- if the courts decides not to order interim direct contact, do they consider 
indirect contact and if so, do they consider any risks involved with such 
contact 
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7. Final orders when domestic violence has occurred : factors courts take 
into account when determining whether to make an order 
To what extent, and how, do courts consider the following factors: 
- the harm the child has suffered as a result of the domestic violence 
- the harm the child is at risk of suffering if an order for residence or contact is 
made 
- the safety of the child and resident parent 
- the conduct of the parents towards each other and the child 
- the effect of domestic violence on the child and the resident parent 
- the motivation of the parent seeking contact 
- the likely behaviour during contact of the parent seeking contact and its effect 
on the child 
- the capacity of the parent seeking residence or contact to appreciate the effect 
of the violence on the child and the other parent 
- the attitude of the parent seeking residence or contact to their past violence 
and whether they have the capacity to change 
 
8. Final orders where domestic violence has occurred: where the court 
decides to make an order for direct contact 
- has the court satisfied itself that the physical and emotional safety of the child 
and resident parent can be secured before, during and after contact 
- does the court consider whether the perpetrator should seek advice or 
treatment as a pre-condition to an order or to assess risk to the child 
- do courts consider whether contact should be supervised 
 
9. Final orders where domestic violence has occurred: where the court 
decides not to make any orders for direct contact 
- do courts make orders for indirect contact; if so, what are the safety 
considerations involved 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE: JUDGES AND MAGISTRATES 
 
 
Identifying domestic violence as an issue 
 
1. When you receive the papers for a first appointment in a contact or residence 
case, how much information, if any, is usually revealed in the papers filed by 
the parties at that stage about domestic violence? If the only paperwork filed 
were the non-resident parent’s C100 form, how would you become aware of 
any allegations of domestic violence?  
 
2. With respect to Paragraph 4.2 of the Revised Private Law Programme, what 
documents are usually available to you at the FHDRA and are they sufficient 
to identify whether domestic violence is likely to be an issue? Has there been 
any improvement in the extent of the information on domestic violence 
available at first hearings (and in particular at the FHDRA) since the Revised 
Private Law Programme came into effect on 4
th
 October 2010? 
 
3. Are you ever/regularly/frequently provided with an initial screening report by 
CAFCASS prior to the first appointment? How detailed are such reports, and 
what sort of information do they contain? Would you usually inform the 
parties of the contents of any screening reports you have received? 
 
4. In your experience, are Cafcass carrying out the steps to identify safety issues 
set out in Paragraph 3.9 (a) to (e) of the Revised Private Law Programme? To 
what extent has this assisted in identifying issues of safety and risk more 
comprehensively and expeditiously? 
 
5. Do you think that the C1A forms usually contain sufficient details of 
domestic violence? [This question will be amended to include the C100A 
forms if they are in use at the time of the interviews.] 
 
6. If you are presented with an initial application for contact and/or residence, 
and neither party raises allegations of domestic violence and such issues are 
not raised in Cafcass’s screening report, would you ask the parties whether 
domestic violence is an issue in the case? Do you think that tribunals are 
more likely to enquire about domestic violence of their own motion since the 
Practice Direction came into effect? 
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7. If either or both of the parties are acting in person, does this have any effect 
on whether domestic violence is likely to be disclosed to the court? 
 
Deciding on the relevance of domestic violence to the conduct of the 
proceedings and the orders sought 
 
8. If domestic violence is raised by either party as an issue in a residence or 
contact case, how would you decide whether it is relevant to the issues in the 
case? What factors would you take into account in deciding this question? 
Are there any circumstances where domestic violence is not likely to be 
relevant to the issue of residence and contact?  
 
9. In what circumstances, if any, could domestic violence justify a party 
opposing direct contact? 
 
10. Do you think that there has been any change in the way in which courts 
consider the relevance of domestic violence to the issues in the case since the 
President’s Guidance in Relation to Split Hearings was issued in May 2010? 
 
Consent orders 
 
11. If a tribunal is presented by the parties with a draft consent order for contact, 
and is aware that one party has made allegations of domestic violence against 
the other, how is that judge likely to deal with the proposed consent order? 
 
12. Would it necessarily be the case that the tribunal would be aware of 
allegations of domestic violence if presented with a draft consent order for 
contact, eg, where no statements have been filed and no screening report is 
available from Cafcass? Would a tribunal be likely to enquire of the parties 
whether it is an issue in such circumstances? 
 
13. Have you ever refused to approve a draft consent order (or requested further 
information or involved Cafcass) because of concerns about domestic 
violence?  
 
14. If a Cafcass officer had raised concerns about domestic violence and its effect 
on the child in a Section 7 report, but the parties subsequently presented the 
court with a draft consent order providing for direct contact, how would the 
court be likely to proceed? 
 
15. Do you think that it is better for children that their parents agree residence 
and/or contact arrangements rather than the court deciding? 
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16. Do you think there has been any change in your practice in respect of consent 
orders, or that of your fellow judges, since the Practice Direction came into 
effect? Has your practice changed in this respect since the implementation of 
the Revised Private Law Programme? 
 
Fact-finding hearings 
 
17. At what stage in residence and contact proceedings would you normally list a 
fact-finding hearing? 
 
18. In your experience, how are fact-finding hearings usually listed, ie, at the 
request of the parties; on the court’s own motion; at the suggestion of a 
Cafcass officer? 
 
19. In what circumstances would most courts decide that a fact-finding hearing is 
not necessary? Has there been any change in such circumstances since the 
President’s Guidance in Relation to Split Hearings was issued in May 2010? 
 
20. Do you think that there has been any change in the extent to which courts 
decide to list fact-finding hearings since the President’s Guidance in Relation 
to Split Hearings was issued in May 2010? 
 
21. How, if at all, has the Revised Private Law Programme affected your ability 
to decide whether a fact-finding hearing is necessary? 
 
22. Vignette: the mother alleges that, in the past, the father has been verbally 
abusive towards her and has hit and punched her when he was drunk. She 
accepts in principle that the children should have contact with the father but 
wants it supervised. She alleges no violence since the parties separated, but 
some verbal abuse and says she is still scared of the father. The father accepts 
that he has been verbally abusive towards the mother in the past, and admits 
some pushing and shoving, but says he has stopped drinking and is a changed 
man. He agrees to some interim supervised contact on a short-term basis, 
with a view to moving on fairly swiftly to unsupervised. Would a fact-finding 
hearing in these circumstances be required? 
 
23. Since the Practice Direction came into effect in May 2008, do you think that 
there has been an increase in the occurrence of fact-finding hearings? Has 
this been the case in your own court? Conversely, do you think there has 
been a decrease in the occurrence of fact-finding hearings since the 
President’s Guidance in Relation to Split Hearings was issued in May 2010? 
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24. Have you tried any cases where a fact-finding hearing was listed, but on the 
day of trial it did not go ahead? Are you aware of any cases dealt with by 
your fellow judges where this has happened? Please could you elaborate on 
the circumstances. 
 
25. Do you find that fact-finding hearings are helpful in determining the best 
outcome for the child in contested residence and contact cases? 
 
26. How do you think fact-finding hearings could be streamlined and made more 
effective? 
 
 
Interim orders – assessing risk and ensuring safety 
 
27. If the resident parent opposes contact on the basis of domestic violence and a 
fact-finding hearing is listed, how do you determine whether there should be 
any interim direct contact? In what circumstances do you think it would be 
appropriate for some direct contact to take place? 
 
28. Has there been any change in the making of interim orders since the 
implementation of the Revised Private Law Programme and in particular, the 
use of conciliation and/or mediation at the FHDRA? 
 
29. Do you think that most courts set out in their orders the statement envisaged 
by Paragraph 6.1(f) of the Revised Private Law Programme? 
 
30. Vignette: the mother alleges that the father was violent towards her when 
they lived together, and has threatened her since they separated. She opposes 
all contact between the father and the child, who is aged 7. You list the 
matter for a fact-finding hearing in 2 months’ time. The father seeks interim 
contact, which is opposed by the mother. How would you deal with this 
situation? How do you think most judges would deal with this situation? 
 
 
Final orders when domestic violence has occurred: factors court takes into 
account 
 
31. When one parent has admitted domestic violence against the other, or 
findings have been made against them, how would this affect your decision 
on the issue of contact? What factors would you take into account in these 
circumstances in determining the issue of contact?  
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32. Do you think that the practice of the courts has changed since the Practice 
Direction came into effect, when determining the issues of residence and 
contact in circumstances where domestic violence has occurred? 
 
33. Do you think that the Guidance on Split Hearings and the Revised Private 
Law Programme have affected outcomes in contact proceedings where 
domestic violence is admitted or found? 
 
34. Where domestic violence has occurred, in what circumstances would you 
envisage ordering contact between the child and non-resident parent? 
 
 
Final orders when domestic violence has occurred: where the court decides 
to make orders for direct contact 
 
35. If domestic violence has occurred but you decide that there should be some 
direct contact between the child and the perpetrator, what safeguards would 
you consider for the child and the resident parent? 
 
36. If domestic violence has occurred, would you consider requiring the 
perpetrator to attend a domestic violence perpetrator programme? In what 
circumstances would this be beneficial for the child and the parties? Do you 
think that there has been any change in the extent to which attendance at such 
programmes is required since the Practice Direction came into effect? 
 
37. Vignette: the mother alleges that the father has been violent towards her over 
a period of years, with allegations ranging from verbal abuse and threats 
through to kicking and punching. The father denies all the allegations. A fact-
finding hearing is held and you make some findings against the father, but 
not to the extent alleged by the mother – that he has been verbally abusive, 
has pushed and shoved the mother during arguments, and hit her once many 
years ago, and that all of this happened when he was drunk. The mother 
opposes all contact on the basis that she is frightened of the father and 
believes he will never change. The father does not accept your findings 
against him. How would you proceed?
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APPENDIX F 
 
 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE: SOLICITORS AND BARRISTERS 
 
 
A. General questions  
 
1. What advice do you give clients generally about contact and how the courts 
view it? Would your advice differ depending on whether you represent the 
resident or non-resident parent? 
 
2. How important do you think it is for non-resident parents to have some 
contact with the child/children? 
 
3. Have you encountered clients who you believe are unjustifiably denying the 
other parent contact with the child/children? How have you formed this view? 
 
4. Do you consider that the fear of domestic violence by one parent towards the 
other would justify them in opposing contact? In what circumstances, if any, 
could it do so? How would you advise a client if they opposed contact in 
these circumstances? 
 
5. Do you think that it is better for children that their parents agree contact 
arrangements rather than the court deciding? How do you think your clients 
have felt about agreements for contact that have been reached? 
 
Defining ‘Domestic Violence’ 
6. Paragraph 2 of the Practice Direction provides that ‘domestic violence’ 
includes “physical violence, threatening or intimidating behaviour and any 
other form of abuse which, directly or indirectly, may have caused harm to 
the other party or to the child or which may give rise to the risk of harm.” 
 
      What is your view of this description of ‘domestic violence’? 
 
7. How do you think most tribunals understand the term ‘domestic violence’? 
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B. Questions relating to the Practice Direction 
 
Identifying domestic violence as an issue and making the court aware of it 
 
8. Solicitors: when a client first consults you about a residence or contact issue 
would you usually ask them: 
a. whether any domestic violence has occurred; 
b. whether the child is aware of the domestic violence; 
c. about the effect of the domestic violence on themselves and the other 
party; 
d. about the effect of the domestic violence on the child? 
 
Barristers:  if there were no mention of domestic violence in your papers, 
would you specifically ask your client about it; whether the child is aware 
of the domestic violence; about the effect of domestic violence on the 
child and on themselves and the other party? 
 
9. In your experience, at the first appointment (or at any stage) have you ever 
been made aware by the court of whether CAFCASS has undertaken initial 
screening for domestic violence? If so, are you informed about the content of 
any screening report or other information provided by CAFCASS? 
 
10. With respect to Para 4.2 of the Revised Private Law Programme, what 
documents are usually available at the FHDRA? Has there been any 
improvement in the extent of information on domestic violence available at 
the FHDRA/first hearings since the Revised Private Law Programme came 
into effect on 4.10.10? 
 
11. Do you think that domestic violence is usually revealed by the C1A forms? 
Solicitors: what degree of detail do you usually include when drafting C1A 
forms?  Barristers: what degree of detail do you usually find in C1A forms?  
 
12. If at the early stages of proceedings there were no statements filed, and the 
only paperwork available is the father’s C100 form, how would you expect 
domestic violence to emerge? 
 
13. If your client has told you about domestic violence perpetrated by the other 
parent, would you routinely make the court aware of this? How would you 
make the court aware, and what opportunities are there for doing so? 
 
14. In your experience, do courts ever/usually consider whether domestic 
violence is an issue in the proceedings even if neither of the parties raise it as 
an issue? Do you think that there has been any change in the courts’ practices 
in this respect since the Practice Direction? 
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Deciding on the relevance of domestic violence to the conduct of the 
proceedings and the orders sought 
 
15. If domestic violence is raised as an issue in a case (either by the court or the 
parties) do courts consider the extent to which it is likely to be relevant in 
deciding contact applications [Prompt: eg, in terms of its nature, extent, and 
effect on the parties and on the child?] Are there any differences in this 
respect between the county courts and the FPCs? Are there any 
circumstances, in your view, where domestic violence is not likely to be 
relevant to the issue of contact? 
 
16. Do you have experience of any cases where domestic violence was raised as 
an issue by a party but the court considered at an early stage that it was not 
likely to affect the outcome? If so, how did the court reach this conclusion? 
 
17. Do you think that there has been any change in the way in which courts 
consider the relevance of domestic violence to the issues in the case since the 
President’s Guidance in Relation to Split Hearings was issued in May 2010? 
 
 
Consent orders 
 
18. How would the court become aware of domestic violence in cases where the 
parties present it with a consent order? 
 
19. Where parties are agreed on contact, how much information would you 
provide to the court? Would you make the court aware of any domestic 
violence if the papers filed did not disclose this? Do you think there has been 
any change in your practice in this respect since the Practice Direction? 
 
20. To what extent do courts scrutinise proposed consent orders? Do they ask for 
information about domestic violence? Do you think there has been any 
change in this respect since May 2008? Are there any differences between the 
county courts and FPCs? 
 
21. In your experience, do courts ever refuse to make consent orders because of 
concerns about domestic violence, or request further information or involve 
CAFCASS for this reason? Has there been any change in this respect since 
the Practice Direction? 
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22. Have you ever represented clients where contact has been agreed despite 
concerns raised by a CAFCASS officer because of domestic violence? 
 
 
Fact-finding hearings 
 
23. How do fact-finding hearings usually get listed, ie, by request of a 
party/parties or on the court’s own motion? 
 
24. If you or the other party requests the court to list a fact-finding hearing, are 
they usually willing to do so? Has there been any change since the Practice 
Direction?  Have you acted in any cases where you or your opponent have 
requested a fact finding hearing but the court has refused? What about if a 
fact-finding hearing is recommended in a Cafcass report? 
 
25. Since the Practice Direction came into effect in May 2008, have you noticed 
any increase in the listing of fact-finding hearings? 
 
26. Do you think that there has been any change in the extent to which courts 
decide to list fact-finding hearings since the President’s Guidance in Relation 
to Split Hearings was issued in May 2010? 
 
27. At what stage in the proceedings do courts usually decide whether to list a 
fact-finding hearing? 
 
28. Have you acted in any cases where a fact-finding hearing has been listed, but 
on the day of trial the hearing does not take place, or is cut short? [Prompt: 
please elaborate on the circumstances] In your experience, does this happen 
rarely/ regularly/frequently? 
 
29. If your client opposes contact on the basis of domestic violence and the other 
party disputes this, would you request a fact-finding hearing? Conversely, if 
you represent the non-resident parent who disputes allegations of domestic 
violence made by the resident parent, would you request a fact-finding 
hearing? In either case, in what circumstances would you not do so? 
 
30. Are fact-finding hearings held in all appropriate cases? 
 
31. What is your view of fact-finding hearings? [Prompt: eg, do you consider 
them useful; a waste of time?]  
 
32. The Practice Direction provides that courts should make findings about: 
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- the nature and degree of domestic violence 
- its effect on the child 
- its effect on the parents 
In your experience, do courts do so? 
 
 
Interim orders – assessing risk and ensuring safety 
 
33. In your experience, if the resident parent opposes contact on the basis of 
domestic violence and a fact-finding hearing is listed, do courts order interim 
direct contact? In what circumstances do courts tend to do so? Has there been 
any change in this respect since the Practice Direction? What kind of interim 
orders do courts usually make pending a fact-finding hearing? 
 
34. In an interim situation, if you are acting for the resident parent and she/he 
was concerned about their safety, how would you advise them and what 
representations would you make to the court? 
 
35. Do you think that courts focus enough on minimising the risks and securing 
the safety of the child when ordering interim contact? What about the safety 
of the resident parent? Do you think there has been any change in the court’s 
focus on risk and safety since the Practice Direction came into effect? 
 
36. Has there been any change in the making of interim orders since the 
implementation of the Revised Private Law Programme and in particular, the 
use of conciliation and/or mediation at the FHDRA? 
 
37. Vignette: you are representing the mother, who alleges that the father was 
violent towards her when they lived together, and has threatened her since 
they separated. She opposes all contact between the father and the child, who 
is aged 7. A fact-finding hearing has been listed, to take place in 2 months’ 
time. The father seeks interim contact. How would you advise the mother? 
What is the court likely to do if the mother opposes all interim direct contact 
in these circumstances?  
 
Final orders when domestic violence has occurred: factors court takes into 
account 
 
38. If the court makes findings of domestic violence against the non-resident 
parent in a disputed contact case (or where domestic violence is 
admitted),how does this usually affect their decision on the issue of contact? 
What is the most likely outcome? 
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39. Do you think that, since the Practice Direction came into effect in May 2008, 
there has been any change in the way the courts determine contact when 
domestic violence is proved or admitted? 
 
40. Do you think that the Guidance on Split Hearings has affected outcomes in 
contact proceedings where domestic violence is found or admitted? 
 
41. The Practice Direction provides that where domestic violence has occurred, 
the court should consider, inter alia: 
- the effect of the domestic violence on the child and the resident parent 
- the motivation of the parent seeking residence or contact 
- the likely behaviour of the parent seeking contact during contact and its effect 
on the child 
- the capacity of the parent seeking residence or contact to appreciate the effect 
of past violence and the potential for future violence 
- the attitude of the parent seeking residence or contact to their past violent 
conduct and whether they have the capacity to change. 
In your experience, do courts usually do so? 
Where would the courts get the information from to consider these factors (eg, 
evidence, findings, Cafcass, experts) 
Has there been any change in this respect since the Practice Direction? 
Has there been any change in how Cafcass consider these issues since the 
practice direction? 
[A written copy of this list of factors will be provided to interviewees] 
 
42. Where domestic violence has occurred, what do you think could make 
contact safe for the child and resident parent? 
 
Final orders when domestic violence has occurred: where the court decides to 
make orders for direct contact 
 
43. If domestic violence has occurred but the court decides to order direct contact, 
what, if any, safeguards is the court likely to direct? 
 
44. To what extent are the courts likely to require the perpetrator to attend a 
domestic violence perpetrator programme? Do you think that there has been 
any change in the extent to which attendance at such programmes is required 
since the Practice Direction came into effect? 
 
45. Vignette: the mother alleges that the father has been violent towards her over 
a period of years, with allegations ranging from verbal abuse and threats 
through to kicking and punching. A fact-finding hearing is held and the judge 
makes some findings against the father but not to the extent alleged by the 
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mother – that he has been verbally abusive, has pushed and shoved the 
mother during arguments, and hit her once many years ago, and that all of 
this usually happened when he was drunk. The mother opposes all contact on 
the basis that she is frightened of the father and believes that he will never 
change. The father does not accept the court’s findings against him. 
 
How would you advise the mother? 
 
How would you advise the father? 
 
What is the court likely to order/direct in these circumstances? 
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APPENDIX G 
 
 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE: CAFCASS OFFICERS 
 
 
A. General Questions 
 
1. How important do you think it is for non-resident parents to have some 
contact with the child/children? 
 
2. Have you reported on cases where the resident parent has unjustifiably 
denied contact with the child/children? How have you formed this view? Is 
this a common or rare occurrence? 
 
3. Would the fear of domestic violence by one parent towards the other justify 
them in opposing contact? In what circumstances, if any, could it do so?  
 
4. Have you reported on cases where the non-resident parent has pursued 
contact proceedings as a means of continuing control over, or harassment of, 
the resident parent? Is this a common or rare occurrence? 
 
 
B. Understanding Domestic Violence 
 
5. Paragraph 2 of the Practice Direction provides that ‘domestic violence’ 
includes “physical violence, threatening or intimidating behaviour and any 
other form of abuse which, directly or indirectly, may have caused harm to 
the other party or to the child or which may give rise to the risk of harm.” 
What is your view of this description of ‘domestic violence?’ Do you think 
that this description is materially the same as, or differs from, Cafcass’s 
definition, as set out in Paragraph 1.2 of the Domestic Violence Toolkit? 
[copy to be provided to respondents] If you consider that the descriptions 
differ materially, how does this impact on your practice? 
 
6. How do you think most tribunals (judges, district judges and magistrates) 
understand the term ‘domestic violence’?  
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C. Questions relating to the Practice Direction 
 
Identifying domestic violence as an issue 
 
7. In all private law cases in which you have involved, has initial screening been 
undertaken by Cafcass prior to the first hearing?  
 
8. Does the initial screening usually reveal whether any Family Law Act 
injunctions have been applied for or made with respect to the parties to the 
Children Act proceedings? 
 
9. In your experience, are the checks required by Cafcass Safeguarding 
Framework (Paragraph 4.3.4) always undertaken in each case?  [List 
provided below] Are these checks sufficient to reveal whether domestic 
violence is an issue? 
 
10. Do you think that enough information is available to Cafcass from the 
documents provided by the courts for the initial screening, to enable Cafcass 
to identify whether, and to what extent, domestic violence may be an issue? 
If the only documentation filed at that stage was the non-resident parent’s 
C100 form, how would Cafcass know whether domestic violence was likely 
to be an issue? 
 
11. Is enough information about domestic violence revealed by the C1A forms 
[C100A if available at time of interview]? 
 
12. In your experience, are the results of initial screening always reported to the 
court prior to the first hearing? 
  
13. Do you consider that telephone interviews with parties, as part of initial 
screening, are sufficient to enable Cafcass to identify whether, and to what 
extent, domestic violence may be an issue? 
 
14. Where initial screening indicates a concern about domestic violence (but not 
such as to require immediate referral to social services), in your experience 
does Cafcass advise the court of the need to implement a more detailed risk 
assessment before decisions relating to the child can be made? [re Para 4.3.15 
of the Safeguarding Framework]? 
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15. If you are involved in a first hearing (as conciliator, Family Court Advisor or 
otherwise), do the parties’ representatives usually inform you and the court 
about the occurrence of domestic violence?  
 
16. In cases where domestic violence has not been revealed by the initial 
screening: if you attend a first hearing (as conciliator, Family Court Advisor 
or otherwise), do courts usually/ever enquire whether domestic violence is an 
issue even if neither of the parties have raised it? Do you think that there has 
been any change in this respect since the Practice Direction came into effect? 
 
17. What impact has Paragraph 3.9 of the Revised Private Law Programme had 
on the identification of risk? 
 
 
Deciding on the relevance of domestic violence to the conduct of the proceedings 
and the orders sought 
 
18. If domestic violence is raised as an issue in a case, do courts consider the 
extent to which it is likely to be relevant in deciding contact applications In 
what circumstances, if any, would domestic violence not be relevant to the 
issue of contact? 
 
19. Do you have experience of any cases where domestic violence was raised as 
an issue (either by initial screening or by a party) but the court considered at 
an early stage that it was not likely to affect the outcome of the application? 
If so, how did the court reach this conclusion? Do you think the court was 
correct in reaching this conclusion? 
 
20. Do you think that there has been any change in the way in which courts 
consider the relevance of domestic violence to the issues in the case since the 
President’s Guidance in Relation to Split Hearings was issued in May 2010? 
 
 
Consent Orders 
 
21. To what extent do courts scrutinise proposed consent orders? Are you aware 
of whether they ask for information about domestic violence? Do you think 
that there has been any change in this respect since the Practice Direction 
came into effect? 
 
22. In your experience, do courts ever refuse to make consent orders because of 
concerns about domestic violence, or request further information or involve 
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Cafcass for this reason? Has there been any change in this respect since the 
Practice Direction came into effect? 
 
23. Do you have experience of any cases where agreement for contact has been 
reached by the adult parties despite concerns raised by you because of 
domestic violence? If so, how do courts usually deal with this situation, and 
what, if anything, are you able to do about it? 
 
24. Do you think there has been any change in the way courts approach consent 
orders since the implementation of the Revised Private Law Programme in 
October 2010? 
 
 
Fact-finding hearings 
 
25. If it is apparent at the first hearing that domestic violence is an issue in a case, 
do courts usually list a fact-finding hearing?  
 
26. If you or another Cafcass officer recommends that a fact-finding hearing 
should be listed, do courts usually ensure that it takes place? Do you have 
experience of any cases in which a fact-finding hearing did not take place but 
you considered that it should have done? 
 
27. Have you noticed any increase in the listing of fact-finding hearings since the 
Practice Direction came into effect? Has there been any change in this respect 
since the President’s Guidance in Relation to Split Hearings was issued in 
May 2010? 
 
28. Have you encountered any cases where a fact-finding hearing has been listed, 
but on the day of trial the hearing does not take place, or is cut short? In your 
experience, does this happen rarely/regularly/frequently? Have you noticed 
any change in this respect since the President’s Guidance in Relation to Split 
Hearings was issued in May 2010? 
 
29. Do you think that fact-finding hearings are helpful in determining the best 
outcomes for children in contested contact cases where domestic violence is 
an issue? 
 
30. The Practice Direction provides that courts should make findings about: 
- the nature and degree of domestic violence 
- its effect on the child 
- its effect on the parents. 
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In your experience, do courts do so? Is there any difference in this respect 
between the different tiers of courts? (judges, district judges and magistrates).  
 
 
Interim orders – assessing risk and ensuring safety 
 
31. If a fact-finding hearing has been listed, in your experience in what 
circumstances, if any, would courts order interim direct contact? Do you 
consider that the court’s decisions are usually appropriate? 
 
32. Do you think that courts focus enough on minimising the risks and securing 
the safety of the child when ordering interim contact? What about the safety 
of the resident parent? Do you think there has been any change in the court’s 
focus on risk and safety since the Practice Direction came into effect? 
 
33. Do you think that the representatives of the resident parent focus sufficiently 
on safeguarding the child and their client? Have you noticed any change in 
their practice in this respect since the Practice Direction came into effect? 
 
34. Has there been any change in the making of interim orders since the 
implementation of the Revised Private Law Programme in October 2010? 
 
 
Final orders when domestic violence has occurred: factors courts take into 
account 
 
35. If the court makes findings of domestic violence against the non-resident 
parent in a disputed contact case (or where domestic violence is admitted), 
what are you likely to recommend to the court with respect to contact? Do 
you think that your practice, and that of other Cafcass reporters has changed 
in this respect since the Practice Direction came into effect? 
 
36. Where domestic violence has occurred, in what circumstances, if any, would 
you be likely to recommend some direct contact between the child and the 
perpetrator? 
 
37. Do courts usually follow your recommendations, particularly if you 
recommend that there should be no direct contact? 
 
38. Do you think that, since the Practice Direction came into effect, there has 
been any change in the way the courts determine contact when 
findings/admissions of domestic violence have been made? 
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39. The Practice Direction provides that where domestic violence has occurred, 
the court should consider, inter alia: 
- the effect of the domestic violence on the child and the resident parent 
- the motivation of the parent seeking contact 
- the likely behaviour of the parent seeking contact during contact and its effect 
on the child 
- the capacity of the parent seeking contact to appreciate the effect of past 
violence and the potential for future violence 
- the attitude of the parent seeking contact to their past violent conduct and 
whether they have the capacity to change. 
In your experience, do courts usually do so? Do you think that all/most 
Cafcass officers address these factors in their reports? 
[A written copy of this list of factors will be provided to interviewees] 
 
 
Final orders when domestic violence has occurred: where the court decides to 
make orders for direct contact 
 
40. Where domestic violence has occurred but you recommend that there should 
be some direct contact, what safeguards, if any, would you be likely to 
suggest? What is the court likely to order? 
 
41. In what circumstances would you recommend that the non-resident parent 
attends a perpetrator programme? Do courts usually follow your 
recommendation? Do you think that there has been any change in the extent 
to which attendance at such programmes is required since the Practice 
Direction came into effect?  
 
 
Vignette 
 
42. The mother alleges that the father has been violent towards her over a period 
of years, with allegations ranging from verbal abuse and threats through to 
kicking and punching. A fact-finding hearing is held and the judge makes 
some findings against the father but not to the extent alleged by the mother – 
that he has been verbally abusive, has pushed and shoved the mother during 
arguments, and hit her once many years ago, and that all of this usually 
happened when he was drunk. The mother opposes all contact on the basis 
that she is frightened of the father and believes that he will never change. The 
father does not accept the court’s findings against him. 
 
What would you recommend in this situation? 
 
What is the court likely to order/direct in these circumstances? 
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APPENDIX H 
 
 
INITIAL DATA COLLECTION THEMES 
 
1. The meaning of ‘domestic violence’ 
- What do courts and professionals understand by ‘domestic violence’ 
 
2. The ‘presumption of contact’ 
- How important do courts and professionals consider contact between children 
and non-resident parents to be 
- How do courts and professionals view parents involved in contact 
proceedings 
 
3. Identifying domestic violence as an issue and making the court aware 
of it 
 
- What documentary information is available to the court and to Cafcass when 
proceedings are issued 
- Are the documentation and procedures currently available sufficient to enable 
full disclosure of domestic violence 
- do courts consider whether domestic violence is an issue whether or not it is 
raised as an issue by the parties 
- are courts routinely provided with initial screening by CAFCASS and do they 
make parties aware of it 
- to what extent do solicitors/barristers enquire from their clients information 
about domestic violence and its effect on the child and the parties 
- to what extent do solicitors/barristers make the court aware of domestic 
violence and its effect on the child and the parties 
 
4. Deciding on the relevance of domestic violence to the conduct of the 
proceedings and the orders sought 
 
- how and when do courts decide the extent to which domestic violence would 
be relevant in deciding orders for contact and residence 
- at the first hearing, do courts consider: (a) the likely impact of domestic 
violence on the conduct and outcome of the proceedings, and (b) whether the 
nature and effect of domestic violence is likely to affect the court’s decision? 
If so, how do they carry out this consideration? 
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5. Consent Orders 
- what information is available to courts when a consent order is proposed, 
including information about domestic violence 
- how would the court become aware of domestic violence when a consent 
order is proposed 
- to what extent do courts scrutinise proposed consent orders 
- to what extent do courts refuse to make a proposed consent order because of 
issues of domestic violence/ or request further information/ or involve 
CAFCASS 
- how are consent orders dealt with where CAFCASS express concerns about 
domestic violence 
- what is the attitude/practice of solicitors and barristers in relation to consent 
orders sought and how do they advise their clients 
 
6. The practice of courts in respect of fact-finding hearings 
- at what stage in the proceedings are fact-finding hearings held 
- how do fact-finding hearings get listed, eg, at the request of the parties/courts 
own motion/request by CAFCASS 
- how do courts decide whether to list a fact-finding hearing 
- if fact-finding hearings are recommended in a CAFCASS report, to what 
extent do they take place 
- are courts willing to list fact-finding hearings if requested to do so by 
either/both of the parties 
- once listed, do fact-finding hearings actually take place; if not, what are the 
reasons for this 
- has the Practice Direction and the President’s Guidance in Relation to Split 
Hearings impacted on the volume of fact-finding hearings 
- how can practice with respect to fact-finding hearings be improved to make 
the process more streamlined and effective 
- what are the perceptions of participants of the utility of fact-finding hearings 
in determining best outcomes for children 
- do courts make findings about the following: 
o nature and degree of domestic violence 
o its effect on the child 
o its effect on the parents 
 
7. Interim orders – assessing risk and ensuring safety 
- to what extent do courts makes interim orders for direct contact pending a 
fact-finding hearing [or CAFCASS report] and in what circumstances would 
they do so 
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- do courts consider the safety of the child and resident parent and the risks to 
the child when deciding whether to make interim contact orders when a fact-
finding hearing [or CAFCASS report] has been directed 
- if the court decides to make an interim contact order, how do they minimise 
the risk of harm to the child and ensure the safety of the child and the resident 
parent 
- if the court decides not to order interim direct contact, do they consider 
indirect contact and if so, do they consider any risks involved with such 
contact 
- how do solicitors and barristers advise parties in respect of interim orders 
 
8. Final orders when domestic violence has occurred : factors courts 
take into account when determining whether to make an order 
 
- Do courts’ findings of domestic violence affect their decisions in respect of 
contact and residence 
- has there been any change in the way in which courts determine contact and 
residence when domestic violence is found to have occurred, since the 
Practice Direction came into effect 
- how do professionals advise their clients when findings of domestic violence 
have been made 
- to what extent do courts follow recommendations by Cafcass when 
determining final orders for contact 
- to what extent, and how, do courts consider the factors set out in Paragraph 
27 of the Practice Direction, including: 
 the safety of the child and resident parent 
 the conduct of the parents towards each other and the child 
 the effect of domestic violence on the child and the resident parent 
 the motivation of the parent seeking contact 
 the likely behaviour during contact of the parent seeking contact and its effect 
on the child 
 the capacity of the parent seeking residence or contact to appreciate the effect 
of the violence on the child and the other parent and the attitude of the parent 
seeking residence or contact to their past violence and whether they have the 
capacity to change 
 
9. Final orders where domestic violence has occurred: where the court 
decides to make an order for direct contact 
 
- what safeguards, if any, is the court likely to order 
- does the court consider whether the perpetrator should seek advice or 
treatment as a pre-condition to an order or to assess risk to the child, 
including attendance at perpetrator programmes 
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- do courts consider whether contact should be supervised 
 
10. Final orders where domestic violence has occurred: where the court 
decides not to make any orders for direct contact 
 
- do courts make orders for indirect contact; if so, what are the safety 
considerations involved 
 
 
